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3ABSTRACT
This work provides a detailed philosophical exposition of 
Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, (1795)• In the 
introduction, the author* s aims and methodology are briefly stated. 
There then follows a survey of those books in English with chapters 
on the treatise. The introduction concludes with an outline of Kant’s 
critical system, and a summary of his theories of aesthetic judgement, 
art and beauty.
The main body of the work consists of an exegesis of Schiller’s 
text. Its 27 Letters are divided, for convenience, into three parts.
In part one (Letters 1 - 9)» we follow Schiller as he describes the 
afflictions of civilization and their cure. Prom a critique of 
contemporary society, he argues for a political revolution resting 
upon the psycho-ethical reform of the individual. Such reform involves 
feeling becoming harmonized with reason, through the educative power 
of beauty and art. In part two (Letters 10 - 17)» we follow Schiller 
as he considers the essential nature of man and beauty. He constructs 
an a priori model of our fundamental human nature, and asserts the 
need for,a corresponding model of ideal beauty, if man’s dual nature 
is to be fully realized in a harmoniously integrated manner. In part 
three (Letters 18 - 27), we follow Schiller as he describes the 
psychological development of the individual and species from a 
sensuous to a rational condition, through the mediation of the 
aesthetic. The exposition is accompanied by assessment and criticism; 
attention is given to Schiller’s changing methodology; and Schiller’s 
ideas and theoretical perspectives are related, where derivative, to 
those of Kant and Pichte.
The conclusion commences with a recapitulation of the main 
arguments in each Letter. This is followed by an evaluation of the 
Aesthetic Letters, identifying those specific theories of contemporary 
relevance, and with the potential for further theoretical development.
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The aim of the present work is to provide an extensive and
detailed exposition of Schaller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education
of Man (1795). Although occasional references will he made to Kant
and Fichte, to other works of Schiller, and (in the notes) to other
commntaaoe, the main purpose of this work is to expound and 
1
elucidate the arguments of the Aesthetic Letters. Although it 
contains a certain amount of criticssm and assessment, this is 
subordinate to the primary aim of elucidation. It attempts to 
consider the Aesthetic Letters as a systematic whole (which S chiller 
hirnelf certainly supposed them to be ), to make some of their 
obscrurities less obscure, and to help the reader find his w^ through 
the complexities and difficulties of Schiller's thought. These 
difficulties are very real, for unlike e.g. Kant or Hfgl, Sctdller 
supplies no surrounding philosophical system which would provide 
reference points to guide interpretation. Added to this, is his 
coimiderable usage of mtaphorical language and imagery, which when 
' translated' into literal language, often reveals Kantian or Fichtean 
concepts .which themselves require elucidation. We have also to contend 
with never being quite sure of the extent that, at a given point in 
his argument, Schiller is being dependent on Kant or
not, nor of the degree to which he is adopting or adapting Kant's
ideas. Although I have criticized other commutators in the survey of 
critical literature below, this is more for their omssions than for 
their misinterpretations. The difficulties and ambiguities of 
Sch-ller's thought are such, that differences of interpretation are 
not only to be expected, but are even desirable - in so far as they 
stimulate further debate amorngt scholars of Schuller's ideas. In the 
main body of this work, I have refrained from the practice of quoting 
and refuting secondary sources, in favour of devoting more space to 
quotations from Schaller's work. The student coming to the text for 
the first time, will want particular paragraphs explained, for their 
language will seem alien to him. Staying very close to the text is 
also a useful discipline for the expositor, helping to focus his mind 
on the problems that need to be addressed, and curbing potential 
flights of fancy in the course of interpretation. It is difficult to 
disagree with the view expressed by Wilkinson and Willoughby that
6*A good deal of . • • philosophical debate has been carried on
. . , in considerable remoteness from the language of
ScMller's text; so that it is rarely possible to see on what 
3
actual rea&Ling conclusions have been based.''
It is my belief that a detailed exposition, Letter by Letter, and 
almost paragraph by paragraph, is the prerequisite for a proper 
understanding of Schiller's thought in this particular treatise. It 
is not only the general tenor of S duller's thesis, but also the 
details of his argument and the peculiarities of his method, which 
need to be exposed to the critical debate of scholars in many fields.
1. A Survey of the Critical Literature
Although almost two hundred years have elapsed since Schuller's 
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man were first published in 
The Horen during 1795^» there is, as yet, no book in English dedicated 
entirely to providing a detailed philosophical exposition of the 
treatise. Just as remarkable, there are only two books devoted to the 
study of S duller's aesthetics in general' (those by S. S. Kerry' and 
R. D. Miler '), and these provide only one chapter or less sumimrizing 
the Aesthetic Letters. The rest of the critical literature on the 
Aesthetic Letters (where books in English are concerned), takes the 
foam of one or (rarely) two chapters, in books which are devoted to 
wider concerns, or that consider the ideas of other thinkers.
Prima facie, Wilkinson and Willoughby provide, in their book 
containing a translation of the treatise, an exception to the above 
general characterization of the critical literature, for their editorial 
material is extensive. However, they do not claim to provide a strictly 
philosophical exposition of the details of Sduller’s arguments. Thus 
they tell us that
’. . .we finally decided for a close analysis of the form of 
the treatise, and against a summary of Schiller's argumnt.'
' . . . ours makes no pretence of being a ''critical” edition in the 
strict sense of the team. It is in all respects a translator's 
edition - in its comennary, and large tracts of the 
introduction . . .' (Preface, p. vii)
78Much of their introduction examines the form of the treatise,
particularly Schiller’ s employment of such rhetorical configurations 
9
as the ’ ch0nf3mps’ . Much space is also given over to discussing the
10reception and repercussions of the treatise in the history of ideas.
The ’ commutaTy’ section is principally concerned with translation
issues (possible alternative renderings, errors comPttaU by other
translators, the historical origins of words, ideas and symboos).
Where the authors do discuss Schiller’s theories, they do so with
insight and accuracy, particularly in their discussion of what they
team Scluller’f ’ doctrine of indirection’ (the indirect relation
of the aesthetic cor^cU^'tion of the psyche to ordinary acts of knowing
and willing). They carefully relate Schiller’s ideas to those of Kont
and Pichta, and give due ep?een^f.s to the political dime rs3 ion of the
treatise. They recognize that Schuller conceives of the ’aesthetic’
and ’ aesthetic education’ in far wider terns than art asd art
education. Finally, they recognize the importance of Schuller's theory
of ’ aesthetic semblance’ ; the importance Schuller places upon m>ral
education begisning in mat’s physical life; and the crucial role of
the understanding in ssmL-<5ontrolling the ’ aesthetic play’ of the 
12imagination in Letter 27.
158, 8, Kerry writes in a difficult style, asd operates a Unlity
which he constantly imposes upon the treatise in his interpretation
of it. He believes we mist understand the ^^^ss^h^ttic Letters as
involving a constant transition between philosophical asd poetical
discourse, Kerry sees this as stemming from as unresolved
psychological cordiict within Schiller, between the philosopher asd 
14the poedt k demy's book, as a whole, falls into the genetic fallacy 
15of interpreting Schiller’s later works through his earlier ones.
His account of the Aesthetic Letters is very fumm,rizeU, with an 
average of only 2 pages per Letter, much of which is occupied by 
lengthy quotations from the text in Garman Some important Letters 
receive little treatment, most notably Letters 23 and 27. As a residt, 
we sever learn how mas aesthetically develops a moral character, and 
the political dimension of the work is om.ttaU,
1 AR, D. Miler’s account of ths Aesthetic Letters is written in a
clear style, but he deals with the Letters in a highly sumpnized 
master (is some 17 pages), with maty receiving only a paragraph of 
consideration, asd with quotations from the text being mortly is 
(^rman Thera are some serious oimssions of important theories asd
8whole Letters. There is little substantive discussion of Letter 10,
viz. of the historical critique of beauty's effects, and the need for
a transcendental treatment of beauty. There is no discussion of Letter
11 and its distinction of the 'peryon' and ' condition'. The drives are
misleadingly teamed 'impulses' in his consideration of Letters 15 to
15; and he misinterprets ' energizing' beauty in otters 16 and 17» as
a ' disguised form of the sublime' (p. 115). Miler oMts discussion of
Letters 18 to 20, and thus does not recognize the influence of Fichte.
Little discussion is provided of Letters 23 and 24; no discussion is
found of Schaller's theory of 'aesthetic semblance' in Letter 26; and
the long and complex Letter 27, is merely summalzed in two sentences 
17and a short quotation in German.
18Deric Regin's book on Schhller sumimaizes the Aesthetic Lettere
in one chapter of only 28 pages. It suffers from some peculiar 
renderings of key concepts, e.g. the person and coned, tion becomes the 
person and 'situation’ , and the drives become 'urges'. On a number of 
occasions, we are told Schaller's moral aim in the treatise is the 
cultivation of ' sublime' character, whereas SclhLller argues in Letter 
23 for the development of a 'noble' moral disposition. Oily one page 
is given , over to expounding the complex arguments of Letters 19 to 23, 
which Regin rather dismis sively calls a ' grey patch' (p. 127). He 
erroneously states that the ' chronological order of man's development 
is physical, moral, aesthetic' (p. 129)» thus reversing the order of 
the last two, and passing over the mediating role of the aesthetic. 
Schuller's long Letter 26 is discussed in only one paragraph. Regin 
does devote much space to an attempt to understand the Aesthetic State 
in Letter 27. Horever, he maces the Aesthetic State a political State, 
and finding little evidence for this in the text, criticizes Schhller 
for not providing a blueprint of its comtitution (p. 140). In an 
attempt to link the aesthetic and political in a direct manner (alien 
to Schhller), we are told taste ' controls legislation as well as 
popular wivemevts' (p. 145 )•
19Vicky Rippere, in her book on Schhller , concentrates on the 
social critique in Letters 5 and 6, ignoring the other 25 Letters of 
the treatise. The form and content of Schhller's social critique is 
compared to similar writings of his times, and to material written 
during what Rippere calls the ' 1960s alienation debate' • ^r basic aim 
is to show that the latter writers have no business to claim Schiller 
as an intellectual forbear. Rippere examines Schaller's characteristic
9manner of handling his received materials, emhaaszing his forms of 
expression, and frequently referring to him as * the rhetor' • She 
assesses the extent to which Sclhller's rhe tori cal configurations 
conform to the conventions governing the use of received ideas and 
imagery which operated in 18th century discourse of the social 
critique type. Rippera's book is thus essentially a work of 
historical literary criliicimi, rather than a philosophical exposition 
of the arguments and concepts in the Aesthetic .tetters.
20Anthony Savile devotes the last two chapters of his book to
expounding the Aesthetic Letters. A serious defect of his exposition 
is that some important Lettera receive little or no attention. Thus 
in Letter 6, only one paragraph is mentioned out of 16; only one 
paragraph of Letter 19 is discussed; only two paragraphs and a footnote 
of Letter 20; only two paragraphs of Letter 25; only one out of 14 
paragraphs in Letter 26; whhle Letters 12 and 21 are omiited. The 
exposition is unsystematic, and frequently fails to follow the line of 
argument of the treatise. Few quotations are provided to support 
interpretations, and the reader is referred to tetter and paragraph 
numbers in a rather haphazard marner. The political dimension of the 
treatise is ignored, and it is essentially treated as a work of art 
theory with dubious moral connotations. SavLle's exposition contains 
a miltituide of errors, the more significant of which will be mentioned 
in the notes to the present work.
21Mclhel Podro’ s treatment of the Aes±he~fcic Letters is necessarily
limited in scope by being confined to 15 pages. ConsequenHy, many
important topics in the treatise are not discussed. In particular,
there is no discussion of how moral character is formed; no
consideration of Schiller’s theory of ' aesthetic semblance' ; and no
attention given to the political dimension of the treatise. Howner,
22
Podro recognizes the usefulness of Sclhller's Mathiason article for
iUiminating how Sclhller sees the play-drive operating in Letter 14. 
Podro provides a short, thought provoking account of the play-dri ve, 
speculating how it mght work in practice, by his own theory of 
aesthetic contemplation involving the spontaneous drawing of analogins 
between comtituent elements of the organized material offered to us 
by an art object, (pp. 49-57).
Philip Kain considers the Aesthetic Letters and some of Scthller's 
25
other philosophical writings in the first chapter of his book.
24Kain's discussion of Schhller is somewhat distorted by being focused
10
on those aspects of Sckhller’s theories which enable him to relate 
Sckdller to Hegel and Marx in the rest of the book. As a result, there 
is an over-emphasis upon Letters 5 and 6; upon ancient Greece as 
providing an ideal of personal wholeness and social harmony, and upon 
the fragmentation or alienation of modern. man. Kain maces no mention 
in the book of Fichte’s influence on Sdhller (or upon Heegl). In his 
discussion of the Aesthetic otters, Wh-le reference is made to the 
' material and formal im]pilses’ (p. 16), no mention is made of the 
play-drive. In an attempt to relate Sdhller to Marx, Kain incorrectly 
claims that
'Scmiler' s goal is to t^r^£n^:^o:m labour and make it more like 
play.' (P. 19)
He then criticizes Sdhller for not explaining how this could be done.
In discussing Letter 27, Kain goes awry in seeking to interpret the
Aesthetic State as a political State ’ beyond' the Moral State (p. 27),
rather than as the latter's psycho-ethical support. Like Eva Schaper ,
he erroneously interprets the Aesthetic State to be some kind of
synthesis of the Natural State and the M>rraL State.
26Dewhurst and Reeves' book on Sclhller provides texts and
comaentaries concerned with Schiller's early medical and psychological
writings. It ends with a brief cort3ideratiot of how Sclhller's later
writings on aesthetics were significantly influmced by these earlier
writings. The authors argue, plausibly, that the Aesthetic Letters are
at least as much influenced by ScWLller's early psychological studies 
27at the Mlitary Academy as by his later reading of Kant's
philosophy, (p. 556). They tell us of
'Sduller's ... endevour to present an essentially 
psychological analysis of mind in Kantian a priori terms, and 
to fuse Kantian transcendental freedom with his own earlier 
concept of psycho-plhyical and psychic balance,’ (P. 558)
This emphsais on the psycho logical dimension of SdhLller's mode of 
argrmentatiot, is a useful corrective to the one-sided concentration 
of philosophicia.ly orientated commntaaors on the logical and 
transcendental character of his philosophical enterprise.
I have only discussed here (for reasons of space), those books in
11
English Which have chapters that deal with the Aesthetic Letters. But
among t the 20 or so articles in English wlhLch deal with aspects of 
28Schiller's aesthetics, mention should be made of those by Grossman ,
29 30 31 32Willoughby , Schaper , Reiss , and Wilkinson and Willoughby.
These contain mterial relevant to the Aesthetic Letters, and are of 
scholarly merit. Reference to these and other articles, as well as to 
the bocks surveyed above, will be found in the notes during the course 
of our examination of the Aesthetic Letters.
2. The Kantian Background
Schuller's Aesthetic Letters rest upon a considerable Kantian
philosophical background, for their general conceptual framework, and
their specific theories of aesthetic contemplation, art, and beauty.
Rather than provide a full and systematic account of Kant's Critique 
33of Aesthetic Judgement , I propose in this section of the introduction,
to outline the basic framework of Kant's critical philosophy, and to
then briefly discuss Kant's theories of aesthetic judgement, art, and
beauty. More detailed discussions of these and other aspects of Kant's
aesthetic theory, focusing upon how they relate to Schuller's
aestheticaL ideas, will be found at numerous points in our detailed
examination of the Aesthetic Letters.
34-Following Hume's sceptical philosophy,the main question in
philosophy became how knowledge is possible. Questions also arose 
concerning the fundamental nature of the human subject and, in 
particular, whether the subject is more than a mere bundle of 
sensations. Kart's philosophy can be seen as an attempt to overcome 
some of Hume's sceptical conclusions. Kant was also particularly 
concerned about the human subject being merely a part of nature, 
caught up in its causal nexus, seeing this as destroying freedom and 
thus the possibility of mooraity.
Kant's first Critique, the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) , was
concerned with the question of how certain knowledge is possible. Kant 
argued that the forms of intuition, i.e. space and time, are imposed 
by us upon all we experience. The pure categories of the understanding 
(the faculty of concepts), namely quantity, quality, relation and 
modaLity, are applied by us to the woodn a priori. Thus the world, as 
we experience it, is coimtrued by the subject. Kant also distinguished 
two dimensions of beings the noumenEaL or supersensible world, and the
12
phenomenal or sensible domain of experience. We can only theoretically
postulate the noume^a!. dimension of being; we cannot experience or
cognize it, as we can with phenomenal existence. The human subject
inhabits both the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. The important point
for Kant, and the raison d’etre of this distinction, is that the
noumenEai. aspect of the self is outside the world of the natural order.
Thus we can postulate that man has free wiiLl whist living in a world
of natural causal necessity. Underlying the critical philosophy of
Kant, is a strong concern to provide a possible basis for man's moral
froedom. In his second Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason
(1788)'', Kant made it clear that the morrOLly good is the absolute,
and the moral will is the lltemate end of man as a rational being.
57The mral dimension imp tidily underlies Kant's third Critique. 
the Critique of Judgement (1790). In the first two Critiques, nature 
was conceived of as little more than a negative foil to moral activity, 
being viewed as basically antagoiu.stic to morality. In the Critique of 
Practical Reason, this took the specific form of an opposition between 
natural inclination/aid rational moral duty. In the Critique of 
Judgement, however, Kant attempts to 'bridge* the supersensible and 
sensible. worlds, by bringing together morality and nature. The bridging 
point is judgement itself. For Kant, judgement is the psychological 
power by which we unify a manifold of sens e-intuitions. Most judgements 
are wlhat he calls ' determinant' , and involve the straightooward 
subsumption of a particular representation of the imai-nation under a 
reedy-made concept of the understanding. But in the case of 
' reflective' judgements, a concept must be formed, under the guidance 
of an a priori principle of teleology (which pertains to the faculty
Xp
of judgement). What Kant has in mind is, that as we encounter a new
phenomenon, we inpiicitly apply an a priori notion of purpose to it,
which assists us to form an emitrical concept of it, by reference to
its perceived function. The same a priori teleological principle of
reflective judgement, also enables us to unify particular laws of
nature by reference to their function in relation to specific ends,
and to view such specific ends in relation to a presmmd general end
of nature. In this process, we tend to assume nature has a purposive
structure, treating it as if it were a product of artifice, with each
part serving some higher principle, and species being contained in 
59genera. In the second part of the third Critique, the Critique of
Teleological Judgement, Kant argues that at the apex of this
15
teleological hierarchical structure,is man, as a moral being. The 
40purpose of nature is ultimately to facilitate human morality. In
the first part of the third Critique, the Critique of Aesthetic
Judgement. Kant argues that the way aesthetic judgements work,
provides a pleasure which, by its disinterest in the sensuous, its
miveraeaLity, necessity, and a priori origin, is akin to maraHty.
Thus in the Critique of Judgement, Kant no longer sees the rational 
41subject as in opposition to nature, but at its apex ; and nature is
not viwed as necessearily mtagioinE^-tic to morality and freedom, for
the aesthetic experience of natural beauty promotes moral feeling.
Kant discusses two types of reflective judgement: 'teleological'
43
judgements, and ’aesthetic* judgemenns. Teleological judgements
involve cogrtLzitg an object by reference to an explicit concept of
its purpose, viewing it as an instance of a kind. Aesthetic
judgements of 'taste' (concerned with beauty), have five main
characteristics: 1) they are disinterested in the sensuous existence
of their object; 2) they are inter-ssubjectively universal, as they
rest on a universal structure and functioning of the human mind
(which all crmQuri.calion between human beings presupposes); 5) they
are concerned only with the purposive form of their object (its
phenomenal configuration, without any particular concept of its
purpose coming to mind and featuring in such a judgement; 4) such
judgements are necessary and, given the miveraeaLity of the mind's
structure, may be imputed to others; 5) aesthetic jndgemants are
subjectively grounded, being connected with a certain type of
subjective feeling, rather than reporting upon any characteristics 
44of the object experienced.
Now what happens in an aesthetic judgement of taste is that,
implicitly guided by the a priori teleological principle, we apprehend
an object as having a purposive form or structure (but without any 
\45concept of the particular purpose it serves being in our mind) s, and 
such form stimulates the -mderstatditg and imagination into an 
mu^xuaLly lively crmeilmtiot. This is a harmonious interrelation of 
two general capaccties, rather than between a particular representation 
of the imagination and a particular concept of the understanding (as 
occurs in. ordinary co&ntion). Uninh^l^;Lted by such particular images 
and concepts, the two faculties engage in a pleasurable ' free play' , 
which is conducive to co^gntion in general, for it promotes the 
harmonious co-operation of these faculties, which all cogin. tion
14
46presupposes.
In his theory of art, Kant tells us it is important that fine art
should, have the appearance of naturekk, it should hide the fact
that it is contrived or designed, and appear as an unforced and
spontaneous creation (although, of course, we are aware of it as an
art work, and do not m.stake it for a work of nature). It must be so
male, that we are principally aware of the art object's formal
qualities, and are not involved in thinking about the concept it was
created to express (for such a concept would hinder the 'free play'
of the faculties, which is the ground of the aesthetic judgement of
taste). Such considerations as the artist's 'intentions', are thm
inhibitory to having a 'pure' aesthetic experience. Fine art is not
the result of following any ' rules' of artistic production, but is 
48rather the personal creation of ’genius*’ : an innate mntal aptitude, 
characterized by the capacity to produce works mmnfesting spontaneity 
and originality. (However, originaLity per se, does not guarantee 
artistic genius; we mist look to exemplary models of great art to 
provide the standards of taste,though not 'rules' of artistic 
production, which help determine true works of genius.)
It is central to Kant's theory of the judgement of taste that the
beauty of a form should not involve us in referring it to a definite
concept. Now since art is designed and contrived with some idea in
mind by the artist,Kant had to find, a way of macing the conceptual
character of art become hidden or impLicit. He did so by his notion 
49of the ' aesthetic idea’. The artist creates a richly significant
image, suggesting a mltipLLcity of ideas which are not reducible by
our understanding to any one definite concept. Kant also distinguishes 
30' free' and ' dependent’ beauty. In apprehending some objects, it is
more natural and amenable to judge them in relation to a definite
concept of what they are, and ought to be, (we judge their degree of
' perfection' : the extent to which they are a perfect instance of the
kind of object they are). With dependent beauty, the judgement of
taste is psycholo^cjaily conjoined with, and immediaaely follows, a
judgement of perfection, with the imagination's faeeedom inhibited by
the latter judgement's conceptual character. With free beauty, no such
definite concept comes to Mnd to hinder the 'free play' of our
faculties. In general, Kant sees art objects in terns of dependent
beauty, and natural beauty as free beauty, leading him to place 
31natural beauty above the beauty of art.
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PART ONE
The Afflictions of Civilization and their Pure




Positive and Nejgative Aspects of Enligfoteiment Philosophy
Schiller commences the treatise, by informing us that he intends 
to present the results of an
*• • • inquiry concerning Art and Beauty in the form of a 
series of lettem.' (L 1:1)
By presenting his ideas in the form of letters, Schiller sees him elf 
as free from the limitations of philosophical form, (w!h.ch latter, he 
believes, only satisfies the intellect, whilst leaving our sensuous 
being unmoved by its dry abstractions). Schhller is quite clear that 
the main subject of his Letters will be beauty and art, viz. aesthetics.
He adimts that much of what he will say is based on Kantian 
principles :
*. . . it is for the most part Kantian principles on which the 
following theses will be based.1 (L1:5)
The Kantian character of the treatise varies, functioning as a 
backcloth providing an implicit framework of fundamennal concepts 
(such as the distinction of natural and moral necessity), in the 
earlier part of the treatise, but comes more to the fore and explicit 
as the work proceeds^o that by its end, Schiller’s own aesthetic 
position is closely identified with that of Kant. In letters to 
KTimeir, his friend, written in the months after the treatise, Schiller 
him elf remarks on his increasing reliance on Kant's philosophy as the 
treatise proceeds. (We will have cause to return to this issue in 
later otters.)
Hem in Letter 1, Scthller particularly pays tribute to Kant's 
second Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason, and states that 
it embocdes the natural moral instincts of all maUnd, but expressed 
in philosophical technical terms:
' Concelititg those ideas which prevail in the Practical part of 
the Kantian system . . . mankind, I believe . . . have always 
been agreed. Once divested of their technical form, they stand
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revealed as the immemorieuL pronouncements of Common Reason, 
and as data of that moral, instinct which Nature in her wisdom 
appointed Man's guardian until, though the enlighteiment of 
his understanding, he should have arrived at years of 
disoration. ' (Li:4)
The reference here to ' that moral instinct which Nature in her 
wisdom appointed Man's guardian', seems to hint at an idea of a 
natural lew basis for mocEa.ity4, which has guided man until the 
Enlightenment mde its principles erqplicit to the understanding.
This implies a positive view of the Enlightenment,
Ho^eT^ei?, Sclhller has an ambbvsdLent attitude towards philosophy, 
in particular contemporary Enlightenment philosophies, which for him 
seem to be divorced from life and feeling. Philosophy does find and 
present truth, and so is of value; but it only reveals its truth to 
one side of man, his intellect, leaving his sentient being uneducated. 
Thus he writes:
'. • • it is precisely this technical form, whereby truth is 
mde mnifest to the intellect, which veils it again from 
our feeling.' 'Is it any wonder that natural feeling cannot 
find itself again in such an image . . .' (Li :4)
Perhaps Sch-ller hopes that his own form of presentation in the
5
Letters, of what some scholars have called 'pcetical-phiOscophy',
g
will appeal to and educate both sides of man The division in man 
of intellect/aid sense, which plays such an important part in this 
treatise, is here already emerging, but in the shape of a discussion 
about the form of philosophy.
LETTR 2
Connrast Between the Ideal/srn.d Reality of Art. The Political
Function of the Aesthetic
ScihLUer's ambivalent attiuude towards contemporary philosophy, 
extends to the view that he takes of his own times in a more general 
way. After telling us that he would not wish to live in any other
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century than his own, he info ms us that
' ... the verdict of this epoch does not, by any means, seem
to be going in favour of art . . •’ ’The course of events has
given the spirit of the age a direction Which threatens to 
-j
remove it ever further from the art of the Ideal.’ (L2:3)
In this passage, Sclhller postulates a causal link of the following 
kind: a) the courae of events, effects b), the spirit of the age,
Which c) devalues art. The course of events is thus the ultimate 
determinant of what happens to art. (Marx would agree with this.)
There is not much here about the power of art to change events or the 
spirit of the age, in the way that Schiller’s general theory of 
aesthetic education aims to.
Schiller-continues, in the same paragraph,
’, , , art must abandon actuality, and soar with becoming 
boldness above our wants and needs;’ (L2:3)
Art, it seems, mist be an escapist form, detached from our real wants 
2and needs. OhLy in the last Letter, Schiller criticized philosophy 
for its detachment from our sensuous being and from life. Now he says 
that art, as true or Ideal, should be detached from our sensuous needs 
and actuality. This demonstrates the use by Schuller of two quite 
contrary standards, one for art, and another for philosophy. Moreover, 
this view of art, as detached from man’s sensuous being, does not bode 
well for the success of his arguments in later Letters, concerning 
art’s ability to harmonise both sides of man, including his sensuous 
side.
In a difficult sentence, Schaller immediately moves on to tell us 
that
’. . , Art is a daughter of Freedom, and takes her orders from 
the necessity inherent in minds, not frem the exigencies of 
matter,’ (L2:5)
Underlying this statement is Kgait’s distinction between rational 
necessity and natural causal necessity. Schnller is simply saying 
that art takes its shape from mind’s free self-expression, not from
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the limitations which nature attempts to impose upon us*''’
Scthller proceeds to criticize the comierccal spirit of the times
(in a marner then coenertlsa^e, and found in the writings of e.g., 
Rousseau, Ferguson, and Burke) He refers to the maket-place ethic
of utility, which devalues everything which has no direct value in 
relation to satisfying maaerial needs:
'But at the present time mae^ir.ai needs reign supreme and bend 
a degraded humnity beneath their tyrannical yoke. Utility is 
the great idol of our age, to which all powers are in thrall 
and to which all talent mist pay homage.* '. . . Art . . . 
shuns the noisy market-place of our century.' (L2:5)
Despite the violence of the French Revolution and the Terror which 
folltwed, ScMller remains optimstic that the form of political life 
is now to be decided by rational debate and not by mere force. Thus 
he writes
*. . . the political scene ... is being debated.' '• . . its 
method of procedure Cis] of quite special interest . . .'
'For a question which has hitherto always been decided by the 
blind right of might, is now, so it seems, being brought before 
the tribunal of Pure Reason . . .’ (L2:4)
Here Scthller demornSratei a typical Enlighltetmmit optimism and faith 
in Reason.
ScMller adm-ts that his concern with beauty may look irrelevant 
to prevailing political concerns, but he asserts that politics and art 
are intimately connected.
*1 . . . put Beauty before Freedom' '• • .if man is ever to 
solve the problem of politics in practice he will have to 
approach it through the problem of the aesthetic, because it 
is only through Beauty that man maces his way to Freedom. ' (L2j5)
Politics then, he asserts, mist be .mediated by aesthetic experience, 
for the experience of beauty is a prerequisite of man achieving 
freedom. A problem arises here in Schiller's account, for beauty 
appears to be made useful to freedom. ScUller too, it seems, judges
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the value of art in i^^ims of utility, albeit political utility, and 
not simply usefulness for satisfying material needs, (Like mny 
philosophers, Sdriller seems lling to allcw aesthetic value to
stand on its own, and feels the need to support it with also having 
cognitive, moral, political, and psychotherapeutical values.)
LETTER 3
The Transformation of the. Natural State, into the Rational (Moora.)
State
Sdriller puts forward the view that individually, and socially 
(in terms of the form of the State), man has a moral duty 
to tremsfom that which nature provides him with (through its alien 
necessity), into a higher form of life and social organisation, based 
upon reason and morality.
*. . . Man . . . does not stop short at what Nature herself mde 
of him, but has the power of . . . transforming the work of 
blind comprisim into a work of free choice, and of elevating 
physical necessity into moral necessity.* (L5i1)
This trams formation involves the sublation of that which is natural, 
for Sdriller generraLly embaaises the need to incorporate mu's 
natural being into 'higher’ (viz. more rational), psychological, moral, 
and political forms. Our natural being too has its rights, which any 
realistic progamme for individual or social reform mist give adequate 
recognition to, if it is to be securely based.
Now the State as we know it, has not, in Sdriller’s view, evolved 
through our free choice. It fulfils our natural needs and is fashioned 
in accordance with the laws of nature, not those of reason, the 
supersensible and morality. (Sdriller is here following Kant’s 
distinction between nature/and reason; the sensible/amd supersensible 
damans. ) Thus we are told,
’. , , CmiuL finds himelf - in the State. The force of his needs 
threw him into this siHation before he was as yet capable of 
exercising his freedom to choose it; compulsion organized it
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according to purely natural lews before he could do so 
according to the laws of Reason. But with this State of 
compulsion ... he neither could nor can rest content 
as a Moral Being. ’ (L5s2)
Sclhller tells us that some theorists have rationalized the 
origins of the State, by constructing models of a past ’state of 
nature’ , which men left as they chose to live in the State.
’. , .in his maturity, [Man seeks to] retrieve by means of a 
fiction the childhood of the race : he conceives, as idea, a 
state of nature, ... attributes to himelf in this idealized 
natural state a purpose of which in his actual natural state 
he was entirely ignorant, and a power of free choice of which 
he was at that time wholly incapable; and . . . proceeds . . , 
as if he were starting from scratch, . . « from sheer insight 
and free resolve, exchanging a state of complete independence 
for a state of social contracts.’ (15s2)
Scth-ller sees accounts of a ’state of nature’ as different from his
concept of the Natural State. The Natural State is the current form
of the State, the modem State, founded on force and natural 
3
compuusion. Men did not enter the Natural State on a voluntary basis,
but were forced into it, in order to satisfy their natural basic needs, 
4
and by external circumstances.s The modem State remains grounded in 
nature’s blind external necessity, not in free human reason; in natural 
needs, not in the moral law. Scthller views theories that postulate
a ’ state of nature* as retrospective rationalizations for our current 
political predicament. They are fictions, rational constructs, endowing 
man in his natural condition with awareness and choice he could only 
have later in a developed social and political context. Schiller’s main 
point, however, is that no miater what the basis of our current Natural 
State is, we have the moral right and duty to reform it rationally and 
morally, and need not feel constrained from doing so, by hypotheeical 
’social contracts’ , and the like. Sclhller criticizes such theories for 
giving the ’appearance of venerability* to the irrationals
’However skilfully, and however firmly, blind caprice may have 
laid the foundations of her work, however arrogantly she may
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mantain it, and with whatever appearance of venezrablity she 
my surround it - Man is fully entitled in the course of these 
operations to tieat it all as though it had never happened.
For the work of blind forces possesses no authority . . .' ’This 
is . . . the justification of any attempt on the part of a 
people grown to m^ttu^ity to transform its Natural State into 
a Moral one.' (L5:2)
Man is, then, entitled to ignore such rationalizations. The work of 
blind forces, of natural necessity, need not deter us from the moral 
imperative of tunisfomiig title Natural State into a Moral or Rational 
State.'’
Hrrever, while the Natural State is in opposition to man qua moral, 
it does satisfy his natural or physical being;
'This Natural State ... is ... at variance with man as moral 
being . . .’ 'But it will just suffice for man as physical 
being;' (L5:3)
A practical problem thus arises in the transition from the Natural to 
the Moral State, for in seeking to do away with the former, we risk 
ioh's physical life for a moral utopian ideal; that which definitely 
exists in him and the State, for what my hypooheeically come to exist 
ii him and the State, viz. the development of his moral being in a 
Moral State.
'But physical mi does in fact exist, whereas the existence of 
moral man is as yet probleratic. If then, Reason does away with 
the Natural State ... she jeopardizes the physical mn who 
actually exists for the sake of a moral mn who is as yet 
problemHc, risks the very existence of society for a merely 
hypothetical (even though morally necessary) ideal of society.'
' • . . iReasonl wtouLd, for the sake of a humanity which he 
still lacks - and can without prejudice to his mere existence 
go on lacking - have deprived him of the means of that animal 
existence which is the very condition of his being human at 
Hl.' (3s3)
It is notable here that Sclhller breaks from Kani' s negative view of
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man s natural being. Instead of it being merely an impediment to the 
moral will, it is the essential substructure of his being human at 
all. ScUller's moniiicatiot of the demand to abolish the Natural 
State and establish a Moral State, also represents a break from Keant's 
view of the absolute character of moral obligation. Practical, 
pragmttic considerations can temper the necessity of obedience to a 
moral imperative.
In order to overcome the (rather contrived) practical difficulty 
in trams foimati on from one form of State to another, Schiller proposes 
a ' support' which will guarantee the continuance of society, ensure its 
natural being is given its due, while yet educating it to independence 
of the Natural State, which is to be abolished,
•, , • physical sirtity6 in time rnmst never eoe a rimee:e^tbsc
to exist while Heral ssoieey an idee is in the p rocess oe beofg 
7
formed:;’ * ’For this reason a support mast be looked for which 
will ensure the continuance of society, and make it independent 
of the Natural State which is to be abolished.’ (L5:4)
Schiller's talk here of abolishing the Natural State seems a little 
naive. It is impossible to ' abolish’ the State, for as a subjective 
ideational object, it cannot be 'got at’ to abolish, (Thus the 
anarchist is forced to settle for lampost bending, )
The ’support' for the interim period, between the abolition of the 
Natural State and the crraatc^n oo the Mmo! State, aannot tt S chi IScr’s 
view, rest upon m^'n natal craracten ppr ie (win. ch is evi 1 vnd 
negative on its own); nor cam it rest on his moral character which is 
imppicit, dormait, and yet to be developed. The ' support’ mist be a 
' third character' of man, capable of educating the natural and moral 
aspects of man to full development, but also out of opposition into a 
haieom.oui relationship, reducing their extreme characters, and 
developing eate to take on something of the other : moraa-ity to become 
more natural; ou:r natural being to become morn rational and moora..
Thus Schiller tells us:
'This support is not to be found in the natural character of man 
which, selfish and violent as it is, aims at the destruction of 
society rather than at its preservation. Neither is it to be 
found in his moral character which has, ex hypothesis first to
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be fashioned. . • ' 'It wouLd, therefore, be a question of 
• , . removing the former somewhat further from matter, and 
bringing the latter som<ewhat closer to it : and all this with 
the aim of bringing into being a third character . . .’ (L5j5)
There is a sense in which the remainder of the treatise can be seen in 
terns of an exploration of what is involved in establishing this 
• third character’ of man.
LETTER 4
The Need for Whooeness of Chsaracter and an Organic Society
Schiller, begins Letter 4 by discussing the subjective moral 
prerequisites for establishing an objective MorraL State. He tells us 
that
•The setting up of a Moral State involves being able to count 
on the moral law as an effective force < • .' (L4s1)
The Moral State can only be set up and sustained if moral behaviour 
becomes our new 'second nature' , as it were, by which we naturally 
are moral, so that our impulses and inclinations actually lead us to 
do our moral duty.
'. . . to be able to count, on man's moral behaviour ... it 
will itself have to be nature, and he will have to be led by 
his very impulses to the kind of conduct which is bound to 
proceed from a moral character, ' ', , . this can only be brought 
about through both these motive forces, inclination and duty, 
producing completely identical results in the world of
phenomena; . , . through impulse being sufficiently in harmony
-j
with reason to qualify as universal legislator,' (L4:1)
H>re, Kant's vi<w of an eternal opposition between rational moral 
duty/and natural inclination, is rejected by Scthller as an absolute 
opposition. He sees the possibility, indeed the political, moral and 
psychological necessity, of overcoming this moral dualism : if man is
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to be politically free (living in the Moral State), realistically 
moral (following a morality in accord with his nature), and 
psychologically whole (integrating his rational and sensuous natures).
In a difficult passage, Scthller tells us that :
'Every individual human, being ... carries within him 
potentially ... an ideal man, the archetype of a .human being 
. . .' ’This archetype , , , is represented by the State . , , * 
(14:2)
Schuller seems to be using the term ’ ideal' here in its Platonic 
sense, as an ideal archetype. Horever, that all men have within them 
immnently this archetype, as a potential to be developed and realized, 
seems a more Ardstotelian view of the ideal. (Gerarally, Schiller
oscillates between these two views of the ideal in his discourse, with
.2a greater tendency to the Platonic conception.)
In an even more difficult passage in the same paragraph, Schuller
writes!
’ [There are] two different ways in which man existing in time 
can coincide with man as Idea, and,in consequence, just as many 
ways in which the State can assert itself in individuals ; 
either by the ideal man suppressing emirical man, and the 
State annulling individuals; or else by the individual himself 
becoming the State, and man in time being ennobled to the 
stature of man as Idea.’ (14:2)
There is a notable absence of erqnlicit teleological language here.
Thus we have talk of for example, man being ’ennobled to the stature 
of man as IcLest* , rather than talk of man realizing his potential to 
actuality, Platonic rather than Aristotelian Ideas seem to be 
Schuller's model. Moreover, the distinction that Schiller draws 
between 'man existing in time’ and 'man as Idea’ , indicates the 
atemporal transcendent status of the latter. But in that case, is it 
an ideal immanent within men as stated earlier? The possibility of 
the coincidence of the two conceptions (’man existing in time can 
coincide with man as Idea’), implies not a transcendent, but an 
immanent ideal, which is atemporal in the sense of being perennial, 
true in all times, rather than outside time, or confined to one time
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like each man. Underneath all this talk however, one suspects the 
Ideal in question is nothing hut Kant’s moral will, which has a 
transcendent supersensible origin, but is meant to be realized in 
the sensible, and whose law all men carry within them by means of 
their faculty of practical reason. It has the same transcendent and 
immanent status in man as Schiller’s talk of the Ideal man here.
Returning to the passage in question, it helps to understand it if 
it is re-arranged, for Schiller deliberately alternates the discussion 
of two different topics in a rather confusing way. It makes easier 
reading re-constructed thus:
There are two different ways in which man existing in time can 
coincide with man as Idea : either by the ideal man suppressing 
empirical man; or else by man in time being ennobled to the 
stature of man as Idea.
This means that the ideal of the moral will may suppress empirical
man in all his sensuousness; or sensuous man may have his natural 
3
being ennobled to conform to the demands of the moral law. The other 
discussion mixed into the passage, concerning the State can be 
re-constructed thus:
There are two different ways in which the State can assert 
itself in individuals : either by the State annulling 
individuals; or else by the individual himself becoming the 
State.
The State can assert itself in individuals by either suppressing 
their individuality; or by individuals becoming more universal, 
realizing and representing themselves as whole beings in the Moral 
State•
Why does Schiller juxtapose these two discussions, one about the 
relation of the moral law to the individual; the other about the 
relation of the State to the individual? The answer would seem to be 
that both discussions are concerned with the relationship between 
universality and individuality. He is in the process of constructing 
an argument which will advocate that universality as moral (the moral 
law), or as positive (the State), should not suppress the individual, 
but rather the individual should be raised to universality (through,
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as we shall see in later Letters, aesthetic education),
Schiller is concerned that mans natural being should be given its
rightful recognition as part of his whole being. Moraaity is
deficient and one-sided if it involves sacrificing our natural being. 
Politics and the State are defective if social Oarmony is only 
achieved by suppression of individual variety, by social control 
enforcing social conformity. Thus he tells us
'. • .it will always argue a still defective education if the 
moral character is able to assert itself only by sacrificing 
the natural.4 And a political comtitution will still be very 
imperfect if it is able to achieve unity only by suppressing 
variety.' (L4s3)
The continuous placing together in this letter of these two lines of 
argument implies a coslnectirs in Schiller's view, between personal 
moral repression, and a society characterized by social and political 
repression, (S chiller may have anticipated Wilhelm Reich in this 
connection.^ Further evidence for this lirkaige is provided a couple 
of paragraphs later, where he writes
' C The State! will have to observe toward those citizens the 
same relationship as each has to himself , , ,' (L4:5)
The MoraL State, in SctOHer's view, rests upon its citizens 
having a whole view of society itself. They mut be socially conscious, 
have a broader view than their own narrow individiuaLity. The Moral 
State represents man as ideal (as universal or moral) and objective, 
not as merely natural and narrowly subjective. The whole man, in 
Oaamrnt with himself, can find in the Moral State (resting on a society 
of whole and objectively orientated individuals), the explicit positive 
expression of the moral law, wOLcO agrees with his own natural law based 
sense of right. In this way, ethical objectivity coincides with moral 
subjectivity. As Schiller puts it,
’, , , the State , , , can only become a reality inasmuch as 
its parts have been tuned up to the idea of the whole, ' '. , , 
the State serves to represent that ideal and objective humanty 
wOLcO exists in the heart of each of its citizens . . .’ ' Once man is
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inwardly at one with himself • . • the State will be merely 
the interpreter of his own finest instinct, a clearer 
formulation of his own sense of what is right.’ (L4:5)
(Schiller may also have in mind here, Kant’s idea of the ’public
sense’ , acting as an a priori universal check, on merely particular
judgements.) It is interesting that Schiller seems to imply an
identification of natural law, moral law and positive law in the
Moral State : hence the coincidence of man’s ’ finest Qmoral^ instinct’
with the ’ clearer formulation’ to be found in positive law. In the
Moral State, there is to be both a coincidence of individual and
universal judgements (via the public sense), and between natural law
based moral instincts, and positive laws which embody the moral law.
(in some of his other philosophical works too, for example On Naive 
7
and Sentimental Poetry , Schiller sees the moral law as the
8self-conscious realization of the implicit principles of natural law. 
Here in the Aesthetic Letters, he goes further, and sees the possibility 
of identifying moral law with positive law in a hypothetical Moral 
State.)9
Schiller warns that should a people be wrapped-up in their own 
subjectivity, opposing objective norms and values, the Moral State 
will have the right to repress this individualism. Individualism per 
se is negative and destructive to the State, to man’s objective 
(social) life, and to the realization of his own ideal (moral) harmony.
’If, on the other hand, in the character of a whole people,
subjective man sets his face against objective man with such
vehemence of contradiction that the victory of the latter can
only be ensured by the suppression of the former, then the
State too will have to adopt towards its citizens the solemn 
10rigour of the law , and ruthlessly trample underfoot such 
powerfully seditious individualism in order not to fall a 
victim to it.’ (L4:5)
Individual variety, as furnished by nature, has its place, but within 
the constraints of an objective social framework, not as a one-sided 
and selfish individualism.
Schiller proceeds to make what is an important distinction in 
terms of the general theory of the treatises
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1. . . man can be at odds with himself in two ways : either as
savage, when feeling predominates over principle; or as 
11barbarian, when principle destroys feeling,’ (L4:6)
Here, follcwing Kant, Sclhller distinguishes two sides of man : 
reason/and feeling. But it is Schhller’s own view that man can be 
internally dirempted by reason domnating feeling (in the ’barbarian’), 
or feeling domnating reason (in the ’savage’). Each is an equal denial 
of a vital part of our complete humnity, the ideal wholeness of man.
Schiller also accepts Keart’s view of the universal validity of the 
moral law, and sees it functioning as a unifying force in a would-be 
moral society. Hwever, this unifying force mist allow for individual 
natural differences of character and temperament (so long as the moral 
Iew is not thereby negated). The opposition of moral unity/aid natural 
diversity, is a tension which in Schhller’s view, only beauty as both 
sensuous and formal can overcome. (For, as he will argue in later 
Letters, beautiful forms may educate both sides of man into a 
harmonious uni-by.)12
’. . whenever Reason starts to introduce the unity of the 
moral law into any actually existing society, she mut beware 
of da^^g-ng the variety of Nature. And whenever Nature 
endeavours to mantain her variety within the moral framework 
of society, moral unity mut not suffer any infrnngement 
thereby. Removed alike from uniformity and from confusion, there 
abides the trimnph of form.* 2 (L4s7)
In Schiller’s view, the prerequisite for the achievement of 
political fraedom is wholeness of personality. The move from the 
Natural to the Moral State is only possible as a political exercise, 
on the basis of a real psychological change in the individuals who 
comprise the State.
’Wholeness of character mut ... be present in any people 
capable ... of exchanging a State of compulsion for a 
State of freedom.’ (L4s7)
TlhLs em^l^iai-s on the character of the individual by Schiller, implies 
the view that ultimately the political form of the .State rests upon
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the foundation of the mass psychology of its citizens 14
LETTER 5
Social Critique of the EviLs of Contemlrart ’ Civilizi3.trsn,
ScM-ller commences Letter 5 on an optimstic note, saying that we 
have seen men in the course of the French and Ameaa.cas Revolutions 
attempt to recover their rights (by force). The Natural State is being 
challenged by the demands of reason:
’. , . over there, and over here, [man] is rising up to seize by 
force what, in Ois opinion, has been wrongfully denied him. The 
fabric of the Natural State is tottering, its rotting 
foundations giving way, and there seems to be a physical 
possibility of setting law upon the throne . . •’ (L5s2)
However, realistically, the subjective concdtions for such a revolution 
are not present. The opportunities afforded by objective crncdtions 
and circumstances are negated by what is possible in terns of man s 
subjectivity : in particular, by the limited moral development of his 
character. A being yet to be fashioned as moral, cannot replace the 
Natural State with the Moral State. Thus he tells us,
'Vain hope I The moral possibility is lacking, and a mommnt so 
prodigal of opportunity finds a generation unprepared to 
receive if (L5s2)
(ScMller* s answer to the problem is moraL education and development 
of a rounded kind of both sides of man, as the prerequisite for 
political revolution. In short, we mist change the individual first.)
The moral unievalopment and unlrepaaadsess of contemporary man 
means that the achievement of political fieedom is impossible as yet. 
The upper classes are sunk in depraved passive lethargy; the lower 
classes are not lethargic, but rather highly active in pursuing 
animal satisfactions, and are steeped in savagery*
’Man portrays , , , On the one Oand, a return to the savage
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state; on the other, to complete lethargy . . .*(L5:5)
'Among the lower and more numerous classes we are confronted 
with crude, lawless instincts, unleashed with the loosening 
of the bonds of civiL order , and hastening with ungovernable 
fury to their animl satisfactions.’ (L5s4)
Such a social situation, in Schiller’s view, even provides a 
justification for the Natural State, to act as an external force in 
relation to its citizens, so as to counter the dissolving tendency of 
society. The Natural State has a record of repression, but it has had 
to sacrifice humn rights for the basic end of simply mdntaining the 
existence of society, as the 'bonds of civil order’ disintegrate:
' Can the State be blsmed for having disregarded the dignity of 
hums beings as long as it was stiLl a question of ensuring 
their very existence?' '[Society’s] very dissolution provides 
the justification of [the Natural State’s] existence. For 
society, released from its controls, is falling back into 
. . . elements . . .’ (L5:4)
The main body of Sclhller’s social critique is concentrated into 
one long paragraph at the end of Letter The critique takes the form
of a large number of brief points mde in rapid succession, but whose 
meaning is fairly self-evident and requires little explanation here.
It is convenient to divide it into a few separate passages, after each 
of which, I will merely briefly summaize the general meaning of his 
main points.
'The cultivated classes . • • offer the even more repugnant 
spectacle of lethargy, and of a depravation of character which 
offends the more because culture itself is its source.' ' ... 
Enlightenment of the mind ... has had on the whole so little
of an ennobling influence on feeling and character that it has 
tended rather to bolster up depravity by providing it with the 
support of precepts.’ (L5:5) •
The so-called cultured classes have been mde depraved and lethargic 
by their culture and civilization (in its removal from time nature). 
Oily their excuses for depravity benefit from Enlightenment, as they
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find ’rational* theoretical justifications for irrationality.
*We discwn Nature in her rightful sphere only to submit to her 
tyranny in the moral, and while resisting the impact she maces 
upon our senses are content to take over her principles. The 
sham propriety of our manners refuses her the first say ... 
only to concede to her in our mteeialistic ethics the final 
and decisive one.* (L5:5)
Nature is ignored qua natural law and beauty, but accepted for her 
contingency and irrationality, as we allcw our natural being alone to 
govern our volition. Politeness hides obvious personal uncoutiness, 
whhlst we allcw our lives to be governed by the pursuit of purely 
mtferial ends.
*In the very bosom of the most exquisitely developed social 
life egotism has founded its system ... we suffer all 
the contagions and afflictions of society. We subject our free 
judgements to its despotic opinion .••**•.• ridicule . . . 
is equsaLly unsparing in its desecration of the noblest feeling. 
Ci-eLlizntion, far from setting us free, in fact creates some 
new need with every new power it develops in us. The fetters 
of the physical tighten ever more alarmingly . . .fear of 
losing what we have stifles even the most burning impulse 
towards improvement, and the maxim of passive obedience passes 
for the supreme wisdom of life.’ (L5:5)
The whole social system is grounded in individual egotism. The impact
of society on the indieidial is only negative, as social control
through public opinion and the ridicule of everything of true value.
New artificial *needs* are generated as fast as old ones are
3
satisfied. The development of the individual and society is frozen 
for fear of losing our maeirLal possessions and by the ethic of 
passive obedience.
Scli.llgi began the Letter on an optimistic note; he finishes it 
with a deeply lessim.stic summary:
’Thus do we see the spirit of the age wavering between 
perversity and brutality, between unnaturalness and mere
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nature, between superstition and. moral unbelief; and it is 
only through an equilibrium of evils that it is still sometimes 
kept within bounds.’ (L5:5)
Perversity, brutality, unnaturalness, superstition and moral
unbelief, all vie with one another, and only by a mutual check of evil 
on evil is the whole social degeneration and disintegration slowed 
down and limited in scope, on occasions.
It is clear that Schiller believed modem society was breaking-up 
and dissolving; becoming more atomistic and increasingly disorganized. 
Schiller’s pessimism concerning civilization was probably drawn from 
disillusion with the outcome of the French Revolution, and from 
reading Rousseau’s critiques of modem civilization. Certainly 
Schiller seems to have had in mind Rousseau’s view of over-
culturalization : a culture which in its artificial refinement has
lost touch with true nature, and thus fails to develop our natural
moral instincts; or develops them in a way which makes them hostile 
5
to the promptings of natural law. The Enlightenment was viewed by 
Schiller as having trained the intellect, but left untouched and 
untamed our natural being : it was a purely intellectual 
Enlightenment. What is needed, in Schiller’s view, is a whole or total 
Enlightenment of both sides of man (through aesthetic experience.)
LETTER 6
Psycho-Social Diremption : the Negative Effects of Specialization
In Letter 6, Schiller continues his critique of contemporary 
civilization, but now focuses on one particular negative feature of 
it, the specialization of human faculties and functions, exploring 
both its causes and effects. He begins by telling us that the process 
of civilization takes us away from nature, a removal intensified by 
the one-sided development of certain of our cognitive powers.
However, it is to these same cognitive powers that we must now look 
in order to find our way back to nature, through a higher level unity 
which will incorporate the intellectual gains made since the time of 
ancient Greece.
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’, . . any people caught up in the process of civilization . . . 
must fall away from Nature by the abuse of Reason before they 
can return to her by the use of Reason. ’ (l6:1)
Schaller proceeds to drew a number of comparisons between ancient
Greek and modem civilization, in WkhLci the latter is mde to appear 
2
in an unfavourable light. Whereas for the Greeks, art and philosophy 
each had their own place in an integrated lifestyle, we allcw one 
smll sphere of either sensuous or rational activity to entrap us 
into its narrow frame:
'CThe Grrselcs] were wedded to all the [ sensuous] delights of art 
and all the [rational] dignity of Lphilosoplhcal] wisdom, 
without however, like us, falling a prey to their seduction.* 
(l6:2)
In the Greeks, sense/and intellect worked together in harmony. Even 
the most abstract philosophical reasoning and speculation still 
considered the mterial dimens ion. Any distinctions which were mde, 
were clearly within a general context, a whole view, which avoided 
disintegrating this overall unity by analysis:
'. . . sense and intellect did not as yet rule over strictly
separate domans ;’ 'However high the mind might soar, it 
3
always drew miter lovingly along with it ; and however fine 
and sharp the distinctions it might mate, it never proceeded 
to mtilate.’ (l6:5)
The gods of an age or people, in Scihller’s view, are the 
projection of a peoples' own self-image qua species.(in this, 
Schhller anticipates Feuerbach and Max,)3 Thus the Greek gods were 
integrally humn, wthlst our heavenly figures are each a fragment of 
humaity:
’. . .in no single one of their deities was humanly in its 
entirety ever lacking. How different with us Modems’. With us 
too the image of the human species is projected in mtgified 
form into separate individuals - but as fragments . . .’ (l6:5)
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Turning to focus specifically on modem psychological diremption 
and social fIagmeniatili, Scthller tells us that
’With us . • . the various faculties appear as separate in 
practice as they are distirguished by the psycholo^st in 
theory, and we see not merely individuals, but whole classes 
of men, developing but one part of their potentialities • .
(l6:5)
Sdn-ller identifies two primary causes of the diremption of human 
nature in modem man. a) The development of anaullrtical thought in 
the sciences leading to specialization of the mind, b) The State, 
which has developed into a complex machine, disorganizing^ society 
into classes and occupational groups. Thus Schiller says,
’ Once the increase of gmplrical knowledge, and more exact modes 
of thought, made sharper divisions between the sciences 
inevitable, and once the increasingly complex machinery of State 
necessitated a more rigorous separation of ranks and occupations, 
then the inner unity of human nature was severed too, and a 
disastrous conflict set its harmonious powers at eniisilce.’
(L6:6)
Scli.llei here identifies an internal and external cause of diremption. 
Chronoloo£.csaLly, he sees the internal cause (the analytical development 
and opposition of different faculties), as prior to the external cause 
(the development of the modem State machine.) Thus he tells us;
’This disorganization, which was first started within man by 
civilization and learning, was made coIm>le'fce and universal by 
the new spirit of government. ’ (l6;7)
In this Ltter, Schiller is particularly fond of employing the 
contrasting metaphors of meckimLisIi/and organism, when comparing modem 
with Greek society. Thus for example, he tells us that modem society is
’... an ingenious clock-work, in which, out of the piecing 
together of innumerable but lifeless parts, a mechimical kind 
of collective lidfe ensued.* (l6:7)
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Society is no longer an organism, it is merely a mechanically (or 
externally) related system of separate parts.
Turning now to look at the effects on the individual of the modem 
development of the division of labour, Schiller tells us that
’. . . man himself develops into nothing but a fragment . . . 
he never develops the harmony of his being ... he becomes 
nothing more than the imprint of his occupation or of his 
specialized knowledge.’ (l6:7)
’When the community . , . insists on special skills being 
developed with a degree of intensity which is only 
commensurate with its readiness to absolve the individual 
citizen from developing himself in extensity - can we wonder 
that the remaining aptitudes of the psyche are neglected ... to 
give undivided attention to the one which will bring honour 
and profit?’ (L6s8)
Man today then, is a mere fragment of full human being. He never 
develops both sides of his being to harmonious unity. He represents 
not humanity, but some particular occupation or field of expert 
knowledge. Modem society insists that the individual develops 
specialist skills. At the same time, he is not encouraged to broaden 
himself through the development of his other potentialities. Society
8rewards with status and salary the development of one aptitude alone. 
Having looked at the effects of specialization on the individual,
Schiller turns to the State. As we have seen, he identifies the modem 
State as a cause of the problem. Schiller now makes it clear that it 
is reciprocally effected by the process of social atomizations
’CThe State is3 forced to resort to classification in order to
cope with the variety of its citizens, and never to get an
impression of humanity except through representation at second
hand, the governing section ends up by losing sight of them
altogether, confusing their concrete reality with a mere
construct of the intellect . . .’ ’Weary at last of sustaining
bonds which the State does so little to facilitate • . •
society begins ... to disintegrate into a state of primitive 
9
morality , in which public authority has become but one party 
more,to be hated and circumvented by those who make authority
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necessary . . .’ (l6:9)
The modern State does not relate to its citizens as human beings, but 
through the meddation of various rational corastructs. The State 
becomes an external machine in relation to its citizens, incapable of 
bonding them together organically. Society begins to disintegrate into 
a narrow individiuilistic 'morality1 ; the State becomes viiwed as just 
another public body to be hated, and the duties it imposes upon us 
evaded.
In the remainder of this Letter, ScthLller is going to slowly swing- 
around into taking a more positive viiw of the development he has so 
far described in wholly negative terms. He will not repudiate what he 
has already stated, but will argue that at least where the development 
of our mental powers and general stock of knowledge is concerned, 
modem man has had to follw the course of development he has done, 
as an unfortunate necessity. As Scthller commences this change of 
perspective, he '©asses’ us into it, by maintaining a negative view of 
the process of mental specialization, whilst introducing the idea of 
its necessity.
'In its striving after inalienable possessions in the realm of 
ideas, the spirit of speculation could do no other than become 
a stranger to the world of sense, and lose sight of matter for 
the sake of form.’ 'But the damaging effects of the turn which
mind thus took were not confined to knowledge and production; 
it affected feeling and action no less. We knew that the 
sernsibility of the psyche depends ... upon the ... 
imagination. The preponderance of the anaL;ytical faculty mist, 
however, of necessity, deprive the imaghnition of its energy 
and warmth . . .' (l6:10)
Not only have knowledge and production become abstract, but the 
development of our analytical powers has led to loss of feeling and 
imagination. (We have here, Schiller's first reference in the
treatise to the ' imsagnation' , a faculty which will be central to the 
thesis of the Aesthetic Letters as a whole. Note how already, he is 
subtly identifying a cogntive faculty with our sensuous being, by 
linking the imagination with the ’sensibility' of the psyche.)
Scthller now proceeds to his more positive view of man s
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development. He adm.ts that post-Greek psycho-social fragmentation
was both inevitable, and for the species as a whole, desirable, for 
11it enabled our know ledge across a wide front to advance. If m^’s
potentialities were ever to be developed, only the narrow
specialization and mitmCL opposition of the faculties could
12facilitate this development.
’I readily concede that,lit tie as individuals might benefit 
from this fragmentation of their being, there w^ no other 
w^ in which the species as a whole could have progressed. ' 
(l6:11)
’If the mnnfold potentialities in man were ever to be developed, 
there was no other w^ but to pit them one against the other. 
This antagonism of faculties and functions is the great 
instumient of civilization . . .’ (l6:12)
Thus wlteit in the individual is a tragic suppression and denial of 
full humanty, is nevertheless a gain for mankind as a whole. The 
specialization of some individuals’ cognition or volition is the only 
means whereby an ’unnatural’ development of powers could take place:
’ Oie-sidedness in the exercise of his powers mus;, it is true, 
inevitably lead the individual into error; but the species as 
a whole to truth. Oily by . . . contracting our whole being 
into a single power, do we, as it were, lend wings to this 
individual power and lead it, by artificial means, far beyond 
the limits which Nature seems to have assigned to it.’ (L6;13)
But wlhlst mankind benefits from this specialization, the individuals 
involved should be seen as suffering martyrs of the Truth. Only if all 
of the mind’ s powers are developed equally, can individuals be happy 
and compete:
’. . . truth will be bound to have its matyir;.’ (L6:13)
’Thus, however much the world as a whole may benefit through
this fragmentary specialization of human powers, it cannot be 
denied that the individuals affected by it suffer under the
* curse of this cosmic purpose.’ ’ . . . the keying up of 
individual functions of the mind can indeed produce
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extra-ordinary human beings : but only the equal tempering of 
them all, happy and compete human beirns.’ (L6:14)
Despite mankind’s general benefit from mental specialization, is it 
not wrong Sdriller asks, that some individuals mist pay for this with 
the loss of their very humnity in its fullness?
’But can Man really be destined to miss him elf for the sake of
any purpose whatsoever? Should Nature, for the sake of her own
purposes, be able to rob us of a completeness which Reason 
, . • enjoins upon us?’ (L6:15)
Sdriller immediately answers his own question:
’It mist, therefore, be wrong if the cultivation of individual 
powers involves the sacrifice of wholeness.’ ’. . . it mist 
be open to us to restore by means of a higher Art the totality 
of our nature . . .’ (L6:15)
In the end then, we mist say it is wrong for individuals not to be 
fully human, even for a grand purpose, like mrn’s cogritive 
development. Oily through art he asserts, will we find the new key to 
fullness of humm-ty.
Letter 6 is long, but presents no problems of interpretation. The
mesanng of what Sdriller largely asserts, is relatively clear.
Schiller’ s high vi<w of ancient Greek society was almost certainly 
15 _
derived from reading Winckelmann. But the contrast of Greek
wholeness and modem fragmentation was common in intellectual circles 
in ^rmany from the 1760s mw sards. The ideal of the 'whole man’ is 
found in Herder and Hlderlin as well as Schiller. It is an ideal 
which will continue to pervade this treatise.
LETTER 7
Political Reform Presupposes the. Psycho-Ethical Reform of the Individual
Letter 7 does not advance the general argument of the treatise. Its 
function is to briefly draw relevant conclusions from the content of
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the preceding six Letters. ScMller begins by telling us that the 
individual and social fragmentation he has described cannot be 
overcome by means of the State, viz. it has no political solution. 
This is because, as he reminds us, the current form of the State, the 
Natural State, is one of the major causes of such fragmentation; 
wMlst the Moral State, is to be constructed by moral man and 
presupposes moral man. The Itoral State is, then, an end for Schiller, 
an embodiment of freedom achieved, not a means for securing it. As 
Schiller puts it,
*. . . the State as at present constituted has been the cause 
of the e-vil, while the State as Reason conceives it, far from 
being able to lay the foundations of this better humnity, 
would itself have to be founded upon it.’ (L7s1)
The moral reform of the State presupposes men who have become more 
rational and moral. Hcwever, Schiller sees the mass of modern men as 
’ savages’ , sunk in nature, and pursuing the satisfaction of merely 
natural and material needs. Thus Scthller considers that current 
attempts at political reform are fruitless endeavours:
’The present age, far from exhibiting that form of humaity 
which we have recognized as the necessary condition of any 
moral reform of the State, shows us rather the exact opposste. 
’. . .we mist continue to regard every attempt at political 
reform as untimely, and every hope based upon it as 
cMmerical . . .’ (L7s1)
Political reform presupposes men who are whole, viz. who are 
psychologically integrated as between their sensuous/and rational 
natures, and thus men who are capable of naturally being moral. In 
short, political reform presupposes the psycho-ethical reform of the 
individual.1
*. . . political reform Cis3 untimely ... as long as the 
spirit within mn is not healed, and his nature so restored 
to wholeness that it can itself become the artificer of the 
State . . .’ (L7:1)
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Schhller tells us that in so far as man is moral today, he is so only 
as a dirernpted being involved in inner self-conflict with his 
imposes, (in the manner of the 'dependent will' in the Kantian moral 
philosophy).2
' ... the strife of elements in moral man, the coirflict of 
blind impulse, has first to be appeased, and crude antagonisms 
first have ceased within him, before we can take the risk of 
promoting diversity. ' (L7s2)
3
The need for mn to achieve wholeness, the psycho-physiological
integration of his rational and sensuous natures, itself implies the 
need for a different kind of moral education, one in Which reason and 
sense are developed into a harmonious relationship of co-operation, 
instead of an eternal warfare based on mitual opposition. .
Returning to the political theme, Schuller (probably thinking of 
the French Revolution and its aftermath), warns against premature 
attempts to achieve political freedom before mn is ready for it in 
psychological and moral terms:
'As long as natural mn still mkes a lawless misuse of his 
licence, one can scarcely run the risk of letting him glimpse 
his liberty;’ 'The gift of liberal principles becomes a 
betrayal of society as a whole when it allies itself with 
forces still in ferment, and reinforces an already too powerful 
Nature.’ (L7:2)
Schhller’s pessimstic view of the mass of men, led him to think that 
until they have been fully (and broadly) educated iso mooaaity, they 
are not fit for political freedom. The premature granting of political 
freedom merely feeds natursJListic mai’s tendency to primitiveness and 
licence.
Political freedom then, in Schaller's view, presupposes a different 
kind of mn, one emnccpated from natural forces. Until mn himself is 
changed, political refora will at best be only partially successful; 
but mostly not so, with there remaining a ' gap' between ideal theory/snd 
real practice. As Schiller puts it,
'The chearacter of the age mist therefore first lift itself out
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of its deep degradation • • • dmmcipatd itself from the 
blind forces of Nature isolated attempts Cat
political refoi^l my succeed. But no improvement in the body 
politic as a whole will thereby ensue, and discrepancies in 
practice will continue to belie unanimity of precepts.’ (L7i5)
We need to be educated not only to deserve, but also to desire 
freedom, for paradoxically we have a fear of freedom, winch leads us 
to flee from it into various types of servitude, including the slavery 
to our sensuous nature involved in licence.
’Fearful of freedom ... we shall either cast ourselves into 
the arms of an easy servitude or . . . escape into the wild 
libertnnism of the natural state.’ (L7s5)
Schuller does not specify what types of ’idrviSude’ he has in mind 
here, but we may assume it takes as many different forms as men can 
find or manufacture for themselves, (e.g. political, religious, 
ideological and myhologgcal form).S
The real point of Letter 7» is that it enables Schiller to dispose
of any further consideration of the problems afflicting civilization
and their cure, in political t^eims. The Letter is actually a
’ justifCaatlin* for Schuller moving from the political into the
aesthetic domOn. From now rn, the political plays a mLnor role in
the treatise, to be replaced by the psychological, the morea., and the
aesthetic. Although the political returns again at the end of the
treatise (in Letter 27), oversCLl the political dimension of the 
5
Aesthetic Letters is not very great. Nevertheless, it is significant; 
but its significance is far more in terms of the diagnosis of what is 
wrong and its causes, than in terms of Schiller’s prescription for 
putting things to right. Politics and the State, as this Letter has 




Psysho-.Ethioal Reform Involves the Development of Feeling in Harmony
with Reason
Having ruled out -the State itself as an instrument for achieving 
political freedom, Schhller turns to ponder the possible roles of 
reason and philosophy in men* s trernsfoimation from a natural to a 
moral life (and the subsequent creation of the MraaL State), He begins 
by asking,
’Is Philosophy then to retire, dejected and despairing, from 
this field? While the domL-nlom of foims [rational organization] 
is being extended in every other direction, is this, the most 
important good of all [political freedom] , to reimin the prey 
of formless chance ? Is the conflict of blind forces to endure 
for ever in the political world, and the law of sociality never 
to trim]pi over hostile self-interes??’ (L8;1)
It is notable that Schiller here mokes political freedom * the most
-j
imposr;ait good of all’ , not the will (as Kant did) , nor even
art and beauty, which are rather means to this highest end’s 
realization,
Schuller proceeds to answer his question, but in a way which gives 
less of a role to philosophy, than to man’s faculty of practical (or 
morsal) reason:
’By no means’. Reason herself, it is tree, will not join battle 
directly with this savage force which resists her weapons.’
(L8j2)
’ Reason has accomplished all that she can accomplish by 
discovering the [morsd] law and establishing it [theoretically] 
Its execution demands a resolute will and ardour of feeinig.?”. .
Truth ... must herself become a force and appoint some drive 
to be her champion in the realm of phenomena;’ (L8:5)
Wh^-fc Schhller is saying here, is that reason per se is poweeless: it 
m^t work in combination with the sensuous if it is to have force. 
Reason per se, can do not more than discover the precepts of the moral
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law.(Here Sclhller follows Kant, who denied, constitutive cognitive
knowledge to theoretical reason, and confined it to a regulative role
in relation to the operation of our lower faculties, urging them to
complete and systematic knowledge. Practical reason however, can
discover the precepts of the moi?al law, and thus has a kind of
constitutive knowledge, but lacks a regulative ability over our lower
sensuous nature to guarantee the implementation and realization of
the moral law.) Reason qua practical, can discover the precepts of
the moral lew, but cannot overcome our sensuous natural being to
realize this law with certainty, and on a general social scale. To
overcome this, Schiller advocates that reason mut work on sense
indirectly, using sense and feeling itself. Only the development of a
rational drive and of ’mtoonal’ sensuous impulses, can hope to counter
the force of the irrational drive and purely sensuous impuLses which
stand in the way of our moral life and its objective realization in a .
reformed Moral State. (This employment of an intermediary agent by
reason in relation to the impulses, is similar to Ksait’s notion of 
2
’moxral feeing*’ acting for the moral will as a ’check* upon our
sensuous impuuses.) Schiller’s reference in the above passage, to
Truth appointing * some drive to be her champion* , is the first 
2
reference in the Aesthetic Letters to the ’ form-drive’ (albeit an
implicit reference), and already we have an indication of the 
importance which Schiller attaches to its development. (This importance 
becomes explicit in Letters 24 forward, in his presentation of a 
psychological history of the individual and species.)
Schiller continues:
’Our Age is Enlightened . . .’ *How is it, then, that we still 
remain barbarians?’ (LQs4)
’There mut ... be something in the disposition of men which 
stands in the way of the acceptance of truth, however brightly 
it may shite,atd of the adoption of truth, however forcibly it 
may convince.’ (L8s5)
It is clear from what Schiller said earlier, that mason as
philosophy, has already done all it can do for the ethical improvement 
of modem man, by discovering and mdcing explicit the foundations of 
the moral law, (an impUcit reference to Kant’s second Critique).
Ho^ee^e^rr, despite the development of our faculties, our knowledge, and
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production, by the Enlightenment, men still refuse to accept or adopt 
the moral law. They live lives which are one-sidedly intellectual at 
one level; and one-sidedly sensuous at another. They do not aH<w 
feeling its rightful place determined by mdea-ity, but are
' barbarians' .
Given Scthller* s view that most men are 'savages* , we may wonder 
why he is now concentrating so much attention upon the barbarian.
The next passage makes the reason for this clear. He is concerned 
that the ruling classes and the intelligentsia, because of their 
one-sidedly intellectual 'enligheemnent’, are unable to assist the 
moral development of the great mass of men who are sunk in 
subservience to their sensuous nature and the satisfaction of its 
needs:
'The majority of men are far too wearied and exhausted by the 
struggle for existence to gird themselves for a new and harder 
struggle against error. Happy to escape the hard labour of 
thinking for themselves, they are only too glad to resign to 
others the guardianship of their thoughts. And if it should 
happen that higher promptings stir within them, they embrace 
with avid faith the formulas wM-ch State and Priesthood hold 
in readiness for such an event. If these unhappy men deserve 
our compE^im, we are rightly contemptuous of those others 
. . .’ 'Such [others] prefer the twilight of obscure ideas, 
where feeling is given full rein, and fancy can fashion at 
will convenient images . . .’ (L8:6)
There are thus two obstacles in the way of any advance by the mass of 
humnity towards mooality and political freedom, a) The labour process 
entails that most men are too exhausted by the struggle for existence 
to have the time, energy and inclination to be able to think
rationally for themselves. They leave this to others who b), do not 
take their duty in this respect seriously, but provide people with the 
delusions they want to have. Ityhhology replaces truth. (This passage 
is far more important than is often realized by Schiller scholars, for 
in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, written shortly after the 
Aesthetic Letters, Sclhller virtually abandons the theory of aesthetic 
education as impracticable, because of most men being unable to actively 
react to aesthetic experience, due to their exhaustion by the labour
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process, and the cultural assumption that the free time to which such
experience is confined, should be ’leisure time’, viz. essentially
• >4passive.)
Thus Sclhller concludes that we cannot morally reform the 
individual through his reason or intellect alone. This is either 
inactive or exhausted (in the ’savage’ misses), or irrationally active 
in producing and reproducing mythologies (in the ’barbarian’ 
intelligentsia, and the ruling classes of State and church). Men of 
both kinds require a powerful moral education. To be powerful, it must 
be based on feeling (and not abstract precepts). The capacity to feel 
itself must be developed, for only in this way will men translate 
thought into action and life, and feel the need to develop their 
rational thought itself. As Sclhller puts it:
’. . . the way to the head mist be opened through the heart.
The development of mar’s capacity for feeling is, therefore, 
the more urgent need of our age, not merely because it can be 
a means of macing better insights Cinto the moral law] 
effective for living, but precisely because it provides the 
impulse for bettering our insights [into truth generally]. ’ 
(L8s7)
Schiller is now ready to move onto the next stage in the general 
argument of the treatise s that it is the aesthetic education of 
feeling that (indirectly) promotes both moral volition and the 
cogaition of truth, in the way seen as so necessary here.
LETTER 9
The Ba^rLs of the Educative Power of Beauty and Art
Sclhller cornnences Letter 9 by restating his fundamental thesis 
that political reform must proceed from reform of individual 
character. He takes the view that the political system in its present 
form is bound to have a negative effect upon character. 00^6^^!’^, 
we must identify some means of morally reforming the individual that 
is independent of the State, and capable of commnicaaing its 
influence powerfuLly (so as to be able to counter the negative
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influence of the State). This instument of reform, he asserts, is 
fine art.
’All improvement in the political sphere is to proceed from 
the ennobling of character - but how under the influence of 
a barbarous constitution is character ever to become ennobled? 
To this end we should, presumably, have to seek out some 
instumient not provided by the State . . .* (L9s1)
’This instrument is Fine Arrt;* (L9s2)
(Schiller did not foresee the extent to which the modern State would 
financially provide for, and thus indirectly control, even fine art.)
Schiller adm-ts that the temporal nature of artists and scientists, 
will often lead them to degrade art and science to conform to the 
prevailing spirit of the times:
’True, nothing is more common than for both, science as well as 
art, to pay homae to the spirit of the age, or for creative 
minds to accept the critical standards of prevailing taste.
In epochs where character . . . becomes enervated and flabby, 
science will strive to please, and art to gratify.’ (L9:5)
Hc^vcr, this temporal limitation and social conformity, need not be 
tine in principle, logically, even if it is often the case as a mater 
of fact, nmplrically or historically. Scthller proceeds to rescue art 
(and science) from temporal limitations and deficiencies, by the 
theoretical device of postulating atemporal Ideas of Art and Science. 
Beauty and Truth are asserted by Sclhller to be tr^nlscetdett pure 
rational Ideas, which are unassailable by temporal’realizations’ which 
fall short of them.
’Art, like Science, is absolved from all positive [legal ] 
constraint and from all conventions introduced by man; both 
rejoice in absolute immuunty from human arbitrariness. The 
political legislator • . . can proscribe the lover of truth; 
Truth itself will pravEa.1. He can humliate the artist; but 
£the transcendent Idea of3Art he cannot falsify.’ ’For whole 
centuries thinkers and artists will do their best to submerge 
Truth and Beauty in the depths of a degraded hu!mntty: it is
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they themselves who are drowned there, while Truth and B.eauty 
with their own indestructible vitality, struggle triumphantly 
to the surface.’ (L9C)
Schiller, then, attempts to make art an instrument of reform which is 
independent of the State, by the rather extreme device of making it 
apolitical through being atemporal and thus transcendent in status.
So far, he has not provided a philosophical justification for his 
assertion of there being such transcendent Ideas. He also seems 
unaware of the problem of providing any criteria for assessing the 
degree of correspondence between actual works of art (or empirical 
•realizations’ of Art), and/the Idea of Art itself.
It seems most plausible to view Schiller’s concept of the
transcendent, as that which is atemporal in the sense of being
perennial, which either exists (as the Idea of Art does in ’good’
times), or merely subsists (as it does in times when humanity is
degraded), in all times, rather than is transcendent in the ’hard’
classical sense of being outside time altogether. Schiller, in other
words, is operating a more ’soft* or limited concept of the
transcendent and atemporal, as that whose being is not confined to
any particular time, age, or peoples’ artistic production. There is 
2 3
no need to interpret him as an orthodox Platonist , or as a poet , 
or as personifying concepts (as various scholars have done)^, when 
he talks of realities which exist over the ages, but vary in their 
qualitative character from one epoch to another.
Schiller proceeds to argue that the true artist can overcome the 
limitations of his own time. The beautiful form he creates is, in some 
sense, atemporal, in the way Beauty itself is; the formal aspect of 
his work can transcend confinement to the taste of his age:
’The artist is indeed the child of his age; but woe to him if 
he is at the same time its ward or, worse still, its minion’.’ 
’The theme of his work may be degraded by vagaries of the 
public mood ... but its form, inviolate, will remain immune 
from such vicissitudes.’ (L9:4)
There is a suggestion here, in what Schiller says, of a neo-Platonic
connection between form (in the art object) and the Idea of Beauty,
5
viz. that the former partakes of the latter , and hence is removed
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from temporal and empirical limitations. These empirical limitations 
are here called the ’theme’ in the art work, viz. that which in L22:5 
is mere ’subject-matter’ or content, and seen there as of lew 
aesthetic and psychotherapeutic value (limiting the psyche). Mooeover, 
in 122j5, there is the same emphasis on form as the essence of the art 
object. (Unfortunately, as ever in the Aesthetic Letters, Sclhller does 
not provide us with enough to more than speculate about, when it comes 
to assessing the Platonic or neo-JPlatonic status of his Ideas. No fimi 
conclusion can be drawn as to their status, and often one suspects 
Sclhller himself was uncertain on this point.)
Another w^ in which art can transcend the limitations of time, is 
that, according to Sclhller, when humanity is in a degraded coned.tion, 
art with its ability to preserve past truth, can rescue current 
humrnnty by confronting it with immortal exemplars:
’ Humnity has lost its dignity; but Art has rescued it and 
preserved it in significant stone. Truth lives on in the 
illusion of Art, and it is from this copy, or after-mirage, 
that the original image will once again be restored.’ (L9s4)
There is again a Platonic suggestion here, that an existential work of
art is the illusory appearance of the Idea of Art, a poor ’copy’ or 
’af'^er-^^mg^e’ of an ’original image’ (the primordial Idea of Art). 
Hcwever, to comUcate matters, Schiller also intends to suggest more 
mu^cda^e^ly, that the work of art is an ’after-OInge’ of a past insight 
into truth, capable of restoring the original truth to present day 
awareness. Underlying Schiller’s talk here of humnity’ s dignity 
living on ’in significant stone’, one suspects there is the rather 
idealized view of ancient Greek art, and particularly its sculpture, 
which he inherited from Winkelman. In the above passage, we have the 
first reference in the treatise to art as ’illusion’ . Later (in Letter 
26), this becomes developed into Schiller’s theory of aesthetic 
’ semblance’ .
Sclhller now moves on from discussing the transcendent Idea of Art, 
the ateOTporal aspect of existential art (i.e. form), and art’s ability 
to ’freeze’ past truth for future use, to discuss the need for the 
true artist to be in some measure detached from his own time. It is 
important, if art is to rescue humanty from its current moral 
degradation and modes of psycho-social diremtion, that artists remain
50
a kind of pure unoorrupted priesthood, disdaining the opinion of 
their age, focusing on the moral law, not fortune and maaerial need:
"But how is the artist to protect hinself against the corruption 
of the age which besets him on all sides? By disdaining its 
opinion. Let him direct his gsa^e ujwwrds, to the dignity of his 
calling and the universal Law, not downwards towards Fortune 
and the needs of daily l±Te.’ (L9s5)
The artist may leave to the man of intellect the depiction and
7
analysis of the empirical world. The artist’s " object’ is the Ideal , 
viz, the supersensible domain : the Idea of Beauty and the moral law, 
whuch are to be made by him in particular sensuous-forms:
"... let him leave the sphere of the actual to the intellect, 
which is at home there, whilst he strives to produce the Ideal 
out of the union of what is [sensuously! possible with what is 
Crationally! necessary.’ (L9«5)
The Ideal should be fully expressed, not merely in art, but in the 
8conduct of the artist:
"Let him express this Ideal both in semblance and in truth, set 
the stEmp of it upon the play of his imagination as upon the 
seriousness of his conduct . . .’ (L9:5)
Tlhis passage maces it clear that Schiller conceives of "the Ideal’ as 
including both the Idea of Beauty (to be miaifest in " semblance" ), 
and the moral law (to be expressed in conduct), (it is noteworthy, 
that in the above passage, Schuller links the creation by the artist 
of aesthetic ’semblance" with the ’pl-^yr' of the "imagination’ . The 
relationship of these three key terms for Sclhller, will be explored 
by him in Letters 26 and 27.)
The aesthetic education of man, to morally reform him and the 
State, is conceived of by ScMller as a protracted and indirect 
process. The artist seeks to express and realize the Ideal in a 
tranquil contemppative mamer, unobtrusively. But for many men, the 
impulse to form takes a more immecLiate and impatient shape, as a 
desire to change the world:
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’ , , . the divine impulse to form often hurls itself directly 
upon present-dLay reality and upon the life of action, and 
undertakes to fashion anew the formless mterial presented by 
the moral world. The misfortunes of the human race speak 
urgently to the man of feeling; its degradation more urgently 
still; enthusiasm, is kindled, and in vigorous souls ardent 
longing drives impaaiently on towards action.’ (L9:6)
(Schiller’s use above of the expression ’impulse to form’ , is another 
implicit reference to the concept of the ’form--lrive’ , which he will 
explicitly develop in Letter 12:4 onwards. He will return to the 
subject of the ’enthusiast* in Letter 27:11.)
So far in this Letter, Schuller has attempted to justify his view 
that art is a suitable instrument for moral reform, on the grounds 
that it has a transcendent dimension, and it is produced by men who 
are themselves sufficiently detached from the sensible world as not 
to be corrupted by its deficient taste, and so as to be able to better 
gain access to both transcendent Beauty and transcendent Truth (the 
moral law). He now takes up the argument of the treatise where he left 
it at the end of the last Letter : the need for a means of powerful 
moral education which will develop man’ s capacity for feeling, and 
reform his sensuous life, rather than directly assail his intellect 
with moral precepts. Sduller proceeds to discuss how art may directly 
address itself to the sensuous aspect of man, bypassing his intellect. 
This discussion takes the form of a mythical address to a young artist.
Schiller addresses the young artist, advising him to raise his 
audiences’ perspective to the rationally necessary, that which is of 
eternal value (the supersensible), mJcing it an object men feel the 
desire for in their hearts, and not merely knew with their practical 
reason or believe with their intellect. Oily by education of the heart 
and feelings will error and caprice be removed from man’ s inner being;
’Impart to the world you would influence a Direction towards the 
Good . . .’ ’You will have given it this direction if, by your 
teaching, you have elevated its thoughts to the Necessary and the 
Eternal, if, by your actions and your creations, you have 
trinsfomied the Necessary and the Eternal into an object of the 
hearts desire.’ ’. . . error and caprice will fall . • ♦’ ’But 
it is in man’s inner being that it must give way . . • ’ (L9:7)
52
(SiLlezr’ s talk here of the aesthetic effecting a ’Direction towards
the Good1, is in line with e.g. L23;3» and his view later that the
aesthetic con<dtion of the psyche promotes and is conducive to moral
volition, but does not per se determine the content of mortnity.)
Scihller’s references in the above passage to the ’Good’, the
’Necessary’ and the ’Eternal’ , appear to be to the moral law. There
is much talk throughout this Letter of a transcendent ’Truth’ as well
as Beauty. Following Kant, the only supersensible tnuth we have
cognitive access to is the moral law (via practical reason). In the
last Letter, Schiller told us that philosophy has established, it
theoretically (via Kant). Now he tells us that artists, detached from
their times, can also establish it aesthetically, turning moral truth
’into an object of the hearts desire’ . In short, beauty can become a
symbol of mooaaity. But how? Do we, as in Kant’s discussion of this
topic, draw analogies between what was in any case natural beauty for 
9
Kant, and moral goodness? Scthller neither iere,irr elsewhere in the 
10treatise, gives us any concrete examples of how he envisages this.
Matters are not helped by the fact that most references to ’ true’ art
in the treatise, are to art which is beautiful (has aesthetic value)
and psychotherapeutic (has psychological value), rather than to art
which man-fesis moral truth in some way. The c.ormection between
mooaaity and beauty is made through the rationalizing effects of
aesthetic experience upon our sensuous being, rather than (as is
suggested in the above passage), through our apprehension of the 
11moral law via aesthetic objects.
One way in which it is possible to make sense of the above passage, 
is to see the ’Eternal’ and ’Necessary’ as not the moral law, but the 
Idea of Art or Idea of Beauty. Apaart from the question of the 
relationship between these two Ideas (which Sethller never discusses), 
we can see how if they are made into ’an object of the heart’ s desire* , 
men will learn to love what is of supersensible origin, and raise 
their minds’ orientation from the sensible and their sensuous needs. 
They are thus given a ’Direction towards the Good’. If this
interpretation is correct, we can see another reason why (apart from 
political independence), Scthller postulates Beauty and Art as 
transcendent Ideas : so that they can inhabit the same supersensible 
world as the moral law, and re-orientate men to their cohabitant.
(This saves him the trouble Kant went to of using an a priori principle 
of reflective judgement to link our experience of beauty with the
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supersensible domain, and thus again enable beauty to orientate us 
towards mooe-aity. Schiller’s transcendent Ideas of Beauty and Art 
function as a more tnsophtsticatei means for achieving a similar 
theoretical underpinning to link beauty and morai-ty, through both 
being grounded in the supersensible.)
Continuing his advice to the young artist, Sclhller says
"It is in the modest sanctuary of your heart that you mist rear 
victorious truth, and project it out of yourself in the form 
of beauty, so that not only thought can pay it homage, but 
sense, too, lay loving hold on its appearance.’ (L9:7)
The artist must nurture moral truth in his own heart, and then 
externally manifest it in the form of beauty : in a form available to 
thought/and sense, reason/and feeling; to both sides of man. This 
passage lends support to the interpretation that Sclhller sees " truth* 
as the m^]^ law, and is advocating that beauty should serve to 
symbooize moiarity in an external sensuous form. This is a more direct 
linkage between beauty and mooality than the second interpretation I 
gave above. But the two interpretations are The
supersensible linkage of the two (as a transcendent Idea/and the moral 
law) is a uhilisopltihal ^^160^^. The concept of beauty as a 
symbol of moiarity, is a sensible linkage of the two (in a sensuous- 
form) , and works as a psychological connection of beauty and morraity 
(in the course of aesthetic experience). Kant, in the Critique of
Judgement, provided a similar double linkage of beauty and mirri.ty, 
in logical and psychological terms, though different in content from 
that of Sclhller here.
The last four sentences of this Letter, are rather concentrated 
with points of significance. It is honveIhhnt to first deal with it 
as a whole in order to establish the general line of argument, and 
then to examine aspects of it separately. Sdhller, still talking to 
the young artist, says,
"The seriousness of your principles will frighten them away, 
but in the play of your semblance they will be prepared to 
tolerate them; for their taste is purer than their heart, and 
it is here that you mist lay hold of the timorous fugitive.
In vain will you assail their precepts, in vain condemn their
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practice; but on their leisure hours you can try your shaping 
hand. Banish from their pleasures caprice, frivolity, and 
coarseness, and imperceptibly you will banish these from their 
actions and, eventually, from their inclinations too.* ’. . . 
encompass them about with the symbols of Cmofatl3 perfection, until 
Semblance conquer Reality, and Art trimph over Nature.’ (L9s7)
Wlhat Sclhller is saying in this passage, I think, is based upon the 
fouling reasoning. The non-coghtive character of judgements of 
taste (wlhch Kant demoontrated in the Critique of Judgement), means 
that taste is uncorrupted by the intellect. We my find a clear avenue 
(unobstructed by determinate or definite concepts), to men’s feelings 
via beauty. Thus, though we cannot undo their precepts or their 
practices, we can through addressing their leisurely interest in 
beauty, get ■ to their feelings in order to effect a powerful 
re-education of the whole man. If truth, beauty and seriousness, enter 
into their leisure and pleasure, it will eventually permeate all men’s 
inclinations and actions. Art provides a vehicle of education and 
individual refom with direct access to feeling, the fundamnnal 
mooivator of all men’s activity,
Sclhller’s reference in the above passage to 'the play of your 
semblance' , and ’Semblance conquer Reea-ity’ , is another early usage of 
the team ’semblance’ in the treatise, and already it is explicitly 
connected with ’pclay’ and also put in contrast to ’reality’. (TMs 
will be fully developed by him in Letter 26.) It is interesting to see 
how Sclhller frequently puts down early ’markers' for concepts he only 
develops fully much later on in the treatise, and wlhch are very 
important to his thesis. It is as though, skilful dramtist that he 
was, he ’eases-in' his most important concepts unobtrusively, so that 
we get used to them, subtly enhancing their acceptability and 
plausibility, before they are given an explicit philosophical 
development.
The reference in the passage above, to the possibility that ’on 
their leisure hours you can try your shaping hand’ , is interesting.
In On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, Sclhller doubts that the leisurely 
attitude is productive of aesthetic experience of any value in
*1 /i
educative teorm. q The reference at the end of the quotation to
’ symbols of perfection’ , puts one in mind again of the section in 
15Kant's third Critique entitled ’Beauty as a symbol of mofatlty'.
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Unfortunately, Sclhller neither explains wteot he means here, nor does 
he use the expression again in the rest of the treatise. But there is 
no doubt that the idea is prominent in Sclhller’s m.nd throughout 
this particular Letter.
The main point Sclhller is mking in the above passage, is that 
art and beauty can bypass the corruptions and prejudices of mn's 
intellect, to gain direct access to his sentient being, and so effect 
a powerful reformation of his character by working from his physical 
substructure. But whit Sclhller argues here, implicitly rests upon the 
assumption that Kant is correct in his analysis of the nature of 
aesthetic experience : that it is immediate, non-coogiitive, and based 
on feeling. If Kent's view cohid be shown to be wrong, then Schiller 
woTuid be in some difficulty, (in the Aesthetic Letters, Sclhller 
merely takes-over many positions established by KEant, without 
bothering to justify them him elf, before he puts them to his own 
different theoretical purposes.)
Another problem, is that Sclhller merely assumes that the 
re-education of feeling will lead to the re-education of thoughts, 
precepts and actions. But, why may not the educative process simply 
’ get stuck' at the level of educating only a transient feeling, felt 
in the course of aesthetic experience, and then 'lost’ at the 
termination of that experience? Why should there be any lasting 
effect on our general sensibility, let alone on our higher faculties? 
This brings me on to a final problem here in wteut S chiller says : 
wihtt is the connection between feeling and the other (’ higher’ ) 
elements of our subjectivity, which he hopes to educate? At least as 
yet, no logical or psychological links have been demoostinted. We are 
being asked by Schiller to simply accept assertions.
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PART TWO
The Essential Nature of Man and Beauty
(Letters 10 to 17)
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UBTTER 10
The Negative Effects, of the Experience of Beauty .in. History, The
Heed for an A Priori Concept of Beauty
Moi, in Schiller's view, can live either doMmOted by his natural
or his rational being (as a ’savage' or 'barbari^ac' , respectively),
and in so doing, suppresses one half of his full humanty. SChller 
1
reiterates that only education through beeaity , can counter either 
form of oneHsdecdiess, and reconcile what appear to be contradictory 
oppsstes •
'. . . man can deviate frem his destiny in two quite different 
ways; that our own age is, in fact, moivng along both these 
false roads, and has fallen a prey, on the one hand, to 
coarseness, on the other, to enervation and perversity. From 
this twofold straying it is to be brought back by m^eans of 
beauty.' '. . . education through beauty Ccan3 counter both 
these opcoite faiingjs at one and the same time, and un-te 
within itself two quite incompatible qua-ities.’ (LlOil)
Schiller does not expect us to find such a view autoimaiCiaLly 
plausible. Indeed, he tells us that many wise men, and experience 
itself, seem to point to beauty having only a negative influence on 
humanty. Ve certainly cannot simply assume a connection between 
taste and mooraity. Plato, for one, saw beauty and art as dangerous 
to the social and political order:
*. • .we are always being told ... that a developed feeling
for beauty refines morals . . .* 'nevertheless, it sometimes
occurs to thinking minds either to deny this fact or at least
to doubt the legitimacy of the conclusions drawn from it.
They do not think quite so ill of that savagery with whLch
prim.tive peoples are usually reproached, nor qhLte so well 
2of that refinement for which the cultivated are commented. 
Even in antiquity there were men who were by no wans so 
convinced that aesthetic culture is a boon5 . . (3L1Os2)
In the debate over the value of aesthetic experience, Scin-ller
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tells us that we can certainly discount criticlems of beauty*s value 
from those whose comnercCeOL spirit leads them to register ’value* 
only in terms of money and profit:
'Those who know no other criterion of value than the effort of 
earning or the tangible profit, how should they be capable of 
appreciating the unobtrusive effect of taste on the outward
ap^arance and on the mend and character of men?* (L1O:5)
Horever, there are important arguments others mace, drawn from 
experience. Beauty per se is moodily neutral : it can be used for 
good or ill, and there is no guarantee that it will not be used for 
ill.
'But there are vdces worthy of respect raised against the 
effects of beauty, and armed against it with formidable 
arguments drawn fr<m experience.’ '. . . it is by no means 
contrary to its nature for it to have, nn the wroigj hjrnids 
... its soul-seducing power CputI at the service of error anad 
injustice.’ (l10:4)
1 serious criticlem of beauty, and of concern with the aesthetic 
in genersaL, is that it fosters an escapist menaU-ty, through its 
eetPhail on foam and appearance, at the expense of content and what 
is real. The value of everything ends up being determined by its 
externa:! appearance:4
’. • . because taste is always concerned with form, and never 
with content, it finally induces in the mind a dangerous 
tendency to neglect reality altogether •••’’••• appearance 
alone determines ... worth.* (U0:4)
Scdller’s statement in the passage above, that 'taste is always 
concerned with form, and never with content’, is a preview of his 
dilculliam of the art object in 122:5. It is clear that Sclhller did 
not change his mind between the early and late tetters of the treatise 
: from s eehin t hh art; object as a bslaice of* fom/gnid con-tent (in 
tetter 15), to the form iomLlMtted saT obbeoc described in tetters 22 
and 26. &sre is early talk of the latter position. (The two different
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views which he does express, can be explained as a discussion of the 
concept of Idea! Beauty on the one hand, and on the other hand, a 
discussion of the reality of art required for the practical purpose 
of aesthetic edixoartt-on.)
Art can, in Bclhller's view, be used as an instilment of social
control. It can instil social and political quietism, through the
presentation of ideal semblances Which divert men's minds from real
social contradictions and injustices. It can show us a 'nice' world,
in place of harsh reHity, destroying the urge to social conflict and 
5
political revolution.
'How many • • • are not in conflict with the social order just 
because the fancy of poets was pleased to present a world in 
Which everything proceeds quite differently, in which no 
conventions fetter opinion, and no artifice suppresses 
nature?' (HO:4)
Another argument against over-concern with the aesthetic, is that it 
hinders clear judgements of moreaL value. Otoession with outer 
impression ignores mer^, and forgets that most vices are comptible 
with a pleasing appearance : &
'Vhat has society profited from letting * • • outward impression 
determine the respect which should attach to alone?'
•. . . every vice in vogue ... is comppaible with a fair 
exterior.' (L1O:4)
The main case against art and beauty however, is provided by the 
evidence of history. History shows art flourishing in societies when 
political freedcm, morrlity, and truth, are in decline:
' ... in almost every historical epoch in which the arts 
flourish, and taste prevaHs, we find humaity at a lew ebb, 
and cannot point to a single instance of a high degree and 
wide diffusion of aesthetic culture going hand in hand with 
political freedom and ... good morels . • . truth of 
conduct.' (HO:4)
In what he asserts here, Scthller may be confusing cause and effect
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Art may not be the cause of. e.g. political servitude, but an idealized 
escapist response to it t a psychological compemation exercise. In 
order to support his view of art as the cause here, Sclhller proceeds 
to discuss its negative effects as a contributing factor in historical 
development. Be conceives of art and beauty as sapping strength and 
vitality, as producing an effete aestheticism. He tells us, for exam?!®, 
that ve find art flourishing in ancient Greece and Rome, only when they 
had lost their strength and freedom:
’When, under Pericles and Alexander, the Gulden Age of the arts 
arrived, and the rule of taste extended its sway, the strength 
and freedom of Greece are no longer to be found,’ 'The Romans 
... enervated by oriental luxury ... bow beneath the yoke 
of a successful ruler, before Greek art can be seen triumphing 
. . i' (C10t5)
Sclhller seems, in all this talk of the virtue of ' strength' , to be 
7
follwing Ferguson in seeing some value in war. ' He continues, by 
telling us that arab culture only flcwered when their waar-like spirit 
was extinguished (LLOj5). Sclhller concludes his historical negative 
critique of ar-fc’s value, by stating that
'Wherever we turn our eyes in past history we find taste and
fresedcm shunning each other, and beauty founding her sway solely
upon the decline and fall of heroic virtues.' (H0:5)
’. . . energy of character, at whose expense aesthetic culture 
8
is commoihy purchased ... is the mhrupring of all that is 
great and excellent in man . . .’ 'If, then, we only heed what 
past experience has to teach us about the influmnce of beauty, 
there is certainly no encouragement to develop feelings which are 
so much of a threat to the true civilization of maij' (H0:6)
A major change in Sclhller's mode of argument new takes place, 
which lays down the ground for the way he will conduct his enquiry 
over the next seven Letters. He is about to justify a movement frcm 
what has, until new, been a descriptively emiiioO. and historical 
• discussion, to a transcendental philosophical mode of enquiry, which 
will focus on establishing an a priori essential mcolel of the mind.
Tlhs will involve analysing those basic and universal structures and
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f’HCiCimnl of the mind which we bring with us to all our experience. 
Scthller begins, by reconsidering the nature of the terrain we
have just traversed. He says that all the acgummtl agatmt the idea 
of there being positive effects from the aesthetic education, of man, 
rest upon either emhircal experience or historical interpretation. 
Scthller believes that the evaluation of beauty should not be 
approached through historical imaecpreaatj^om of its supposed * causes* 
and 'effects*, but in terms of its logical being in thought as a 
toanlcemient concept. Act-uHy, he is not imt^rm^ucimg anything new 
here, for the concept in question is the Idea of Beauty with which we 
are already familiar. But instead of relating this Idea to existential 
art (via the latter's form^ as^ct, and its creation by ’detached’ 
artists), and relating the Idea to its feio<w inhabitant of the 
lu^:re<elsible dimennSon,ahe moral law, he now proceeds to relate the 
Idea of Beauty to an a priori modes! of mLnd, which he calls the Idea 
of Human Being. He now tells us that the Idea of Beauty regulates our 
judgement of taste, and adcdtionlly, is the necessary pre-condition 
of our being fully humun, vis. realizing the Idea of Human Being. The 
Idea of Beauty is now therefore invested with an epistemological role 
(in regulating judgements of taste), and an ontological status (in 
the achievement of full humaity). The epis’^(3m3lL^g.cal and ontological 
functions of the Idea of Beauty cannot be coepratealdei, in Scthller* s 
view, through a hilaocico-empirical approach to understanding the 
effects of beauty.
'But ... Experience is not the judgements eat before which 
such an issue as this can be decided.' ' • . . a concept of 
beauty derived from a source other than experience ... by 
means of it we are to decide whether that which in experience
we call beautiful is justly entitled to the nam.' (l10:6)
q
'This pure rational concept^ of Beauty ... itself corrects 
and regulates our judgement of every actual case ... [has! 
to be discovered by a process of abstraction, and deduced 
from the sheer potenntjaLities of our semlum-ICl.tio]nul nature.’
' • . . Beauty would have to be shown to be a necessary 
concdLticn of Human Being.’ (LlO:7)
Scihller’s :rerecance in the above passage to the Idea of Beauty 
regulating our judgement of taste, confirms the interpretation that
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it is not a radLcgaLly transcendent concept. It has, in view of its 
supersemsible status (in oommon with the morsd law), a transcendent 
aspect. But its realisation mrreon^le^f^s, over time in particular 
art woriM, and now, its role in regulating judgements of taste, gives 
it also an immanent . status. Its position in this respect parallels 
that of the moraaL law, which is supersernible in origin, and yet 
accessible by men via their faculty of practical reason, in order to 
regulate their volition (should they allcw it to). The Idea of Beauty 
is said to regulate our jucudnemt t f t aste, vMch would seem to impty 
it is an Idea of theoretical reason. But on KKintiia grouun, any
11attempt to cognize such an Idea of theoretical reason is impoosible.
Clearly, Schiller breaks with Kant in his attempt to deduce an a
priori Idea of theoretical reason, by means of a transcendental 
12investigoti on.
H<owver, it mut be said that Sclhller’s statement that the Idea 
of Beauty regulates our jwUd»^tenti of faute i s pprniliaa, ann is at 
variance with his brief coco^ideratloy later in the imUss, as to 
how we assess the degree of beauty in an art object. In Letter 22, it 
is clear that we assess the ' excellence' of a work of art by reference 
to its psychological effect on us:
'The more general the mood and less limited the bias produced in 
us by any particular art, or by any particular product of the 
seme, then the nobler that art and the more excellent that 
product will be.* (L22:4)
Thu,although here in tetter 10, SchUler tells us that the concept of 
Beauty is phLlosop}h.C£l.ly found by abstraction from experience, and is 
a priori in status, it is clear frem the passage quoted above from 
Letter 22, that the judgement of taste operates in an i posteriori 
way, being involved in a meta-judgement of our own psychological state 
in the course of aesthetic experience. C<ynSsheicy between the earlier 
and later Letters here, is hard to find. As ever, the main problem, is 
that Scle.llti does not say enough on the subject. Apart frem not 
elaborating on precisely how the Idea of Beauty regulates the 
judgement of taste, he never again uses the expression 'regulates our 
judgement' . Like his reference in the last tetter to ' symbols of 
perfection’ , it is an isolated, unexplained, if not inexplicable,
occurrence
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Solhller makes it clear that we can only discover and evaluate the
concept of Beauty via a transcendental investigation. Ve mutt examine
the universal essence of human nature, and then see what is a logical 
13condition of it achieving its fullness of development qua human. It 
is not, as in Kant* s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, a matter of 
wording back from our experience of beauty to its a priori 
epistemological concdtions, i.e. an examination of what are the 
necessary grounds of the possibility of our mOcing a judgement of 
taste. Sclhller’s ’deduction’, involves establishing what is basic to 
being a human being, and then woricing forward to what can fulfil his 
a priori essential model of mind t to wfot is a conddtion of the a 
priori model being realised fully in a posteriori psycholoigioal terms. 
Sclhller’s answer, of course, is that given a certain basic moddl of 
the essence of the human mhd, its fulfimnent and realization requires 
the experience of certain existential forms of beauty. He will work 
from a), an t priori psychological model of the mhd’s essential 
structure; to b), a corresponding a priori moddl of Beauty as Ideal; 
and from this, to c), an t posteriori model of the essential 
structure of existential beauty. Stage a) is located in Letters 11 to 
14, in which Sclhller describes the essence of human nature in terms 
of t distinction of ’Person’/end ’Conddtion’ , and then develops the 
idea of the mind having various basic drives; with further development 
of the t priori model in Letters 19 to 21. Stage b) is located in 
Letter 15, in his concept of Ideal Beauty as ’ living foim* , the 
correlative of his model of the a priori mhd. Stage c) is located in 
Letters 16, 22, and 26, in discussions of two existential types of
beauty, the art object, and the nature of aesthetic semblance,
respectively. As can be seen from the Letter numbers underlined above, 
the ’deduction’ takes place, in essence, through Oil its stages in 
Letters 11 to 16. Other later Letters, develop the conq^e^-ty and 
soplhstication of the three mcoldls involved and their relationships. 
Sclhller’s process of ’deduction’ involves imposing the (t priori) 
psychological mcddl onto both the (a priori and t posteriori) 
aesthetic mcoLdes, so that the letter are derivatively structured; 
beauty is anthropomoophicctly modelled to suit human psychological 
structures, functions, and requirements. O^eerOl., there is t good 
deal of conflation of types of argument in the process described here, 
with the logical and the aesthetic both running into the psychological, 
in a way which leaves the former two not only indistinct at times from
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the las’, but actuuLly psychoo<og-OfiULly structured.
It mut be said that as a philosophical mothcdology, the process
of 'transcendental deduction' is somewlhu’ dubinm. As in most
transcendental deductions, Sclhller ’rings’ the structure of the a
priori model he supposedly ’ saactl from’ , so as to achieve a
predetermined a posteriori model of experience of a certain kind.
The experiential side is itself hidden from the reader at the start,
but it has been carefully selected. The real starting point is
hidden % being from a selected view of the type of beauty or aesthetic
experience Sclhller wishes to ’arrive’ at. Such transcendental
deductions begin ’behind the back’ of the reader, with a hidden
induction from a carefully selected view of experience, to construct
an a priori model from wl^ch, one can then, in the reader^ presence,
return to the originally selected experience again. The procedure is
circular. It involves tailoring a priori mcddls to allcw movement from
^he^m to carBfully predetermined a posteriori crncl'mians. (TUs
criticSem of the transcendental method, applies less to Kant in his
Orrtiques, as he is not so interested as Scthller is in moving from 
15the a priori to the a posteriori. It does not apply at all to Fichte
in The Science of Knowledge, who in taking the process of 
transcendental deduction seriously, was unable to arrive at any 
plausible a posteriori model of experience from his gen-iundy a priori 
starting poimt.)
Scihller’s ostensible starting point will be an a priori essential 
mcmel of the human mind. This will occupy him for the next four 
tatters. The process of constructing such a conceptual modi is 
described by him, as he concludes this tatter.
’Ve mist lift our thoughts to the pure concept of Human Nature; 
and since experience never shows us Human Nature as such, but 
only individual human beings in individual situations, we mist 
endeavGur to discover . - . . that wh.ch is absolute and 
unchanging, and • • • apprehend the necessary conditions of 
their exislencm♦,e^ (L10s7)
Let se now briefly summarse the position we hive arrived at, in a 
way wi^ch is more ly]lipathtaic to Scthller's proposed mrthodology. In 
mrier, partly, to get round emiircal doubts about beauty’s positive 
educative effects, Sclhller proposes to deal with beauty
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transcrnndentally. Be will embark on a transcendental psychological 
17deduction , rather than a logical deduction as such. But like Kent,
the logical and psychological are for ScUller intimately related,
and so a purely logical transcendenta deduction would not seem
appropriate to him, Sclhller seeks not only (despite what he says),
the pure rational concept of Beauty, hut also those eyrirlcll species
of existential beauty, which can resolve conflicts and imbslLances 
18between man s rational and sensuous natures. Crrticism of his
method, as involving the coIitlltion of types of argument, may be 
inappropriate to such a venture : his broad approach may be necessary 
in order to be able to overcome the rat;ionai/s8isuLous divide in man
LETTER 11
The 'Person'/1 C<yliition> Distinction
In this Letter, Sclhller attempts to establish what is absolutely 
basic to human being t that which all our manfold activities 
logically presuppose. He distinguishes, and tersely defines, two 
fundlnenieal aspects of our being,whice he calls the
'Person and C<ondtioi - the self and its determining attributes 
- which . . . are . . , eternally two.' (L11:2)
Sclhller rarely provides adequate definitions for his major concepts, 
and appears to expect us to acquire their meanings from the way he 
employs them. The 'person' is used by him to mean the self or ’I* 
(terms which he interchanges as the Letter proceeds). The ' coned ti on' 
includes both bocdly life, and its relation to the external sensuous 
world. The influMnce of Fichte’s seminal work, The Science of 
Knowedge . is evident behind this distinction, which comes down in 
the end, to Fichte’s distinction of the ego/and the non-ego, (with 
the latter including the non-ego aspect of the self, i,e, our own 
petiymeInl aspect of being, the body). In addition, the :rtllticnship 
of the two terms distinguished, person and cyncdtiyi, has similarity 
to Fichte’s view of the relationship of the ego and non-tgy, 
GneerULy then, I think it aids clarity, to use the terms ego and 
non-ego to convey the meeadng of Schiller's person/condition
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distinction. Ve axe entering a section of the treatise where the 
influence of Kant declines somewhat. The influence of Fichte is 
important in this Letter, and even more so later, in Letter 19. 
(FLchte’s influential work. The Science of Kncor ledge was published 
at Sai'ter 1794> a few months before Sclhller began to substsainially 
revise his original letters to the Luke of Aiugutenburg, in order 
to prepare them for publication in The Hooren.)
Solhller proceeds to distinguish the two sides of mans being as 
atejqgomtL/and tempoortL t as the person which endures,/and the 
coned.tion which changes. Each is conceived of as being logically 
independent of the other, so that the person papists in the course 
of changes in the concdLtion; the condition changes despite the 
persistence of the person. The person or ego, then, is now attributed 
with an laeepooraL, transcendent being, in contrast to the pheno^^r^j^l 
ton<dtiom, (As ever though, for Sclhller, this itempratity involves 
pereninLal being, and a transcendence which does not exclude 
imminence)2
’. . .in man [there is J something that endures and something 
that constantly changes. That which endures ... Cis 3 his 
Person, that which changes, Cis3 his Ccoiddtion.' (L11:1)
’Amid all persistence of the Person, the Ccoddtion changes; amid 
all the changes of Ccrnddiion, the Person persists.^* (LH:2)
Aglnst the view Schiller puts forward here, one might want to argue 
that the person does change, but in a way much slower relative to the 
change of the concdtion. The mennslL development, decline and death of 
persornlity, are not simply to be identified as changes of conndtion. 
Morrtllty, in particular, would seem to show that the person is in a 
reciprocal relation to the cornd-tlon, not abstractly separate as 
asserted here. NeveeTlhless, providing Sclhller is only making a 
logical distinction here, such psychological and empirical
considerations do not invilidite it.
Sclhller proceeds to again tike what appears to be in ulmnccrsEl'ily
extreme view of the sehlrattton of person ind conddtion., when he says
’. . . the Ccttdltion. can neither be grounded upon the Person, 
nor the Person upon the C<oindiion.’ ’. . . were the former the 
case, the Connition would hive to peraist ;’ (Ll1i3)
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One nay perhaps wonder why Sclhller does not allcw the relationship
of person and conciLtiom to he one of substance and accident,
4
respectively. ThLs wo^d allcw the concdtion to be grounded in the 
person, and at the same time wouLd not require the cond-ticm to
peinis’ ; accidents moImatm-ee and ceasa-tc>-ea in the course of the
5
ongoing being of substance. Horever, to have the nmn-ago posited/ 
by the (finite) ego in this way, may have seemed to Sclhller to be 
verging on solipsism. Sclhller actwOLly follcwl Fichte, and accounts 
for the non-ego, as having been posited by an absolute ego, or as 
Sclhller puts it,
'In the Absolute Subject alcme do all its determining 
Attributes penis’ with the PersmsUity, since all of them 
proceed from the Personality.’ (L1t:2)
•The msta’rr.al of activity ... or the reaLi’y which ’he Supreme 
Intelligence creates out of itself, man his first to 
receive;’ (L11:6)
What is a little surprising here, is that the idea of the absolute 
ego as being God, is only implicit in The , Science of Kn<meeeii./ It 
only becomes explicit in Fichte1 s later works such as The Way Towards 
the Blessed Life, or Doctrine of Religion, (1806). Sclhller thus seems 
to have anticipated the later development of Fichte1 s philosophy in 
this respect.
In a statment that reads like a passage from The Science of 
&noeieige» Sclhller writes
' • . .we feel, think and will, because outside of ouroelves 
something other than ouraelval exists too.1 (L11:3)
The activities of the person or ego, are all possible because of the 
existence of the mos-ego or ccn<i.tion. Yet, Sclhller proceeds to 
describe persoMUi’y as lerfggmunlded being, and as ’tarafore 
lelfideaerainate and essentially free:
'The Peclom • . . mat be its own ground; for what persists 
cannot proceed from what changes. And so we
. , , have ’he idea of Cunconditiomed3 absolute being grounded 
upon itself, ’hat is to say, freedcm Clelf«■dlete:Iminatim3. * 
(L11«4)
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Now hetie are two problems here, concerning how the person can be 
self-rowmded and unconditioned, in view of a), its ability to feel, 
think, and will, depending on something other than the self?; and b), 
the question of the relation of the finite ego to the absolute ego, 
or the person to the GodHead, a relationship that needs careful 
exploration if it is to leave the person tite. There is talk at 
various points in this Letter about a 'Godhead* (L 11:2,7,9), the 
'Absolute Subject' (L11:2), the 'Absolute Being’ (L11:2). In order 
to avoid the problem for human freedom this raises, Wilkinson and 
Willoughby wrongly assume that in the passage quoted above, Schiller 
mut be still talking about the Personalty of God. They thus 
translate
' * • • die Idee des absolute^ in sich selbst gtgiuhdeten 
Seins . . .' (L11:4)
in a way which puts the words ' absolute’ and 'being* together from 
their separation in German, and capitalize them, so as to mace 
'Absolute Being', i^nqp^ng of course, God. In the context here, this 
results in G>d not the finite person (as Sclhller intends), being 
possessed of freedom via having a stlf-iyttnldtd being. It is the 
latter position which corresponds with his earlier stated view of the 
person being ltempoeill and transcendent (L11:2), or as Kant would put 
it, having a supereeensible aspect which makes man essentially 
unconditioned wlhlst living in a conditioned world. In terms of what 
Sclhller has said so Iit, problems a) and b) above remain unsolved 
however. (He will address problem a) in Letter 19$ problem b) is not 
resolved or even explored.)
Sclhller tells us that whereas per3oin.lity is self-roumded, the 
concdtion is externally grounded; not however in personality as one 
might expect, but obscurely, in 'Time' , (with the creation of maeer-al 
reality by the 'Absolute Subject* or God, now suddeinly forgotten by 
Sclhller)*
'The Concdtion ... mutt have a ground other than itself; it 
out, since it does not owe its existence to the Person . . .’ 
'And so we would ... have the condition of all contingent
•7
being or becoming, that is to say, Time.' (Li 1:4)
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In investing time with this objective logical status, grounding the 
maeir.a and phenomena dimension independently of the person,
Sclh.ller breaks from Kant, who saw time as a subjective fora of our 
intuition. For SChLller, time has an objective ontological status, 
whist for Kant, it has a subjective epistemologgcal status. Both, 
in their different ways, conceive of time as condtiorning the way 
the phenomena world appears for us, for the person's or ego*B 
ea^eihence; but for Kiant, there are other equally important 
conditions of the phenomena, such as the form of space and the 
twelve a priori categories, not just the one corndtion, 'Time', as 
Scthller redutively asserts.
As the Letter continues, Scthller mces it more clear that the 
person is identified with the ego:
'The Person, which manfests itself in the eternally 
peraisting 'I' . . (L11:5)
What Scthller says about the person, seems derivative in part from 
Kian's theory of the ego as the transcendental unity of apperception,
Q ’
in the Critique of Pure Reason. Tths, put simply, is the idea that
the self or I, is the permanent ongoing unity, at the centre of all
our diverse experiences. All particular experiences are the
experiences of the self which transcends any one of its experiences;
which in relation to their fjniteness, particca^-ty, and limited
transient nature/, is infinite, uihversal and permainnt. Fichte takes
this idea over, but develops it so as to mace experience ultimately
grounded in the ego itself, as the non-ego ' opposited' to itself by 
9
the absolute ego , in order to have an object to know, and an arena 
for wora activity.
Having logically distinguished the concepts of person and 
condition, Sccn-ller now proceeds to logically relate them. Be tells 
us that personalty per se, as the ego, is an indeterainate pure form, 
it is potential being only, devoid of realty. Its real existence and 
determinate being is only as a phenomena being, in a particular 
oondtian in time:
' • . . man is not just Person pure and simple, but Person 
siiuated in a particular Conation. Every Ccoidition, however, 
every determinate existence, has its origins in time; and so man,
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is a phenomena, being, must also hive a beginning, although 
10the pure Intelligence within him is ^^eer^. ’ * • • • without 
becoming, he would never be a determinate being; his 
Personalty would indeed exist potentiHly, but not in fact.* 
(L11t5)
The ego receives external mlteral reaLity into itself t^hrough the
process of perception. In the course of receiving ill this transitory
miterEa, the ego remans constant, ind his as its activity, the
organisation of Hl this mleerua into some unity, as theoretical 
11reason demands. The subject forms this mlteral, raising it from the
particularity of sense data, to the unl'ee:r3£ll.ty end signi-fiance of 
thought.
’The mltert of activity (^^^3 . . . man his first to 
receive • • • by of perception, is something existing
outside of him in spice . . ’This changing miter.! within 
him is lcocv^>^anLni by his never-changing ’I’ - and to remain 
perpetwaiy hiamelf tthr^ou^gout all change, tn convert nae tint 
he apprehends into experience, ieeo to organise it nato a unity 
which has signifitnce . . . this is the injunction laid upon 
him by his rational nature.’ (L11:6)
In L96, ScMller used the expression ’the divine impase to f om*.
Ve hear an echo of it now is he writes,
’ • . .we mut surely cHl divine any tendency whch his is its 
unending task tie realisation of • • • C and! manfestation of 
potontial • • .• (l11s7)
Tie egg also h^3 a footmtive tenddenc which is hire cded caniavtlt it
relLity, to reform eettearnlLty, atn in so ddoc^, to rtnaizer ddetrrmnn
and mhfest its self as a potential inner being, striving to become
actual outer being. (The idea of the ego* s t,nlttiomohh to the mon-egu
involving an ’tmendixgf’ activity of striving, again reflects tie 
12strong influence of Piohte’o The Science of Knorledge here.)
In the two above quotations (from Ll1t6 and 7), Schller is saying
it is ftmd.loonnal to human being to relate to the world in two ways ; 
one whch is p<tsiw/, tie other active; one which is recipient of tie
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external/, the other reformative of the external? one subjectifying 
objectivity/, the other objectifying subjectivity. Vhat he is doing 
here, is laying down the groundwork for the development in the next 
Letter of two tundiInemi^a drives, corresponding in their aims, to 
these two basic ways of relating to the world. In ^tter 13, he will 
go on to argue that the two drives wodc optimally when they 
interfunction. He now proceeds to lay down the groundwork for this 
liter position too.
In Schiller's view, both aspects of man, his personalty and his 
oon(d.ticntd being, must be given ^111x1,1^ on, and their ictuHity 
itqhlies hheir combbimlion, for each has something hhe other both 
lacks and needs. Persomlity per se, or the ego, in abstraction from 
sensuous mteera in the form of perceptions and sensations, is an 
empty form, devoid of reil content, and remans an unrealized 
potential being. Our sensuous nature per se, or our cyndltiomtd 
phenomena being, in abstraction from hhe ego's formative activity, 
is mere miter without form:
'His Personalty, considered for itself Hone, tnd independently 
of til stist«^lnttmi8tL, is merely the predisposition to a possible 
expression of his infinite Nature; and as long as he has neither 
perceptions nor sensations, he is nothing but form tnd empty 
potantii.. His Sensuous Nature, considered for itself alone, 
tnd opart from tny spontaneous activity of the mind, can do no 
more than reduce him ... into matter . . .* (L11:8)
Peeling, desiring tnd willing of i purely natural kind, do not give 
reilizitian to the self. Whist mu’ is sensuous nature is the ego* s 
means of realizing its potential, this sensuous being itself requires 
the ego, in order to make any realization, any volition, the 
individiua’s own, viz. i reiliziticrn whLch pertains to his personlity:
'As long as he mjrely feels, merely desires tnd acts upon m^-re 
desire, he is is yet nothing but world . . .' 'True, it is his 
Sensuous Nature alone which can turn this potential into actual 
power; but it is only bis Personalty which mikes ill his 
actual activity into something which is inil^mibly his own,' 
(111:8)
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(it is noteworthy that ScMller now clearly identifies the
'Conditicni* with our 'Sensuous Nature. This maces it all the more
surprising that in Letter 27, Sduller attempts to aesthetically
reconcile our sensuous/and rational natures, by reducing the former
nature to a faculty of the latter, the imagination. Here in tetter
11, Schiller still gives our sensuous being its full philological 
\13meaning, as the body*) '
S chiller now summrizes the position we have arrived at : the 
mutual necessity of both aspects of our fundnmntaa. human being, if 
we are to achieve the full realization of our potentiality.
'In order, therefore, not to be mere world, he mut Cintemny] 
import form to miter; in order not to be mere form, he mist 
give [external rea-ity to the predisposition he carries 
within him.' (L11:S)
Man (as ego), mut internHly form all that is outside him, and not 
simply po3sively receive it; and he mrnt externalize the universal 
form within him, objectively reforming the world about him, with the 
body as $he necessary instument of self-irerlizatiot in this process. 
The two processes, (which amount to cognition and volition, 
respectively), are intimately related as two aspects of the one ego's 
'predisposition’ to formative activity. Sclhller concludes the Letter, 
teling us that
'[There are] two fundamennaa. laws of his sensuo—rati canal nature. 
The first insists upon absolute reaLity ; he is to turn everything 
which is mere form into world, and make Hl his potenntHities 
fully manfest. The second insists upon absolute formaity : he 
is to destroy everything in hiraelf which is mere world, and 
bring harmony into Hl his changes. In other words, he is to 
externalize Hl that is within him, and [internally] give form 
to Hl that is outside him.' (L11:9)
Sclhller, then, cHls the two formative processes the ftltdamentH laws 
of our sensuo-rationH nature. Hwever, on closer inspection, they 
both have far more to do with the rationH side of man Hone : with 
the need of the ego to fnteitHly and externally form objectivity. The 
sensuous nature of man has only a secondary role in these activities,
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ts a mere 0611X8 : supplying the data for sensse-perception im the 
former activity; supplying the bocdLly power needed for the latter 
activity.
Schillers methodology in this Letter is open to some doout.
Neither logical relooming nor empirical nvidnmtn are very evident.
SciLlle^in analysing mam into two fumda^^^n^ natures, (each with
its own meeds, but with ultimately reconcilable functions), seems
to be t]ppeeiLing to our intuitive sense that this is the wwa imi ere
essentially. The origin of what he says, appears to lb bsaed coi Ois
own introspective intuition about our funda^^n^ psychological
structure and functioning. In a letter written whole revising the
Aesthetic Letters, he confessed to Goethe that tie psycholog^a!
mleer.al in the treatise was drawn from Ois own self-observation. 4
Tie a priori model of mam, is really just a picture of the essence
of human mature; it is not produced by a ’ tramscemdenta deduction* ,
but oust withim the tern of in introspectively based speculative 
15psychology. Meeh of tie argument of tie rest of the treatise will
rest upon this moddl of our essential mature; yet there seems no 
compelling reason to accept it,In pWilooohOlcal ter^. Ne veer he less, 
it my still provide significant insights into our nature, as well 
is into art imd its possible relation to moorlity end politics, 
despite this, or is Schiller might sey, even because of this.
LETTER 12
The ’Sense-drive*A the ’ffutmdrive*
In the list Litter, Schhller developed the motion of our having 
two fundimenn£aL matures, a rational mature based on the ego or person; 
and a sensuous nature, i.e. tie body, inked to the external sensuous 
world. The descriptive elaboration of tiese two natures, gave the 
first a supere (edible atanocenient being, as atemoora. end
onlfiroum’dei; and attributed the latter nature with i sensible 
phenomena, being, is temoora. and concdLtiomed. Although some movement 
was made by Schiller to drew them towards i unity by highlighting 
their mutiul. necessity im tie process of compete self-realization, 
be now once moire falls back to empphiszing their distinctness, and 
indeed their oppoostiom, (before in tie next Letter, again
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highlighting their ooaatibility).
Solhller now tells us, that we tre impelled by two opposite * drives’ , 
etch of which, seeks the complete reilizitiorn of one of our fundamental 
natures. Our sensuous ntture strives for compete railizttion, end the 
tottl doMirnttion of our being, through the sense-drive. Our rational 
ntture strives for coml-ate reaLizttion, tnd the tottl doMmtion of 
our bein^, through the form-drive.
' . . .we tre impelled by two opposing forces which, since they 
drive us to the realization of their object, my tptly be teamed 
drives. The first of these ... the sensuous drive, proceeds 
from the physical existence of mun, or his sensuous nature.' 
(L12:1)
•The second of the two drives, which we moy call the formal 
drive, proceeds from the tbsolute CunconddtionedO existence of 
mtn or from his rational ntture . . .' (L12s4)
Now we mty wonder what is the precise relatidiship hero, between t
•ntture' sad t 'drive*. One clue wlhch we have, is that in the ptsstge
tbove, Sclhller tells us that etch drive 'proceeds from' its
corresponding ntture. This mlces the two concepts logically distinct,
end im?Hes that t ntture, in some way, grounds or gives rise to its
drive. The drives tre also described as ' forces' , which drive us to
the ' realization of their object’. The concept of ' force’ implies
phyicil power, which suggests thtt the drives function at least in
part, physiologgcally, ts strong feelings. These strong feelings must
be of t rolttively permanent kind, for the concept of 'drive’ implies
tenqural dtutrbiiity, ts opposed to the temporary character of 8n urge 
2or impiuse. These strong feelings would be either of t purely sensuous,
or of a rationally s^d morally orientttei kind, us they sc’ os agents
to prosecute the aims of the respective natures they etch serve.
Hcorwver, there is a problem here, for wtereas one con envisage how our
sensuous nature might generate a strong feeling of a permaNent kind,
it is not at ail clear how our rational nature could do so. This is t
problem Sclhller shares with Kant, for the latter does not clearly 
3
explain how moarsL reason is able to generate moaroL feeling. There is, 
in other words, t ' gop’ that needs bridging between rationality end 
the domain of feeling. Neither Sclhller nor Kent, seems aware of the 
implS8Slillty of constructing such a bridge from t radically dullstic
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prem.se, (auoh as that which Selhllei's distinction of person/and
concdtion lays dowi). There are two further points to notice about
Sclhllei’s theory of drives. Firstly, it is not until L1^:1O, that
Scihllei even makes it clear upon it is that the two drives are
seeking to urge a totally rational or complltely sensuous course of
reaLization, namely the will, wh.ch we are then told, rather
mfsteriouly, stands 'between' them. Secondly, the precise status of
the drives always remans problematic, because at certain points in
the treatise, Sclhller also equates them with various faculties^", as 
5
welX rs with each of our two natures themelves.
Turning to dea first with the general aim of the smse-drive,
Sclhller tells us that it seeks to reduce man to a purely phenomena 
being, confined to a continuous flux of sensations in time. HLs life, 
under the sway of this drive is dominated by mteria realty, as an 
endless series of sens e-impressions, lacking any unity of the self,
'Its business is to set him within the limits of time, and to 
turn him into raTter . . .* 'By matter in this context we 
underetand • • • change, or reality winch occupies time.'
'This state . . . is caied sensation , . (L12:1)
By connecting the sense-drive with sensation in this way, Scihllei 
relates it to the senses and thus to our phreiologlca being, i,e. 
to our sensuous nature in its fullest sense.
In r way which is remftLscett of the first chapter of Hogel* s 
Phenomenology of Spirit \ Scihllei tells us that the life of bare 
sensation only has realty in the present mornem, giving rise to no 
lasting deteimLt^tiot, (being a passive, not r creative or formative 
state). The whole infinite potent in of pereoirntity is unreaized 
(except in one limited aspect, in one temporn mommet), for 
persoxrntity itself is absent as a unity, in this materia flux of 
sensations over time:
' • . • when man is sensible of the present, the whole 
infim-uide of his possible dete:rmiinatiatt is confined to this 
single mode of his being. Wlnerever ... this drive functions 
exclusively, we inevitably find the highest degree of 
limitation.' '• . • his Persontity is suspended as long as 
he is ruled by tensatfot, and swept aong by the flux of time. 
(112:2)
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Horever, the drive to i life of pure onnouutsneBs is essential to 
tie whole phenomm! side of maXs life, his very natural existence. 
Moor over, it is only through this ’ drlve-to-reaLity’ , as one might 
oalll it, that his rational being end formal aspect is able to achieve 
realization. But tie sensuous also limits this realization from 
achieving comheeeness, limiting reason to always achieving at least 
a partially sensuous realization:
*... it is ... to this onnototo drive tilt the whole of 
mix’ s hOenuoermal existence is ultimately tied. ’ ’. . . although 
it is this drive alone which ... develops the hotenna£al-ties 
of mam, it is also this drive ilone which mikes their compete 
fulfiment imphsslbte•’ ’• . . it binds ... spirit to tie 
world of oenon . . .’ (L12:3)
The sense-drive presses for reality of esioaencn ; for sensuous content; 
for reel purposes, emd a content to will. It could be celled the 
’ reali ty-drive’ •
’ TOouht may indeed escape it for the oomont . . . but suppressed 
nature soon ... presses for reality of existence, for some 
content to our knowing and some purpose for our doing.’ (l12:5)
Turning to tie form-drive, Sclhller tells us that it proceeds from 
mu’s rational nature, his ego or h®rso]naLity. It seeks to introduce 
harmony end form into his sensuous reilizaticmo; end within himslf, 
to provide en ongoing unity in change, unifying tie flux of temporal 
sensations.
’• . . tie formt. drive, proceeds from ... his rational 
7
mature , emd is intent on . . . brlmgj[lngD harmony into the
f
diversity of bis miXf©stations, end to effim his Person 
among Hl his changes of Ccoindtion.’ (L12:4)
In this passage, SdOller seems to simply identify the form-drive 
with the activities of the ego, so that his description of the 
form-drive repeats the account of the operations of the ego already 
provided in the list Letter, (fn the rest of the treatise, there are 
u number of places in which SobOller uses the terms ’nature’ or
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'drive* as though they were synonymoouj, in a rather loose way.)
9
In whit sounds like t pisssge from Hegge’s Philosophy of Right 
(written 25 years liter), Sclhller siys
’{The form-drive3 wants the reel to he necessary end eternal, and 
the eternal and the necessary to be real. In other word, it 
insists on truth and on the • right.’ (L12:4)
Wthit he is saying hem, is that the form-drive seeks to make the 
phenomena, become rational; and to mice the sal>:r3eIliiile become 
mn^e^st in the phenomnd. Put more simply, in knowing its aim is 
rational truth; in willing, its aim is to realize the moral low*
Conninuing to discuss the aim of the form-drive in terms of 
rational cognition end mortal volition, Solhller contrasts it, in this 
respect, with the sense-drive:
'If the first drive only furnishes cases, this second one gives 
laws - laws for every judgement, where it is i question of 
knowledge, lews for every will, where it is t question of 
actienL.' (H2:5)
In other words, wherets the sense-drive only provides endless
ptrticulir sensuous items of experience, the form-drive provides the 
universal principles whereby our judgement is enabled to subsume a 
particular sensuous representation under on tlpr:>pliite concept; the 
form-drive also provides the un-verstl precepts which enable the 
will to determine itself moraiy. Now there is t notable identification 
here, of each drive with the ntture it is supposed to ’proceed’ from. 
Sclhller is confltting the distinction of nature/and drive, to the 
extent of endowing the latter with the ability to perform the functions 
of the former (furnishing ’coses* end giving ’laws’). Sclhller’s 
position here, also represents a remarkable break frem the Kantian 
critical philosophy of mind. Sdn-ller has the sense-drive, rather then 
the faculties of sense (intuition tnd imogin.tion), furnish particular 
’cases’ of sensuous experience; he has the form-drive, rather than the 
faculty of understanding, provide laws and concepts for our judgement; 
finally, he has the form-drive, not the faculty of practical reason, 
provide the universal precepts for the moorl will. This represents a 
co]nsidnrtile sirnplification of the oomplex Kantian schema of ficHties,
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10reduoing it essentially to two -1x010^1 drives.
Sclhller contintns to discuss tie beneficial effects of tie
form-drive, but mow in teres of Oow (through promoing both rational 
cognition and moorl volition), it also develops our sensuous nature :
’• . • im both oases, we wrest this our concdLtfon from the 
jurisdiction of time, end endow it with • • • untveraality 
end necessity.* (L12:5)
The form-drive rescues otr phenomenal being from tie limits of a
purely temporal emd mlerill existence, by involving it in the process
of tie ego*s rational cognition emd moorl volition. Partfcittlar
onnotLOuo er^riences become endowed with umiveeriality fn cognition;
imd hltaitullr oenouLoto impHses become determined by universal
precepts in volition. The wloole men is able to know end will
rationHly wlhlst having beitg-in-the-world. The form-drive illcws
en essentially stperrBemaible being to remain. free, wlhlst yet acting
to realize itself in the sensible world. SolOHer ends this discussion
with a statement that echoes Kant’s view of tOe universal consequences 
11of willing it cotformty with the categorical imperative:
’• . . once yot ... practise justice because it is justice, 
then you have made at individual case into a lew for all cases, 
and treated one moment of yotr life as if it were eternity. ’ 
(112:5)
The particular emd hhenooeetl ire thus endowed with uitLveraElity, etd
raised to a supersensible significance, ^ratotntiitg tie lioiao of
t-om.
SclO-ller concludes the Letter, with a statement wOLch leaves no 
doubt as to where his sympathy lies is between the two drives:
’Where ... the formal drive holds swey ... we experience 
the greatest enlargement of being : Hl limitations disappear, 
end from the mere -unit of quantity to wo-ch tie poverty of Ois 
senses tndtced Oio, men Ois raised Oimelf to u unity of ideas 
embracing tie wfaoXe reilO of hhnnooorm.•’ ’Ve are no longer 
individtHo; we are species.’ (L12:6)
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The form-drive enlarges our. being beyond confinement to the
particular and sensible, towards what is universal and superaeraible. 
From rarely passively experiencing each particular sensuous datum, we 
instead determine all particular sensuous data via a unified system 
of laws, comprehending the phenomenal world, and freeing us from its 
conditioning, as we manifest our rational self-dLetemiration over 
sensuous determination by the p^nomema..
At the end of the last Letter, we sew how Solhller’s statements
affiming the mutual necessity of both aspects of our being for the
achievement of our full realization, on closer inspection, assigned
to our sensuous nature a very secondary role. In this Latter, we have
seen the form-drive discussed in a way which m^es it mans raans of
attaining truth in cognition and moraaity in volition, wlhlst the
sense-drive is seen by Sclhller as confining ran to * time' and * ratter’ ,
at best an unfortunate necessity for ma^' s rational realization. (This
is a view similar to K^I’s idea of mans sensuous nature, as being a
mere ,hincrnlce, to moral volition, raking the moml will a * dependent
will’.) As the Aesthetic Letters proceed, Sclhller increasingly moves
away from the ideal expressed in the earlier Litters, of harnomizing
mm's sensuous and rational natures. Despite recurrent claims
throughout the treatise, that he is seeking a means to establish their 
13equilibri-OB * harmony, he actually moves towards a rationmly or 
form—drive doimrated, asymmtrical relatiraship of the two sides of
ran.
Solhller’s theory of two fUidameniaL drives, has seme similarities
to Fichte’s theory of two primordal drives in The Science of 
14Kwoedge. g For Fichte, the two drives are the theoretical drive, 
which involves the inwardly directed self-reflective activity of the 
ego; and the practical drive, which is outworUy directed in moral 
activity to realize the ego in the non-ego. Fichte conceives of the 
two drives as thus striving in opposite directions. The two opposed 
drives 'meet* on the battlegrumd of the iranglnatimi, where they 
' oscillate’ in an * interplay’. In mi activity, a temporary 
equilibrium is possible through another drive to harmony (or 
’iIdLeteimliatimi’)• **5 Sclhller too, sees the drives as similarly 
essentially receptive/emd active, as iiier/aid outer directed; and 
also seeks to harmonize them through a third drive which establishes 
a temporary equilibrium of the two primary drives, through achieving 
a condition of indeternlration (in Letters 19 to 21). This condition
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has its reality in the aesthetic ’plsyf’ of the imagLmation (in 
tetter 27).
Despite the number of simiarlties here, those very few scholars 
who have at all bothered about the relationship between the 
philosophies of Schiller and Fichte, have mostly denied a connection 
between their theories of drives, on the ground that Fichte reO.ly 
onLy has one fUndamentsO. drive^®, not two, viz. the drive of the ego 
for realization in the non-ego. It is claiimed that there is no 
equivalent of the sense-drive. It is certainly possible to dispute 
this interpretation of Fichte. But, even assuming it is correct, we 
have seen that Sclhller too gives emphasis to mai's formal realization, 
the realization of the ego and mai's rational being in knowing and 
willing. The sense-drive is in a secondary position to the form--dr.ve, 
right from the tme of its emergence in this tetter. In the next 
tetter, and at various points in the treatise, Sclhller will talk of 
establishing an equullibrious harmony between the drives, but in 
reality, this is not to be seen as a harmony of eq-plity : in general, 
the form-drive increasingly damjrntes and subordinates the sense-drive 
as the tetters proceed. As much as for Fichte then, it is possible to 
argue that Sclhller ha3,in effect, one primary drive, and that other 
drives are secondary.
In the last tetter, we saw how Sclhller’s initially separate 
descriptions of our two fundamental natures, as involving on the one 
hand, passive receptivity to sense-impreesiont/, and on the other hand, 
an active reformative activity, were developed into a relaticrnship, 
involving the ego’s rational organization of sensuous kndecdg/, and 
its rational realization in the sensible world, respectively. This 
enables us to see these activities as involving a theoretical drive/and 
a practical drive, respectively, underlying both of which is the ego’s 
fumdsment£SL drive to self-realization in the non-ego. It is thus 
possible to argue (on a numter of levels), that not only does Sclhller 
take on Fichte’s distinction of the ego/and non-ego (in that of the 
person/and concdtion), but that he also takes on something of Fichte's 
theory of drives; and, as we sh^Ll see later (in tetter 19), Sclhller 
also mkes use of the framework of Fichtean epistemology.
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LETTER 13
The Mutui L-P-tation of the Two. Primary Drlens
Sclhllnr'o purpose in this tetter, is to argue for the essential 
compatibility of the se:nse-drivn ltd tie fore-drLve, for their 
necessary interfunctioning, if either is to carry out its own function 
fully. He begins by telling us that althcuiy the two drives have 
opposing tendencies, as i drive to reality/wii i drive to fore, 
nevertheless emlo seeks only tie mallzitiom of that side of max's 
being from wloLcO it derives. Thus the onnsn-irive does not ahtnaaet 
the ego's essential unity emd hetmlxeemce, whilst the form-drive does 
mot seek to do away with diversity emd change in oense-nxherlenoe.
TOe two drives io mot naturally encroach upon each other, but are 
complementary. Horeerer, civilizaticn, in its iep^tatrn from mature, 
has lei our drives to develop beyond tOeir respective bases in our 
two f^undu^^X^^ matures.
’The sensuous drive does indeed demand change} but it does mot 
demand tie extension, of this to tie Person emd its domain 
. . .' ’TOe formOl drive insists om unity imd pers-steice - but 
it does not require the Condition to be stabilized as well 
as the Person, does not require identity of sensation. TOe 
two ire, therefore, mot by nature oppcoied; and if they 
nevertheless seem to be so, it is because they hive tnooon 
opposed through t wanton transgression of Nature ... confusing 
their spheres of operation,’ (L13:2)
In a footnote, Solhller tells us thut one drive should mot be 
sutordimatei to the other. In plttitulur, the onnotouo drive should 
mot be outurdlnated to our rational being, (en illusion to Kant's
moorl hhllQSOhOy):
*... by unoonddiioneeLly subor<d.tatitg the oenotuts drive to the 
rational.’ ’ • . • only uniform-ty can result, never Ourmoony, ind man 
goes om for ever being divided. Suborcifxntion ... mut be
reciprocal.’ (L15:2, fo. 1)
The ideal relation of the drives, them, is for them to be
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reciprocally related, in a reloti<nlship of mlt’otl soio:id.n^■timi and 
limitation, so os to enable a co-oidiiated full realization of the 
whole mm. Here, Sclhller appeals to Fichte for philosophical 
suppo:’’:1
’Both principles are, therefore, at once subordinated to each 
other and co-ordinated with each other, that is to say,they 
stand in reciprocal relation to one another % without form 
no mater, and without mater no foam. (This concept of 
reciprocal action, and its fundameniEaL importance, is adm^l^ly 
set forth in Fichte’s The Science of foaorledge, Leipzig, 1794.) 
(H3:2, fh. 1)
Bach drive has its own proper sphere, which is excluded from the 
dcomim of the other. Both drives suffer a lack of compete realization 
if one domnaes the other. They are both mutuaiy essential to the 
full realization of the self, and the compete human being of their 
* oranr’.
’Necessary as it may be, therefore, that feeling should have no 
say in the realm of reason, it is no less necessary that reason 
should not presume to have a say in the realm of feeling. Just 
by assigning to each of them its own sphere, we are by that 
very fact excluding the other from it, and setting bounds to 
each, bounds which can only be transgressed at the risk of 
detriment to both.' (H3:2, fn. 1)
It would seem so far, that in Sclhller’s ideal model of the
ielaticmship of the two drives, they conjoin, but do not fully combine 
in the sense of interpenetrate. They man tain an external reioti<Kship 
with each other, rather than uKL’e in a synthesis in which they lose 
their separate identities.
Ik a second footnote, Sclhller implicitly criticizes Kerni’s 
mppomStimi of natural inclination to rational duty in his moorO. 
philosophy. In such a view, our sensuous nature becomes a mere 
•hindrance* to our ratiaiol being, mein? the moirO will become 
’ dependent* , and • clogged’ by sensuous impediments to its rational 
sel^J-—c^^eemiiari.on.
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'In the transcendenta method of philosophizing « • « one easily 
falls into thinking of maerial things as nothing but an 
obstacle, and of imagtitg that our sensuous nature, just 
because it happens to be a hindrance in this operetion, mut of 
necessity be in conflict with reason.’ (L15:2, fh. 2)
In Sclhller’s view, it is education which has the important role of 
developing both drives, within their proper spheres. Our sensuous 
being needs to be developed, and protected fr<m doImimtisn by the 
form-drive. Our rational being needs to be developed, and protected 
from ddmmtion by the sense-drive. Sclhller sees the development of 
a drive as being itself the provision of protection for it vis-a-vis 
the other drive. Thus the educative process involves fully developing 
our capacities to feel and to reason.
’To . . . secure for each of these two drives its proper 
frontiers is the task of culture [education] which is . . . 
duty bound to do justice to both drives equaLly : not simply 
to maintain the rational against the sensuous, but the sensuous 
against the rraionna too.* ’. • .by devveopiing our capaccty 
for feelinn ... Laudldevveophnm ouu cispcity for reason.’ 
(Ll5t2)
Sclhller proceeds to elaborate how he conceives of this dual 
educative process, in a long but important paragraph, concentrated 
with significant points. It is cotveItivtt to first deal with it as a 
whole, and to then ppck out sphcifec phOlte to noticc. The generel 
msaaiing of wlwh he hha to say oca be saumerizzV in the following way. 
Our sensuous nature needs to be developed extensively, in order to be 
made receptive to apprehending the marietm breadth and variety of 
sensuous experience. In contrast, our rational nature needs to be 
intensively developed, to comprehend and unify in a svlfdVeVeeLining 
way, the mrteerial apprehended by our sensuous nature. The two modes 
of development are clearly csm?.h■«Jmvttsry, for the reception of a wide 
variety of stimuLating sensory experiences, will furnish the ego with 
novel material to conceptually organize and tItiey*
’ • . . the perfection of that faculty which icnntets man with 
the world will have to conist in maximum ... externd-ty. ’
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*. . . the perfection of tOut faculty which is to oppose change 
will have to be eexioum uutcniooy imi 0x10110 intensity. The 
more facets Ois Receppivity develops . • • so much more world 
does mt uppMOemd.’ *. . . the more freedom Mason attains, 
so etch moom world does men comprehend education
will tOeM-ore comist, firstly, in htuc■trlmg for the Mceptive 
faculty tie most eatfold contacts with the world . • • ; 
secondly, in securing for tOe determining faculty the highest 
degree of lnldnhendence from the Mtehtlve . . .* ’Where both 
these aptitudes are conjoined, mum will . • . dtle . • . into 
WlosI^ . • • Cthe] ftflmi'uide of phenomnxa, and subject it to 
tie unity of Ois Mison.* (L13:3)
Now it is notable tOut OeM in L13:3, the drives of Li 3:2 suddenly
become referred to is ’fitultleo,, but without emtiom of any
hattictlat faculty by time (in tie earner of KaX). It is as if tie fore 
2imi sense drives also function as fltultlno , a view which cotreohondo 
with L12:5, where SdO-^ler taLk:ei of the for:e-dtivn providing concepts 
for cojgnLtlon, ltd universal precepts for moorl volition, vie. 
fulfilling wist for Kant are tOm roles of two different faculties, 
those of undeM tending emd hrae^tical Mason Mspectively. SchOller 
appears to io sway with Ke^X’s cooler ocOnol of fecuZL’ties end replace 
tOeo with a siop-er model bused on two fumdamnnal drives. Huwner, im 
Letter 26 onwards, tie Ksextian faculties ezxplicitly emerge,
as tOe understanding end tie leag-mthot, which provides some
evldemce for a ’break’ between tie hhlloolohhy of end underlying tie 
5
earlier and liter Letters of the ’Metise.
Another point to notice in the ibove passage, is tOut Sclhller
identifies our sensuous being with Moeptivlty/, our person or ego 
with rational coeht>honmhon of what the former being provides. Thus we 
see our sensuous being become tnduted to the cogm-t-ve hruteso of 
apprehension.; whilst our rational being is identified with
toshreh«tsion. Now if Sclhller is foll<wlng Kain’s mcolel of the 
* atlnocendental synthesis of ieeegfnahon, , in the first edition of the 
Critique of Pum Reason.. tOm it is mot surprising tOut by LS27t4, 
Sclhller is able to Miuce our oenotuuo being end its drive to the 
faculty of ieagnaeicoX’ uni our rational being emd its drive to the 
underttam:dL^g, for in Kurt’s lfoteelnmtloned mdol, the htucnos of 
apprehension is executed by tie iOBtgnalioV, emd tOut of coorehemaion
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by the umderetamdimg (in harmony with the imtgnttion). Thus we see
here in L13:5, the first indications of a process of reduction mode
in Letter 2ft whereby the whole of our sensuous being is reduced to
the faculty of imnglnatiom, and the whole of our rational being is
reduced to the understanding. In this way, the iunda^^i^^ division
within. mti, becomes resolvable, as a mere coHict between the
faculties of apprehension and cmm>liLh^eKimn. (Schiller probably
derived Kimi’s distinction of opprebensimi/tnd oomqrihenniom, from
the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement in its treatment of the 
5
’MOhenmtiictl Sublime* , rather than from the Critique of Pure Reason 
first edition, ts he would hove rend the second edition of the latter 
work. However, this does not akfeot the argument I put forward here,)®
Sclhller now moves from the plame of the ideal model of the drives’ 
rel^or^:^<mship, to look nt the reality of their relotienahip in 
contenpo:iaiy man Be also mores from looking o’ the ideal of eeo<cttion 
to its oontemporary real deficiencies. He begins by telling us thot 
although nature intended the two tides of mti, with their respective 
drives, to woidc in harmony, in practice., we see one drive drnmi^i’e the 
other, and either reason supplant the function of sense, or vice versa:
’ But moi con ruri these relations upside down Cand] let
his sensuous drive encroach upon the formO,, and mtke the 
receptive faculty do the work of the determining one. Or . . . 
let the form drive encroach upon the sensuous, and substitute 
the determining faculty for the receptive one,* (l1):4)
S duller sees in modern ’civilixed* man (the product of Enlighteiment 
rationalism tnd on over-refined culture), a tendency for reason to 
enervate sensibility and feeling. We all agree, he says, thot it is o 
negation of true humnnty to aUcw reason to surrender to sense, but 
equal damage is done to our full humoity when reason encroaches on 
feeling and sense. In scientific endeavour, we impose our rational 
constructs upon noture and foil to see it os it is, in all its 
semauoouness. Im m>millty, we become obsessed with the form of our 
willing, the umlverea]iLry of our precepts, and lose the ability to 
em?lt’i■ie with others.
*The pe:imiclooLa effect, upon both thought ok— notion, of on 
undue aorremeer to our sensual mature will be evident to
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aH.’ *. • .no less impootant, is the nefarious inel^vnie 
exerted ... by a preponderance of ratidnaity.* ’• . . [and] the 
damage caused when the functions of thought and will vtirosii 
upon those of intuition and feeling.’ (l13s4» fn. 1)
’ However strong ... the inqact made upon our organs sens^ 
by nature, ail her manfold variety is then entirely lost upon 
us, because we are seeking nothing in her but w^t we have put 
into her . . , thrusting ouraelves out upon her with all the 
impatient atticipaticma of our reason.’ (Llj5s4» fn. 2)
’How oan we, however laudable our precepts . • • be just, kindly, 
and human towards others, if we lack the power ... of feeling 
our way into the si'uation of oohees, of^ Bakinng therr vshpee’s 
feel^:ngs our own?’ (L13:4, fn 3)
Sclhller criticizes the corwitimnal view of a ’character forming’ 
education, as involving the blunting of sensibility through the 
one-sided instillaticrn of rational principles. To lose ote,s capacity 
for natural feeling, maces one deaf not only to the needs of the rest 
of htmatty, but alao deaf to the needs of our own itmlamty:
i
’But in the education we receive ... this power Eof feeling)
gets repressed in exactly the ^^^ure that we seek to break
the force of passions, and strengthen character by means of
principles. ’ ’ • • • we « . • try to mae charaater secure by
blunting feeling . . .’ ’And this, for the most part, is the
operation that is mewt when people speak of forming 
7
character . . .’ 1 ’A mn so formed will ... be armoured, by 
principle against all natural feeling, and be equally 
inaccessible to the claims of iumatty from without as he is 
to those of humanty from within.1 (L13:4» fn. ))
Keeling, then, is an important part of !^'t it is to be fully human : 
its loss or suppression, is a loss or suppression of our humanty 
itself. We become enervated beings living a haf-life. Sclhller takes 
the view that the man who is a tyrant with iimlsVf, suppressing some 
aspect of his own nature, will be a tyrant with others, suppressing 
them:
’. . . the man who is lenient to others will also be lenient
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to Oimelf; emd Oe who is severe with himelf will be the saee 
with others.’ (L13:4» fi. 4)
There is em implication here, that internal person! suppression leads 
to external social suppression. TOe cultural end ndu<tltiotal suppression 
of the individual is perhaps connected with the political suppression of 
society. (TIoLs would corrnshonLd to tie view that Seth Her put forward in 
14:5 emd 5.)
Although Sclhller Ois said ouch in this ^tter concerning the 
educative meed for both drives to be invelohnd emd so confined to their 
proper spheres, Oe has yet to describe precisely tOe means for 
effecting this. In tetter 16, he will talk: of two existential types of 
beauty which wiH prpro.de the oeeais, maoely ’melting* beauty end 
’emerg-zing’’ bebnet• Yete here in tetter 13, Oe proceeds to talk us if 
our sole meed is for the rel axing of our drives (emd that by
implication, we need only melting beauty). Sdiller t^Ous seeos to
anticipate the fact that after tetter 16, he will oOt energizing
beauty from any futthnt discussion, so that meting or relexltg beauty 
becomes syn^ot^o^ with beauty, as if there is really only one type.
’Both drives, tOntefotn, need to have limits set to them and • • • 
meed oo he memod. 5 Oee sense-drive so that it does not encroach 
upon tho doioenof law, the formal drive so that it does mot 
encroach on tOut of feeling. ’ ’• . . Pereomlity out keep tie 
sensuous drive within its proper bounds emd receptivity, or 
Nature, eist io the seme with the forol drive.’ (l13s6)
Both drives then, out be limited in scope, end this involves relaxing 
tOeo down froe being drives to whet we eight call ’ tendencies* • The 
oensn-drive oust not tike over the function of thought ; the fore-drrlvn 
out mot tike over the function of feeling. From Scliller’s account, 
it is clear that the controlling limit on each drive’s activity, is 
the oppoos-te nature of our being. Thus our person or rational mature 
out limit the onmse-dri ve, wilst our sensuous nature out limit the 
scope of the foto■<OltLve.
Howver, there ire difficulties im this view. It would oneo that 
natO of these natural controls eist be !reaiy developed aspects of our being 
in order to do the necessary controlling. The drive control function 
of etch of our natures woli seem to presuppose that each is well
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developed, and so capable of acting as a powerful check on its 
opposite nature and its drive. In other words, the harmonious 
reciprocal relationship of the drives Schiller seeks, presupposes a 
harmony between the two aspects of our human nature. But, we may 
wander, how do we get to this position in the first place?
Having said in the early Letters of the treatise, that modem man 
is either a savage or a barbarian, viz. is one-sidedly developed in 
his human nature, we may wonder how this can be corrected by the 
scheme here, which presupposes both aspects of man are developed and 
powerful enough to counter the drive of the opposite side of our 
nature. In more concrete terms, how for example, does the undeveloped 
and suppressed sensuous nature of the barbarian, re-assert itself to 
check the over-mighty • out of bounds’ form-drive of his developed and 
suppressing rational side? What Schiller describes above will not do, 
except for an ideal humanity, yet to be achieved. What he has described 
above, will maintain an existing equilibrium, but not create harmony 
where it does not yet exist.
However, to be fair to Schiller, we must remember that despite 
occasional forays in footnotes into the empirical realm, he is in this 
Letter, for the most part, describing the fundamental features of the 
Idea of Human Being. In other words, although he has lapsed into brief 
discussions about what is wrong with contemporary man and his education 
he is still, in the main, supposedly ’deducing* an a priori
psychological model of the essence of human being, by assigning to it 
various drives and describing their relationship. The discussion of how 
beauty may function as a corrective to the forms of one-eidedness men 




The ideal relationship between the sense and form drives is, as we 
have seen, conceived by Schiller to be one of reciprocity. In this, 
each drive activates the other, but also sets a limit to the scope of 
the other’s domain of influence, confining it to its own proper sphere 
(the aspect of our being from which it derives). Each drive only
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achieves its fuLl development and realization through the complementary 
activity of the other.
’We have nw been led to the notion of a reciprocal action 
between the two drives, . • • Lso) that the activity of the one 
both gives rise to, and sets limits to, the activity of the 
other, and in wlh.ch each in itself achieves its hi£»st 
mntfestatisn precisely by reason of the other being active.’ 
(L14«1)
Sclhller now tells us that the achievement of such s reciprocal 
relaticrnship of the two drives, is a ion<:dLtiat demanded of us by 
reason.
’Such a reciprocal relation between the two drives is, 
admitedly, but a task enjoined upon us by Reason . • .’
(114:2)
Now this is a rather curious position for Sclhller to take up. On’s 
first thought is that he is attempting here to ernppoy Keait’s notion 
of theoretical reason regulating our faculties. Hcwwvvr, such a motiom 
is inappropriate for Sdhller, as reason is a ’party to the dispute’ , 
as it were, in Sclhller’s rather different philosophy of mind. Our 
rational being and its drive (the form-mve), is part of wtet needs 
regulating into a reciprocal relation with our sensuous being. The 
issue is made more conpld^, because Sclhller adds that the reciprocal 
relation of the two drives is the ideal state of ma^'s nature, an ideal 
which he otsfat-to-ee, but oan never actually achieve:
’It is, in the most precise sense of the word, the Ides of his 
Human Nature, hence som>thimn Infinite, to wh^ch in the course 
of time he csn approximate ever more closely, but without ever 
being able to reach it.’ (1,14:2)
Now this idea of a rational demand to achieve the tnaclh-evable, mikes
the esse, in Kgyitian terms, seem to be one enjoined tpsn us by practical
reason t that we should achieve moral perfection, viz. become a moral
will. Kant ^oo, saw this ss a miter of appraximtion for ’dependent’ 
j
Ulls like oure. But how osn we equate a demand that men should realize
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the moral law, with Scthller’s idea of a psycholcojicsLl.ly optimal 
ordering of the relation of our drives? What has the latter got to do 
with practical reason? The answer is provided by Sclhller at the end 
of this Letter, where he discloses that the optima relation of the 
drives is conducive to the realizability of mualL^'ty. Wat he does then 
is move the focus of practical reason's iml>eralive from moral willing 
itself (as in Kat), to a demand that man should achieve that 
psychologim! cmcdtion which is conducive to moral volition. This is 
one stage ’back’, as it were, from moral volition itself. Sdhller 
then, not for the first or Last tjtae in this treatise, bmows a 
ooncept from Kant and puts it to his own different use.
It is also rather strange that Sclhller should now say that the 
Idea of Human Being, wthch in Letter 10 was described as the a priori 
essence of man, is unachievable. Hesaizations of any kind, would be 
from this essence, as their bads. Moreover, whereas up until now, 
whenever he refers to an 'Idea1, for exmqle the Idea of Beauty, he
2means something which has both a transcendent and an immrnent being ,
here he seems to make the Idea of Human Being more radically
transcendent. It becomes an ideal model, a Platonic Idea or primo3a&al
archetype, which we can only reflect, but never actually realize.
Howver, under anaysis, Scthller's Idea of Hman Being, is neither
simply equatable with a Platonic Idea, nor as we have seen, with Kauf s
concept of moraL perfection, the moral will. It is an ideal
psychologlca clncetiln, an optimal ordering of the futeamenta
structure of the human mind. It has more in common with Kart's
technical concept of the ' common sense' in the Critique of Aesthetic 
3
Judgement/, with its idea of an optimum proportionate reLat ions hip 
between the facuties. But Kant certain^ did not attach an inceraUve 
to such an optima menta functioning; it is coggntively desirable, 
rather than moraHy necessary.
Sclhller takes the view, that as long as ohy one of our two 
primary drives is deveLoped and realized at the expense of the other, 
or if they are realized separately in an alternate mamer, then man 
falls short of achieving full humnnty; he does not conform to what 
he ought to be, to his ideal human nature.
'That he does actuary conform to this Idea, that he is 
conequartly, in the fullest sense of the word, a human being, 
is never brought home to him as long as he satisfies only one
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of these two drives to the exclusion of the other, or only 
satisfies them one after the other.’ (L14’2)
There my be some criticaem here of Fichte’s position in The Science 
of KrKorlecdn^♦ that the drives mut be satisfied by turn, and then 
never coeeleeely. The expression ’never brought home to him’ in this 
passage, implies that awareness of the full self, i.e. full 
svLf«crotscicuane8S, is a product of mn achieving the optimal relation 
of drives which Sclhller equates with full humsnty. The im^erSive to 
achieve this optimal concd.tion, is thus also a requirement to achieve 
fuLl self-consciousness. The importance of the achievement of full 
self-consciousness, and its 111^1^ with ftndyeevtaSl human being, is 
again stressed in Letter 19, where Sclhller lr-tvs:
’Only of him who is com,iicts of himelf can we demand Reason 
... whvereality of consciousness; prior to that he is not 
a human being at all, and no act of humsnty csn be expected 
of him.’ (L1^s11)
That no act of huminty can be expected of him, implies that in 
Sclhller’s view, there is a threefold colntection between 1) the 
achievement of the optimal relation of drives, 2) the achievement of 
full self•cscmaciotaness, and )) the possibility of morality. Thus 
Sclhller instead, of merely applying the morrl impeerhive to our 
willing ss such (ss Kant did), also applies it to the conchtisms of 
such motaSl volition being possible at Hl, viz. selfioota3cictlsneaa 
snd ilreony between the primary drives.^ And, not mly to subjective 
coned, tions of motaSL willing, but ilso its objective conedtions, for ss 
we saw in Letter ), Solhller talks of the motaal necessity to abolish 
the Natural State and establish i Morel State, (of. L5:5). Scthllea1a 
position is more complex and regllistic than that of Kean, in this 
wider view of the necesasay comd.tiona of morel willing, snd wider 
view of the ippli.cabelity of the morel imperetive to such conc&tions.
Having established a morel requirement to sutheve avlf-cotaciotsness, 
ind harmony between the drives, Scthller now larcveda to the means 
whereby this condition my be achieved. He tells us that when man 
exercises both drives simultaneously, he is aware of his enr’a 
selfddetemination, viz. his freedom is s person to realize snd 
determine him elf; at the same time, he is slso aware of his sensible
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maerial existence, This involves a self-conscious awareness (of both 
a rational and intuitive kind), of one’s compete human nature, Now 
Schhller implies such a whoHstic or total self—oonsciousness, is 
externally generated by a symolic object, an object wlhLch by its own 
harmcon.ous combbration of form/and sensuo-usness, in turn harmoiously 
activates both these sides of owreelves in its rodentim, In its 
harmony of foiay/and sense, such an object sets before iu a s^md of 
what we ouraelves ought to be, oou ideal being
'Should there, however, be cases in which he were to have this 
twofold eaqprienoe simuLtaneously, in which he were to be at 
once cn^cious of his freedom and sensible of his existence, 
were, at one and the same time, to feel himelf ratter and 
come to know himslf as mind, then he wouLd in such cases, and 
in such oases onLy, have a complete intiuLtion of his human nature, 
and the object which afforded him this vision would become for him 
a symbol of his accomplished destiny , , ,' (l>14s2)
Now when, in this w^y, through such an external sypbolic object, 
the two primary drives co-operate in concerted activity, they give 
rise to a secondary drive, the combined psychological product of their 
activity % the play-drive, The play-drive is not seen by Solhller as 
merely a passive product of the other two drives com^irn^t^;ion; once 
activated, it reacts on each of them, determining them to a new 
modified form, ensuring and developing their co-operation in harmony 
In other wor&3, the play-drive, once activated, is a power in its own 
right, Referring to the effect of experiencing appropriate symbbUc 
objects, Sclhller says
'• • , cases of this sort , , , would awaken in him a new drive 
which, precisely because the other two drives co-operate within 
it, would be opposed to each of them cnwidered separately 
, , ,’ 'The sense-drive derands that there sha.1 be change 
, • • the form-drive demands , • . there sha’ll be no cha^e, That 
drive , • . in which both the others work in concert , • • the 
play-drive , , . would be directed towards , « • reconciling 
, , • change with identity, ' (L14*3)
The sense-drive demands change and sensuous content, The form-drive
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demands identity and rational form. The pLay-drive, as the product 
of their combiLnl;ion, provides rational identity in sensuous change 
in the subject; and a fumed sensuous content in the (beautiful) 
object. What ScOh.lloa is doing here, is laying down the groundwork 
for later Letters, in which he will discuss beauty* s ability to 
reconcile the rationaL/mid sensuous in man, harm oozing his atomporrLl 
transcendent aspect/end his temporraL phenomena. aspect; thus achtoviti 
a psycho lo^glcal ground for moral volition which is evoked through the 
apprehendon of objects which themselves embody a formal and sensuous 
har^c^r^. In other words, he will interreLate our optimal psychological 
coned.tion, with the perception of beauty, and the possibility of 
molralty.
In what is both a difficult and important passage, Sc^hllor teHs 
us that,
'The sense-drive wants to be determined, wants to receive its 
object; the form-drive wants itself to determine, wants to 
bring forth its object. The elly-erivo, therefore, will 
endeavour so to receive as if it had itself brought forth, and 
so to bring forth as the intuitive sense aspires to receive.' 
(114:4)
The sotse-daive wants to be externaLly determined by a sensuous object, 
receiving it into itself. The form-drive wants to externalLy determine 
the self qua ego, realizing it in objectivity, by reforming the latter to 
solf-lonfolmLty. The play-drive is receptive of an object wh.ch is not 
mrely an object as such, but a reflection of the self brought forth from 
subjectivity and realized in and as an object. It is determined by 
something which has been already re-formed by itself, to refLect itself 
qua the harmony of form and sense. The past tojnso of ' to receive as if 
it had itself brought forth' , is thus central to interpreting the me£atlti 
of the passage and for understatditi its siinificstlco for the play-drive. 
The object whch determines the subject, and which it receives, is a 
subjectified object, which has already been re-formed by its
solfedeeeCTliti.tg volitional activity. Such a subjectified, essentially 
formaL object, is an art object. The elay-e.rivo 'receives’ in aesthetic 
contemeatiot, and 'brings forth' in artistic production.
The meaning of the above passage can be further clarified, in terms 
of the process of artistic production and aesthetic contomeatiot, by
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reference to s plsssnv in Sclhller’s article reviewing Matehsaon*s g
nletre or lsmdaclle poetry. There is s plsaagv in this article, 
where Sclhller whtes
, there are ilnys two demnds which no lree worthy of the
maee csn avoid : First he mist leave the imagination free play
snd selfdieterainltirn, snd secondly he mut stimulate s
specific setsltion snd be certain of his effect,’ 1Hrw does
the poet overcome this contradiction? By this t that he
prescribes for our full i^yn-mstirn no other pith thin that
which it would have to take in its freedom snd follwing its 
7
own lews , . .’ ’
What Sclhller is saying here, is that the poet must form his raSerial 
so is to leave our imsnLmetion scope for free plsy, yet suggest 
definite snd achieve specific emotions in the reider. He does
this by providing a form the imagLrnetion of the reader wouLd hive 
produced for itself in its freedom, (This ides puts one in mind of 
Hjem’s view of the Selee paovi.dinn laws which the individual would 
hive willed for himslf, so that he avmits free in obeying such 
laws.X An i^m^<^3r;s^,t aspect of the poofs technique is also to leave 
the determination of ideas snd feelings incoeplete, leaving free the 
imsgLnation of the reader to compete them for himslf. Ths is 
rb■\V.ct3ly s freedom within lav-ordeavd limits, carefully designed by 
the poetic nvtits to give the iiuusion of full freedom to the reader.
Now if we return to the lssssge again (l14x4)» the crucial sentence 
of it concermLtg the play-drive, csn now be read in the lfght of the 
above discussion of poetry’s cavltiol/8md llp3acCatirn. (I will use 
Pod^t^’s translation here.)
’The play-drive is stiirnd to receive [in aesthetic
ionte-n^lseiolD is it would itself have [freely3 produced, snd
80 Caeseietically3 produce in the way sense aspires to receive 
In[viz. to produce aenstct3ly embodied framS^.’
The meajnLng of the passage osn now be stated in the foUding way.
The play-drive is the lsych>logi-oal basis of aesthetio irnteml&tion 
snd artistic production. In its receptive aspect (aesthetic 
iontemllSe.on), it seeks to receive forms in s way which although
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ttri-iete2mited by the artist alrtaiy, still leaves the contempator 
free and selfdietdmining, as the artist has produced a form in the 
manner the recipient wouLd have done had his own imag-notion and 
understanding been given full true frtted<p• In its active aspect (in 
artistic produccion), the plty-irivt seeks to produce sensuous forms 
(lhtnoptmtL configurationi), the kind of forms the senses strive to 
receive (and thus not, for example, abstract gtomptrioal forms such 
as triangles, etc), This short and difficult passage is impootjait, in 
that it is the ody time in the treatise, Schuller mazes it at all 
clear (*) that the play-drive is the basis of both artistic production 
and aesthetic sontep>latiln; and not meekly one or the other, or some 
much wider concept which has no special relation to aesthetic 
perception or to art,
The concept of the play-drive receives a more full development, and 
one rade more epistepologicotLly complex through the mecd-ation of 
Fichtean terminology, in Letters 19 to 21, The crucial idea developed 
in these later Letters, is that it is a concdtion of psychic 
»itlietermLtation,. Although there is no direct reference here in
Letter 14 to this more complex concept of the play-drive, one can 
nevertheless foresee its development in the passage quoted fr<m 
L14:4, if one views it as the posing of a philosophical antinomy (in 
the manner of Kant in his Critiques), When Solhller, here in Letter 
14 says
'The sense-drive wants to be determined • , , the form-drive 
wants itself to determine • , •' (L14*4)
one can see, perhaps, how this right be ' resolved* , if the play-drive 
is a state of lndeterri.mttion between being determined/and determining,
In another difficult passage, Sclhller tells us that the effect of 
the unfettered sense-drive on its own, is to succumb the whole psyche 
to the necessity of natatu. TTe effect: of tf wh,ettefet torrdrivi 
on its own, is to impose on thh psychp t^la^ rat ioaal ^aoesecey of rnoram 
precepts, The primary drives thus separately exercise two types of 
constraint upon the whole of our being ; subjecting it either to 
natural or moral necesesty. Non the phif-Halve, iv their combiro^^z^on, 
exerts a double, but at thh sam tim, m^tuaiy poddfyitg constraint:
12
'Both drives , • • exert constraint upon the psyche; the
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£senso-erlve 3 through the Laws of nature, the Cfoim-drive 3 
through the laws of aelslt. The play-drive, in consequence, 
as the one in which both the others act in concert, will 
exert upon the psyche at once a mora and a physical 
comtraintj it will • • • annul Hl cortltraitt too, and set 
man free both phjyicHly and morHly.* (L14:5)
The idea of the play-drive both exerting and lttulliti constraint, at 
first seems contradictory. The pLay-drive will exercise upon the whole 
psyche, both a moon.1 and physical cutraint, but will also set man 
free physidLly and morUy, by remoon-ng the comulLion from each.
What Sclhller is getting at here, is that the combiina;iot of drives 
in the pLly-eaive st3eti£hets each side of our tatuae so as to be 
capable of withstanding the drive of the oppooite side. They mhuHly 
mtiilte each other* s power qua drives, reducing their lppolitional 
com>eUsion3 to cotelementlry tendencies. What we Hght cHl the 
* de-eaiviLIi** of our sensuous nature, enables our feelings to be 
ClmaltL^le with rational ideas and mrH precepts. The *ee-dsiviIi.* 
of our rational nature, removes the harsh compuLsion of reason and 
mooraity, in relation to sense, reconciling aelsot and moora-ity/with 
the life of the senses.
’CThe play-drivel to the extent that it deprives feelings and 
passions of their dynamLc power ... will baitg them into 
harmony with the Ideas of reason; and to the extent that it 
deprives the laws of reason of their moonl comeUsion, it 
will reconcile them with the interests of the senses. ' (D14:6)
Despite appearances, what Sclhller has in mind here, is not some
mutnaL ’ neutering' of feeliris/ame reason, to force a harmony between
the two sides of our being by creating a diluted and rather enp^ty
third neutral state of beiti (in which we wouLd be both oneavatee/ate
amooH). What he has in mind is a harmohous conjunction, in which
each primary drive retains power within its own .lep:r^p3rLate sphere,
but where each is able, by its own deveLoped power, to restrain that
of the other. It is a mater of what we could cHl a ’ bHance of 
13powers' aaaaniemnt. Bach power is strong, but this enables it to
curb its opposite from being encrlachlltily too powerful. The two 
primary drives thus not only complement each other in function, but
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through the plsy-drive regulate esch other’s growth and development.
The reciprocity Sclhller envisages between the drives, is dynamo, 
with each drive functioning at s high level. The result of their 
interaction, is s caeltivv-rvceltivity 4 which promotes aesthetic 
realOIneVcrealivity, snd s harmony of avsson and sense wlh.ch is 
conducive to morel volitoon.
It is notable that in L14:5, Sclhller introduces the term ’psyche*
(Gemt) into the ervltise, is that which Sil three drives, snd both
types of necessity, sct upon. Wilkinson snd Willoughby suggest that 
" 15we should understand the psyche to be the whole Mnd. Homer, this
creates the problem of how drives which operate within the mind, snd 
ire thus urt of the m.nd, csn yet sct tlon the whole mind. What the 
drives ire suting upon, mu3t be lrn±illly distinct from, snd more 
specific than, the whole Mnd. The concept of the psyche is therefore,
I suggest, better understood in marrcler terms ss the ego. .
It may be objected, that the ego is the ground of the frrm-da-ve, 
snd too closely linked to thst drive to be acted upon by it. Hwwver, 
we hive already seen in Letter 12, how the activity of the ego ultimately 
grounds both primary drives (snd not merrily the ^^-^^6); snd here 
in ^tter 14, Scthller has mde it clear that the ego or psyche is 
recilrr<iSlly effected by what it grounds, experiencing necessity snd 
constraint when effected by one of its drives, snd freedom when effected 
by both in the plsy-drive (of. Letter 14:5). In Letter 21, Sclhller 
tells us that
’. . . The psyche my be ssid to be . . . determined itsseuii as it 
16limits itself, by virtue of its own absolute power. ’ (L21:3)
Sclhller here identifies the psyche with that aspect of ms^’s being 
which is uncornid timed (or absolute). He also implies ^hat the drives 
whLch either retimally or semstc^t3ly determine it, ire nrcutded in 
itself, ss modes of its own either active or receptive activity, so 
that it Ulemately determ.nes or limits itself.
The earlier concept of the ’leaaon1 (in Letters 11 to 13), aeeearvd 
to the one-sidedly rstimal ego, which ws closely sasrciated with the 
form<brLve. Through the fuLl awareness of its wh^^e humsnty, achieved 
by the itleeasction of reason ind sense in the plsy-drive, the ego 
bvcceea fully self•■ctotsciots. The psyche then, denotes the fully 
svlf•iconacioua per8omaJ-ty, the persm who has integrated his sensuous
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ieitp and its drive, into his concept of the self* It is for this reason 
that, having now developed the concept of the play-drive, we hear 
little more about the abstractly rational ‘person* in the treatise*
From now on, Schiller favours the team ‘psyche* , to denote the more 
compete and stlf-cottciout being at the centre of all our activities,
By intrDiusitp the concept of the psyche, Sclhller is more 
explioitly lsychololjpLzitp the sense-drive, dip.it.shitg its phyiologLcal 
aspect * The fundtwntal division within our whole being, between our 
rational/sensuous natures, which w^ highlighted in the early 
Letters of the treatise, now bee ernes a p.srosotm.c division within the 
mind, involving the ego or psyche being beset by two opposing
lsycholoJ^pLcal drives* The focus of the division has thus tarrlwei* a 
process of reduction weice will be competed in tetter 27, when it 
becomes a rare coinf^Jict between two cognitive faculties *
In teams of Sclhller’s *t^:tmtcendenttl‘ philosophical enterprise,
as outlined in tetter 10, Sclhller has now established what is warns
rundawntaL human nature, The next step, is to establish what is
logically tecetstry as a conedtion of its realization, viz* the
play-drive activated by Beauty* Now there is a problem in this
enterprise concerning the logical status of the plty-irivt* For
Sclhller maces it clear that it is not a fundapntaL drive, but a
derivative secondary one* Is it, then, part of the a priori mdel of
our human being? Initially one may thUnk that there is no reason why
it should not be seen as derivative and secondary in the sense of
being logically deduced within the context of an a priori modi, and
so still be itself a priori in status* How there are two problems here :
1) The llty-irivt is not logically deduced but rather lsychol(oPc^tLly
asserted* 2) The llay<-irivt is externally generated or evoked by a 
17beautiful existential object ', so that its being derives from a 
posteriori experience, Its logical status, as a priori or a posteriori, 
is then, at best aP^iguolU3* but the tviittst points to its having 




Beauty ss ’Living Form1 : The Objective Cooreeative of the Play-Drive
In this ^tter, Sc]h.llea is concerned with the eranscendentH 
deduction of the Idea of Beauty frem the Idea of Hums Being, viz. 
frem the a priori model of our ftndsmennal human nltuae which he 
believes he his estsblished in Letters 11 to 14. Be will llsr briefly 
discuss how the Ides of Beauty avlaeea to existential beauty, snd how 
the concept of the plsy-drive avlatea to the reality of the plsy-drive.
He begins by telling us that the object of the sense-drive is ’ lUe’ , 
which he describes as sensuous mterial being in general. The object of 
the form-drive is said to be ’fora’ , viz. the forml cheasCerrstics of 
being in general. The object of the plsy-drive, coebenitg these two 
laiesay drives, is ’living form* , which it this stage, he defines 
simply ss the aesthetic q-iuULties of being in general.
’The object of the sense-drive ... we call lii*e • . . 
designating all mleer-H being snd all that is iemeeiaSely 
present to the avnaea. The object of the form-drive ... we 
cHl form . • • which includes ill the formal qualities of 
things snd Hl the relations of these to our thinking faculties. 
The object of the llsy-drive • . . may therefore be celled 
living form t s concept aeavitg to designate Hl the aesthetic 
qullties of phenomena end, in a word, what . . , we call Beauty.’ 
(115:2)
In the description of our two laiesry drives in the above passage, there 
is in interesting movement frem subject/to object/back to subject. Thus 
we hive the sens e-drive/whose object is mlter/perceived by our ’senses’. 
The eoam-daivv has/form is its object/and this is referred back to the 
’thinking facultiea,. The question of interest here, omcems how 
Schiller conceives of the relationship between the two subjective 
elements he comlecta with esch type of object. Are the subjective terms 
aynlrnyeolt3? In earlier Letters, we hive seen Sclhller apparently identify 
s drive with s nature or s faculty, snd here would seem to be another 
ilstemce of this. Again it is l<r^sible to see in this, the gradual 
identification of our svnstrts/and rationH natures, with the sense/and 
form drives, end frem this, their identification with the faculties of 
avnae/smd thought. But csn .we equate our aetatrts nsture, including
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the body, with the faculty of sense in this way? Sclhller's reductive 
process is being continued, and subtly reinforced by the repetition 
of related terms to function synonymoosly,wlhle he is seemingly dealing 
with some other issue (here, the deduction of the Idea of Beauty).
Sclhller does not intend us to understand the concept of living form 
in a literal way, by interpreting it simply as the orgeahcsaLly 
structured. Quite lifeless stones, he tells us, can become the living 
form of sculpture. Qute live things, having an organic form, e.g. the 
human being, may yet lack beauty and that dynamic relation of form and 
mUerial content that we recognize as beautiful only when we 
experience it.
'A block of mable, though it is and remains lifeless, can 
nevertheless, thanks to • • • the sculptor, become Kving form; 
and a human being, though he may live and have form, is far-j
from being on that account a living form.' (l15:3)
What Sclhller is getting at here, is that the mere conjunction of 
fom/swd mUerieaL content will not itself produce beauty. Ve know that 
form and content are necessary, but they are not sufficient, conch tions 
of beauty:
' ... because we know how to specify the elements wlhch when 
combined produce beauty, this does not mean that its genesis 
has as yet in any way been explained; for that would require 
us to understand the actual manner of their comhuLng, and 
this • • • remains for ever inaccessible to our probing.'
(H5s4)
Because, then, we know the two factors wlhch combine to produce beauty,
viz. form and sensuous content (or ' life* ), only meara that we know its
necessary ingredients. But we do not know how or why sometimes their
relation does, or does not, produce beauty. They are necessary, not
sufficient contritions of beauty. The process whereby they become
sufficient in their mutual relation, is unkworabbe. We can only
recognize beauty when we see or hear it in expsrienoe, a posteriori;
2we cannot formriate it in advance, a priori. But this may raise doubts
about the viability of Sdhller’s attempt, in this Letter, to 
3
traLmoendennsally deduce an a priori Idea of Beauty.
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In L15!5, there is an interesting sentence, where in relation to 
our judgement of human beauty, Sclhller tells us that
* Only when his form lives in our feeling and his life takes on 
form in our unde:rJtaniinp* does he ieccmt living form; and 
, • , we adjudge him ieauttf1U3L*’ (L15?5) ~
Vhat is interesting here, is how Sclhller deliberately mi.spltshet the 
aspect of the object/and the aspect of the subject who perceives it. ' 
Thus form is related not to the utde:rJttniitp as one expect, but
to feeling; and life (sensuous mater), is related not to our sentient 
being, but to the utd<trIttnii.nP* This device serves to empphaize the 
interaction and reciprocity of drives and natures at work in the 
perception of beauty, Hcoewr, it seems to be at some variance with 
L13:4» in which Sclhller sondtpnei the determi.titg faculty doing the ' 
work of the receptive one, and vice versa, Moor over, the play-drive 
was supposed to keep each drive confined to its own sphere, and not 
to involve an exchange of functions in this marner,
The above passage is also notable for its early reference in the ‘ 
treatise, to the faculty of the utde:rtttnditp (one of the facunties 
in Ka^fs critical philosophy of m.nd), Beauty itself is described in 
Kantian terms here, as involving a subjective judgement of taste, 
based upon the rtL.atiotteip of the fasuTtitt of sense and utde:rJtttditp 
Following the iitcustiot in L15t2, cotcertitg the objective referents 
of the drives (i.e. ’life’ and 'form*), we have here a discussion of ' 
their subjective 'inner' references, We see the itpittitp of a tendency 
by ScleLller* to incorporate the two sides of our being and their “
respective drives, into a more Ksanian view of aesthetic experience, 
couched in terms of an interrelation of facunties (a view fully 
developed in Letter 27), :
Sclhller tells us that, in phLlosophLcaL terms, the rational 
necessity of the concept of the play-drive lies in it being a logical ‘ 
sonci.tion of the completion and cleerttcy of the concept of Baman 
Being, ^^a^on (in the manner of Kean), demands competeness in our 
knowledge, The exclusive operation of one drive leads to imperfection,; 
liLpitatiot* and itclp:)Petenets in the concept of Human Being, The 
play-drive is thus a rational necessity for the perfection and 
coupleeeness of the a p>rdori moddl of our futdappntal human nature,
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'Reason, on transcendental grounds, rakes the following demand t 
Let there be a bond of union between the form-drive and the 
raneehal drive; that is to say, let there be a play-drive, 
since only the union of reoLity with form « • • maces the 
concept of human nature ooDnhete. Reason mut make this demand 
because it is reason - because it is its nature to insist on 
perfection and on the abolition of ail limitation, and because 
any exclusive activity on the part of either the one drive or 
the other leaves human nature incomplete and gives rise to some 
limitation within it.’ (L15s4)
In this passage, Sclhller appears to conflate what is a logical
necessity in terms of achieving coherency for the concept or Idea of
Suman Bern/, and what is a psychological necessity, in order to make
existential - human nature cornpleee. He talks of both necessities here,
4
without clearly distinguishing them.
Sclhller's talk, in the above passage, of 'Reason'oaking a 'demand* ,
in the sense of a mtapthesea imprative, is i^napp;^3^3^^'te. He is 
again borrowing from Kant's critical philosophy, where reason urges us 
to absoluteness of cognition and volition, viz. to completeness of 
knowledge and to moral willing. How S chiller has not philosoplhcally 
established reason as anything more than our rational nature. tooeover, 
for Kant, reason demands moraL perfection, not psychological 
completeness and harmony. Indeed, Ka^'s view of moral perfection 
involves - in Schiller* s terms - psychological disharmony, through its 
doMnanc© of reason over sense. In addition, the demand of reason for 
us to overoome limitation in our being, for Sclhller, involves the 
achievement of self-detImLination resting on the basis of limitation 
and determination by nature (as we shaLl see in Letter 19); a concept 
of selfddetemination qhLte foreign to Kart, and mich closer to that 
of Fichte. Thus Schiller here, is hiding behind Kan's philosophy, in 
order to secure support for his own different philosophical purposes.
Sclhller next discusses his usage of the expression 'play-drive* t
'But you may long have been tempted to object, is beauty not 
degraded by being made to coiwist of mere play and reduced to 
the level of those frivolous things which have always borne 
this name?' (L1$; 6)
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Schller justifies the term ’play’ in play-drive, on the grounds that 
it indicates the connection between beauty and freedom, viz. living 
fora* s ability to free us from the antagornstic opposition of the 
sense and form drives, and from the natural/and rational necessity 
they respectively seek to impose upon the psyche. 'Play’ indicates 
beauty’s liberating effect on the psyche, and the harmoihous 
co-operation it establishes between the two sides of our being:
’This term is fully justified by linguistic usage, which is wont 
to designate as "play" everything which ... imposes no kind of 
constraint either from within or from without. Since in 
contemplation of the bejaitiful, the psyche finds itself in a 
happy medium between the realm of law and the sphere of physical 
exigency, it is . . , divided between the two, CandH removed 
from the constraint of the one as of the other. ’ (L15s5)
In employing the terms ’ contemplation’, ’ happy medium’ , and ’ removed’ 
here, Sclhller appears to modify his concept of the play-drive, so as 
to mace it become a third neutral state of quiet contemp-ation, lying 
carefully between the realm of rational laws/and natural constraints. 
This view of it, as involving a blissful repose in a happy medium, is 
somewhat escapist and passive, lacking the dynam-c reciprocity of the 
earlier play-drive concept (of. Ll4:1), which involved an interaction 
of the two primary drives, where each expanded - yet contained - the 
other to achieve its ’highest mannfe station’ (l14:1).
However, paraioxically, Sclhller now attempts to combine the above 
view of the play-drive, with the idea of it being dynamic as well. He 
proceeds to tell us that aesthetic play between our two natures and 
their drives, maces us whole, while expanding the two aspects of our 
whole being:
’. . . it is precisely play and play alone, which of all mm’s 
states and concdtions is the one which maces him whole and 
unfolds both sides of his nature at once. Wtht you ... call 
limitation, I . . . cHl expansion.’ (L15s7)
Hcorever, wlhle this restores some dynamism to the play-drive, it does 
not restore its fuLl reciprocity, which the image of it an providing 
a ’removed’ ’happy medium’ for the psyche, to some extent undenmnes.
In an irnpprtant passage, Schller directly employs Kantt s division
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5of three types of pleasure, in the O3r.ti.que of Aesthetic Judgement,
This enables him to distinguish vhat ve might caLl an 'aesthetic 
attiuide* to objects, from a ton-<tfthetic attiUlde towards them, He 
identifies an attiUlde of 'earnesUness* , in which ve relate to objects 
in t^;ms of their being either sensuously *tgrtet^le' ,/or else as 
rationaLly 'pold, , or ’perfect’ instances of a kind, This contrasts 
with the aesthetic attiuide of ' play*, which later, in Letter 26, is 
revealed to be associated with the conte]tplation of aesthetic semblance, 
In the attiUlde of earnestness, ve are cotcerttd with the maerial 
existence of an object, wlhlst in play, the mere appearance (or 
semblance) of beauty is enough^
'• , , the apreetiLe* the good, the perfect, with these man is 
meertly in earnest; but with beauty he plays,' (L15*7)
(The concept of ’play*’ here, is, of courae, inseparable from the
play-drive, It is an elucidation of that 'happy medium’ between
rational/and natural corn traLnts, which the psyche enjoys through the
play-drive* s balttcitp of the two primary drives influence on the
psyche, freeing it from either a prtpltdefItltly rational or sensuous 
n
ttptptp<tnt with objects,)'
According to SchUler, our experience of play and beauty will usually 
be defective, Indeed, he goes further, and states that we stt never 
experience the full reality of the Idea of Beauty; nor can we ever 
experience the fullness of the play-drive (which alone can create or 
appreciate such ideal Beauty), Our experience always falls short of 
the Idea or pure rational concept of ease*
'... in actual life we should , • • seek in vain for the kind of 
Beauty with which we are here cotcerted* The beauty we find 
in actual existence is precisely what the play-drive we find 
in actual existence deserves; but with the ideal of Beauty that 
is set up by Reason, an ideal of the play-drive, too, is 
enjoined0 upon man , , ,’ (L15:7)
Sclhller next proceeds to reiterate his basic definition of Beauty, 
in the follwing teims;
'The beautiful is to be neither mere life, nor mere form, but
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living form, i.e. Beauty . . . absolute formaity and absolute 
reality' (l15:8)
How there is a major problem with Sclhller’s definition of Beauty as 
' living form’ , for it is simply not sufficient to enable us to 
logically or empirically distinguish beautiful objects from any other 
kind of phenomena, for all existential objects are varying combraaions 
of form and sensuous content (there being no phenomena object which is 
either purely materless form, or purely formLess miter). It is 
difficult to see how, then, Sclhller can hope to delineate a distinct 
species of beautiful objects from this concept of Beauty. Hence his 
necessary recourse to a distinct psychological state in aesthetic 
experience, to connect such inadequately delimited objects to. By means 
of the concept of the play-drive, he attempts to psychologically 
distinguish, the effect on our primary drives of the experie^nce of 
beautiful objects/, from the effect on them of experiencing objects 
which are not beautiful. However, if Sclhller is unable either to 
logically or empirically distinguish the objective causes of these two 
types of experience, can he coherently distiiguish their psychological 
effects? ,It seems unlikely that having failed to logically or 
empirically distinguish the objective cau3e of aesthetic experience, 
Sclhller can then hope to base a psychologically distinct effect upon 
it.
Perhaps, however, Sclhller’s distinction of 'earnestness'/end ’play’, 
can provide him with a subjectively grounded, purely psychological 
bnis, for distinguishing an aesthetic mode of expedience from other 
modes of experience, a distinction based on an ' aesthetic attiuude' (of 
play) we bring to certain objects as opposed to others. Such 'bringing 
to', cannot surely be arbitrary though, and mist be related to certain 
(aesthetic) qiualties in certain types of object. In any case, Sclhller 
usually talks of aesthetic play as being activated or evoked by 
beautiful objects, viz. that play is not so much brought to objects, 
but is again an effect of experiencing certain types of object. Thus 
the need for Sdhller to adequhely conceptually delimit beaitiful 
objects reman.
Sclhller conceives of a very close connection between aesthetic 
play and the achievement of full humnnty. Indeed, each is asserted to 
be a condition of the other : man cannot be fully human if he does not 
aesthetically play; and man cannot aesthetically play unless, or until,
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he is fully human,
’• . . man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the 
word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when 
he plays.’ (l15*9)
’With beauty man shUl only play, and it is with beauty only 
that be shaLl play.’ (L15:S)
Now given Schiller’s views in otters 5 and 6, that moderm man is a 
mere ’fragment’ of a human being, these statements would seem to 
imply that contemporary man can neither play nor experience beauty. 
This raises the problem of how modeem man can ever experience beauty, 
ever come to play aesthetically, and so become fully human. There 
mist be some suspicion that Sclhller’s statements here, may close the 
door to human progress.
The important question miust now arise, that if man only 
aesthetically plays when he is fully human, then in wheat mamer does 
he experience beauty when less than fully human? Sclhller’s answer,
I think, lies back in L15:7 (and later, in viz. that in
relation to objects of beauty, partial man is in ’ earnest’ in various 
w^st, only relating to beauty in terms of the ’agreeable’ , the ’good’ , 
or the ’perfect’. But this raises the further question, as to how the 
experience of beauty can raise fragmentary men to full huraanty, and 
change their aesthetic attitude from earnestness to one of play? The 
solution to this irnplied end/means problem here, would be for Sclhller 
to make ideal Beauty and the ideal play-drive (of L15’7) the end, and 
existential beauty and the rejUity of the play-drive be the means to 
their achievement. In other words we get to the ideal by irnperfect 
means
Sowerer, wlhlst Sclhller does talk of a less than ideal existential 
beauty (in L15?5 and 7, as well as in L22:4-4, we are given no concept 
of a serviceable less than ideal play-drive, to either create or 
contemplate such inferior beauty. Inferior beauty wou.d involve an 
xven~lrep>omderlmce of sensuous content/or of rational form in the 
object, compiling us to judge it in terms of the ’agreejUe’/, ’good’ 
or’perfect’ . But wlhat could an inferior plly-dnivl be? It could only 
be play mixed with llnmestmesB, a hybrid play in relation to a hybrid 
beauty. HowTOr, such ’ ’aranst-play’ would be indstinct frm ondimany 
play of a mxn--es8th’tic variety, since for Scthller, it is its total
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lack of earnestness which distinguishes aesthetic play from other 
10kinds* In other words, if Schiller accepts the concept of a less 
than ideal play-drive, he makes beauty no more educative or important 
for human development, than for example, card games. It would seem 
therefore that Schiller must not dilute the concept of the ideal 
play-drive, or else aesthetic experience in its subjective aspect, 
is not psychologically distinguishable from other types of experience 
which involve an element of play. This is important, for as we have 
seen, his concept of Beauty as ’living form’ is insufficient to enable 
aesthetic experience in its objective aspect (as the contemplation of 
beautiful objects), to be logically or empirically distinguishable 
from our experience of any other kind of object. By his talk in U5:7, 
of the play-drive being in practice always less than ideal, Schiller 
is in danger of failing to either subjectively (psychologically), or 
objectively (logically and empirically), delimit a specifically 
* aesthetic’ domain.
If the concepts of’Beauty’ and the ’play-drive’ are to be 
philosophically useful to Schiller, they must have meanings which are 
reasonably definite. Schiller attempts to give beauty a definite 
meaning by grounding it in the play-drive, as its objective correlative. 
But this makes it all the more important, that the concept of the 
play-drive itself, should be logically distinot in its meaning. This, 
for the reasons discussed above, entails that it must only function in 
an ideal way : it cannot create or experience beauty which is less than 
ideal. This results in the ideal play-drive being narrowly identified 
with the creation and contemplation of fine art, a view which 
corresponds with Schiller’s description of its functioning in L14:4.
However, Schiller wants to operate both definite and relatively 
indefinite, ’ closed* and ’ open*, meanings of both beauty and the 
play-drive. He wants to be able to talk about either concept in a 
narrowly defined way (in their ’ideal’ modes), but also to be able to 
branch out from this, and investigate the aesthetic aspects of a variety 
of phenomena, and of diverse domains of human experience, which entails 
a much wider concept of the aesthetic and aesthetic experience. Thus 
the reason why Schiller employs the (’ open*) concept of a less than 
ideal play-drive (as expressed in L15:7)» is that he does not, in fact, 
want to delimit a specifically aesthetic domain, or at least not one 
which narrowly relates the ’aesthetic* to fine art. Thus while fine 
art is ideal beauty, and is related to the fullness of the ideal
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play-drive, Sclhller intends the 'aesthetic* to be understood in much
wider terms. There can be an aesthetic aspect to many kinds of object
(their formal aspect), and an element of aesthetic play involved in
other types of play, or mixed with serious actotittes. Sclhller then,
does not want to delimit a specifically aesthetic domedn : in a
post-modenhst way, he wishes to point to the enseheeic qualities in 
12all dimemions of phenomenal being. There is ecttully nothing new in
this position from Sclhller's view, as right from the point where he 
introduced the term to the treatise, he defined living form in very 
broad terms, es
'. . • a concept serving to designate all the aesthetic 
quhities of phenomena , , (l15«2)
Just how very widely Solhller conceives of the aesthetic qualities of 
being, only becomes fully apparent in tetters 23, 25, 26 and 27, where 
it includes such things as the ordering of our physical life, 
ornlmcaSalion, love between the sexes, and ultimately, the Aesthetic 
State.
There, is some evidence of an ' aesthetic break* between the earlier
and later Letters of the treatise. Up to tetter 19, Sclhller talks of
beauty as the means for the aesthetic education of man, and relates it
to a narrow concept of aesthetic experience in terms of the play-drive.
in Letters 22 to 27, we see the aesthetic defined more widely in terms
of form in general, whist the play-drive is developed to become 'the
aesthetic condition of the psyche' in Letters 20 and 21, Form replaces 
13beauty; and a psychic state of 'indifference' replaces the dynam.c
reciprocity of bmic drives in the play-drive. it is as though 
Solhller, recognizing his inability to delimit beauty as * living form1 , 
and as a result of his unwillingness to limit aesthetic experience to 
the ' play-drive* , decides instead to adopt a much wider conception of 
the aesthetic, and one which simultaiaomly saves aesthetic education 
from being dependent upon, in beauty, a means of being effective, 
which already presupposes a high level of aesthetic education itself.
Schller concludes the tetter, by looking back to a time when men 
did play adequaely and were fully human. Play and hudi^y were both 
evident in the art and life of the ancient GraCcs, But they transposed 
and projected onto their gods, the aesthetic atti-uide of play. Thus 
the gods are depicted in Greek art, as neither subject to natural nor
109
m>ma. l^awis, but experience their sublltiom in the concept of
Necessity or Fate. Their calm composure and conteinplative attiuide 
(visible in Greek statuary), is an image of that ’happy medium’ 
(between the sense and form drives), that the llly-drive bestows 
upon the psyche.
’[The play-drive] w^ long ago alive and operative in the art 
and in the feeling of the Greeks . . . only they tralmsfernld 
to Olympus what was meant to be realized on earth.’ ’Both the 
material constraint of natural laws and the spiritual 
constraint of moral laws were resolved in their higher concept 
of Necessity . . .’ (Ll5*9)
Schiller ends the Letter with a psychological description of the 
lileril^mcl of aesthetic play. Ve are at once attracted to the object 
of beauty, and in our lack of lannestmess, kept detached from it. Ve 
are at once in a state of rest/end of excitement. The overaLl effect 
is a complex stirring of our feelings which is not expressible in a 
definite concept.
J
’Ircesistably moved and drawn . • . Icept at a distance ... we 
find muralves at one and the same time in a state of utter 
repose and supreme agitation, and there results that wondrous 
stirring of the heart for which mind has no concept nor speech 
any nam’.’ (l15*9)
Sclhller’s debt to Kaif s description of the ’free play’ of the 
facuLties in the judgement of taste, in the Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgement. is visible here, Kant described it as involving a 
’quickening’ of our faculties of feeling and imagination, accompanied 
by a mjutitud’ of indeterminate concepts in the understanding. In
contrast to Sclhlllr’s Fichtean epistemology and theory of drives, 
whenever he is cdscTu3sin? "the narrowly aesthetic (iee. tie experience 
of beauty), in th.B treatise, Schiller’s viwrs are, in the min, 
derivatively Keanim. HLs talk in the above passage, of aesthetic play 
involving ’utter repose’ and ’ supreme agitation’ , presages his 
discussion in the next Letter of two types of existential beauty, viz. 




Two &d.Btential Types of Beauty > ’Energizing' and 'Melting* Beauty
Sclhller tells us that the ideal of Beauty, as the correlative of 
the ideal play-drive, involves the perfect union and balance of 
sensuous con-tent and rational form. However, in realty, either form 
or sensuous con-tent predominates in beautiful objects, with the 
consequence that our experience is always of one of two existential 
types of beauty.
'We have seen how beauty results from the reciprocal action of 
two opposed drives , , ,' 'The highest ideal of Beauty is, 
therefore, to be sought in the most perfect possible union and 
eqiuilibrum of reaLity and form. This eq-uUbbrum • , , remains 
no more than an Idea, wlhch can never be fully realized in 
actuality. For in actuality we shall always be left with a 
preponderance of the one element over the other . • , in wlhch 
now reality, now form, will predomuae.' ' • , , beauty in 
experience will be eternally twofold • , (Li 6:1)
It was disclosed in L1 5*2, that beauty is the objective correlative 
of the play-drive. Beauty pertains to ^{aiuiful objects, whereas the 
play-drive is our subjective experience of either creating or 
contemplating such objects. Thus, when in the above passage, Sclhller 
says that ideal Beauty is the ' equLlibrum of reality and form’, 
implying balanced proportions of these two aspects of the beauuiful 
object, he is putting forward a view which corresponds to the balanced 
reciprocal relationship of the form and sense drives in the ideal 
llty-drive. Sclhller’s aesthetic model of Beauty thus corresponds to, 
or to be more accurate, derives from, his psychological model of 
subjective harmony. A balanced reciprocity is postulated, within the 
subject (between the sense/anid form drives); within the object of 
beauty (between its sensuous/and formal aspects); and between subject 
and object (in the play-drive' s production/and contemplation of 
beautiful objects).
The symmetry within, and correspondence between, the aesthetic and 
psychological mxdls here, is later adjusted by Sclhller, to create 
asyo]ootry wlhlst rahntaining correspondence. In L22:5, he mates the
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art object ’wbaiEOiced' , as form-dilm.rm^tld; leading to the
psychological dam.mnce of the form-drive, with ratiomaLity and 
^^^dl^ty as revised ends for man in the treatise. Thus, the ideal of 
aquUlibril in both subject and object, put forward here in Letter 16, 
is effectively lost from L22:5 o^gard^.
As the objective cxnn^lltivi of the play-drive, the beautiful object 
has a twofold effect upon our recilni<cally related primary drives. 
Beauty simuLtaoeowgly ’tenses’ (or strengthens) both drives, as each 
provokes the other to greater activity, and ’releases’ (or 
both drives, as each gives its oppose a checking power over itself.
’ . . .we must expect from beauty at once a releasing and a 
tensing effect : a rllel8img effect in order to keep both the 
sense-drive and the form-drive within proper bounds; a tensing 
effect, in order to keep both at full strength.’ (Li 6:2)
Sclhller may have derived the idea of a simultaneous tension and 
relaxation of both sides of our being, from a seimimgly unimpo:rrtlni 
passage in Kent's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, in which Kant 
describes the psycholojg.cH effect of hearing a joke recited:
’ ... thi joke must have something in it capable of 
momntarily deceiving us. Hence, when thi semblance varnishes 
into nothing, the mind looks back im order to try it over 
again, and thus by a rapidly succeeding tension and relaxation 
it is jerked to amd fro and put in oscillation, ’
Thi parallel increases, because in Letter 26, Schiller will describe 
artistic beauty as aesthetic ’semblance’ (cf, L26S5)* Im addition, in 
Li 6:1, Sclhller twice employs the term ’ iscillatOon’ , to describe the 
relation of sense and form in existential beauty.
Although ideally, Beauty will release amd temse both primary drives 
sin^U.ttnli'U5ly, to the same degree, im reality, Sclhller tells us, the 
different types of beauty will either tense more than release/, or
p
release more than tansi, as ’emargizOig’* /and ’meltingf’ beauty 
respectively,
’ [Ideally,] Beauty is to release by tensing both natures 
uniformly, amd to tense by releasing both matures uniformLy.’
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•But LinJ experience . . . it will always happen that to a 
greater or lesser degree, a preponderance entails a deficiency, 
and a deficiency a preponderance.* (l16s2)
Now following the earlier discussion, in L16:1, of the reality of 
beauty Involving either a form or sense dominated object, one would 
have expected Schiller to now assert a direct causal connection 
between the domination of form/or sensuous content in the beautiful 
object, and the preponderance of a tensing/or releasing effect on our 
primary drives. The form dominated object could strengthen the 
form-drive, our more active aspect, having a tensing effect; the 
sensuously dominated object could strengthen the sense-drive, our more 
passive aspect, having a releasing effect. However, Schiller wants an 
overall tensing or overall relaxing effect on both drives, and says 
nothing in concrete terms about the features of the object that might 
produce either overall effect. (This means also, that his discussion 
in I»16:1, of the beautiful object as being in practice either formally 
or sensuously dominated, does not clearly connect with his discussion 
of energizing or melting beauty, and so appears to be a somewhat 
tangential introduction to the main topic at issue in the Letter.)
It iB interesting that Schiller does not classify beauty objectively, 
by the predominance of form or content in the object, but rather 
subjectively, by its effects upon our psyche (as ’melting’ or 
•energizing* our two primary drives). He follows Kant in understanding 
beauty primarily in terms of subjective experience. This contrasts 
with, for example, Hegel’s aesthetics, in which major divisions of art 
into Symbolic, Classical and Romantic, are made with reference to the
3
three possible relations of form and content in the art object itself.
The ideal of Beauty involves a perfectly balanced unity of form/and 
sensuous content, and corresponds to a perfectly reciprocal play-drive 
relationship of the form and sense drives, in which they are both 
equally tensed and relaxed. In reality, however, beautiful objects are 
unbalanced in their relation of form and sensuous content, the play 
drive is unbalanced in its relation of the two primary drives, and 
presumably, the effect of these two imbalances is a predominance of 
either a tensing or relaxing effect on both drives. It is not clear 
though, from Schiller’s account, whether the overall tensing or 
releasing effect is due to an existing imbalance of primary drives, or 
is the result of experiencing an unbalanced object of beauty.
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Presumably It is both, as the latter would be created by the former 
(except in the case of natural beauty).X Hoeevr, Sclhller in this 
Letter only asserts that there '±s* an energizing and a melting type 
of beauty, and does not explain what their causes are.
'Ideal Beauty, thouX one and indivisible, exhibits under 
different aspects a melting as well as an energizing attribute ; 
but in experience there actually is a melting and an energizing 
type of beauty. ' (l16:2)
But in the next Letter, Sclhller does describe the causes of meeting 
beauty, in very general terms, as due to the effects of different 
predominances of sense and form in the object^, so that an objective 
causal explanation of meeting and energizing beauty has some w samant.
In this Letter, Sclhller partially resolves the fundamental problem 
raised in the last Letter, as to how the play-drive and beauty can be 
both an end/and means. For here, Sclhller describes existential types 
of beauty and experiential types of play-drive, which in their 
imbjala^<^<^8, clearly fall short of the ideal concepts of both. This 
confirms the interpretation that Sclhller wonts to argue for a 
progression towards ideal ends via imperfect m^^ns, (in Letters 24, 26 
and 27, Sclhller sketches a psychological history of man, in which we 
see an increasing adequacy of both aesthetic forms and aesthetic 
experiences, culminating in life in the Aesitheitie State.)
Beth energizing and meeting beauty can, in Scthller1 s view, have 
an overall negative effect upon character. EnerrgLzing beauty 
strengthens both drives, but the overall effect is a hardening of our 
sensuous side, a tendency to savagery, for our sensuous side profits 
most from the increase in strength. The effect of meeting beauty is to 
relax both of our drives, physical and moum, but again the greatest 
loss is to our sensuous being, so that our charmster becomes enervated, 
soft and lethargic.
’Energizing beauty can no more preserve man from a certain 
residue of savagery and hardness than melting beauty can 
protect him from a certain degree of effeminacy and enervation. ' 
'. . . the effect of the former is to brace his nature, both 
plhyical and moral ... CbutJ it can happen all too easily 
that ... our brute nature profitCs mccst] from an increase of
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strength • * .' 'And because the effect of melting beauty is 
to relax our nature, physical and roral, it happens no less 
easily that energy of feeling is stifled . . . Candl character too 
shares the loss of power • ••''••• CGntleness degeneraaesJ into 
softness . • « into apathy . , (L16:3)
It is curious that although both drives and sides of our being are 
said to be either strengthened or weakened, by each type of beauty, 
nevertheless it is the sensuous side wMch is affected m>st. TlhLs is 
presumably because it is the rnrst affectable, being the most receptive 
to external impressions. However, ScMller himelf provides us with no 
explanation for this.
ScMller scholars have noticed that after Latter 17, he omts
energizing beauty from further discussion in the treatise. The reason
for tMs, I, tMnk, can be discerned from a passage in this Letter.
For the mass of men who are dominated by their sensuous nature, or
for the ruling classes and intelligentsia who are dominated by their
rational nature (cf. the ' savage'/'barbarism' distinction of L4s6),
melting beauty by itself can weaken the overpower-iu! nature, and thus 
7
allow the suppressed nature the opporTziuhty to develop. Eneirg-zing 
beauty is apparently only required for those presumably very few mn 
who, through frequent exposure to beauty, are in a state of equilibrium 
between their sensuous and formal natures.
'The man who lives under the constraint of either miter or forms 
is, therefore, in need of melting beauty . . .' ' The man who 
lives under the indulgent sway of taste [the harmony of matter 
and form] is in need of energizing beauty . . .' (Ll6:3)
The man of taste, contetpPativn of beauty, and in a 'happy medium' 
removed from the constraints of rational laws or nature, is in need
Q
of jolting out of his apathetic state of 'indifference' . Cle&rriy,
ScMller can only envisage a very minor role in 'aesthetic 
psychotherapy' , as we may call it, for energizing beauty. The vast 
m^ac^orLty of men are not in a state of psycholcogLcal harmony and balance, 
but require meeting beauty to reduce either rational or sensuous 
predominances in their character. Thus in Letter 17, ScMller will 
only discuss the ability of melting beauty to act as a corrective to 
one-eidedness of character. (Perhaps another reason why Sclhller will
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concentrate upon the effects of melting beauty, is that it weakens 
the drives, macing harmony between them more obviously possible. The 
strengthening of the power of the drives by energizing beauty, may 
have male it a little more difficult for Sdriller to plausibly 
deIo>enlrate his overall thesis that beauty can restore psychological 
harmony)
In tetter 10, Sdriller put forward various viewpoints concerning 
the positive value or the harmful effects of beauty. He did not 
himelf take a view in this debate, but instead took a view of it, 
telling us of the need to understand beauty from a transcendental 
philosophical perspective, viz. in relation to the Idea of teauty. 
Haring transoenc^^r^tta^ly ’deduced’ the Idea of Beauty in Letter 15, he 
now rr-allerts the importance of this transcendent concept for 
understanding existential beauty. Br makes the point that disagreements 
over the infumice of beauty and the value of aesthetic culture, are 
principally due to people not differentiating the two forms in which 
the Idea of Beauty exists, and their different psychological effects. 
The value of each type of beauty will be relative to the type of humanQ
character it is experienced by.7 (in this, Sdriller implicitly equates 
aesthetic value with what is of psychological value.)
' « « • the discrepancy cooooely met with in the judgements 
people make about the influence of beauty, and in the value 
they attach to aesthetic culture. The discrepancy is explained 
once we remember that, in experience, there are two types of 
beauty . . .’ 'And the discrepancy is resolved once we 
distiiguish a twofold need in man to which that twofold beauty 
correspond.' (l16*4)
Sdriller concludes the tetter with a brief oeehodoOoogcal notice:
'In the rest of my inquiry I shall . . • setting out from the 
two species of beauty, move upwards to the generic concept of 
it. I shall examine the effects of melting beauty on those who 
are tensed, and the effects of energizing beauty on those who 
are 1110x11, in order finally to dissolve both those contrary 
modes of beauty in thr unity of Ideal Beauty • . •’ (L16:5)
There is a logical difficulty in Sdriller’s stated aim here. It is
i I D
not at all clem how two existential types of beauty could be
’dissolved* into am a priori transcendent Idea, or pure rational 
comcept of Beauty. Another logical peculiarity arises from Sclhller’s 
talk of tha relAtionship of energizing aod melting beauty to/the Idea 
of Beauty, as one of ’too species uf beauty’ to/their ’generic 
concept’ . Now a gaous includes what is common to the totality of its 
species, and cannot be regarded as a primitive concept which is ’one 
and imdiv.sible*, as when Sclhller tills us that
’Beauty as Idea, therefore, can never be other than one aod 
indivisible . . .’ (l16s1)
’Ideal Mauty, though one amd indivisible . • •’ (Ii16:2)
In adcdtiom, tha concept of a ’gaous’ relates to a natural kind, viz. 
is am ampinicll uhveraality, wlhch is inalp:!n>plnately l^e^rm^nc^^l^cc^l^y 
identified by ScThllm with ao a priori transcendent Idea. Im seeking 
to relate the Idea of Beauty to energizing and mating beauty, by thi 
device of ’ amhlrLcizilg?’ the former, to become a genus in relation to 
its species, Schller corOTlates logical and etpirLcjaL forms of 
universality.
Io this ^ttar, Sclhller has moved from the transcendent plane of 
Letters 11 to 15, in wlhch he established an a priori mcdel of our 
essential nature aod its drives (Letters 11 to 14), and am a priori 
mdel of thi essential structure of Beauty (Letter 15). He has mow 
moved into thi existential doman, principally to deal with practical 
psychological concerns. ffij cinclrn in this Uttar has been to lay the 
groundwork for tetter 17, in wlhch he will explore the process of 
aesthetic psychotherapy. He has already said a little in this Letter 
concerning how aesthetic education can utilize each type of beauty to 
act as a psychological corrective to imbaiatcis of character. Mating 
beauty is therapeutic to those who are too teosed: energizing beauty 
is therapeutic to those who are too mUtted.® Clearly, Sclhller does 
not see the negative effects oo our sensuous mature of either type of 
beauty (wlhch he discussed in L16:5), as a serious obstacle to their 
use as carefully alloyed correctives. Tresumbly, it is a mater of 
not oi^i^-com^c^’tiog character into the oppcoite one-eidedness, or of 
mot ’ correcting’ the wrong side of our character. But how do wi 
establish precisely who needs what type of beauty? and how ’much’ of 
it, in terms of quality aod quantity? Scthller provides us with no
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practicable criteria, either for accurate psychological diagnosis, 
or for aesthetic prescription. HLs approach continues to be, essentially 
that of a speculative psychology, with little provided in the way of 
enpprical corroboration, and with a lot more assertion than logical
reasoning.
LETTER 17
Aesthetic Psychotherapy t Through Meting Beauty as 'Tramcqui Form'
or 'Living Image'
Letter 17 is essentially a short extension to tetter 16, adding 
little new information, except to briefly discuss two specific types 
of melting beauty. Now Sclhller, as we saw in Li 5*4, has a concept of 
psycho logical 'perfection' , which is related to, but is nevertheless 
essentially different frcm, Kart’s concept of moral perfection. (For 
Sclhller, psychological perfection is no more than conducive to moral 
willing; while Kart’s moral will, with its rational domraaion, 
involves psychologloal disharmony) Psycho logical perfection, for 
Solhller, involves the ideal of fullness of human being, resting on 
the dynam.c interrelation of mai's sensuous and rational natures, with 
their respective drives interfpnctiotitg in a balanced reciprocity (in 
the play-drive).
Sclhller now describes two bahc types of psychological imperfection 
which can occur. Firstly, psychological disharmony ray occur due to one 
of the primary drives being too tensed or strong, donmnating our whole 
being. By implication, the other drive is simuLtaneously too relaxed or 
weak, unable to limit the range and intensity of the other drive. 
Secondly, psycholoog.cal lnq>enrectiot occurs when both our sensuous and 
rational natures are too weak and lack any drive. (Solhller does not 
diagnose as an imperfection, a position in which both primary drives 
are strong, as for him this conforms to the ideal of the play-drive.)
'. . . if man s perfection resides in the harmohouB energy of 
his sensuous and spiritual powera, he can, in fact, only fall 
short of this perfection, either through lack of harmony or 
through lack of energy.' ’. . . man [is J either in a state of 
tension or in a state of relaxation, according as the one-sided
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activity of certain of his powers is disturbing the harmony of 
his being, or the unity of his nature is founded upon thr 
uniform enferblemrnt of his sensuous and spiritual powera.
Both these contrasting types of limitation are ... removed
by beauty, which restores harmony to him who is over-tensrd, 
and energy to him who is relaxed . . .' (Ll7s2)
1
Beauty then, can act psycho'the^i^ie^lJjLcal^^yr to correct either type of 
imperfection : milting beauty can relax the over-tensrd individual, 
with an over-strong nature or drive: energizing beauty can vivify the 
over-rilaoced individual, both of whose natures and drives arr weak.
Sclhller tells us that all beautiful objects are less than ideal, 
and are limited to being either energizing or melting beauty. (Whch 
they are, is somjtlhng determined subjectively, by a mta-judgement of 
our own psychological balance in thr course of, or iomeiiately after, 
aesthetic experience: of. L22t4.) Such less than ideal, limited beauty, 
is created by less than ideal, psychologg<cally imperfect men : by 
artists who themselves tend towards either sensuousness or ratiorality.
'Beauty will ... in actuality nrvrr show heraelf except as a 
particular and limited species, nrvrr as a pure genus . . .’
'. . . it is . . . man himself who transfers to her thr 
imperfections of his own individuality, who by his subjective 
limitatitn perpetually stands in the way of her perfection, 
and reduces the absolute Cunli^ml-tedl Ideal to two limited types 
of manfestation.' (L17:5)
In an interesting passage, near to the end of this Letter, Schiller 
tells us that
’[.Beauty] is dependent on Ethr human mttlIal'3 offered her by 
either the formlessness of nature or the unu^atur^lness of 
civilization, she will in both oases still bear traces of her 
origins, and tend to lose hemelf in the one case, more in maaeer-al 
life, in the other, more in pure and abstract form.' (L17'4)
In other wor&3, art produced by sensuously dominated men, will tend 
to be heavily imbued with sensuous content, whist the rationally 
doMnated and enervated human paoduct of civilization, will produce
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2art works which ara highly abstract and formaist in character,
Schiller describes thi problem of over-tension as a dlsilnm>m.zitg
one-eidedness, in which either thought or feeling becomes ao
individual's dom-natt modi of activity. It this, the individual comes 
under thi constraint of either rational laws or natural catuaUity. He 
cat only be fully sllf-deln:mlnlog and free, if both aspects of his 
full human tatura aq-ually determine his activity. Freedom thus rests 
on the balance of two kinds of necessity,
’I call a mat tense when he is under the compusion of thought, 
to less than . , , of filling. Exclusive domintiom by either 
of his two ba3ic drives is for him a state of constraint ... 
aod freedom lies only in the ci-iplratical of both his matures. ’ 
(H7:4)
Nenvahheless, as we will sae presently, Sclhller does tot allcw this 
’ci-xperatiot, to involve rusot being conditioned by tltunl.
Sclhller text proceeds to discuss the two species of melting 
beauty : ’ tranqul form’ and ’ living image’ . Waist describing them 
as different types of beauuiful object, S 0^111^8 principal concert 
is with their different subjective effects. Tlhir objective differences 
are described in only very general and abstract terms, and nothing is 
disclosed concerting the particular concrete features of either type 
of object, which causes their respective psycho logical effects.
’The man one-sidedly doimitatid by feeling, or the sensuoiurly
tensad man, will be released and sit free by means of form;
the mat one-sidedly domiciled by law, or the spiritually tensed
mat, will be released and sit free by means of mater.’ ’ . . .
to ba adequate to this twofold task, melting beauty will
therefore reveal heroelf under two different guLses. First, as
tranqvui form, she will assuage the violence of life, and pavi 
%
thi way which leads from sensation to though. Secondly, as 
living image, she will arm abstract form with sensuous power, 
lead concept back to intuition, and law back to feeling.’
(117:4)
Both forms of psycholog^H disharmony are described as being 
corrected by a precess of ’ releasing*. The sensuously tensed mat is
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' released’ by a bejauiful object mlttfestitg a tranquil form. The 
spiritually tensed man is ' released' by a beautiful object monfesting 
mater as a vibrant living image, in which presumably, the beauuiful 
object’s form is heavily imbued with a vivid sensuous content.
It is notable how when Sclhller talks in the above passage of the 
ability of tranqhl form to 'tBSPtgn the violence of life* (or sense), 
and of living image having the ability to 'arm' abstract form 'with 
sensuous power’, we see again (as in L16:3), how it is our sensuous 
nature which is most susceptible to being affected by beauty. Here, 
either type of meeting beauty acts as a psyohotherappuuical corrective 
to an over-tensed. drive, by ee^tce]tltg or strengthening the sense-drive. 
In both cases, the influence on our rational nature is described as 
only indirect t a mater of either weakening sense, so as to allow 
rationality the opporhuhty to develop; or of strengthening sense, to 
balance a powerful rationality. The effect of tranqihl form or living 
image, is not to directly strengthen or weaken our rational being in 
a positive way, but is one of indirectly influencing it in a negative 
way, by altering our sensuous nature’s strength. Thus Sclhller talks 
of tranqihl form as directly and positively weakening our sensuous 
nature, to 'assuage the violence of life', so as to merely 'pave the 
way' for thought to develop. Similarly, living image arms or enhances 
our ' sensuous power’, merely to ’ lead concept back to intuition'.
Now apart from the fact that Sclhller sees our sensuous nature, 
qua receptive, as the most affectable, there is perhaps another reason 
why Sclhller only wonts beauty to affect our rational nature indirectly 
and negatively, through the adjustment of our sensuous power. This is 
a mUter, I think, of Solhller being m.rnlful of the Kantian insistence 
on the autonomy of our rational being. Clearly, there would be a strong 
im>PLLOation of hetercnLomy, if an external sensuous object, albeit a 
beautiful object, was able to directly exert a positive effect on our 
rationality. It would imply that an object in the world of
spatio-temporal natural causes, w^ able to directly and positively 
act successfully as a cause, in a relationship where our reason would 
be a mere effect. On Kantian grounds, reason is uncouthtioned by the 
phenomena world, by natural causation. Thus for all his concern with 
achieving psychological harmony Sclhller retains a foaitian view of the 
need for reason to be pncotd.tioted by nature, in order to ensure the 
mocra. autonomy of the human subject.
The importance, in order to achieve a certain definite type of
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adjustment to our psychological balance of drives, as to whether the 
beautiful object is dominated by fonVor by sensuous content (as 
tranquil forn/or living image, respectively), is now mush mre clear 
than it in Letter 16. Yet, in Letter 22, we will sir Sclhller
clearly asserting the need for an unbalanced, form-dominated art 
object (LS22:5), precisely to avoid psychological imbsaLaacrs of the 
drives. Indeed, the im^p^is of Letters 22 onwards, is on the need 
for form in general t subjectively, in the development of the 
foIm-drivr; and objectively, as thr aesthetic aspect of objects.
Thus Sclhller will appear to ra>vr away from the ideals of his 
balanced psychological mdel (Letter 14), and his balanced aesthetic 
mo^el (Letter 15). In the latter, ideal Beauty was described as thr 
perfect union and 'eq>uifbrLU.o:, of form and sensuous content (l16: 1 ). 
But form comes to dominate his theory of the art object (in Letter 22), 
and his theory of lesttetic semblance (in tetter 26).
Referring to thr different releasing effects of beauty as tranquil 
form/or as living image, Sclhller tells us that
'Thr first of these services she renders to natural man, the 
second to civilized ^.' (L17'4)
It is because Sdhller views the mass of men as more or less
'savages*, who arr dominated by their sensuous nature, that from Letter 
22 onwards he concentrates on thr educative effect of beauty only as 
tranqiu.1 form. He leaves behind much of the lsychoeofig.stio terminology 
of Letters 16 and 17, with the various types of therapeutic beauty 
distinguished therein, and instead refers simply to ' beauty*. It would 
seem from the formaist lositi<n he adopts in his description of thr 
art object in Letter 22, and of aesthetic simblancr in tettrr 26,tint 
he is concentrating on the educative requirement of thr mto3rlty of 
men for tranqhl form. If this interpretation is correct, then Sclhllrr 
does not contradict his concept of ideal teauty (of Letter 15), with
its perfect ' iquilibrum' of form and content. The alteration in his 
im^phais in Letters 22 on:^eerd3, is partly explicable as due to his 
principal theoretical interests becoming more practically orientated, 
towards the process of aesthetic education. In Letters 22 and 26, we 
will see an rxamintion of the type of formal beauty required for thr 
psycho-ethical reform of the mats of man^i^^d.
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PART THREE
The Psycho-Mstorioal Development of Man
(Letters 18 to 27)
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3JBf?TSR 18
The Concept of a Psyohologioal *Middle State*. Criticism of
Empiricist and Ratioinaist Aesthetics
For Sdriller, as we have seen, beauty Ss able to act as a 
psychotherapeutical corrective to disHarmony between our sensuous and 
rational natures. It is able to lead the sensuous man to thought, and 
the rational man to feeling, (not to an oppooite imbalance, but to an 
equilibrium between our natures and their respective drives).
*By means of beauty sensuous man is led to form and thought ; by 
means of beauty spiritual man is brought back to mater and 
restored to the world of sense.* (i18:l)
It is to the nature of this state of eqtllibrbm that Sdriller now 
turns. He calls it a *m.d<dle ststte* , lying somehow between sense and 
reason, and between a passive and an active disposition of character.
In inducing us into this *m.d<dle state*, beauty is said to be linking 
what Sdriller conceives of as two inherently opposed activities : 
feeliigj/end thinking,
*, , , there mut be a state midway between mater and form, 
passivity and activity, and , , , it is into this muddle state that 
beauty transports us.* *Beauty links the two oRpooite concdtions 
of feeling and thinkiing. • •* (L18:2)
Clearly, there is a need for an exploration of the nature of this
*m.ddle state* • One my whether it is, for example, a neutral
2*point of indifference* ; or a tenuous holding together of two
oppooite contritions which are pulling apart; or a synthesis in which 
differences are sublated; or perhaps the two factors are simply done 
away with, and lost In an empty third neutral state. At various points,
Sdriller appears to adopt each of these positions,
S driller talks here, as though he were, in the *m.ddle state*, 
introducing a major new concept, but in reality, he is about to 
rf-fHKmLne and further develop the already faMliar concept of the 
play-drive, though now from the standpoint of Fichtean epistemology, 
rather than purely within the framework of a speculative psychological
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theory of drives (as in Letter 14). (The term 'play-drive' itself is 
left behind, in favour of such synonymous substitutes as 'MdeUe 
state’, ' middle disposition' , ’ aesthetic sifte’ and ’aesthetic 
condition’ • ) This re-examination and development, is only announced 
in this Letter; it will receive a protracted philosophical treatment 
over the course of the next three Letters (Letters 19 to 21).
Sclhller tell’ us that ve mut commence the exploration of the 
middle state, by fully acknowedging the real oppoostion of thought 
and feeling, reason and sense. We must take their distinction seriously, 
or else any unity we achieve phUosoplhcally, will be by sleight-of- 
hand, a confused unity, which unites factors which were never really 
allowed to be opposed in the first place. The main philosophical task 
which Schller now sets for himslf, is to establish precisely how 
beauty can possibly unite what he views as two inherently opposed 
coned.tions.- He tells us from the outset, that such a unity can only 
be effected by beauty having the ability to rahcaLly alter their 
inherent characters.
’Beauty, it said, ^nTjes two coned.tions wlhch are
diteeeticatLly opposed and can never become One. It is from this 
opposition that we have to start; and we must first grasp it, 
and acknowledge it, in all its unhiigatnd rigour, so that 
these two conations are distilgpLishnd with the utmost 
precision; otherwise we shaLl only succeed in confusing but 
never in uniting them. In the second place, it was said, beauty 
unites these two opposed con<d.tiotB and thus destroys the 
spposStist. Since, however, both conehtions remain everlastingly 
opposed to each other, there is no way of uhting them except by 
destroying them.’ (L18:4) •
The influence of Kant can be seen hern, in Sclhller’s description of 
the 'everlastngj* opposition of reason and sense.
Sclhller describes the philosophical task of bringing reason and 
sense into a relationship of unity, in rather extreme terms:
•. . . there is no other w^ of uhting them except by destroying 
them. Our ... task, therefore, is to rake this union oonpplte 
... with such urnmtigated thoroughness that both these 
csn<htiots totally disappear in a third without leaving any
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trace of division behind in the new whole that has been made 
. . .’ (110:4)
Hern, Schaler tells us that what he now chooses to call ’concdtions’,
viz. thinking and feeling, rather than 'natures' or 'drives’ (as ever,
he keeps altering his terminology, whist basica/Ly meaning the same
thing), will not just be externally related in an ' equLlbbruoa’ , in a
' balance of powers' areangeoent (as was thr case with the concept of
the ideal play-drive, in ^tter 14) > but they will be ' destroyed* and
'disappear' in a ’thirol’ cwndtion which will be a’new whole'. This
talk of ' deltIoyirg:’ the opposed principles to achieve a ' coolete’
union, appears to be a movement from the llty-drive' s iquilibrum, to
a 'middle state’ of synthesis: from a balanced external relationship
of factors, to a sinple unity in which each loses its separate
identity. Howver, Wilkinson and Willoughby may be causing Schuller's
position here to appear more ixtmoe than it really is, for they 
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translate ’aufgihoben’ as ’destroyiig’ . Had they chosen the term 
'subl^t^z^ig^’ instead, this would have iuplied that reason and sense 
retain their qmaities to some extent within a third synthetical 
condition (rttier than lose thio altogether). This would enable us to 
interpret Schiller's position in a oorr plausible way, and one which 
more closely corresponds to what he actually will do.
The philosophical task wthch Scthller has set himelf here, is not 
consummted until Letter 27. In L27:4, by reducing the opposstion of 
our sensuous/and rational natures to thr ’aesthetic play' of 
ioag■natioip<end understanding, respectively, the oppooition of reason 
and sense dors indeed totally disappear in a third psychological 
condition. But this is only achieved by the (sleighteof-lnnd?) device 
of reducing the scale of the o]l>ooltion involved, to become one which 
is oeerely between two clgntfve faeulties. Such a 'new whole', is only 
a OLcresolOLc unity of the more funda^oe^n^ division of our rational 
and sensuous natures, wthch was operative in earlier Letters.
Half-way through ptragrali 4 of this Letter, Scthller suddenly 
complexly changes thr subject of discussion, from his own philosophical 
task (for Letters 19 to 21), to instead deal with what he sirs as two 
opposing oethodoloogies in aesthetics. He proceeds to enter into a brief 
critidoo of imirrcist and rationaList aesthetics, which have, as hr 
sees it, one-sided and therefore incomplete understandings of beauty. 
Emiiiocst aesthetics, hr tells us, has a single wholistic perspective
128
of both aesthetic experience and beauty, based upon the immed-acy of 
feeling t focusing on the genera sensuous charrac teds tics of beiaiuiful 
objects which evoke certain sensations in their perceiver. In co^i^orajit, 
rationaList aestheticians engage in a comlex dissection of beauty and 
aesthetic experience, analysing the whole into discrete parts, and 
seeking concepts which are clearly distinct.
'Those . . • philosophers who, in reflecting on this mater, 
entrust themelves blindly to the guidance of their feeling, 
can arrive at no concept of beauty, because in the totality of 
their sensuous impassion of it they can distiiguish no 
separate elements. Those others, who take intellect as their 
exclusive guide, can never arrive at any concept of beauty, 
because in the totality which constitutes it they can discern 
nothing else but the parts, so that spirit and mater, even 
when most perfectly fused, remain for them eternally distinct.
(ii8:4)
Scthller conceives of his own methodology as enjoying the advantages 
of both approaches (wlhlst presumably, avoiding their respective 
defects). He tells us that he will examine the necessary conceptual 
distinctions and oppooitions which the intellect maces in aesthetioal 
maters, but will then also seek to draw them together into a unity, 
by means of an exammaion of the effect of beauty upon our sensuous 
nature. (He thus proposes to adopt each method separately, in an 
alternate maner, and will not attempt a synthesis of them. )
'We shall avoid the rocks on which both Cintimmlist and 
fppiricist aesthetics] have foundered if we start from the two 
elements _ Lfom and sensuous content] into which beauty can be 
divided when considered by the intellect, but subsequently 
ascend to the pure aesthetic unity through which it works upon 
our feeling, and in which the two concdtions previously described 
Cof thought and feeling,] comlleely disappear* (i-!©^)
After Sclhller’s statement here, of his proposed methodology, it is 
interesting to consider whether he will actually carry out his stated 
intention. In Letter 22 (concerned with the art object), he does 
distinguish the 'two elements' (form and sensuous content), 'into which
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beauty can be divided' , and ' subsequently' establishes their form- 
dom-nated ’aesthetic unity’ . The exploration of how beauty 'works 
upon our feeling’, occurs throughout Letters 23 to 27. In these 
Letters, he examnes from a variety of perspectives (historical, moral 
and psychoOosgcot.), the effect of formal beauty on our sensuous being s 
particularly the ability of boastful forms to m>de2ittn feeling and 
sense, so as to provide the oppocitlpn.ty for our rational being and its 
form-drive to develop. Finally, in Letter 27, in the concept of 
aesthetic play., 'the two conddtions' of thouSt and feeling 'disappear' 
as opposed conchtisns. Thus Sclhller doe’ moore-or-Less execute his 
antsutced meehodeOosg.cuL intention, of firstly conceptually analysing 
beauty (in the manner of rationgaist aesthetics), and then secondly, 
studying the (modenaing) effect of beauty on our sentient being (in 
the manner of eipiricist aesthetics)^
What Sclhller has done in this Letter, is announce the programme for 
the remainder of the trnftise. In his earlier discussion in the Letter, 
of the 'middle state' , he atnoptcnd the general content and method of 
Letters 19 to 21. Following his criticBemB of rationalist and mmpric^c^^t 
aesthetics, he has tntsutcee the general content and method of tetters 
22 to 27. Letter 18 is thus what we might call a 'signpost' Letter. Its 
function in this respect, ooiin^potdB to that of tetter 10, which set 
out his progamme for tetters 11 to 17. Letters 10 and 18 are the only 
'signpost’ Letters in the treatise, and are located at turning-points 
in its content and methodology*
LETTER 19
Fichtean Epistemology t The Ego' ’ Freedom Rests Upon Lim-tation
Sclhller csmlleaces his exploration of the psycho logical 'middle 
state', by distinguishing what he calls two modes of ' detnnmntbility‘, 
viz. two fundaeental ways in which man has the ability to be determined, 
Man has the potoatial to be either passively determined by the sensuous 
(his own natural being and external nature) ; or, he may be actively 
selfedeti:rainLng, internally or externally forming the sensuous, in 
thinking or willing, respectively.
'We can distinguish in man as such two different states of
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Oetermiaabllty, the one passive, the other active . . .'
Sol&llrr proceeds ' to briefly outline the development of these two
raxOes of determination, in a way which is sioJUlttne<l,ully an account
of the psychological development of the individual, and also a 'histoayy 
1
of the dlellopoant of the psycholoigLcal powers of the human race* Thr 
mnd 'begii-rs' by being in a state of empty ' in^deS^€^:ra^ra^<^y^' , in which 
it is simply not determined in any oamer at all, but somehow subsists 
as a pure potential being. In the next stage of its development, the 
Oind becomes externally OetnminrO by thr sensuous, and acquires a 
content thenugh its receptivity to leale-iopmsilas•
'The concdtion of the human Oind before it is determined by 
lrall-iol:mssilnl at all, is one of unliOitiO deterimnability.'
'. . * [a] con<OLtiQn of compe'Se absence of determination 
. . (L19s2)
'Now comes the moment when sense is to br stiaeed . . .' 'A 
perception is to bi bom in hio. Wtht in the preceding state 
•, • . was nothing but empty po*k^]nI;^tl, now becomes an effective 
force and acquires a content.' '. . . it is only ... through 
thr surrlader of oue uacoIad.tional deter]Onathlity that we 
achieve OeteIm.metioa• ' (Li 9: 3)
Now such external detlrOiaatioa, implies something internal is 
being so Oete^roLnlO• Recepli•eity to thr externally sensuous, iop-ies 
an internal aon-llalulus receiver : thr aln-lgo io>lies the ego. To 
experience the external as an ’ other' , presupposes the conscious 
distinction of self from not--self.
' . . . oeerr exclusion Cof the seasuo^u^^3 would never ... produce 
reaLity, nor oem sensation ever give ‘birth to perception, 
unless something existed from which to exclude, uhiiss through 
some autc:almous act' of the Oind the negating were referred to 
something positive . . .' 'This activity of the psyche we call 
judging or thinking . . .’ (L19s4)
Thus arises, in Sd&llrr’s view, the selfodete:olfnlfag activity of the 
ego, or as he puts it, the autonomous activity of the psyche. This now
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active relation to what is received via sense, involves the ego 
organizing the non-ego, forming its mPttplicity of sens e-impress ions 
into a unity, through the concepts and laws employed in thinking and 
judging.
The development which SclhLller has briefly sketched-out here, 
involves a movement through three stages % 1) Nm-determination 
('unlimited determnnbiliSy, ). 2) External determination by the 
sensuouj, 3) Self-determination (in which the sensuous is formed by 
the self). Clearly, stage 3) presupposes stage 2), and it is this point 
that Scthller is m>st concerned to bring out in this Letter, viz. that 
our freedom or compete self-determination rests upon the necessity of 
limitation by the sensuous, incorporates the sensuous, and so is not a 
purely rational seiCd^iBeeminati^on. In this Letter, Sclhller wants to 
distance himelf from Kuh’ s concept . of a purely rational freedom, and 
instead put forward a more whodstic mdel of a freedom which 
necessarily rests on the harmonious balance of both our rational and 
sensuous natures, (in a sense, what Sclhller is doling, is borrowing 
loosely from Fichtean epistemology , to attack Ksactian pocrdty.)
The development of the mind from the m»re passive reception of 
sense-impressions, to the activity of forming the sensuous, is described 
by Sclhller as a transition from feeling to thinking. Now, adopting a 
Kantian view of their relationship, Sclhller tells us that the 'gulf* 
between feeling and thought, is not one which can be 'bri<g5ed* by beauty 
but only by reason, which again fdlcwing Kuh, he describes as the 
'absolute* (or tncond-tionfd) faculty. (Beauty mar, however, assist the 
transition from feeling to thought, by relaxing the power of sense; of. 
’tranquil form* in Ll7:4.)
'When ... it is assented of the bea-hif-hL that it provides man
with a transition from feeling to thinking, this mut in no
sense be taken to mean that beauty could ever bridge the gulf
separating feeling frem thinking, pa3sivity from activity. This 
3
gulf is infinite' ... without the intervention of some new 
and independent E1UIt<nlomcct3 faculty . . .’ 'Thought is the 
spontanfcts act of this absolute faculty.' (i19%8)
In this passage, Scthller appears to move from a Fichtean, to a more 
Kuatian perspective, particularly in the radical onooition he 
postulates between feeling and thought (or nature and reason). He tells
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us that this oppooStton is ultimately b:iiegnd by reason itself, with 
the u]t3atisfactoiy result that 'a party to the dispute' , as it were, 
part of the psychologic!. elultistic problem, is put forward as the 
solution to it. The real point of this passage, is that ScMller wishes 
to ma.ntain both the Kantian opposStion of nature and reason, and the 
Kantian primacy of reason in their relaticrnsMp, so as to make the 
development from sensuous to rational human being, a movement 
Belfenenim^lined by ma^’s rationaLity, rather than one externally 
determined by a beoitiful object, as this wcould threaten the autonomy 
of the ego.S Suddenly then, Sclhller has reverted to Kantian concerns 
(albeit temporally), wMlst in the Mctet of a development largely 
couched in Fichtean terms.
There is some inconsistency between Schiller' s statement above (in
L1?:6), based on a Kantian radical opposStion of reason and sense, and
ScMller*’ theoretical practice in this treatise, which assumes the
possibility of a more haimsn-sps relationship between reason and sense.
In particular, Sclhller’s model of psychcoMstonical development, rests
upon an im?Heitly Fichtean vi<w of the relationship of nature and 
5
reasons, in order to facilitate a continuous gradual evolution from 
senae/to’ rationality wMch incorporates sense. This development (which 
is given a much fuller treatment in Letters 24, 26 and 27), discloses 
no great ’leap’ between feeling and thinking as a result of a Kantian 
’gulf’ between nature and reason. Mreover, as ScMller mikes clear 
later (in L20?1, and L26:1), ^'s psycho-Ms tonical development is 
grounded in nature, is a natural development of increasing rationaLity, 
assisted by aesthetic experience. TMs is a position far removed from 
Kart’s, and empphaszes the tempor! priority of nature. Horever, when 
describing aesthetic experience per se, in terms of our subjective 
experience of beauty, ScMller tends to take up a more Kantian position 
Thus wMlst ScM-ILlei’B theory of drives, and theory of knowledge, are 
loosely based on those of FichteS, his aesthetic theory is explicitly 
derived from Kant.
8cMller continues Ms discussion of the 'absolute faculty' of 
reasst, telling us that
'The autcnloml with wMch it operates excludes ell outside 
influence; and it is not by providing an aid to thought ... 
but merely by furnishing the tMnking faculty with the freedom 
to express itself according to its own Ha^^, that beauty can
131
become a means of leading on from mater to form, from feeling 
to law, from a ljoited to an absolute existence.’ (L19:6)
Heeee, Sclhllir appears to disagree with Kahn's view in the Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgement, that aesthetic experience of beauty is ' subjectively 
final’ for (or proooer), cogrhtian in general. Ktant bad the experience
of beauty induce an optimal proportionate relation of faculties for
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general coghtive purposes, in his concept of the 'coooon sense'. In 
Sclhller’s view, reason's autonomy means that its thinking process, 
per sr, does not require external aids. The value of beauty, is rather 
in prlooOiag a general rational psychological development, in a twofold 
way. Neegitively, as ’ eraaq^Ul foiO (of. L17:4)» beauty reduces the 
power of sense, and provides the olpo:rt^unLty for an ioH-cit rationalLey 
to develop. Mre positively (as Scthller later describes in L26;8), thr 
aesthetic reformation of ’natural’ foxos, develops our rational ability 
to express ourselves independently of what atetrl provides. In the above 
passage, Sclhller particularly eu^lh^izes beauty’s value in
'. . . furnishing thr thinking faculty with the fraedoo to 
express itself . . .’ (L19s6)
Its positive value, in terms of rational development, is thus in 
providing a sensuous oediuo for lelf-e3l>rlssian (in artistic produccion), 
facilitating the development of self-consciousness, a development wlhch 
will be presently stated to be the con<OLtila of all moral volition (in 
H9:11 and 12).
Sclhller continues this discussion of how beauty ray assist our 
rational psychological development, by facing up to the problem it 
implies for OLnd’s rational autonomy in relation to nature.
'But this presupposes that the fraedoo of the thinking powers 
could be inhibited, which seems to cantrahLct the aotioa of an 
autonomous faculty. ’ '. . .we OtscoastIUl the very nature of 
O-nd if w^ attribute to sensuous passions the power of being 
able to suppress the fraedoo of the spirit positively.' (L19:7)
Sclhller tOOtl that talk of difficulty in the development of thought 
from sense, and of the iiiO for beauty to aid the transition by 
lessening the power of sense, okes it appear as if the rational O-iO
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can be hindered by nature, is not fully autonomous in relation to 
nature. His employment of the term 'inhibit-cl’ here, provides us with 
a clue as to how we might resolve this difficulty. As with Kantsg
conmept of the ' dependent* will , we msy admt that sense can in 
practice 'hinder* or 'clog’ an activity which in principle is 
attonomoh!. Sclhller’s own resolution to the problem is pecuLiar, viz. 
that any sensuous impediment is autcmomc^ly self-willeds
'. . # the senses can never set them elves up against mam as a 
power, unhess the spirit has of its own free will remoumce- 
all desire to prove itself such.' (Ll9s7)
In other words, the determination of reason by sense, is a
self-defimlined external determL]nsticm : a mitter of a weak spirit 
allcwing itself to be hetero>nom:ct^ly affected.
Sclhller next proceeds to summarse his derivatively Fichtean theory 
of knowledge : The ego’s rational activity rests upon the basis of the 
passive reception of external sensuous mterial to reform. Its freedom 
or self-dete:minatsom• and its absolute character (as embracing itself 
and the not--3elf in its compete activity), rests upon the limitation 
of external determ-nation by the not-self. Put in the m>st simple 
ter^, the rational activities of the mind (thinking and rational 
willing), require external sensuous ' raw mteri-al’ to work upon:
'The finite mind is that which cannot become active except 
through being passive, which only attains to the absolute by 
mesas of limitation, and only acts and fashions inasmuch as it 
receives mttrial to fashion.’ (L19:9)
At this point, Sclhller connects the passive self/mid the active self, 
(the self involved in LiPlitaiColVsn- the self involved in absolute 
selfddefimiming activity), with the sense-drive/and the form-drive, 
respectively:
’ ... mLnd will accordingly combine with the drive towards 
form, or towards the absolute, a drive towards m.tter, or 
towards limitation, these latter being the con<dttioms without 
which it could neither possess nor satisfy the first of these 
drives.' (l19’9)
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^ere, the oentBe-Lerive is re-defined in wider terms, as a drive not 
merely to mater, but to limitation. The fore-dr^.vn is similarly 
widened in meaning to become a drive towards absoluteness. Now, given 
what Sclhller has already said (in Fichtean term), about self- 
determLInaiot resting upon external enterm-mttisn and limitation, he 
has now indirectly provided another deJmstBliation (in addition to that 
of L15’5), that the primary drives only fully function in a rnlatiotBhtp 
of os-speiatl.on : a relationship in which the form-drive needs, and is 
oonce.ticnnd by, the sense-drive. Contrary to Kant, therefore, our 
rational being in practice rests upon our natural being; our fmeedom 
rests upon necessity; and our ’higher’ rational activities presuppose 
(rather than oppose, as in Kan), our 'lcwer' sensuous ones.S
Sclhller now reiterates the position established in tetter 14, that 
the two primary drives in their full development, cancel out each other, 
qua drives or conqn-sB-olt3. They do not cease to exist, but are mntully 
limiting, and prevent the psyche from being doMtnned by either 
exclusively. However, whereas in tetter 14, it the 'play-drive' that 
inpiesentee their harmoLm.ous nq^pLlibliUlm, and in Letter 18 it w^ a 
third neutral ’middle state' , now we are told it is 'the will’ which 
stands 'between* the primary drives, free from determination by either; 
and as the sole power which limits them.
' . . . these two primary drives ... just because both ... 
strive towards oppooite ends, these two com>PPlionB cancel each 
other out, and the will mantains perfect freedom beiween them.
It is, then, the will which acts as a power ... vis-a-vis both 
drives; but neither of these can of itself act as a power 
against the other.' (L1^s10)
The view expressed here, that neither primary drive can act as a power 
against the other, is at variance with the their equHibrum w^
established in L14:1< Now it is the will whch limits the drives, not 
each other in a 'balance of powers' relaticmship as before. ScMller's 
statement that only the will is a ' power’ in its :ielati<nlsMp to the 
drives, is strange. What is the difference between a 'drive' ate a 
’power* ? Are the drives powerless? ScMller appears to be in a muddle 
here. Moorwwr, the will is conceived by ScMller as active and 
reforming, and csnsequently really ought to be closely related to the 
form-drive on Schiller's terms, rather than somehow located 'between’
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the drives’ And what meaning can we assign to a spatial coacrpt like 
'be’tween’ in this context? Wlht does it mean to say a psychological 
item subsists 'between' two other psychological items? Scihller’s 
solution to the age-old lWilosolh^cal problem of freedom versus 
necessity, or free will versus OetlIoiaiso, on closer inspection, 
raises oore problems tiaa it solves’
In the last two paragraphs of this tetter (Ll%11 and 12), Sclhllrr 
discusses the ioporttacr of the development of sllf-coIl3cO<Ulnlrss ’ He 
begins by telLljnig us that
'It is a necessity outside us which, thIougi the medium of 
sensation, determines our Conndtion, our existence in tOi.’
'And it is no less a necessity within us which, at the instancr 
of sensation and in lppolltioa to it, awakens our Personalty; 
CganOl srlfawraerness • . •' 'Only of hio who is conscious of 
hioelf can we ’loand Reason, that is, absolute consistency and 
unveiissalty of consciousness • . • ' (L1?:11)
We are thus subject to two kinds of necessity : natural and ratilatl
necessity’ The external necessity of nature imposes itself upon us via
our sensuous nature’s receptivity. Rational necessity is a logical or
moral necessity of our own, which arises from our negative response to
natural necessity, as we seek to ovlr-5ooe the latter's alien
OetlrmLntila• The ego,s srlf-consciousness, is the prrretqusite of 
10comileent universal willing , and of the unity of knowing, and it 
arises fno aw saneness of the self as being distinct from, and opposed 
to, the not-self’ The influence of Ficiteaa epistemology is leidrat in 
eifl grounding of oond willing, rational kno^i^^, and self-consciousness 
in the ego's negative response to the non-igo, as our rational being 
strives to oviix^<^oi the bamler of lppolitLLon constituted by sensuous 
nature and its alien necessity.
In Scihller’s view, the self-conscious ego pr^-viOes an ongoing unity 
for all experience. It is the unity at the centre of all experience, 
and the foIoetivl unifier of wiat is experienced, giving unity and 
identity to all acts of cognition and volition.
'. • . lrlf-ooI:sci<usaess ... lace its immuable unity is 
established, there is also established a law of unity for 
everything which is then for oan, and for everything which is
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to come about through him, i.e., for all his knowing and for 
all his doling.’ (H9:11)
Sclhller’s discussion here of the unity of self-ccmsoi<utsness, owes
ranch to Ksart’s postulation of the ego as the transcendental unity of 
11apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason. Howver, Sclhller’s
view of the origin of self-consciousness, leads him to oppose Kahn’s 
concept of the moral W.ZL1 in the Critique of Practical Reason, for 
Sclhller has the moral will depend on the achievement of self­
consciousness, Which itself depends upon sensuous experience of 
external nature. There is thus a sense in which one can say that for 
Sclhller, the m>ral will is grounded in the sensible rather than in 
the supersensible (as it was for Kaart). Howver, to be fair, one mist 
remember that Sclhller arrives at this position from a consideration 
of the temporal priority of nature in our psycholo^gLcal development, 
wlhlst Kauit, in contrast, was concerned with the transcendental logical 
priority of the a priori ground of the possibility of moral volition.
Sclhller closely associates sensation with the sense-drive, and 
selfcooxwcicuisness with the development of the form-drive. Through 
sensation, man becomes aware of his existential being in the world. 
Through self-ccnsoiousness, he becomes aware of his ability to 
determine himelf in knowing and ^i^llLiLng, (i.e. aware of his 
selfdLetesmiinbiiity, or his ’absolute’ existence).
’. . . once [sensation and self-consciousness^ have come into 
being ... man has, through the medium of sensation, acquired 
aw soreness of a determinate existence; once he has, through 
self-consciousness, acquired awareness of his absolute 
existence, then these two basic drives are quickened , .
’. . . only ... when both have come into existence, is the 
basis of mans humanty established. Unntl this has happened, 
everything in him takes place according to the law of [ natural ] 
necessity. But now the hand of nature is withdrawn from him 
. . (L19:12)
Basic human being then, rests upon the existence of both natures and 
drives. As our sensuous nature and its drive are always already ’there’ , 
as it were, the basis of humanty comes about through the development 
of the form-drive, to counterbalance the previously exclusively dominant
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sense-drive. The development of the fsi,m--erLvn also represents the 
overcoming of exclusive determination by natural necessity, by 
countering it with a iatromal necessity of our ow (self) deteim.Lmttion. 
Thus the development of the form-dr-ve, becomes equated by ScMller, 
with the transition from a natural oomd-tion to humanty.
The Bie^PlttnesuB determ-nation of the individual by natural 
necessity, and his(self) determ-nation by rational necessity, involves 
an oppcoition of two contrary necessities, which tn ScMller's view, 
gives rise to freedom,
’ ... as soon as two opposing fundamental drives are active 
witMn him, both lose their compUBion, and the opposition of 
two necessities gives rise to freedom.’ (Ll9s12)
In Schhller’s view, the drives through Which we experience these 
necessities, may develop to achieve an eqU.libii.outs relationship, 
whereby they cancel out each other’s influence, leaving the will free 
frem compULsory determination by either. TlhLs establishes a new mode 
of ’ indeterminacy’ , resting upon the simultaneous experience of two 
modes of determination, and which is thus es sent i ally different from 
the empty indeterminacy we began the Letter with (in Ll9i2), which was 
rarely a state of oom>p^'te na^-^^^itermLin^ition. ScMller will explore 
this doubly determined indeterminacy, in the next two Letters (Letters 
20 and 21), as the ’aesthetic concdtion’ of the psyche.
LETTER 20
The Aesthetic Ccsltetion of the Psyche (i)
In tetter 20, Sclhller discpsseB the development of the twofoldly 
determined psychological condd-tion of tndetelmi.Inttism, which he 
introduced at the end of tetter 19. He begins, by restating his concept 
of psychological freedom;
' [Freedom! arises only when man is a coml^e being, when both 
his fpndaeentaf. drives are fully developed; it will, therefore, 
be lacking as long as he is incomPete, as long as one of the 
two drives is excluded • • ♦* (L20:1)
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Freedom thus rests upon psychological wholeness (a wholeness which, 
as Sclhllrr oaOe clear in Letter 6, oxteem society deprives the 
individual of, ehrougi the specialization of social functions anO 
psychological faculties, that it imposes upon its oeeObir). For 
Schiller, freedom presupposes the absence of clnstraiat upon the psyche, 
by either of our natures anO their respective drives. This condition 
is only achieved when both prioary drives are fully developed, to the 
point where they counterbalance each other1 s deterOinetion of the 
psyche.
It is important to notice S Culler's use of the term 'trflel, in 
the above passage. In Letter 21, ScMller will oake it clear that 
freedom nises from this eqiuLlibrious contd-tion, which provides only 
its b&sis. More particularly, this csa<OLtion frees the psyche from 
sensuous determination, and leaves it free to choose whether to 
OeteImiae itself either rationally or lenluo^u^ly in its willing. In 
aLlcwing oan to choose rational volition (by removing sensuous 
impediments thereto), this condition makes hio potentially free.
Howver, only if he then wills rationally, Om he become actually free, 
(This difference between potential and actual freedom will be discussed 
by Scihller in L21:4 anO 5),
In Letter 19, we saw how Scchller operated a three stage oodOl of 
psychological development, in which oan moves from 1) the 
aon-OeterO.lnetioa of 'puri detrrO.faah]Lity' ; to 2) lialulul external 
determination (and the OoOintion of the srasr-Oriee); to 5) rational 
lelfodeeemiaation (and the doOira;ioa of the forohOrLve), Scihller now 
imphaizes the t^^iq^c^3rai order of these stages of development:
’Now wr can, in fact, in the species as a whole,as well as in the 
individual humn being, point to a oomnt in which oan is not 
yet compete, and in which one of his two drives is exclusively 
active within him. We know , • • tint he lrlceeds from 
llf.oitaeioa to iafiaity• The liasuous drive, therefore, cooes 
into operation earlier than the rational, hrcause sensation precedes 
consciousness, and it is this [temporal! priority of the sensuous 
drive which lro■eiOes the clue to the whole history of human 
freedom. ' (L20:2)
' • , » freedom is itself an effect of Nature , • • and not the 
work of Man . , (L20i1 )
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Now for Schiller, the whole purpose of the process of aesthetic 
education, is to assist man’s progression from stage 2) to stage 5) 
in the aforementioned model of psychological development. In this 
process, the ’aesthetic condition* of the psyche is viewed by him, 
not as itself an end, but rather as a means for enabling man to become 
rational and moral (and thus to meet the psycho-ethical prerequisite 
for the political transformation of the Natural State into the Moral 
State, as described in Letter 3).
*. . . there is ... a moment in which the life-impulse, just 
because the form-impulse is not yet running counter to it, 
operates as nature and as necessity; a moment in which the life 
of sense is a power • • .’ ’But in the state of reflection into 
which he is now to pass, it will be precisely the opposite s 
Reason is to be a power, and a logical or moral necessity to 
take the place of that physical necessity.’ (L2O:3)
It would appear from this passage, that Schiller’s ideal of
psychological harmony, involving the equilibrious relation of both our 
natures and drives, (an ideal which largely occupied Letters 13 to 17)» 
is not to be viewed as itself an end for man, but rather as merely a 
temporary means for breaking the power of sense, in order to install 
rational self-determination in its place. Rational domination of the 
psyche, is to replace sensuous domination t we are to merely move from 
one type of psychological one-sidedness to another, in which a 
transitional balanced psychological condition is to be sacrificed for 
rational freedom (of a Kantian kind). Now whilst this may serve the 
political goal of creating the Moral State, and preserve a Kantian 
conception of morality, it sacrifices balanced character at the 
psychological level, and devalues the aesthetic to being ultimately a 
politically and morally useful means. Ve know from Schiller’s Fichtean 
epistemology in Letter 1% that he does not intend our rational activity 
to be purely rational, and that it must rest upon and incorporate sense. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from the above passage, that the position of 
sense is to be secondary to reason, as subordinated within an 
unbalanced relationship of necessary co-operation, rather than one, of 
equilibrious harmony.
The ’aesthetic condition’ of the psyche, represents the introduction 
of a fourth stage into Schiller’s model of man*B temporal psychological
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development (a stage which is located, between stages 2) and 3)). Now 
Schiller takes the peculiar view, that the transition from the 
domination of the psyche by sense, to its domination by reason, is one 
which cannot take place directly. The transition necessarily rests 
upon the temporary suspension of the sense-drive:
' • • . sensation as a power mut first be destroyed before law 
can be enthroned as such. ' ' • • • sanething which wias there 
mut first cease to be. Man cannot pass directly from feeling 
to thought; he mist first take one step backwards, since only 
through one determination being arnmlled again can a contrary 
determination take its place.* (L2O:3)
This conddtion, in which the sense-drive is ’annulled’ and is to 
'cease to be* , is considered by Sclhller to be part of the 'aesthetic 
condition' of the psyche, and a necessary prelude to that conddtion’s 
full development. Prima facie, it appears to be at variance with his 
earlier descriptions of the ' play-drive' and the ' mddle state’, in 
which both drives, including the sense-drive, were fully developed, 
and only, by interfunctioning in a dynamo reciprocity, were able to 
Idmit each other, so as to leave the psyche or will free ' between' 
them. Howver, it is necessary to distiiguish what Sclhller regards 
as the philosophical ideal of a perfectly eqtdlibrious play-drive (and 
here, the psychological ideal of a balanced 'aesthetic condition* of 
the psyche), from the reality of an unbalanced play-drive (and here, 
an unbalanced 'aesthetic conddtion*)', which latter are required for a 
practical educative purpose : in order that the mass of mankind may 
progress from being ' savages' who are dominated by their sensuous 
being, towards a more ideal psychology caLly balanced concdtion, and 
thence to a rational and moral conddtion. In the case of the play-drive 
and the aesthetic concdtion, we progress to the balanced ideal via 
imperfect unbalanced means, Sclhller's principal concern in this Letter 
is with how aesthetic experience can begin a development towards this 
balance, from man’ s initially sensuously dominated concdtion.
Solhller sees the fully developed aesthetic concdtion as involving 
a counterbalancing of both the sensuous and rational determination of 
the psyche, which cancels out determination as such of either kind, 
whist yet allowing us to have the fullest possible sensuous and 
conceptual content:
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*In order to exchange pa3sivity [to sense] for [rational] 
autonomy • • • man mut therefore be moment ahly free of all 
determination wlhtsoever, and pass through a state of pure 
determLmability. * * * . , it is a question of combining ... 
sheer absence of [sensuous and rational] determination . . . 
with the greatest possible [sensuous and concepinuaL] con-tent 
. * .* (120:3)
Tlhs eqiullibriaus concdtion is, however, only attained through the 
modification of our sensuous determination. Although we are to retain 
a sensuous content, the sense-drive as a drive or power, is to be 
tempooirily annulled:
'The determination he has [already] received through sensation 
mist - therefore be preserved . . . but at the same time it mut, 
inasmuch as it is limitation, be aramHled, since an unlimited 
[self] deteiImiability is to come into existence. The problem 
is, therefore, at one and the same time to. destroy and to 
maintain the [sensuous] determination of the [psyche's] 
condition - and this is possible in one w^y only ; by 
confronting it with another [rational] determnation.' (L2O:3)
Now a problem arises at this point, as to how Sclhller conceives of 
the means whereby the sensuous determination of the psyche by the 
sense-drive is to be annulled. In the last sentence quoted above, 
Sclhller implies that sensuous determination cannot be annuLled until 
rational determination is in place to counterbalance it. But how do we 
arrive at this position of counterbalance in the first place? Earlier, 
in L20:3» Sclhller told us that
' ... only through one determination being anniHed ... can 
a contrary determination take its place.' (L2O:5)
In other words the existing dom-nant sense-drive, mist first be 
suppressed, in order to allcw the form-drive to even develop at all. 
Tins suppression characterizes the development of the aesthetic 
condition, while the counterbalancing of modes of determination 
pertains to the fully developed aesthetic couhtion. The first creates 
a balanced aesthetic coned ti on; the second mhntains it once
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established.. (Aggln, this parallels the relationship beiween the 
unbalanced play-drive involved in aesthetic psychotherapy in Letters 
16 and 17, and the balanced ideal play-drive of Letter 14, Which the 
former aims to attain.)
In ^^0^5, Scihiler appears to move away froo the Fichtem 
epistemology of the last tetter to some extent. It now seems that the 
lciieveornt of rational (self) determination and the development of 
the form-drive, require the anmULling of sensuous external
Oeterminetiln and the sense-drive. In Letter 19, rational
self-dletemination was described in Fichtean terns as resting upon
lenlulus external deterO-nationi anO the form-drlvi was described as 
2resting upon the sense-drive. Now however, the form-drive is to be 
developed independently of the sense-drive, in the latter's absence. 
Heorever, in emphaszing that the determination already received through 
sensation mud be preserved, Scihller retains a Fichtean view of the 
necessary sensuous basis of rational activity. It is the sense-drive, 
and its determining power vis-a-vis the psyche which is to be annulled, 
not sense as such nor the need for a sensuous content.
The overall ^^u.ng of wht Scihller is saying in the above rather 
difficult passages quoted from can perials be rendered more
clearly, if we drop his sooewitat confusing talk about various types of 
' deteIO.fna;iln', ' deteImL--alhiLity' , etc., and consider the development 
described purely in terms of the drives. Now Scchller takes the view 
that the sense-drive out be counterbalanceO by the development of the 
form-Ohve. The latter, however, cannot satisfactorily develop against 
the doO.ialIt position of an already established sense-drive, unless the 
linsr-drivr is teopormny suspended as a drive, by the OihiOzation of 
the psyche's receptivity to sen3e. (in tetter 22, it will bi disclosed 
that such suspension is effected through the psyche being confronted in 
perception with a form doO.natid object, whose sensuous content is 
O^^iO-zed, viz, by an art object mlifestfag the beauty of 'tranqH 
form’,)
Orce, in this way, the form-drive is enabled to develop, it becomes 
3strong enough to counterbalance a restored sense-drive , so that the 
aesthetic condition assumes a more balanced structure, in which sense 
and reason cancel out each other as determining forces. The psyche 
becomes free from physical and m>ra! constraints, and yet is able to 
be actively physical and mjrraL. It is only constraint and determination 
as such that are removed. The psyche is enabled to choose whether to
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act in a sensuous or a rational way, without being under the compusion 
of either natural or moraL necessity:
•Our psyche passes, then, from sensation to thought via a rnddle 
disposition in which sense and reason are both active at the 
same time.' ’. . . they cancel each other out as determining 
forces . . .’ 'This middle disposition, in which the psyche is 
subject neither to physical nor to moral, constraint, and yet is 
active in both ... Cis] a free disposition ...'*... this 
condition of real and active determrnaility [is 3 the aesthetic. 
(L20:4)
Now if we compare this description in L20i4 of a balanced aesthetic 
concdtion, with Sclhller's statemmts in L2O:3 concerning the need for 
the sense-drive and its determination to be ’destroyed* , 'cease to be’, 
and be ' aranmed' , it becomes more clear that Sclhller conceives of the 
aesthetic concdtion_ as moving through two phases : from (a) an 
unbalanced condition, in which the sense-drive is suppressed in order 
to allcw the form-drive to develop; to (b) a balanced concdtion of the 
two drives, which is the basis of the psyche’s freedom.^ The 
psychological movement through (a) and (b) here, is seen by Sclhller 
as occurring qqdckly, for earlier he talked of the aesthetic condition 
as being one in which
' ... ima mst therefore be momentarily fife eo aal 
determination whatsoever, and pass though a state of pure 
determnnaility.' (L20:5 )
But how might such a rapidly two-phased aesthetic conidtion be 
experienced in practice? Here we can only speculate, lacking any 
concrete discussion of it by Sclhller. Presumably, when confronted by 
the kind of foIm-d.om.nated iealSiful object that Scthller advocates 
as necessary (in L22;5), one's initial response to it will be to ^ocus 
on its formal characters tics : its shape, outline, layering, etc., at 
both the level of the whole object and its infra—formal features. Then, 
as our attention liigerr on such features, ve start to become aware of 
the object’s more sensuous aspects : the interplay of light, harmony 
and colour; noticing how the colour ’sit upon' one another, to 
complement or contarasfc, and so on. Now this sounds like a reasonably
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plausible description of any aesthetic engagement with an object of 
beauty, and in this light, Sclhller’s theory of a two-phase aesthetic 
condition is not as strange as it may at first appear, when considered 
only in the highly abstract teams that he emp^ys, Schiller is 
concerned to overcome the sensuous predisposition most men (as 
'savage’), will bring to aesthetic (or any) experience; he is 
concerned to avoid a response which judges beauty merely in terms of 
the sensuously agreeable. This can only be avoided by a form-dominated 
art object whch encourages an initially more formal response by us, 
one which is able to lessen our tendency to sensuous response, but 
which then leads us on into a more psychologically balanced aesthetic 
response.
In a footnote at the end of Letter 20, Sclhller infoims us that the 
object of the balanced aesthetic concdtion relates to the whole of our 
being : ail .our faculties, natures and drives,
'Everything wh.ch is capable of phenomenal m!aifestation may 
• • •’ ’ • • • relate to the totality of our various functions 
without being a definite object for any single one of them t 
that is its aesthetic character, A man can please us . . . 
without our taking into consideration in judging him any law or 
any purpose, please us simply as we contemplate him , , ,'
*, . , [in this] we are judging him aestheticetLly.' (L20s4, fn.)
Here, Sclhller explicitly adopts a Kantian view of aesthetic experience,
5
as involving a judgement winch does hot involve definite concepts of 
'any law or any purposee. Wlht is interesting, is Sclhller's suggestion 
that ' everything which is capable of phenomernal miaifestation’ , viz. 
any kind of phenomenal object, is capable of furnishing us with an 
aesthetic experience, is capable of evoking an aesthetic response, or 
at the very least, is capable of being judged aesthetically by us. Thus 
again, as in our discussion in tetter 15, we see that Sclhller operates 
a very wide conception of the ' aesthetic’ (which he closely associates 
with the formal aspect^ of phenomena, an aspect all phenomena have, in 
varying degrees of aesthetic qiuaity),
Sclhller emphasizes that despite not being eaglihtly informed by 
definite concepts, the aesthetic cond.ti.on of the psyche is not an 
arbitrary disposition. Although the aesthetic concdtion of the psyche 
involves neither natural nor rational determination, it does nevertheless
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still iapliciely involve concepts. It does not, however, involve our 
explicit aw wanness of such concepts.
’. . . our psyche in the aesthetic seaer does indeed act freely,
is in the highest degree free from all coooltlioa, but is in 
7
no wise free from laws ; and . • . this aesthetic freedom is 
distiIguishahlr from logical necessity in thinking, or oooral 
necessity in will mg, only by the fact that the Iiws according 
to wh-ch the psyche ... ^1^1 do not become apparent ae such, 
and • • • aeerr appear as a constraint.* (L2^:4, fn.)
Wlht Schiller is doing in this footnote, is considering (in a rather
abstract wear), how we experience the second phase of the aesthetic
cln<d.tfon• It is a balanced psychological concdtila, in wh-ch although
both the foro-drivr and the sensr-Orive are operative, they cancel mch
other ano as seOetrrming foma, so thaa the psyche experiences sense
and concepts in an indeterminate noner, Thu although the beeaniful
object is experienced sensuously, and althoiu^ concepts are involved in
its lrrcrptfoa, neither is experienced in a OeterOL-ntte, viz. particular
and definite, w^y; The *i.ndetemina.cy* of the psyche, in the second and
balanced phase of the aesthetic condOLt-on, is thus impLlcitly conaectrO
by Schiller with Kant* s thruy of the pure judgement of tller : wh-ch 
0
similarly does not involve a definite clncrlt or a particular sensuous 
lleusuIeo, md yet nevertheless, involves both concepts and sense, in 
the *frer play* of the uadersetndinf md imtfination• It woHO appear, 
therefore, that Scihller moHOHed the lsyciological.ly balanceO ’aesthetic 
condition’ of ’ inOeterOLIaecy’ , upon KehI's theory of the aesthetic ’free 
play' of the faculties of concepts and sense, in the Critique of 
Judgement, recasting Kean’s eirlry into his own model of psychological 
development, with its trrminolofy of drives and different modes of 
Oetrroination and indeterminacy.
LETTER, 21
The Aesthetic Ccoadtisa of the Psyche _ (Il)
In ^ttrr 21, Schiller continues his discussion of the aesthetic 
condition of the psyche, concentrating upon its fully OrerlolrO
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eqwLlibricas mode, and in particular, upon its role in grounding
freedom. He begins by telling ua, that just as there are two ways in 
witch the psyche can be determined (i.e., either sensuously or 
rationally), there are also two modes in which it can be indeterminate, 
or in what he calls a state of 'pure determ.iaaility’. The psyche my 
be so ' determlrable* , either when it is an empty indeterminacy, which 
is potentially determinable by any content wlhtsoever; or, when it is 
already possessed of a determinate content, but is fully receptive to 
any further mode of determination, viz. is totally open to receiving 
sense-impressions and concepts. The former condition of 'determnaabiity', 
was that described as the first stage of mai’s psychological development 
in Letter 19» The latter condtion of 'deierm.Mt)iliiy' , is the 
aesthetic condition of the psyche. It is (unlike the former state), not 
an empty indeterminacy; but is rather totally determined : allcwing 
itself to be sensuously and rationally determined without limitation.
'The psyche my be said to be determinable ... ittssmuch as it 
is determined in a way winch does not exclude anything, i.e., 
when the determination it undergoes is of a kind which does not 
involve limitation.' '. . . tThiqJis aesthetic determ.Lnaility 
(it has no limits, because it embraces aLl reality).' (L21:2)
In Sclhller's view, the psyche in the aesthetic condition is, in 
principle, capable of being determined by everything, and ray have an 
'infinite abundance' of con-tent within it. 'Aesthetic deter]miatility', 
viz. the ability of the psyche in the aesthetic condition to be 
determined, excludes determination by anything in particular : whether 
it be by any one limited sensuous object or feature of the same, or by 
any one definite concept, (This again reflects Kent's theory of the 
pure judgement of taste, in the Critique of Judgement ), It is, instead, 
a cond.tion in which the psyche has the capacity to be oompletely open 
to sensuous and rational content in general : a concdtion of total 
receptivity.
, the aesthetic disposition is in respect of determittility 
, , , negation by virtue of the infinite abundance within it,'
, aesthetic deter]miatility has one single point of contact 
with mere indetermlnation - viz., that both exclude any 
determinate mode of existence - while in all other respects they
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are to each other as nothing is to everything, hence, utterly 
and entirely different* ‘. , . aesthetic freedom of 
determination • • • mut be regarded as an infinity filled with 
content . . ,‘ (L21s5)
In the aesthetic condition, ran is not internally determined by 
anything in particular, in terms of cognizing some particular sensuous 
or definite conceptual content. Nor is he determined to be anything in 
particular externally, by realizing himelf through willing in some 
particular way. Instead it is man in his wholeness that is determined, 
in aesthetic contemplation : through the experience of beauty, all his 
powers are reorientated into a harmonious equilibrium.
‘In the aesthetic state, then, man is Noxught, if we are thinking 
of any particular result rather than of the totality of his 
powers . . * (L21:4)
The main point that Sclhller has been mUng so far, in the first 
half of this Letter, is that the overall effect of experiencing beauty 
is not something determinate, i.e. definite and particular, for either 
knowing or willnigj. It is rather a state of freedom from such limited 
activities. Mn is raised to an unlimited (all-embraoing) contemplative 
concdtion : to a highly receptive state of openness to the rational and 
sensuous determination of all his faculties and drives.
Now bearing in mind that the ‘aesthetic condition* of the psyche is 
supposed to be a developed and sophisticated form of the earlier concept 
of the ‘play-drive*, Schiller's discussion of it here in Letters 20 and 
21, is rather one-sided. The play-drive described in Li 4:4 as being
both the ba3is of artistic production, and as activated in the course 
of aesthetic contemjpation. Sclhller's entire emppasis now, however, is 
upon the aesthetic condition as a mode of totally receptive
contemplation. It is not clear at this stage, how this state could be 
the basis of artistic production. It ray be that the artist, free from 
determinate concepts (concerning e.g. utility, purpose, and possession), 
and also free from determinate sensuous con-tent (allowing his 
imagination to form his ' raterial' mentally, rather than allowing 
himelf to be confined by the limiis of existing 'natural' structures), 
produces in a ‘free* way. This is, in fact, what Scchller will argue in 
Letter 26, so it seems that he delays his discussion of the aesthetic
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condition as the psychological buhs of artistic production, until he 
has spent a number of Letters (20 to 25), discussing the psychological 
process involved jin aesthetic contemplation, and its psycho-ethical 
consequences.
Having discussed the aesthetic condition as the state of aesthetic 
oantempsatLon, Scihller proceeds in the second half of this Letter, 
to argue for its ability to be the psychological bo3is of freedom. He 
commences by reminding us that the complete experience of beauty, by 
developing the equHibrious aesttetic condition, produces in us a 
freedom from any particular sensuous or definite rational content. It 
is thus unproduedve of any particular result for our knowing or 
willing:
’[Beauty] a^c^crn^l^^Lshies no particular purpose, neither 
intellectual nor morrOLj it discovers no individual truth, 
helps us to perform no individual duty^ , • . ’ (L21 : 4)
The overall effect of what Scihller calls ’aesthetic culture’ or 
’ aesthetic education’, viz, of the influence of beauty on the process 
of psychological development, is thus to leave the will free from the 
doMinttion and corwtraint of either of the primary drives, so putting 
man back into a similar position of ’ open’ potential to that which he 
enjoyed before he was determined by either drive at all. From this 
restored position of potential being, man is enabled to realize him elf 
free frem. determinate sensuous or rational impediments, to achieve what 
Scihller calls his ’actuality’, or that which he ’ought to be’ , viz, to 
realize him elf in a way which through its wholeness and psychological 
balance, realizes his funda^^r^n^ human nature (realizes the Idea of 
Human Being),
’By of aesthetic culture , , • nothing more is achieved by
it than that he is henceforth enabled , , , to mace of himelf 
what he will - that the freedom to be what he ought to be is 
completely restored to him.’ (L21:4)
The aesthetic coned.tion,then, is seen by Scihller as remod-ng sensuous 
and rational constraints upon the psyche in its willing, to leave it 
fully self-dleteminable : restoring its potential to realize itself 
without sensuous or rational impediments which ’ close down’ its
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potential to some extent, one way or the other. (The idea that the 
rational may, as mach as the sensuous, be an impediment to the will, 
and thus a constraint upon our freedom, highlights Schiller1 s much 
more cautious approach to the concept of a purely rational freedom, 
an approach which distinguishes him from Kent.)
Sclhller’s argument that beauty may psycholoogcsaLly ground freedom, 
appears to rest upon the idea that objects which are beoitiful should 
have neither an explicit (or istrkcngj1 ) particular sensuous content/, 
nor should they explicitly convey some (* powerful* ) definite conceptual 
content, wtech would one-sidedly develop the sens e-drive/or the 
form-drive respectively, in a way which would prevent the equilibrium 
of drives which characterizes the aesthetic concdtion, from becoming 
established. Now in practice, such a view would place some peculiar 
restrictions upon what we would normally want to include under the 
category *beaitiful object*, Moreover, the idea that a beautiful object 
is one which avoids conveying to us any determinate sensuous or
conceptual content, carries with it the odd implication that what is
conveyed is an indeterminate, i.e. indefinite (or even vague ?) content. 
On a generous view, we can see how this theory might apply to abstract 
visual aft and to orchestral missc, where form preponderates over any 
kind of content. But it is a viw of beauty and of the aesthetic 
condition itself, which leaves little room for the literary arts, other 
than poetry. Dramtic works and novels, clearly do convey to us, 
predumrately, definite concepts, in the form of spoken or written 
words. Even with the visual arts, can we really say that a particular 
art object, qua an object, is not experienced as a definite, limited, 
particular sensuous item? (as well as being something which may 
transcend such a limit). In musc, operas, oratorios and mases, all 
convey large numbers of definite concepts, in the explicit form of sung 
words. The idea that the psyche can, through the experience of beauty, 
be free from determinate sensuous or rational con-tents of an explicit 
and definite kind, does not therefore appear to be plausible. Sclhller 
will directly address himself to this problem in the next Letter (22), 
and will put forward two argumenns, that wlhle the psyche in the 
aesthetic con<dtiln is totally open to rational or sensuous content and 
thus determination, in beautiful art such determnatim 1), is ideally 
cancelled out by a balance of both kinds of content, in wlhch there is 
a total appesal to all our faculties simultaneously (L22:4); and 2), is 
suppressed by the predominance of form in the object (L22:5). The min
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em?!hsis in Letter 22 is on argument 2), wlhLch essentially involves 
the idea that by being dominated by form, both the sensuous and 
rational con-tents of art are rendered merely implicit* However, in 
the types of art that I have mentioned here, it is clear that in many
objects which we would want to call ’beautiful’ , form rarely does 
render sensuous or rational con-tent implicit. These con-tents are 
arguably significant aspects of what constitutes aesthetic experience, 
and thus should not have their role minimized in any adequate conception 
of either the ’aesthetic condition’ or the ’beaujiTul’ itself.
In Sclhller’s view, aesthetic experience restores the freedom and 
full humanty which are lost by the exclusive dam.iui.tion of nature or 
reason, not only when one dominates the whole mLnd, but where the 
realm of one is not tempered and balanced by the activity of the other 
in that realm, viz. when our sensuous nature is uninfluenced by reason, 
or our rationality does not incorporate sense, but seeks to function 
entirely independently.
’, . .it was precisely of this freedom that he was deprived by 
the one-eided constraint of nature in the field of sensation 
and by the exclusive authority of reason in the realm of thought 
... the power which is restored to him in the aesthetic mode 
. . . Cis J the gift of CfuLl] humanty itself',’ (L21:5)
Now the intermixing of reason and sense into each other’s realms, which 
Sclhller here i-mpties is a necessary part of full human being, seems to 
go against his earlier view of the necessity for them to ma.L^t^^^n 
separate domains of activity, even wlhlst inter'functionina in 
co-operation:
’Both drives ... need to have limits set to them • • . the 
sens e-drive so it does not encroach upon the domain of law, the 
formal drive so that it does not encroach on that of feeling. ’ 
(H3« 6)
Sclhller sees the aesthetic condition as giving man a full and 
balanced human nature. But the unlimited openness or ’determbnahlity’ 
upon which this state rests, means that as soon as man does in fact 
realize or ’determine’ himelf in any mamer at all, he loses his full 
humanty and becomes limited, by being involved in either a
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predomimntly sensuous or rational mode of activity, in a particular 
or definite way. As soon as he uses his f%edom to move from 
potentiality to actuality, to realize his huraaity, he is - as a finite 
being, confined to acting within a particular space and time - bound to 
lose his fullness and become only partially human TMs leads Scihller 
to assert the need for a permanent recourse to aesthetic experience, in 
order to continually restore man to psychological wholfeness, pure 
determirnbility and potential being, after each fragmentary mode of 
only partial self-realization.
*. . . he possesses this [ full! humahty in potentia before 
every determinate concd-tion into which he can conceivably enter. 
But he loses it in practice with every determinate condition 
into Which he does enter. * *. . . this humanly mnst be restored 
to him each time anew through the life of the aesthetic.’ (L21 s5)
In a footnote, Scihller says that in any kind of psychological 
movement from a condition of sensation to/one of thought, no matter how 
rapid, we always necessarily pass through the aesthetic concd-tion:
*. . . the rapidity with which certain types pass from sensation 
to thought . . . scarcely - if indeed at all - allows them to 
become aware of the aesthetic mode through which they mwt in 
that time necessarily pass.* (L21:5, fn.)
Tihs suggests that the aesthetic coned.tion of the psyche is a necessary
psychological stage which we may perhaps frequently experience, as part 
4
of our everyday cogntive process, rather than being some rare
experience of hL^ level contem^-ation. (if this is Schiller’ s view, it
has some similarity with Kant’s view in the Introduction to the
Critique of Judgement, where he says that we often foil to notice the
pleasure attendant upon the achievement of the aim of knowle^e, because
of its fariliarity, being so mich a part of our everyday cogntive 
\5experience.)^
In the same footnote, Scihller puts forward the view that in practice 
people vary coraiderably in their ability to Unger in, and thus to 
enjoy, the aesthetic coned, tion:
* C Crtehn3 natures cannot for any length of time tolerate the
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state of indetermirnation, but press irnpatienniy for seme result 
wMch in the state of aesthetic liMitlessness they cannot find.
In others, by contrast, who find, enjoyment more in the feeling 
of total capacity than in any single action, the aesthetic state 
tends to spread itself over a much wider area Cof life]. Mich as 
the former dread emmttness, just as little are the latter capable 
of tolerating limitation,* (L21;5, fn.)
ScMller here describes the man who enjoys lingering in the aesthetic 
condition, as one who wishes to remain conscious of his total capacity, 
who finds it intolerable to determine himelf in any particular way (as 
realization requires), and who seeks to aestheticize other domains of 
experience. This is the type of persornaity that &ega had in mind, in 
his critique of the concept of the ’ beautiful soul’, in his
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).° The beautiful soul was a concept that
ScMller Mmelf did much to promote in his treatise entitled On Grace
and Dignity (1795)» written less than two years before the Aesthetic
Letters appeared in public. Hegd criticized the beoitiful soul for
dweeiing in a state of indeterminate limitlessness, enjoying the feeling
of its uMversaL potential, but actuaLly achieving nothing, for any
determinate realization would put an end to this state as such. In
short, the concdtion of the beautiful soul, in itself, is totally 
7
unprodutCive.
In this Letter, ScMller has attempted to argue that beauty provides 
us with the po'b^r^tii-al for becoMng fully human in actuality, by creating 
the psychological pre-condLtion of such a compete realization. But his 
view that any realization, involves some loss of our full humanty, 
means that this potential can never be fully realized. The aesthetic 
concdtion’s psychological wholeness and its equilibrium of natures and 
drives, is lost, whenever we attempt to realize in some limited and 
particular way, a concdtion wMch essentially involves being unlimited. 
Ve thus seem to be caught-up in the contradiction of attenuating to 
realize that wMch, in the very process of its realization, is
necessarily lost, Sclhller’s response to this problem, is recurrent 
aesthetic psychotherapy, to keep restoring us to full humMty. But 
this perpetu&l returning to potential being, does not of itself, help 
us to realize that wMch is lost whenever we try to realize it. Prima 
facie, therefore, Sclhller's concept of the aesthetic coned tion appears 
to suffer from the same unireeaLizable and u^j^rr^cd^^^jlve character, as the
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’beautiful soul* concept that Heggsl criticized.
Hwever, it is possible to interpret Sclhller in a plausible 
which extricates him from one criticssm that attaches to the beautiful 
soul concept, by viewing the aesthetic concdtion as at least being 
productive. This involves the idea that particular acts of knowing and 
willing benefit by proceeding from such a psychol<ogcally whole and 
balanced beu3is, retaining a more complete and balanced character, than 
would have been the case, if they had not had such an origin. Any act 
of self-realization will necessarily involve particular feelings, 
definite thoughts, and limited actions; but by proceeding from the 
bo3is of the aesthetic condition, such inevitable limitations of the 
psyche, will be less than otherwise would have been the case. There is 
also a necessity to return to the aesthetic condition after such (less) 
limited realizations, in order to restore the psychological boris of 
further broader and more balanced modes of cognition and volition. 
Coonequently, there is a permanent psychological need for intermittent 
aesthetic experiences (even if mly of the rapid and unconscious type, 
that Sclhller mentioned in L21s5, fn.), in the course of everyday 
cognition and volition, involving an oscillation between aesthetic 
psychological wholeness anVpaaTicular limited acts of knowing and 
willing. Now if we take this view of the interrelation of aesthetic/end 
mrndne experience, in wlhch the former to some extent carries over into 
ordinary acts of knowing and willing, then Sclhller carnnot be criticized 
for having created, in the aesthetic concd-tion, a sterile ’besartiful 
soul’ concept.
Sclhller, then, recognized the inevitability of fragmentary modes of 
self-realization in the world, and allcwed for them by realistically 
integrating psychologcaLly unbalanced and partial activities into his 
view of activity Which occurs from the basis of a psycholog.coLly 
balanced aesthetic coned tim. The most he offers is an oscillation 
between psychologcal equilibrium/snd disequilibrium (in which the 
latter will be limited in its scope, by the pre-existing equilibrium). 
Sclhller, then, does not argue for the desirabblity, or even the 
possibility, of a permanent psychooogoal equilibrium of the kind 
associated with the concept of the beautiful soul. It wouLd appear that 
he rejected such a concept, as being unvLable both for the individual 
and for society.8
In the remaning Letters of the treatise, it will become clear that 
Sclhller views aesthetic experience as being not merely psychologcally
155
restorative,but also as positively feeding into, and modifying the 
form of, ordinary modes of experience. In entering into particular 
acts of knowing and willing from the basis of the aesthetic concd-tion, 
such activities are more inclined to involve the co-operation of both 
our natures. In knowle^e, it may bring together both rationalist and 
enpiricist standpoints (as Scihller described himelf as doing in 
L18:4)» or it may render science into common sense (of. L27s11). In 
willing, it may harmon-ae our rational and sensuous natures, promooing 
a ’noble* natural inclination to perform our rational moonl duty (as 
Scihiler will describe in Letter 25). Howver, whist Scihller conceives 
of the aesthetic condition as thus positively modifying the psychological 
form of knowing and willing in other doimin3 of experience, he does not 
conceive of it as providing any kind of substitute for the substantive 
and integral content of these domain. Earlier in this ^tter, Scihller 
told us that
’EBeautyD accomplishes no particular purpose, neither intellectual 
nor morraL; it discovers no individual truth, helps us to perform 
no individual duty . . .’ (L21:4)
.L
¥e can now see more clearly what this statement meens. The aesthetic 
condition of the psyche is to be the full and balanced ba3is of 
particular acts of knowing and willing, merrily by harmooiooily mocUfying 
their psychological form. By harmoonzing reason and sense, it will
predispose us towards truth in knowing, and moraaity in willing, but it
g
will not itself provide the con-tent of either truth or morality.
LETTER 22
The Art Object
In Letters 20 and 21, Scihller explored the aesthetic cmd-tlon of 
the psyche purely as a subjective state. In this tetter, he proceeds 
to relate this state to that which evokes it, viz. to the art object. 
In doing so, he will not discuss any particular concrete features of 
art objects, but will merely mace general statements about the 
reciprocal relationship of subject and object in determining more or 
less eqhli^bri^ons psychological states. HLs principal concern is to
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argue for the necessity that any determinate sensuous or rational 
con-tent in the art object, should be balanced in its psychological 
appeal (by being addressed to all our faculties simuLtaneotuly), through 
both types of content being rendered implicit by the predominance of 
form in the art object.
Sclhller commences by reminding us that in the aesthetic condition,
the psyche is meant to be free from the limitation that arises from
any particular sensuous or rational determination, with all its powers 
1
interfunctioning in a state of active receptivity:
, the aesthetic mode of the psyche is to be regarded as 
• • • the absence of all limitation and . , • the sum total of 
the powers • . • are conjointly active within it.* (122:1)
It becomes more clear that Sclhller conceives of the aesthetic
condition as beneficially carrying over into ordinary acts of knowing 
and willing, when he tells us that
* ... a disposition of the psyche wlhch removes all limitations 
from the totality of human nature mut necessarily remove them 
from every individual maifestation of it as well.’ (L22:1)
Any particular act of knowing or willing, if it proceeds from the 
aesthetic condition, will partake of the latter’ s psychological 
wholeness and beksaice. Sclhller* s statement that the aesthetic 
disposition ’removes all limitations from the totality of our human 
nature’ , appears to overlook his position in L14?1 and 2, that such 
full human-by rests upon ti» miutuil limitation of each drive. Our 
overall freedom from the exclusive limitation or constraint upon the 
psyche of one drive, is a limitlessness wlhch itself rests upon 
limitation : the limit of each drive by the other, whereby they cancel 
out each other as determining forces.
In Sclhller’s view, any disposition of the psyche, other than the 
aesthetic, neoessaurly involves a merely limited exercise of our 
psychological powera.
’Every other w^ of exercising its functions endows the psyche 
with some speoial aptitude - but only at the cost of some 
special limitation; the aesthetic alone leads to the absence
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of all limitation* (L22:1) <
The development of some limiting aptitude referred to here, is J
explained by Schiller in the follcwing way. Expediences which are 
predominantly sensuous, have the psychological effect of limiting our *
capacity for intellectual exertion. Experiences which develop and 
exercise our intellectual powere, involving abstract conoepttudization, 1
HiLmit our capacity for feeling and sensuous experience.
’That which flatters our senses in immeddate sensation ... 4
[has the effect of 3 rendering us proportionately less fitted |
for CmsnttaJ exertion. That which tenses our intelleciuial j
powers and invites them to form abstract concepts ... [ has I
the effect of 3 depriving us of seraibility . . .’ (L22:2) 1
In contract, Sclhller tells us, the experience of beauty places us in
a condition of actively receptive equilibrum (the aesthetic condition), 4
frem which we can proceed equally to engage in abstract reasoning or
simple apprehension of the sensuous. :
. i ?
’If, by contrast, we have surrendered to the enjoyment of genuine .j
beauty, we are at such a moment matter in equal degree of our J
passive and of our active powere, and we shall with equal ease J
turn to . . • the discursions of abstract thought or to the
direct contemplation of phenomena.’ (L22:2) !=
Sdriller proceeds to connect the aesthetic condition with the ideal 
art object. The true woric of art, he tells us, has the effect of 
establishing in the mind a limitless dqullibrim, involving both 
intellectual power and sensuous vigour. He believes that we can utilize 
the degree to which this psychological state is produced in us by a 
work of art, as a criterion for evaluating it. Sclhller thus provides 
a subjective criterion for evaluating art, in terms of art’ s 
psychological effects. If an aesthetic experience does not establish 
psychological equilibrium, but leaves us principally inclinied either 
to thought or to feeling, then such experience is not what he calls a 
’pure’ aesthetic experience. J
’This lofty equon.mty and freedom of the mind, combined with
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power and vigour, is the mood in which a genuine work of art 
should release us, and there is no more certsdn touchstone of 
true aesthetic excellence. If, after enjoyment of this kind, 
we find oureelves d-sposed to prefer some particular mode of 
feeling or action, but unfitted or disinclined for another, 
this may serve as infallible proof that we have not had a 
purely aesthetic experience . . .’ (122:5)
If our aesthetic experience is not of such t ’pure* kind, ScMller 
tells us that the psycholo$£Lctl disequilibri'^m involved may have three 
causes: 1) The art object may be unbalinced, with a predominance of 
either sensuous or rational content in it, 2) Our psychological 
disposition prior to aesthetic experience may have been unbolinced, 
with t paadrmLnance of either the sensuous or formal drive in it, 
moddfying our response. 5) Both objective cause 1), and subjective cause 
2), may simultaneously interact in reciprocity.
*. • . [if 3 we hive not hid t purely aesthetic experience ... 
the cause lies in the object or in our own response or, as is 
almost always the case, in both it once.* (122:5)
If the cause is reciprocal (5), presumably there may be either some 
exacerbation, or cancelling out, of the domiiaioi of one drive or the 
other. Por example, t cmceptanaiy dominated art object may restore 
equl3^;^l^;r^im to a psychological pre-conci.tion characterized by the 
irmIntiri of the sens e-drive. The therapeutical functioning of beauty 
described in ^tter 17, would seem to require what Sclhlier here implies 
would be merely in ’impure’ aesthetic experience. An unbalanced 
psychological effect is surely necessary in order to ’release’ whichever 
drive is too ’tense’ or strong, (of. L17s4). Vhat ScMlier here calls t 
’pure* aesthetic experience, would not be capable of functioning 
psyohothe:laapeaticgbLLy (in the w^ the miss of mankind require), but 
could only mlntain (t rarely) existing equilibrium.
However, what Schuller hts been describing as t ’pure aesthetic 
experience* , is the psychological effect of the ideal art object. Thus 
he proceeds to tell us that
’... in actuality no purely aesthetic effect is ever to be met 
with ... the excellence of t work of art can never coinist in
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anythiig more than a high approximation to that ideal of 
aesthetic purity; and whatever the degree of freedom ... we shaLl 
• . . leave it in a particular mood and with some definite 
bias.' (L22:4)
The ’ excellence' of a work of art is a mater of the degree to which 
it provides us with a 'pure' aesthetic experience. In redity, any 
aesthetic experience will leave us in either a passive or an active 
mood, and with a bias towards either feeling or thought. Aesthetic 
evaluation involves an introspective psychological self•aa..sfssemfne of 
our own ’mood’ and 'bias’ •
'The more general the mood and the less limited the bias 
produced in us by any particular art, or by any particular 
product of the same, then the nobler that art and the more 
excellent that product will be.’ (L22?4)
The 'excellence' of a type of art, or of a particular work of art, is
something which we can subjectively evaluate in terms of its
psychological effect upon us. The evaluation of art is not directed
at any chea?accerrstics or features of the art object, but is directed 
2inwards at our own psychological condition. In taking up this position, 
Sclhller appears to commlleely equate what is of aesthetic value with 
what is of psycholo^g-cal value.
Scthller proceeds next to briefly consider the main types of art, 
with regard to the partiality or fullness of their psychological appeal 
to our faculties. He tells us that mruic appeds most to the senses, 
poetry to the imcg.]nctioi, and sculpture to the intellect.
’. . . even the most ethereal music has ... an even greater 
affinity with the senses than time aesthetic freedom redly 
dlcws; ... even the most successful poem partakes more of 
the arbitrary and casual play of the imag-nation ... than the 
inner lawfulness of the truly beautiful really permts; ... 
even the most excellent sculpture ... does, by virtue of its 
conceptual precision, border upon the austerity of science.’
(122s4)
Now in Schiller's view, these narrow affinities can be overcome by the
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skilled artist. He has the ability to widen the psychological appeal 
of a type of art, so as to make it add^ss other faculties, and thereby 
increase its ’excellence’ , viz. its psycho logical value in developing 
equilibriim and wholeness.
’Neveirtheless, the greater the degree of excellence attained by 
a worik in any of these three arts, the more these particular 
affinities will disappear . . .* (L22:4)
Such widening of affinities, will involve music being as hea^vLly imbued 
with form as possible. The plastic arts (including sculpture), mut be 
made to appeal to us sensuoiudy, and not primarily concept-iully. Poetry 
mut not just appeal to the imeag-ration, but also to feeling and the 
intellect.
’Muic ... must bccome sheer fomn • • *• ’The plastic arts 
• • • must . . t move us by the mirnediacy of their s<msucu.s 
presence. Poetry ... mut grip us pcwcsOsU.ly as music does, 
but at the seme time, like the plastic arts, surround us with 
serene clarity.’ (L22j4)
SctoHer does not say how, in concrete terms, any of these suggested 
remecdies are to be produced, and again confines himself to discussing 
art in ternm of its psychologicd effects. It is notabln that in ahis 
discussion, Sdn-ller has moved from his own relatively simple 
psychological model of two SuedamoneaL natures and drives, to adopt 
the Kantian division of faculties. Thi.s has been necessitated by three 
main types of art, requiring to be specifically connected with a 
correBOcndieg number of different psychological powera.
Scthller tells us hlatt hhe c liter rone ore eval^ateIes ’ style* in a 
type of ama, lies in the hegrae to which the leLmi'ts of Cah tyt>e e f 
art have been dimuetchsd, as assessed by the generality of its 
psychological appeal.
’This, precisely, is the m,rk of perfect style in each and every 
art % that ±t se abet ot rammo'e the sposCfic limitations of the art 
in question . • • Canl.3 is able to ccoifer upon it a more general 
character. * (L22 :4)
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Tins ’ more general chanter*, does not involve any transcendence of
3objective frontiers between types of art , but refers to the ability 
of in art form to subjectively appeal to the totality of our faculties.
If it is possible to talk of Sdhlier having t concept of the 
* judgement of taste’ , it w^uid appear to involve a detached higher 
level judgement (or mtijudgement), winch we mbke of our own 
psychological state in the course of, or im[maialely after, having an 
aesthetic experience. In the aesthetic condition, we conten?lata in 
object of beauty in the special aesthetic ottiuide of active receptivity, 
and assess it by exploring its features it the level of consciousness. 
Howver, we superimpose over this aesthetic judg^me^-t in the narrow 
sense, in assessment of our own degree of psychological wholeness and 
balance, it the level of selfcoonsciusness * This second judgement, 
not the first, is seen by Scihller as the level it which we ire able 
to a^^qmlJc^JLy assess ’excelaince’ and ’style* in art. Thus what we would 
ordinarily think of is the psychological locus of the judgement of taste, 
for Scihller has only t preliminary and subordinate function, to lead 
into or psycholog-ccbUy ground t higher level mtijudgement where 
aesthetic and psychological assessments merg^. Consciousness of the art 
object ip aesthetic contemplation, functions is t pae-con<d.tion to 
self—oonscioneness of our own psychological state. Schiller's concept 
of the judgement of taste then, if we draw together and mbke explicit 
what underrdes his discussion so fir in this Litter, would appear to 
take the form of t two level psychxwsthetic judgement.
Having competed his discussion of the need for any determinate 
sensuous or national content in art to be btiinced in its psychological 
appeal, by being addressed to til our faculties simultineougly, ■Sclhllea 
now proceeds to discuss the means whereby this result may be achieved % 
through both types of content being rendered i-msU-eit by the
paad.omLnlnce of form in the art object.
’In i truly successful work of art the contents should effect 
nothing, the form everything; for only through the form is the 
whole man affected, through the subject-matter, by contrast, 
only one or other of his functions. Subject-matter • • • always 
has t limiting effect upon the mind, and it is only from form 
that true aesthetic freedom can be looked for.’ (L22:5)
The skilful artist can mike form absorb both types of content, so that
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they become sublated within it and rendered inplicit:
’• « • the mailer i.n any art • • • can mike his form consume his 
material . • •' (L22j5)
In the two passages quoted above, Scthller foll<ws Kant to some ex-tent,
in ascribing to the formal quOities of an art object, the source of
its aesthetic value^; c value, again like Kent, seen in purely subjective
terms. For Knt, the formal character of beauty enables aesthetic
experience to be disinterested in sense, providing us with a non-sensuous 
5
pleasure wlhch promotes morality. For Sclhller, form functions by 
appealing psychologically to all our drives and faculties, whereas some 
determinate 'subject-matter' , viz. some definite conceptual or particular 
sensuous content, appeals to one drive or the other, or to a particular 
faculty. Thus wlhlst for Kant, form promotes morality, for Sclhller form 
is conducive to psychological equilibrium and wholeness.^
Sclhller takes the view that both rational conceptual content and 
sensuous maenhal con-tent in art, are always limiting to the psyche, 
through their appeal to either the form—drive or the sense-drive 
respectively, (or to the faculties of reason or sense). If the psyche 
is to be unlimited in aesthetic experience, on the basis of a total 
equHibrum of natures and drives, then he argues that form mist 
do]mlnctf the art object. Howevr, this view appeara to involve 
artificially detaching form from our rationality and the form-drive, 
i.e. from that nature and drive by wlhch it is constructed in the process 
of knowing, or reconstructed in the process of artistic production. In 
his discussion of 'aesthetic semblance' in Letter 26, Sclhller 
(flll<wi^ig Kan), clearly conceives of form as being something of our 
own active construction, and not something which we merely passively 
receive from nature (cf. L26:4 and 8). The active reconstruction of 
form in artistic production, is executed by the rationally informed 
aesthetic ima£Llnctioi, wlhch Scthller carefully distinguishes from the 
formLess natural imagination (of. L27:4). Even though Scthller conceives 
of the aesthetic imagination as interlirking reason and sense, the 
engteaiis is on the need for it to be law governed (cf. L27:4, fn.). It 
does not, then, seem plausible for Scthller here in Letter 22, to 
pretend that form is somehow detached frcm having any special affinity 
with our rational nature and the form-drive, in order that he can give 
it a neutral status whLch will not especially appeal to and develop the
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form-drive, (a development which mLght hinder psycho logical eguilibriw 
from becoming established). ScthLller is, of course, correct to 
distinguish form as such from concepts, as being a much more implcit 
mode of rationality than the latter. Nevertheless, even an impplcit 
rational structuring of the sensuously existential, entails that form 
and the forming process are much more cioseiy allied with our rational 
nature and the form-drive, than with our sensuous nature and the 
sense-drive. The artist’ s skilful utilization of form my well render 
both concepts (i.e. explicit rationality), and sensuous features in an 
art object, more impPicit, but it is a process of rendering Which is 
principally executed by our rational nature, and whose formal result 
will have a closer affinity with that nature and the form-drive.
Schiller’ s position concerning the psychol<ogLcal neutrruLity of form, 
is not only somewhat implsauible, but is also arguably unnecessary. In 
Letters 5, 4 and 9, the general purpose of aesthetic education w^ 
stated to be to mike sensuous man become rational and moora., and 
consequently to be capable of creating a durable Moral State. In terms 
of this educational programme, it would actually be helpful if form 
endowed the art object with the biased effect of developing our 
rationality. Instead, Schiller has form function to have an equal 
affinity with both primary drives, and thereby engage them
simultaneously, so as to limit each other. If Schiller allwed form to 
be rationally biased in its psychological effect, it would, of courae, 
only worsen the psychological disequilibri•m of those men whom Sdiller 
refers to as enervated ' barbarians’ (cf. L4:&). Ultimately underlying 
Schiller’ s rather strained theory of form’ s psychological neutrality, 
is his Ksaitian concern that if the art object did have the effect of 
positively and directly developing our rationality (rather than doing 
so negatively and indirectly by limiting sensuous hindrances to its 
development, in the shape of a dominant sense-drive), it would undermine 
the autonomous status of our rational being.
Schiller’s whole theory of aesthetic education initially appears to 
involve some compromising of the autonomy of the psyche, for it invests 
the art object with the ability to effect mdifi.ca'ti^c^ns in our 
psycholo$g.cal cojndtion, which in turn effects consequential modes of 
knowing and willing. Hwever, in the concept of ’aesthetic semblance* , 
in ^tter 26, Sdiller will mdce it clear that whether we are involved 
in contemppating or producing art which is form-doIisnlted, we are 
dealing with something of our own mdcing (cf. L26:8). In so far as our
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psycho3.ofg.cal state is * determined’ as a result of encounter with an 
aesthetic semblance, it is through interacting with a medium which is 
essentially of our own, and which thus leaves us selfddeeemined (or 
autonomous) in relation to it.
Schiller takes the view that not only should aesthetic experience 
leave the psyche autonomorui, in the way we have seen, but that art 
itself should be autonomous vis-a-vis other domains of experience; it 
should be an end in itself. It mist not, he tells us, serve some 
particular aim such as inducing pathos, or teaching, or momaLly 
improving us. These all entail limiting the psyche’ s orientation.
’Arts which affect the passions ... are not entirely free 
arts since they are enlisted in the service of a particular 
aim (that of pathos) • . .’ ’No less self-contradictory is 
the -notion of a fine art which teaches (didactic) or improves 
(moral); for nothing is more at variance with the concept of 
beauty than the no'tion of giving the psyche any definite 
bias’ (L22:5)
One m.ght, perhaps, think that Scihller himelf is guilty of seeking 
to mke fine art serve ends outside its own domin, by functioning to 
mike mm m>re rational and moral, and capable of political reform. 
Horever, Scthller conceives of the relationship of art to moral 
improvement and political reform, as involving onLy general aims to 
be achieved indirectly through the psychological effect of form in 
art, and not as involving particular aims (mral precepts, or a 
political minifesto, or coratitutional proposals), to be directly 
achieved through some explicit conceptual content expressed in art 
worics. (Schiller’ b view of the necessary autonomy of art in this 
respect, is a topic he will return to again in 126:10 and 11.) The 
precise nature of the relationship between aesthetic education and 
moral im^:rove^^1:, is the issue to which Schiller will turn his 
attention in the next Letter (Letter 2j).
By arguing in this Letter that the art object should be form 
dominated, Scihller is not saying that a woiC of art should not have 
any sensuous or rational content, but that these should be organized 
so as to leave us in a concd-tion of psychologioal equilibrum in, or 
immediately after, their experience. The aim of carefully contriving 
an art object’ s psycholofgcal effect in order to produce a balanced
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response, is seen by Scthller as being achieved through form dummaing 
both types of content, to render them relatively im?Hcit. Hoover, it 
is not at Hl clear from anything that Scthller has said in this tetter 
just why it is that if an object is form dommted, it will produce a 
balanced response, activating both drives so that they counlterbalcncf 
each other. We may find ourselves asking what is so special about form, 
that enables it to engage both drives simultaneously? For the answer to 
this question, we have to go bsiok to the epistemological position 
Scthller expressed in Letter 19. There it w^ disclosed that the 
psyche' s formative activity rests upon the passive reception of a 
sensuous content (as 'raw material' to form),
’The finite mind is that which cannot become active except 
through being passive, wthch only attains to the absolute by 
means of l:imitaeioi, and only acts and fashion-sCor forml 
inasmuch as it receives miatrial to fashion.' '. . . mLnd 
will accordingly combine with the drive towards form, or 
towards the absolute, a drive towards mater, or towards 
liLeieaeion, these latter being the concdtions without whch 
ij could neither possess nor satisfy the first of these 
drives.' (L19:9)
The relevance of this passage to the current context of discussion, is 
that it j^npli-es that we cannot discern or create form without 
apprehending a sensuous content, and that both drives are necessarily 
engaged in this process. Horerrer, ScMller does not hereby tell us why 
the drives are necessarily engaged simuLtaneously (and not say 
alternately, as in Fichte' s theory of drives in The Science of 
KioW^dge), or why they are engaged to an equal extent (so as to 
counterbalance one another, and produce the equuiibrious aesthetic 
condtion). We mut, therefore, conclude that much of what Sclhller 
says in this tetter about the psychological effect of form in art, does 
not go beyond being a series of assertions.
In order to encourage both drives to be engaged sieULecnfot3ly and 
(roughly) to the same extent, Sclhller would perhaps have done better 
to argue for the art object to be endowed with equaLly powerful 
conceptual and sensuous contents, (something like a Wagner muic drama 
perhaps). Tlhs would involve mak-ng both types of content as explicit 
as possible. In other words Schller should have argued for the
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malimsation, rather than the mLm.imaation, of the psychological
effects of both types of content in art. The overall effect produced 
in us, would more closely conform to the ideal of man’ s psychological 
perfection which Sclhller expressed in Letter 17s
. mm’ s perfection resides in the harmom.di.s energy of his 
sensidus and spiritual powers . . .’ (Li 7:2)
Schiller’s own position in Letter 22, in which form ’consumes’ both 
types of cOT^iJei^'t, rendering1 them merely impplcit, would seem to produce 
a psychological situation in which
’. • . the unity of his nature is founded upon the uniform 
enfeeblement of his sensuous and spiritual powers,’ (L17:2)
Schiller’ s description of the ideal art object in Letter 22, maces it 
become rather anaemic and indeterminate in character, producing an 
effect which would leave us in need of ’energizing beauty’ (of. L17:2). 
Sdh.13.er seems to have foiowed Kant into a rather enpty aesthetic 
formalism where art is concerned. The reason for this wo^ld appear to 
be Scftiller’ s overriiiig concern to ensure that psychological harmony 
is produced by aesthetic experience. Two weakened natures and drives, 
may more ob^eidlisly be reconciled than two dynamc ones. Thus SclhLller’s 
moral and political aims in the treatise, have led him to produce a 
theory of the ideal art object which reduces it to being anaemic and 
formlist in character in the end.
LETTER 23
The Aesthetic Develoument of ’Noble’ Moral Volition
In this Letter, Schiller’ s perspective returns to the practical 
educative role of the aesthetic, as the means whereby the mats of 
mankind, doImitltei by their sensuous nature, may become rational and 
moral. Vheraas in the last Letter the ’aesthetic’ discussed in the
na^ow terms of types of art and the ideal art object, in this Letter 
the ’aesthetic’ is conceived of in a much less ideal, and at the seme 
time broader way, as being ’fomn* in general, in the sense simply
165
of order, structure and harmony of any kind. Seth lie r will argue in 
this Litter, that through an 'aesthetic* education in this wider sense, 
our sensuous nature miy he ’foimed’ in a way which both facilitates the 
development of an as yet mrely dormant rational nature (by dlm.liL.shing 
sensuous hindrances to its development, and ensures that our sensuous 
nature will, once reason is developed, be more comma^'dle with the 
latter, and capable of interrelating with it in a relatively hareosi.ous 
marner,
Schiller begins by rdm.niiig us that the transition from the life of 
sense, pmsivity and feeling, to a life of active rational co©^!^ 
and volition, is a movement which can only be effected through the 
eediatisi of a ’m,ddle state’ of aesthetic freedom, viz. by passing 
through the aesthetic concdtion of the psyche.
’The tranition from a passive state of feeling to an active 
state of thinking and willing cannot, then, take place except 
via a mddle state of aesthetic freedom.’ (L23:2)
Scihller further reiterates that the aesthetic eonedtion of the psyche 
does not involve explicit definite conoBpts. C3n^€^<^u^e^n3^^, ft can 
provide us with neither intellectual insights nor moral convictions. 
Nevertheless, he asserts, it is the necessary psychological ane-eon<d.tion 
of us having any rational concepts or moral principles (for sensuous man, 
left to himelf, is unable to attain to either).
’. . . although this state can of itself decide nothing as 
regards either our insights or our convictions ... it is 
nevertheless the necessary are-con<d.tioi of our attaining to 
any insight or coni..ction at Hl.* ’. . . there is no other 
way of macing sensuous man rational except by first macing him 
aesthetic.' (L25;2)
Scihller then continues, telling us that
’. . • beauty can produce no result, neither for the unde:]rstlidLig 
1
nor for the will ... it merely imparts the power to do both 
. . (L23:3)
In bis refdrdnse here to beauty imparting ' the power' to understand
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and will, Sclhller is saying that aesthetic experience psycholo^cd-ly 
promotes the general purpose of knowing and willing. This is because 
the aesthetic concdtioi involves an equili^briLcus relationship between 
our drives and faculties, which to some extent beneficiclly carries 
over into ordinary particular acts of knowing and willing. (This is 
si^milar to Kant' s idea in the OIr■ti.ltf of Judgement that the ' free 
play* of the fccULtifs of ie^c£inatfln and underrstanding evoked by 
beauty, is ’subjectively final* for, viz. promotes the end of, cogrhtion 
in general.)
Sclhller proceeds to argue that if the sensuously doImiiltfd man is 
ever to rise to truth in his knowing, he mut develop the ability to 
think autonomously, and not merely be passively recipient of a 
mtuttplicity of external sens e-impressions. The development of active 
attonoey in and ^i^Zil.-Lng, does not involve doing away with this
passive receptivity, but rather the superimposed development of an 
active rational (self) determfictiln, involving i^nternally and 
externaLly forming the matrial so received. Now Scthller takes the 
view that mn has within him, even in his natural sensuous state, an 
imp-l-cit rational nature. The development of this potentially active 
rational nature, in a way which will allcw the individual to remain 
passively recipient of sense-impressions (wlhch, as Sclhller made clear 
in Letter 19, is the necessary basis of him having a content to 
actively form), is brought about throTup an aesthetic education towards 
the aesthetic condd.tfoi, wherein mn becomes passively and actively 
determined s-LmtLtcie(lt3ly (through the equilibrium of his primary drives 
effected by experiencing a form domnated objeot).
•Truth is not ... like ... the physical existence of things, 
[something wlhch] can singly be received from without. It is 
something produced by our thinking faculty, cueoioeoutly . . .' 
•And it is precisely this autonomy, this freedom, which is 
lacking in sensuous man. Sensuous man is already(physscally 
speaking) determined, and ... no longer possesses free 
dete^mniaillty. This lost determni.Cility he will first have 
to recover before he can exchange his passive determLn^'tion for 
an active one. But he cannot recover it except by . . . already 
possessing within himelf the active determination towards 
wlhch he is to proceed.' 'Be will ... need to be at one and 
the same time passively, and actively, determined} that is to
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say, he will have to become aesthetic.’ (L23:4)
The process of aesthetic education begins with the development of 
reason within the context of our still being doMimted by sense. It 
involves our sensuous nature being formed to become a ’second nature* 
of a more retionel kind, compaatble with reason itself.
•Through the aesthetic modulation of the psyche, then, the 
autonomy of reason is already opened up within the domain of 
sense itself, the dominion of sensation already broken within 
its own frontiers . . .* (L25;5)
As we saw in ^tter 20, the sense-drive mut be suspended as a
determining power vis-a-vis the psyche, before reason can begin to 
develop. Sclhller is thus here describing the earliest phase of the 
development of the aesthetic concdtion, which will lead sensuous man 
towards its fUly equllibrious mode. The ’aesthetic education’ described 
in this Letter is really proto-us thetic, being carried out by the psyche 
internally forming or structuring our sensuous nature, rather than 
effettd^ by an externally formed art object evoking the fully-fedcged 
aesthetic conddtion of the psyche.
Schiller tells us that the transition from mats sensuous state to 
the aesthetic concdtion, is a more difficult transition than the later 
one from the aesthetic condition to a rational and moral state. The 
former involves enlarging mats nature by developing his imppicit 
rationality, and at the same time reforming his sensuous nature by 
imbruing it with order and structure, to mace it less contingent in 
character, less of an immetUate hindrance to rational development, and 
ultimately more with our rational nature when this is
developed to explicit existence. The later transition, from the 
aesthetic to a rational and moral concdtion, can be relatively easily 
executed by mats then powerful free will, which wculd no longer be 
hindered by an opposed sensuous nature.
’The step from the aesthetic to the logical and monal state ... 
is . • • infinitely easier than was the step from the physical 
state to the aesthetic . • .’ ’The former step man can accomppish 
simply of his own free will ... it merely involves . . .
fragmenting his nature, not enlarging it . the step
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from brute matter to beauty • • • mwt first be facilitated 
by the grace of Nature • • • * ‘To obtain the same results from 
sensuous man we mist first alter his very nature.* (L25;5)
In this passage, we see further evidence of Scihller’s continuing 
concern that the process of aesthetic eduoation, viz. of aesthetically 
effected psycho logical development, should not involve any infriigjement 
of our rational autonomy. Once reason is established as a power qua the 
form-drive, its further psychological development and external 
realization, is achieved by its own selfdletemination, without the 
need for aesthetic assistance, Scihller’s statement in the above passage 
thafcthe step to the ’moral, state’ involves ‘fragmenting* mn’s nature, 
would appear to be an implicit criticssm of Kant* s moraL philosophy, 
with its view that the moral will involves the opposstion of reason and 
our sensuous nature.
It is clear that Scthller conceives of the crucial and distinct role 
of aesthetic education as being solely to reform mo^'s sensuous nature, 
initially (in this Letter), by imbuing it with form, viz, with order 
and structure, in place of its natural formlessness, its blind force 
and contingency,
*It is, therefore, one of the most important tasks of [aesthetic3 
education to subject man to foam even in his purely physical 
life . . (L23s6)
Scihller appears to view such aesthetic education as a bahc human 
right. He tells us that no individual should be left merely subject to 
nature’s blind forces, its alien necessity. The individuaL’s knowing 
and willing should attain a universal character, so that it may conform 
to that of the rest of mankind. (This is a similar view to Kan’’ s idea 
of our judgement being rendered more universal by reference to the 
’public sense*^). In other words, from dependence upon nature, man must 
be raised to rational self-deteraination. (Scihller here adopts a more 
Kantian view of the relationship between reason and nature, where they 
are seen in opposed terms with regard to the basis of human freedom.)
‘If man is, in every single case, to possess the power of 
enlarging his judgement and his will into the judgement of the 
species as a whole ; if . . , out of every dependent concd-tion
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be able to wing his way towards autonomy and freedom t then we 
mwt see to it that he is in no single moment of his life ... 
merely subservient to the law of nature.' (L23:6)
If the individual is to transcend the imitation of merely realizing 
natural ends (in wMch his physical needs provide the entire content of 
his volitional purposes), to attain the autonomy of willing rational 
purposes wMch he gives to Mmelf, then he mut, wMlst witMn the 
cona'traints of the former concd-tion, commnce to realize even his 
natural needs with an element of choice and selfdLetemination, by 
i^n^^aaT^ng to their satisfacticrn some order and form*
*If he is to be fit and ready to raise Mmelf out of the 
restricted cycle of natural ends towards rational purposes, 
then he mut already have prepared Mmelf for the latter 
witMn the limits of the former, and have realized his physical 
destiny with a certain freedom of the spirit, that is, in accordance 
with the lews of beauty £or form].' (L25s6)
Now what ScMller appears to have in mind here, is the concept of
well-being, viz. the co-ordinated and systematized satisfaction of
natural needs, wMch imparts some degree of form and thus implicit
rationality, to what would otherwise be the formLess satisfaction of 
4
blindly foiowed natural impMses as they contingently arise. The
inqpa'ting of form to the process of natural need satisfaction, is at
this stage, purely an internal formative prooees, in wMch the psyche
introduces some order and organization into the impulses, achieving a 
5
degree of selfddetemination by its choice. Oily much later in man's 
psychological development does he impart form in an eapliiitly aesthetic 
sense, to the external manner of need satisfaction (of. L27:2 and 5).
The satisfaction of natural needs in a way wMch imparts to the 
process some order and form, i.e, some degree of rationality, does not 
in ScMller's view, involve the suppressim of the integral character 
of our sensuous nature. From the 'point of view*, as it were, of our 
sensuous nature, it is a mater of indifference wthther our natural 
needs are satisfied in a purely sensuous way, with ouraelves acting as 
a mere part of nature (caught up as a blindly acting force in a network 
of forces), or whether we transcend natural caiuaaity and satisfy our 
natural needs so as to acMeve some degree of rational freedom wMlst
no
still within the domain of nature,
'And this he can indeed accomplish without in the least acting 
counter to his physical ends,* *, • * for his physical destiny 
it is a miter of compPete indifference whether ... he 
realizes it merely as sensuous being and natural force (i.e. as 
a force Which only reacts as it is acted upon), or whether he 
will at the same time realize it as absolute force and rational 
being . . .’ (123:7)
Sclhller now introduces a morel dimension to the discussion, and 
tells us that man is raised to what he calls ’nobility* of nature, when 
he imports order and form into the satisfaction of his natural desires, 
and thus achieves a degree of selfdietemiination in a realm where the 
mooraL lew does not require him to extend the jurisdiction of rational 
form.
’, , . it dignifies and exalts him to strive for order, harmony, 
and infinite freedom in those matters where the common man is content
. . to satisfy his legitimate [naturel] desires.’ ’. . . nn 
the sphere of . . . well being, form has every right to exist 
. . (123:7)
The references in this passage to ’ order’, ’well-bering’ and ’Toma’ , in 
connection with man’ s natural desires, confirms that at this stage,
Schiller is not talking about imparting form to the external manner in 
wh.ch we satisfy our needs (as in e.g. graceful modes of eating). He 
has in mind a purely internal formation of our natural impulses by the 
psyche, as the earliest and most rudimentary form the (aesthetic) 
formation process can take, but one which is a necessary prelude to 
later more advanced and explicitly aesthetic formative processes. The 
only limited rational character of well-being, will be discussed by 
Sculler in the next Letter (in L24s5)»
In Schiller's view, rationality mist be introduced into our sensuous 
nature itself, at an early stage of our psyol^c^o^t^^t^^^L development, and 
not rarely be later externally irnqnosed upon it, in a morel ’war’ between 
two independently fully developed sensuous and rational natures. Our 
mooraL life nnst begin within the domain of our physical life:
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is . . . in the . • • sphere of PbyOiCal life, that wan wst 
make a start upon his m>ral life . . .’ 'The Cmorall] law of 
his will he mui; apply even to his inclinations . . .’ (L23:8)
There is in what Schiller is saying here, an imllcit criticssm of the 
Kantian conception of morrlity, which sees self-diet erminati on and 
rational form as only needing to be forcefully imposed upon our natural 
being ab extra, without recognizing the practical need for the latter 
to attain some degree of rational form within its own realm, if morrHty 
is to have a psychologically secure bahs, and be realizable in a way 
which does not involve fragmenting our human nature.
In a footnote, SclhLller tells us that within the terms of the Kantian 
mortal philosophy, the concept of the 'mortal will’ requires only that the 
will itself should be rational in character, not our natural
inclinations and impilses as such. Now Scihller takes the view that by
inqaating form and thus im?Hcit rationality to our natural desires and
imjpuses, their opposition and hindrance to reason is diminished; their
qiuai-rational qiuQity gives them a csImp'libbiL•'ty with the demands of
moraL reason, which enables them to assist its realization. In other
words, opr natural inclinations may become 'soul inclinations', as it
were, providing us with a tendency towards wlmt Scihller terms 'noble’
7
conduct, in which we are naturally and .spontaneously moral.
’. . . carrying out the physical in an aesthetic CfomedJ saner, 
is ... to exceed duty, since Cmona.3 duty can only prescribe 
that the will be sacted Cor rational], but not that nature itself 
shall have taken on sacral [rational] dimeter.’ ’. . . such 
conduct we call noble.’ (L23:7, fn. 2)
’. . . we do not prize noble conduct because it surpasses the 
nature of its subject - on the contrary, it mist flew freely 
and without constraint out of this - but because it surpasses . * 
. its physical end and passes beyond this into the realm of 
mLnd.’ (L23j7- fn. 3)
Scihller proceeds to distinguish ’noble’ moral willing from that 
which he calls ’ sublime’ :
’Noble conduct is to be distiiguished from sublime conduct. The 
first transcends moraL obligation [the latter 3
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exceeds • • • our experience of the • • • strength of the human
will.’ (L2J:7, fn. 5)
By developing 'moral inclinations', and thus a 'noble' nature, we can 
avoid the need for 'sublime' superhuman moral willing, i.e. the attempt 
to externaLly impose rational moral principles of action upon an 
unformed and psychologically independent sensuous nature.
'He mut learn to desire more nobly, so that he may not need to 
will sublimely.' ® (L23:8)
Sublime moraL willing is the kind of morsOL willing Schiller implicitly
identifies with Kant’s moral philosophy, with its eternal oppooition
between rational moral duty and natural inclination. He implies that
the Kantian m>raL will is a psychological impoosibblity, exceeding
' our experience of the ... strength of the human will' (125:7,
fn. 5)* It is thus unable to provide,in practical terms, a sound basis
for a realistic and realizable moraaity. Ohy the seih-rationalization
of our sensuous nature to render it more commpaible with the demands 
10of moral reason , can provide such a bahs for maraHty. In the same 
way that in Schuller's epistemology (in Letter 19), rational cogrhtion 
rests upon the basis of a co-operative relaticrnship with sensuous 
apprehension, so too in Scthller's moraL philosophy, rational volition 
rests upon the basis of a co-operative relationship with a comppUble 
sensuous nature. In other words, for Schller, mral freedom is only 
achievable through psychological harmony.
Within the context of Sclhller's revised four stage model of man’s
psycho logical development (in Letter 20), what Scthller has argued in 
12Letter 25, is that a very basic type of 'aesthete education ,
involving the forming of our natural inclinations, enables the
development of our inner rational and moral life to proceed, less 
hindered by an incot]ppltble and doihnant sensuous nature. Scthller is 
proposing the means whereby man may begin the process of developing 
from being domnated by his sensuous being towards the aesthetic 
conchtion proper. The particular means for achieving this initial 
development discussed here in Letter 25, do not appear to be 'aesthetic' 
according to any conventional mesaming of the term. Hcwever, for Schiller 
form is precisely the quality which is capable of endowing anything at 
all with the attribute ' aesthetic* : whether the phenomenon in question
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is an art object (as in Letter 22), or mai's sensuous being (here in 
Letter 25), or the political State (in Letter 27). Indeed it is notable 
how in this Letter, Scthller has argued for a simiHir form dojmrrn.tion 
of mu’s inner sensuous content, viz. his natural impulses and 
inclinations, as in Letter 22 he argued the artist should impose upon 
the external sensuous con-tent of the art object if it is to be ideally 
beaitiful.
The stage in mu’s psychological development considered in this 
13Letter, should be viewed as being proto—aesthetic x : a concdtion which 
lies scmewtere between a purely sensuous mode of being, and attaining 
to the equLlibrious aesthetic condition of the psyche. Sclhller argues 
that by imparting form to mai’s 'outer’ phenomenal (or sensible) being, 
the way is opened up for his 'inner ’ rational (or supeirsensible) being 
to develop, less hindered by an incoepatible and dominant sensuous 
nature: -
’ [Learning to desire more nobly] is brought about by means of 
aesthetic education, which ... in the form it gives to outer 
life, already opens up the inner.’ (L23s8)
.1
Although, as we shall see in the next ^tter (Letter 24), the sensuous 
domirntion of the psyche is not immediaaely abolished by this formative 
process, at least our sensuous nature is rendered comeptibld enough with 
our rational being, to allcw the process of rational psycholo<g.cal 
development to proceed.
LETTER 24
The Psycho-hstorical Development of Man (i) : Reason’s Development
Perverted by Nature
Although we have been fol-lcwing an outline account of ma^’s 
psycho-hstorical development ever since Letter 19, it is only now that 
this history begins in earnest. In Letters 19 to 21, Sclhller w^ 
principally concerned to justify his mcddl of psychological development, 
particularly aesthetic ’ midle state' , in tarns of a derivatively
Fichte an epistemology. In Letter 22, he focused on the role played by 
the art object in evoking this MdcdLe state, and discussed the
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psychological criteria for evaluating types of art and particular art 
works. In Letter 25, although Scihiler described mn's initial process 
cf rational development, as involving the systematization of natural 
impulses in ’well-being* , he then looked well ahead to how this very 
preliminary mode of ’aesthetic* education has important long-tem 
beneficial consequences for moraaity, through ultimately developing a 
’noble’ moora. disposition of character. Thus the outline account of 
mans psycho-historical development has, up until now, been sidetracked 
into theoretical justifications of Scihller’s psychological model of 
development, his aesthetic model of ideal art, and his moral philosophy. 
In the next Letter (Letter 25), we will again have to foio<w a diversion 
into the moraL doraa.n, before Scihller returns to complete the story of 
mans psychological development in Letters 26 and 27. Thus Scihller’s 
account of the psychological history of man is essentially concentrated 
into Letters 24, 26 and 27 (with other Letters, from Letter 19 onwards, 
primrily serving to justify the conceptual apparatus employed in the 
outline of this developmenn).
Scihller begins ^tter 24, by re-affrmiing the necessity of his model 
of mans psycho-historical development, but it is now revised by being 
reduced -£o a three stage moddl. The first stage discussed in Letters 19 
to 21, viz. the stage of man's pure potential state of being prior to 
any mode of determnation at all, is now orntted by Schiller from his 
moddl. This is presurably because the stage in question was a logical 
abstraction, a merely postulated pre-conch tion, whereas Scihller* s 
theoretical interests from Letter 25 onwea?<d3, are orientated to the 
practical educative role of the aesthetic, and thus to stages of 
development which, in his view, actually exist over time.
’We can, then, distinguish three different moments or stages of 
development through which both the individual and the species 
as a whole mst pa3s, inevitably and in a definite order, if 
they are to complete the full cycle of their destiny.’ ’Man in 
his physical state mrely suffers the doiminiGn of nature, he 
emarncpates himelf from this doImLluLGU in the aesthetic state, 
and he e,cqxu.res rastery over it in the mora.’ (L24:1)
A difficulty arises with both Scihller’s midi of, and his outline 
account of, mai's psycho-ldstorical development, in that they are much 
more obid.oiu3ly psychological than historical. His language, in the
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course of their descriptive elaboration, is usually couched in terms
of the individual. The social dimension of psychological development,
and the notion of a psychological development of the species,are
secondary. Sclhller’s model and his outline account have mere
plausibility at the level of individual psychological development,
than they do at the (supposedly simultaneous) level of the 
1
psycho-lnstoirLcal development of the species.
A further problem arises when one attempts to view the process of
psychological development described by Sclhller, in historical and
species term3. Given that Scthller considers the rams of contemporary
^^^c,nd to be merrily * savages’ doimnated by their sensuous being
(cf. L5s4)» the aesthetic stage of the species development mut, like
the mrora stage, be located at some time in the future. Two of the
three stages of development, therefore, wlhch are asserted to be
'inevitable’ and to occur in a necessary ’definite order’ (in L24:1),
are in the future, Sclhller is thus getting close to involving himelf,
by implication, in the plhlosoplhcally i^ee^^ii^maate process of
predicting the future course of mu’s species development (albeit in
the most general term). Sclhller gets into this position by macing
claims whch endow what is essentially a model of individual
psychological development, with a species sl^gnif^^ian^ce and a historical
dimeimion; at the same time, transferring a psychological necessity in
the stages of development of the former moddl, to become a necessity
in the process of historical development. In other words, if we draw
out the full implications of Sclhllea’s position, we see he gets close 
2to a position wlhch involves a psychologgccaLly based historicism : 
transposing psycholo|!g.cal necessity into historical necessity, as he 
claims a species si^gnifiictn^ce and an historical dimension for a moddl 
of individual psychological development.
Sclhller begins the man argument of the Letter with a detailed 
speculative ’description’ of the coghtive and volitional standpoint 
of the purely sensuous mam, inhabiting a ’state of nature’ . He tells 
us that the purely sensuous mm is caught up in the process of 
unceasingly satisfying his physical needs. He satisfies himelf only 
as a particular natural being, before he has a ’self proper, viz. a 
self-oonscicus ego, to realize. HLs volition is a lawless licence, not 
the true freedom of rational self-detamlitliiot via the moora law. He 
is enslaved to his passions and impulses, rather than governed by 
rational concepts or moral precepts (in ’aul.e.eo^verned' behahour).
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He experiences the world, as a blind alien necessity, not as an 'object* 
(which would presuppose that he is a self-conscious 'subject’);
'What is man before , . . form Cor the aesthetic! tempera the
savagery of life? A monotonous round of ends ... self-seeking,
3
and yet without a Self'; lawless, yet without Freedom; a slave, 
yet to no Rule. At this stage the world is for him merely Fate, 
not yet Obbect . , ♦' (124:2)
Such an individual experiences phenomena as particular isolated items, 
unrelated to other items and to other experiences. Lacking rational 
necessity in his cofgrition and volition, lacking any sense of his own 
continuing unity and identity, he is unable to organize and unify his 
transi ant experiences of pheno^na into a ’co-ordinated system of 
knowledge* -Hs attitude to what he experiences is negative ; either 
fleeing from natural phenomena as threats, or consuming them as objects 
of desire. His relation to what he experiences is always one merely of 
direct physical contact, unmeedated by rational thought.
'l^,ch phenomenon stands before him, isolated and cut off from 
all other things • ••'*••• with the lack of necessity within 
him, there is none outside of him either, to connect the changing 
forms into a universe . . .' ' Either he hurls himelf upon 
objects to devour them in an access of desire; or ... he 
thrusts them away in honor. In etther cas3e his relatoon to the 
world of sense is hhat of inmediate oontact • • . ' (L24:2)
The ssji^nuousli domminatd individdil cm do no more thou respond no ehe 
endLess demands of his phyical needs, which only find a natural limit 
in the satiation of appetite or in his exhaustion:
' • • • ceaselessly tor^OLre0 by imperious need3, he finds rest 
nowhere but in exhaustion, and limits nowhere but in spent 
desire.' (L24:2)
The individual only begins to emerge from this submergence in, and 
slavery to, nature, as he becomes self-conscious, and able to 
dist;dlgoish him elf from nature, self from not--3elf:
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*. . . he gropes his way through the darfness of his life until
... he learns through reflection to distinguish himelf from 
things . . .* (L24:2)
Schhller adMts that the picture he has drawn of a 'state of nature' 
is a rational construct rather than based upon historical fact3 
Hcwwver, he man tains it is relevant to our underetanding of ran’s 
psychology, for man always retains a natural aspect to his being to
some extent.
'This state of brute nature is not, I adwt, to be found exactly 
as I have ‘ presented it here among1 any particular people or in 
any particular age. It is purely an Idea . . .' 'Mon ... was 
never in such a completely animal condition; but he has ... 
never entirely escaped from it.' (L24s3)
S chiller reminds us that man's being is a combination of nature/and 
reason. Morality requires these two aspects of our being to be 
distnguished; but psychological harmony requires their equtlibrious 
interre lat i on:
*. . . ran ... unites in his nature the highest and the lowest; 
and if his moral dignity depends on his distinguishing strictly 
between the one and the other, his hope of . . . blessedness [or 
psychological harmoiny depends on a due and proper reconcdiation 
of the opposites he has distinguished. ' (L24:3)
It is the function of aesthetic education to harmoniously reconcile the 
principle of ranra. freedom with the principle of psycholog.cal harmony:
'An [aesthetic 3 education which is to bring his [moral! dignity 
into harmony with his happiness [or psychological harmony3will, 
therefore, have to see to it that those two principles are 
maintained in their utmost purity even w!h.le they are being 
rant intimately fused.' (L2z4s5)
Such a fusion of the principles of freedom and harmony, which avoids 
a confused moraL aestheticism, occurs as we saw in Letter 25, when we 
develop a natural inclination to perfozm our rational mml duty, viz.
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develop a ’noble1 disposition of character.
In the rest of ^tter 24, Sclhller describes the psychological
situations which occur when reason first develope^th^ a context still 
doimnted by sense. We see the negative effects upon our rational being 
of its emergence still being overwhelmingly concdLtioned by nature. 
Reason’s initial emergence from a psychological state of purely sensuous 
doimmaion, at first functions to mace maters worse % the domrtLot of 
sense becomes absolute, through reason’s own regulative demand for 
cowp^I^^]^<I9s in knowing and absoluteness in willing, being perverted by 
a still dominant sense-drive to its own matraal ends.
’The first appearance of Reason in man does not necessarily imply 
that he has started to become truly human’ ’. . . the first 
thing reason does is to mace him utterly dependent upon his 
senses . . .’ ’It is . . . through the demand for the Absolute 
... that Reason make itself known in imn? ’ • . .it can, 
through a W.sundeIa^tatding (almost unavoidable in this early 
epoch of prevailing ral,airaality), be directed towards physical 
life ...» (L24:4)
Sclhller closely foioows Keaifs critical philosophy in telling us 
5
that the demand of reason is for completeness of cognition and 
absoluteness in volitoon. This he asserts, again following Kant, can 
only be attained by leaving behind the finite realm of the phenomenal 
and sensible, and by raising our cogn.tion to the Ideas of reason^, and 
our volition to determination by the superoensible moral law:
’CThe demand for the Absolute should! force him to leave the 
physical altoggeher, and ascend out of a limited reality into 
the realm of Ideas.’ ’. . . and lead him upwards from the 
sensuous world towards an Ideal world . . .* (L24:4)
Hwever, when man is almost totally under the sway of sense, the urge 
to complete knowledge and unconditioned willing becomes mLs<dLaecied, 
by being converted by his sensuous being into a drive to achieve the 
most full and unlimited physical life. (The precise psychological 
process of this conversion is not described by SchUler.) Instead of 
directing his c^^u^’ti^^n to truth and his volition to mogality, reason 
drives sensuous man into an unlimited striving for the total physical
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satisfaction of all his natural instinctive need3.
*In the very mdst of his ajnLmlity the drive towards the
Absolute • • • is directed merely towards the maeed-al and the 
tempoaraL ... he will ... be led to strive . • • after an 
unfailing supply of mtter . . . * 'That very drive which, 
applied to his thinking and activity, was meant to lead him to 
truth and mrall^'ty, brought now to bear upon his passivity and 
feeling, produces nothing but unlimited longing and absolute 
instinctual need. ' (L24: 5)
It is notable how in this passage, Sclhller identifies Knit’s concept 
of reason's regulative demands upon our cognitive and volitional 
processes, with the form-drive (which, as in Ll9s9» is described as 
the drive 'towards the absolute'). Thus Sclhller adopts Kant’s concept, 
and then adapts it : by giving it a physiological dimension, and 
converting it into a funda^ee^^^ psychological drive.
The individual proceeds to embark upon the process of endlessly 
seeking the unlimited total satisfaction of all his physical needs 
(in the form of ' well-being' ), in a realm where all is Limited and 
finite. The pursuit of such satisfaction, can in practice only take 
the foam of endless particular and partial satisfactions. The 
individual* s striving mist be unlimited, and his satisfactions be each 
limited, for (in Kantian terms), he cannot ever achieve an unlimited 
or absolute realization purely within the conhtioned phenomena. realm.
'An unlimited perpetuation of being and well-being ... is an
ideal which belongs to appetite alone, hence a demand which can 
7only be made by an animlity striving towards the A^^orL^^l;e•' 
(L24:5)
Such an individual never achieves the goal of realizing a limited end, 
in the way that even animals are able to do. Instead, he seeks an 
'infinite' satisfaction mate up of endLess finite satisfactions. The 
'ideal*' or general end he pursues, is just an endless repetition of 
what he already has.
'Thus, without gaining anything for his humanty ... man merely 
loses thereby the happy limitation of the animal ... in favour 
of longings for what is not, yet without seeking in all those
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Umitless vistas anything but the here and new he already knows.* 
(124:5)
At a further stage of development, sensuous man begins to use his 
intellect, relating phenomena in terms of a nexus of causes and 
effects. Reason’s regulative demand for completeness in knowledge (in 
the shape of the form-drive towards the absolute), leads the individual 
to seek an unconcd.ti<med ca^al explanation for phenomena:
'As soon as man has begun to use his intellect, and to connect 
the phenomna around him in the relation of cause and effect, 
Reason . • • presses for an absolute connexion and an 
rnconcdtioned caw3e.* (L24:6)
But instead of rising to the realm of rational Ideas, to the domain of 
the superaemible, sensuously dominated man, not yet capable of such 
abstraction, seeking and failing to find an unconditioned cause in the 
world of external sensuous phenomim, seeks and finds it in the world 
of his own internal sensuous being, viz. in his feelings.
'This, strictly speaking, wooUd be the point at which he ought 
to leave the world of sense alLtgether, and soar upwards to 
the realm of pure Ideas; for the intellect remains eternally 
confined within the realm of the conditioned . . .’ 'But since 
the man with whom we are here concerned is not yet capable of 
such abstraction, that which be cannot find in his sphere of 
empirical knowledge, and does not yet seek beyond it in the 
sphere of pure Reason, he will seek beneath it in his sphere 
of feeling and, to all appearances, find (L24;6)
The arbitrariness of feeling, is thus the perverted form his search 
for the unconditioned ends in. Instead of a postulated first cause 
or final cause, we have that which is setmlmely 'lnconditi<mted’ by 
having no cause whatever in its absolute contingency.
’. . , this world of sense shows him nothing which might be its 
own cause ... but it does show him something which knows of 
no cause and obeys no law. Since, then, he cannot appease his 
inquiring intellect by evoking any ultimate and inward cause,
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he manages at least to silence it with the notion of no-caust 
...» (124:6)
How he feels about the world, and in particular, what he happens to 
feel is to his own advantage, is to be the arbitrary criterion of a 
perverse 'truth* and 'moraLlty*, the principle-less principle by which 
he indetrrmlinitely determines his cognition and volition:
'Because the life of sense knows no purpose other than its own 
advantage, and feels driven by no cause other than blind chance, 
he Okes the former into the arbiter of his actions and the 
latter into the sovereign ruler of the world.' (124:6)
At a still further stage in the development of reason in sensuous 
man the individual becomes aware of the moral ltw. Reason now seeks 
to enjoin upon him an absolutely rational mode of volition. Borever, 
the precepts of the moral law to sensuously do^i^l’ed man can only 
appear as external constraints upon his ' fifedom’ •
'Eyen • • • the moral Uawr, wwen it first nOaet its appearance in 
the life of sense, cannot eecape such perveesson. Since its 
voice is metvly inhibitory, and against the interest of his 
animal self-love, it is bound to seem like something external 
to hiwelf • ..»'... hr merely feels the fetters which 
reason lays upon him ...» (L24:7)
Sensuous man using his intellect, proceeds to degrade the status of 
the oral law. As he bases his knowledge only upon sensuous experience, 
he sees merely how his sensuous being temporally precedes his
consciousness of the moral law. He proceeds to view the moral law as 
a positive creation by either men or God at some time in history; not 
as an eternally valid means of attaining to true freddoo of volition, 
but tte vdeduct of an accidental evenn in taoa lh storey. The absolute 
validity of the moral law, is thus reduced to a moral rrlativiom.
'Because in his experience the sense-drive precedes the moral, 
he assigns to the [moral! low of necessity a beginning in time too, 
a positive origin, and ... Okes the unchangeable and eternal 
in himelf into an accidental product of the transient. Hr
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persuades himself into regarding the concepts of right and 
wrong as statutes introduced by some will, not as something 
valid in themelves for Hl eternity.’ (L24;7)
The moora. rationaLity of man may be ’ taken out’ of him and assigned 
to God, with the moral law’ s postulated origin in a trans cehdett God. 
The moora. law of humn reason my become viewed as being the divine 
law of God. The moral law is effectively tem^c^o^;tzed and relativized, 
as the laws of mooHity become regarded as being divine laws which are 
’revealed’ in religion at a certain time or times in history.
’. • . ’n the explanation of the moora. world, he goes beyond 
Reason and forfeits his humanty by seeking a Godhead . . .’
. ma considers laws which were not binding from Hl 
eternity as not . . , binding to Hl eternity either.’ (L24:7)
(in this passage, as well as in his talk of religious divihLtiee as 
being human ’laojectiols3’ in 16:5 and L25s5, one can detect in Sclhller 
a rather unsympaieeio attitude to the truth claims of religion.)
Sclhller concludes Letter 24 by summlazite the nature of the 
development which we have fdowred in it, and by pointing to its 
general cause. He tells us that the perversions of rationality that we 
have observed, are all consequences of that natural state in which the 
sense-drive domnates the form-drive.
’, , . these deviations are • • • Hl attendant upon his pl^yicd 
concdLtion, since in Hl of them the lffe—mpulse plays the master 
over the form-impulse.’ (L24:8)
In the puraly sensuous mn, nature dominates him with a blind necessity. 
But in the sensuous man in whom an infant reason develops, a reason 
still in nature and not yet developed to independence out of nature, the 
rationH and moral aspect of his character is simply perversely pressed 
into the service of the phfsicH. Wether in his purely sensuous state, 
or in that con<dLtign in which reason commences its subordinated 
development, man remains locked into the sensible world, confined to its 
limits and subjected to natural compusion.
’Vhetlh^a it ... be that reason has not yet made its voice heard
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in man, and the physical still rales him with blind necessity; 
or that reason haa not yet sufficiently purified itself of 
sense, and the rnmo^l ii still aa tth seevice oo tth physical ; 
in either case thh sole principle pn^-vsali^ng within him is a 
mat rial one, and man is, at least in his ultimate tendency, a 
creature of sense • . .* (L24:8)
Although most of the con-tent of Letter 24 is reasonably easy to 
foiow wiwh regard to its meannLn,nevetVheless it does raise three 
main difficulties. In tth first place, it is not at all clear why any 
of the sub-6tagts of development discussed are necessary. They are 
speculative 'descriptions*, rather than logically 'deduced* in any 
way. The account may be interesting and con-tain certain psychological 
insights, but it is not philosop]h.calli compelling : things could be
Q
otherwise than as described.
A second difficulty with ScMller's account of mans early 
psychological development in this Latter, is that some of the stages 
of development described, along with their attendant 'htrvereigns*, 
appear too advanced for sensuous man to be likely to encounter. Here, 
one thincs particularly of ttntuols man (the ' savage* of L4s6)» searching 
for an lncgncd.tiontd causal explanation of the phenomenal world; or of 
him being aware of the morraL law to the extent of being egnetrntd to 
degrade its theoretical status. The functioning of the intellect, and 
of both theoretical and practical reason, seem to be too advanced for 
such an early stage of psychological development. The levels of 
development described towards the end of the ^tter, occur imlanibly 
soon after Scthller has described mai’s sem---anL}ilistie condition in a 
* state of nature*. From sem.-am.]mlity to worrying about the thai:ut of 
the morel law, represents a considerable leap forward in mans 
development (over a few paragrepih). In adcd-tion, the kind of intellectual 
and m>oraL considerations raised in this Letter, would be more likely to 
occur and be of interest to the *barbariam* intelligentsia, rather than 
to the 'savage** masses (whom, we were told in L8:6, are too 'exhausted 
by the stzllgglt for existence* to think for themtlves, and leave the 
thinking to others : to the intelligentsia of State and church).
Finally, a third possible difficulty with Scihller’s account arises 
over whether his description in this ^tter of nature's ability to 
pervert the course of man s rational development, does not involve 
simultaneously such a high level of tenslole hindrance and rational
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impotence, as to subvert the autonomous status of reason. Howver, the 
fact that in later Lettere, Schller will describe reason’s eventually 
successful e^^e^^i^ce out of sense to attain independence, 
demogte-alfcee that, in principle, has been described in this Letter
is a high level of hindrance rather teat heteronomy.
It should be noted however, that the epistemology of Letter 19 
entjails that for Sclhller, there can be no compete autonomy or total 
independence of reason from nature. The highest state of rational 
freedom rests upon a physical substructure, a harmoohoue relation to 
our natural being (cf. Ll9s9). Sclhller thus gives full recgglhtiot to 
the fact that we are not 'lure*, but rather embodied, rational beings. 
The crucial role of aesthetic education is to create eaamgty between 
our rational and sensuous natures, whist simuLtaneously literating 
reason from the early hindrances that our sensuous nature imposes upon 
it. Thus mfs psycho-lhstorical development involves a movement icwaads 
a con(iLtiot of relative autonomy, with Sclhller ultimately sacrificing 
the KiiI^;!^ notion of reason* s absolute autonomy, in the interest of 
psychological harmony (and the realizable ’noble’ moora-ity whch stems 
from it).
A notable feature of Letter 24 has been how Sclhller has simply ‘taken 
over a number of Kantian conceptions without acknow edging the fact, or 
justifying his employment of the concepts concerned, or even showing 
much concern as to whether they are congruent to the plhlosollhLcal or 
psychological framework established in previous Letters. For examie, 
we have seen references in this Letter to the ’ream of Ideas’ (L24:4), 
and to ’the pure Ideas’ to be found ’in the sphere of Pure Reason’ 
(L24s6). tere, Keaifs Ideas of theoretical reason, which are
epistemologically regulative in status, are bo^^ed by Sclhller without 
acknowledgment or theoretical justification, and apparently without 
concern that they are considerably different in logical status from his 
own earlier rather more Platonic Ideas of Human Being and Beauty 
(employed in Letters 10, 14 and 15), elhce had an objective ontological 
status (placing Sclhller, in contrast to Kait, in a position of 
lagtg-absolute idealism). Moreoorer, again in contrast to Kant, for 
Schiller such Ideas may be cognized by mean of a talhecetdental 
deduction (cf. Ll0:7)» Ve are now entering a phase of the tetters in 
wh-ch the influence of Kant becomes more pronounced, and that of Fichte 
(which was so powerful in tetter 19), all but disappears. Even some 
features of Sclhller’s own theoretical framework begin to somewhat fade
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from the foreground. Thus, for example, talk of the drives becomes
increasingly rare and token, as the Kantian faculties increasingly
take over the theoetical terrain of the last few Letters. Moot notable
of all, a more Kantian understanding of the subjective aspect of 
9
aesthetic experience , will become visible over the next few tetters,
LETTER. 25
Aesthetic ConteimPation. Beauty as a ‘Brifee* Between Nature and Freedom
Having described in Letter 24 the natural state, in which man is 
doimnated by his sensuous being, Schiller now proceeds to describe the 
nature of the transition from this to the aesthetic ‘middle state* of 
mar’s psycholofgLcal development. tetter 25 is divided into two parts. 
There is, firstly, an initial discussion of wht is psychologically 
involved in *contem?pation*, (developing a concept put forward in L15s5)* 
The second half of the tetter, is concerned with reiterating how the 
contemppation of beauty specifically, has the ability to effect an 
harmonious interfunctioning of our rational and sensuous natures, (a 
topic already discussed a number of times, most notably in Letter 14 
under the concept of the play-drive), which promotes the possibility of 
moral volition. There is thus not a great deal which is new in this 
Letter, and it seems to function principally pedgogically, to renew the 
reader* s faith in the educative effect or developmennal power of the 
aesthetic, follcwing Schiller*s rather graphic descriptions ofthe high 
level of sensuous hindrance to, and perversion of reason, in the last 
Letter,
8 chiller commences the Letter by emphaszing that it is the 
development of self-conscidsness wlh.ch is the critical point in mm's 
psychological development, the point at which he definitely overcomes his 
subordination to nature. The development of stlf-ccmsoiousness is closely 
associated by Sduller with the development of a capacity for 
oantemplation, wlhch rests upon the ability to view phenomenna objects 
with a certain degree of psychological distance from, and disinterest 
in, their sensuous being. ScihLller tells us that a degree of liberation 
from the sensuous is presupposed by the capacity to simply contemplate 
an object. In his purely natural state, mn w^ un<d.ffeeentiated from 
the world of im]eetiate sens e—impressions around him, wh.ch he simply
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passively reoeived in a life of pure feeling. At the aesthetic stage 
of development, he distn:glisatt ■the self from the not-self, as the 
subject in relation to a world of patnometnaL objects.
'As long as man, in that first physical state, is merely a passive 
recipient of the world of sense, I.e., does no more than feel, he 
is still compete^ On with that world . . '(hily when, at the
aesthetic stage, he puts it outside himrelf, or eonttiphatts it, 
does his persond-ity differentiate itself from it, and a world 
becomes maifest to him because he has ceased to be One with it.1 
(125:1)
The ability to conteiplate an 'object*, is seen by ScThller as the 
first mnnfestation of telf-c<ilsciousness and relative autonomy in 
relation to the ttnsl^gls realm.
’ Corit uniat ion (or reflecticn) is the first liberal relation 
which man establishes with the un-verse around him. If desire 
seizes directly upon its object, contemplation removes its object 
tp a distance . . . putting it beyond the reach of passion. * 
125:2)
The *libernl relatoon1 SclhLller refers to here, involves a freedom from
attachment to the sensuous. Whreas desire 'seizes directly’ upon its
objects seituole being, contem>hation focuses on its object’s form,
apprehending this indirectly, through the objects sensuous being. Now
Schiller here is simultaneously employing concepts of both psychical 
2distance from, and disinterest in, the stntugus, as being essentially 
involved in the process of contemphatiig any kind of paeioietn.l object. 
He does not specify that the object in question rnut necessarily be 
beautiful for this to occur. Hwwver, presumably the process described 
would surely be assisted if the object were to be beaiUful. One would 
expect certain ■types of object to be more or less conducive to being 
apprehended with the necessary lack of desire to create the
disjiLterest<dnest and distance which are essential components of 
oonteIF?latioi. Honver, Schiller does not (as yet) argue this, and 
instead appears to view the ability to develop a contemplative attitude 
to objects as a subjective facility that is independent of the nature 
of the phenomenal object before us. In other words, for Schiller
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contempation is a perceptual capability which is subjectively developed 
rather than objectively evoked.
Now such a broadly referenced concept of contempation corresponds to 
the view which Sclhller expressed in Letter 20, that
'Everything which is capable of phenomenal manifstation may
• ••*'••• relate to the totality of our various functions 
without being a definite object for any single one of them : that 
is its aesthetic character. A mn can please us . • . without our 
taking into consideration in judging him any law or any purpose, 
please us simply as we contemplate him ...*'... we are 
judging him aesthetically.* (L20s4, fn.)
In this passage, Sclhller is not saying that all phenomenal objects are
beaitiful or aesthetically pleasing, but rather that all phenomenal 
3
objects have a formal aspect which may be contemplated and judged
aesthetically. The passage also shows that Sclhller's concept of
contemp^-ation involves a disinterest not merely in an object's sensuous .
being, but also in its rational or conceptual character.^ (in this
position, he is merely following Kant* s distinction between judgements
of 'taste* , and judgements concerned with the sensuonusly 'agreeable* or 
\5rationally 'perfect* , in the Critique of Judgement.)^
It is also important to remember that for Sclhller, the aesthetic
concd.ti.on is not a rare psycholtogical state of high level contemPation, 
but rather a frequently and rapidly experienced aspect of our everyday 
ordinary cognitive processes. Thus in Letter 21, he told us that
*. . . the rapidity with wlhch certain types pass from sensation to 
thought or decdion scarcely - if indeed at all - allows them to 
become aware of the aesthetic mode through which they mut in 
that time necessarily p^^,' (L21 s5, fh.)
And here in Letter 25, Sclhller says
'In a general way, then, those three momets which I motioned 
at the bS^iming of the twenty-fourth tetter £viz. the physical, 
aesthetic and moral states] may well be considered as three 
different epochs, if we are thinking either of the development 
of mankind as a whole, or of the whole development of a single
188
individual; but they are also to be distnguished in each single 
act of perception , and are, in a word, the necessary coned, tions 
of all knowledge which comes to us through the senses.* (L25;1, fn.)
It is impoir;ant, therefore, if we are to comprehend Sclhller's concept 
of contem?p&tion, that it is not viewed in narrowly aesthetic terms, as 
being involved only in the perception and appreccation of beauty and art. 
For Sclhller, the concept of con-fce^l^l^^on appears to function 
epistewoLcog.<ca]Lly, to denote a certain perceptual relation of the subject 
to any kind of object. However, in Letter 26, ScihLller will raOke it clear 
that such a perceptual relation (involving distance and disinterestedness), 
attains its m>st complete or ideal form in the contemppation of aesthetic 
semblances, viz. art objects. Thus, as with his concepts of the 
'play-drive* and the *aesthetic condition* of the psyche, Sclhller 
operates both a wider and narrower mendr^, or less and more ideal,
concept of contemplation.
In Sclhller's view, when the individual achieves the ability to 
contemplate an object, this maZes a mjor point of transition in his 
psychological development. The individual becomes self-conscious and 
self-deerraining in his perceptual relation to the externally sensuous.
He is involved in forming the sense-impressions he receives, so that he 
is at once actively seffdleeemining and passively externally determined. 
In other words, he is in that condition of active receptivity which in 
L20:4 Sclhller described as the distinct qmlity of the 'aesthetic 
dispositoon* of the psyche.
Sclhller proceeds to describe the effect in experience of this active 
forming process. He tells us that through the development of the capacity 
for contemppation, the wlttplicity and flux of sens e-impressions becomes 
stilled, both spatially and temporally, by being subjectively structured. 
As the individual focuses his consciousness upon phenomem, he forms 
representational images of them in his imagination, and apprehends their 
form, where before he experienced only a chaos of sensuous mater:
'In his senses there results a momennary peace; time itself, the 
eternally mooing, stands still; and, as the divergent rays of 
consciousness converge, there is reflected against a background 
of transcience an image of the infinite, namely form.* *. . . the 
storm of the universe abates and the contending forces of nature 
come to rest between stable confines.* (L25?2)
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Schiller here does not distinguish or relate the respective roles of 
the imagination and the understanding in the process of synthesizing 
the moiifold in perception, and it is not entirely clear whether, as 
indicated here, it is the imagination which gives form to sense-impressions 
or whether it is the unde retarding’s conceptual thought, as the rest of 
this Letter strongly suggests.
It is worth examining m>re closely the above passage, for it is rich 
in maming. The passage my, I think, be plausibly interpreted in two 
ways : 1) It my refer to how we develop the ability to represent 
objects in the form of imaginative images, and so extract them from 
the flux of external space and time, recollecting them into the relative 
permanence of our imaginary internal ’space’ and ’time* . Alternatively,
2), Sclhller my be putting forward the notion which underlies Plato’s 
allegory of the cave (in The Rewbllc) s that any given phenomenon is 
an imge of- an infinite transcendent Form. On this view, the phenomenal 
form we apprehend in consciousness is a mere reflection (or poor copy) 
of some intelligible pure Form or Idea. This involves the Platonic and 
Kantian notion that the phenomena world has its ultimate ground in a 
noume^a dimin^on. The passage above then, my be interpreted as being 
either an epistemological statement concerning the role of the 
imag-nation in the cognitive process, and in particular its function in 
forming representational images; or as being an ontological statement, 
asserting that any given finite phenomenon is a reflection of an 
infinite transcendent Form. It seems quite possible that Schiller 
intends to suggest both of these mettn.n<g3, for they are not incompaible 
with each other, and accord with positions that be takes up elsewhere in 
the treatise. (Cf. L27:4 on the imagination; cf. L9:3 and 4 for a 
Platonic ontology.)
In the aesthetic condition of actively recipient contemplation, the 
individual is no longer dominated by nature, mrely passively receiving 
it in sense. Instead, he domrates the sensuous by imposing form upon 
it in the process of thinking:
’From being a slave of nature, which he remains as long as he 
merely feels it, man becomes its law giver from the momnt he 
begins to think it. That which hitherto mrely dominated him 
as force, now stands before his eyes as object.’ ’. . .lie 
iilarts form to mater ... and mn gives evidence of his 
freedom precisely by giving form to that which is formLess.’
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' • , . be knows how to give it form and convert it into an 
object of his conte^rplation.* (L25s5)
Wheraas in L25:2, Sclhller appeared to be assigning to the i^gnative 
forming of representational images alone, the process of impeding form 
to a mrnnfold of sense-impressions, in the passage above, and in the 
rest of this Letter, it is a function which Sclhller closely associates 
with thinking, and thus the rationally informed, imagination (a vi<w 
confirmed and developed in L27:4).
In the passage quoted above, Sclhller follcws Kean's epistemology, 
in the view that the object in itself is formLess, and that it is we 
who impose form upon it. Howver, Sclhller differs from Kant to some 
extent in how he conceives of form being so imposed. In particular, he
does not adopt Ksan’s a priori teleological principle of reflective
9
judgements in the Critique of Judgemgmt, as being involved in this
process. Sclhller, in the passage above, appears to connect the
impacTting of form principally with the process of thinking. This 
10connection again casts doubt upon his position in Letter 22 that form
is somehow detached from having any special affinity with our rationality, 
so enabling a form dominated art object to be neutral in its
psychological appeal to the primary drives, or to the faculties of 
sense and reason.
Moreover, if form is primsahly the product of telikiig, how can its
creation and contem)lsb’ioi be part of a discrete aesthetic 'middle
state' , which is psycholo<g<cally distinct from the rational state in
which we are involved in rational cognition? Sclhller's answer, given
in ^tter 20, was in terms of the rationality and concepts involved in
the aesthetic condition being only im?picit (cf. L20s4, fn., last
sentence). In Lnter 22, we were also told that form is able to render 
11a conceptual rational content implicit in an art object. Now Kean’s
notion of beauty as purposive form apprehended without any determinate 
12concept of a purpose , can be seen as underlying Sclhller's position 
here. But without taking cn Kean’s a priori teleological principle, 
SclhLller has no theoretical justification for derivatively eminying 
such a conception of form.
Sclhller might perhaps have done better to argie that form is 
produced solely by the specific synthesizing function performed by the 
imagination, viz. the forming of representational images, without the 
understanding and its concepts entering into the process. (Tlhs was
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the position he initially appeared, to be taking up earlier, in 125:2),
In this way, form would be related only to the process of apprehension
(rather than principally to rational compeheenSon), and as such, could
have been more suitably connected by Schiller with a state of aesthetic
contemplation which lies somewhere 'betoeen* the sensuous and rational
cmcd. tions of the psyche. As it is, when Sclhller comes shortly to
discuss the process of rational thinking per se (in 125:5), he can only
view this as involving a thorough-going abstraction from the sensuous,
in order to moke it psychologically distinct from the kind of sense
forming thought that he has assigned to contemplation in the aesthetic
condition. By means of this distinction, it is also possible for the
aesthetic condition, as involving thought and sense, to be portrayed
as the more psychoooggcally balanced and desirable state.
In Scthller's view, the individual in the aesthetic condition of 
13actively receptive contem^Lation, not only asserts his cognitive 
autonomy in relation to nature, through his ability to impose form upon 
it in the process of thinking, but in addition, he develops a volitional 
autonomy which overcomes natural cauBation in his own sensuous being, as 
the latter becomes rationally formed to be ' nobly' inclined to moreaity:
'Once he begins to assert his Ccogultive] independence in the face 
of nature as phenomenon, then he also asserts his [morel 
volitional] dignity vis-a-vis nature as Ca blind ] force, and with 
noble Cinclined nature, in] freedom rises in revolt against his 
ancient gods Cor determining natural forces].' (L25j3)
As man becomes self-conscicus of his cogrntive and volitional 
autonomy, he comes to recognize in nature the formal imprint of his 
own mind : the subjective forms of his thought, and the objective forms 
created by his will:
'Now Chis ancient natural gocd! ... surprise him with his own 
image by revealing them elves as projections Cor rational 
construction}3 of his own mind.' (i25:5)
Sduller here is simultaneously making an epistemrlcoglcal statement, 
and a subsidiary statement about religious divinities being projections 
of the human mind (as in 1(6:5)* As nature itself becomes cogntively 
less alien to mu, his image of the divine reflects this, and moves
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from being viewed as a blind force, to a spiritual pantheon, possessed 
of human qmdities and rational purposes. This particular transition 
in religious conceptions, is historically identified by Scihller with 
the surpassing of oriental divinities by the gods of Greece:
'The momtrous divinity of the OiientgdL, which rules the world 
with the blind strength of a beast of prey, shrinks in the 
imsaglnation of the Greeks into the friendly contours of a human 
being.' (L25:))
Schiller admts that in considering the relative autonomy of knowing 
and willing which arises from the formation process which is involved 
in the aesthetic contemplative relation to nature, he has shewn the 
stage of psychological development which sensuous man mist attain to, 
but without- deimnstrrting precisely how he develops towards it from out 
of the sensuous hindrances and perversions which we saw a nascent reason 
encountering in the natural state (in Letter 24),
' ... a sudden leap of this kind is contrary to human nature, 
and in order to keep step with this latter we shall have to turn 
back once more to the world of sense.' (L25:4)
Horever, the detailed description of the transition from man's
sensuous state is not provided by Sclhller until early in the next
Letter (in L26:2), for he first proceeds in the rest of this ^tter, to 
again discuss in general terms how beauty, by its own harmonious 
combination of sense and form, is able to effect a corresponding 
psychological harmony within ran, between his sensuous and rational natures 
Beauty is able to assist man to -develop from being dominated by sense, to 
a naturally moirai condition, in which our rationality rests upon a 
reformed sensuous substructure,
Sclhller considers now the narrower, more ideal meganing of 
' conteIS?lation', as the contemplation specifically of beautiful objects. 
This involves a discussion of what is involved, psycholce^-csaHy, in the 
subjective experience of beauty. He begins by rem.ntd.ng us that as with 
aesthetic oontes[platins in the wider mezming already discussed, the 
aesthetic cnstenplation of beauty involves an actively receptive 
psychological condtion, in which we form in thought what we receive in 
sense. The contemppation of beauty thus subjectively combines both
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thought and sense:
’Beauty is . . . the wonk of free contemplation, and with it we 
do indeed enter upon the world of ideas - but . . . without 
... leaving behind the world of sense , as is the case when 
we proceed to knowledge of truth.’ (L25:5)
In retaining a sensuous aspect, the contemplation of beauty is 
distinguished by Schiller from the discovery of truth. Truth is 
identified by Schiller with Kant’s notion of a supersensible domain : 
the source of both theoretical reason’s Ideas, and practical reason’s 
moral law. Truth or the supersensible, can only be postulated 
cognitively, or determined volitionally, by abstraction from what is 
sensuous:
’Truth is the pure product of abstracting from everything which 
is material and contingent $ it is . . . pure and unadulterated 
... pure autonomous activity without any admixture of 
passivity.* (L25:5)
?»
However, in a difficult passage, Schiller tells us that we may derive 
an Intellectual pleasure from admiring a system of ideas, or what he 
calls a ’ rational unity* . Similarly, we may develop a moral feeling 
of respect for the rationality of the moral law, and through it check 
our natural inclinations, so as to bring our sensuous being into line 
with pure thought:
’True, even from the highest abstractions, there is a way back 
to sense; for thought affects our inner life of feeling, and 
the perception of logical and moral unity passes over into a 
feeling of sensuous congruence.’ (L25:5)
Schiller’s implicit reference here to moral feeling, is another example 
of him borrowing in a rather casual way from Kant’s critical philosophy 
(in this case from the Critique of Practical Reason)^, without any 
acknowledgement, or any attempt to justify his employment of the concept 
concerned within the context of his own theoretical framework in this 
treatise.
Schiller proceeds to argue that we cannot, in practice, psychologically
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distinguish our perception of beauty in an object, from our subjective
feeling of aesthetic pleasure. The perception of beauty in a phenomenal
object, like all perception, simultaneously involves the passive
reception of sense-imprassions and their active formation in thought.
The feeling of aesthetic pleasure, arises from contemplating an object,
16whose form is subjectively determined by thought. Both the relationship 
of thought and feeling, and of subject and object in aesthetic experience 
are thus regarded by Sclhller as being reciprocal:
'... it would be a vain undertaking to try to clear our 
perception of beauty Cin an object! of these connexions with
[subjective] feeling - which is why it will not do to think of the 
one as the effect of the other, but Cit] is imperative to 
consider each as being ... reciproc^Lly, both effect and 
cause. ' (i25:5)
Schiller is here perhaps also implicitly criticising both the contrasting 
17views of Budce and Kant , concerning the cause or ground of our 
aesthetic experience of beauty. Burke made certain sensuous 
chsaraccerrstics of the object the cause of such experience; wlhlst Kant 
argued for a subjective cause, by grounding the judgement of taste upon 
a feeling of pleasure wlhch arises from the 'free play* of our faculties 
of imag-nation and understanding.18
Sclhllea develops the idea of the double reciprocal influence of 
subject and object, and of thought and feeling,in the determination of 
beauty, in a long and difficult passage:
'In the delight we take in beauty . . . no , . . succession of 
activity and passivity can be discerned; reflection is here 
. . . compleeely interfused with feeling . . .' 'Beauty, then, 
is indeed an object for us, because reflection is the condition 
of our having any sensation of it; but it is at the same time a 
state of the perceiving subject, because feeling is a concd-tion 
of our having any perception of it.’ '. . . beauty is indeed 
form, because we contemplate it; but it is at the same time 
life Esersuousnessl, because we feel i-t.* (i25:5)
The meaming of this passage is as follows. Unlike intellectual pleasure 
and moral feeling, beauty does not involve the succession of rational
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thought by sensuous feeling, but rather a pleasure which results from
the simultaneous reciprocal relation of thought and feelnng. Beauty
presupposes a beautiful object, as we mist distinguish in our formative
thought, something to have a sensation of, or a subjective feeling in
response to. Beauty is also a product of the psychological state of
the subject who perceives the object, for our sensuous receptivity and
feelings provide the basis and con-tent of our thouprt* s forming process
(of. Ll9s9)* What we contemplate in beauty is an objects form; what we
feel in aesthetic experience is sensuous : beauty is itself thus both 
19formal and sensuous.
Sclhller now proceeds to develop the discussion in the Letter from 
the psychology of the experience of contem?!.ating beauty, to its 
morally educative effect. He begins by reiterating the point just made : 
that our experience of beauty involves both passivity to sense and the 
activity of thought; and that the object of beauty, in itself, appears 
to be a combiirnaion of matter and form. Now the point Sclhller goes on 
to mace from this, is that our subjective experience, in the 
contemplation of beauty, demonstrates that it is possible for 
self-deeemdm.ng rationality (or though), to raintain a relative 
autonom^KP^w^^L^-t combined with and resting upon the sensuous. In adcd-tinn, 
the apparent structure of the beautiful object puts before us a symbol 
that the moora. will can be realized qua rational, wlhlst combined with 
and resting upon our sensuous nature.
*. . . beauty provides us with trimphant proof that passivity 
by no means excludes activity, nor mater form . . . that, in 
consequence, the moral freedom of man is by no means abrogated 
through his inevitable dependence upon phsical things.* (L25;6)
Now it may be here, that we can at last see wht Sclhller meant in
L9s7, where he urged the young artist to create in beauty a symbol of
moonLlty. This is effected not by embocdy-ng moral themes in art’s
content; but more simply, in its harmonious phenomenal structural
relation of form and sensuous content, the ieauiiful object is a symbol
of the ha:rmorn.ous psychological structural relation of reason and sense 
20in the ’noble’ maral will.
Scthller believes that understood in this way, beauty can overcome 
the problem of the moral will’ s realization posed by a duaHstic 
conception of moora!ty like Kant’ s, in which reason and sense are
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opposed to each other, in an antithesis of duty and inclination. 
Philosophers like Kant, postulate the moral will as a condition of 
our volitional freedom and rational autonony. Howver, they do not 
show how the moral will can in practice be realized in the sensuous 
domain it has been made autonomous from. In Scihller’s view, it is 
not adequate to siiqply say that men will realize the moral law because 
they have an absolute moral obligation to do so. It is necessary to 
show how, in practical terms, the moral law can be realized in and 
through the sensuous it is opposed to and cut off from.
’ . . . analytical philosophers [like Kean] are unable to adduce 
any better proof that pure reason [or the moral will] can in 
practice be realized in human kind than that this is in fact 
enjoined upon them.’ (L25s6)
(in his criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy here, Sclhller correctly 
to my mind, ignores Kant’ s theoretical device of em^l^(^:^2ing moral feeling 
in order to provide a connection between moral reason and our sensuous 
inclinations, in which moral feeling acts as a checking ’agent’ for the 
former upon the latter. Such a device merely shifts rather than solves 
the problem of how in an epistemology. <cHly duaHstic philosophy which 
postulates two worlds - the supersensible/aid sensible - it is possible 
to overcome the problem of how pure rational thought could determine 
sensuous feeling.)
Sclhller sees his concept of beauty as solving the problem of the 
moral will’s realization, through the arguments put forward in this 
Letter that 1), the beautiful object is an educative external symbol, 
which puts before us ’proof’ of the possibility of the haimom.oui unity 
of rational form and sensuous mater; and 2), that beauty is capable of 
psychologically effecting in us - in the course of aesthetic experience 
- i harmoihous relation of our rational and sensuous natures.
’. . , since in the enjoyment of beauty ... an actual union and 
interchange between mater and form [in the object], passivity 
and activity tin the subject], mm^met^ily takes place, the 
compatibility of our two natures, the practicability of the 
infinite [moral law] being realized in the finite [sensible 
doiman] ... is thereby actually proven.’ (L25:6>)
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These two arguments should be understood in the context of others put 
forward earlier in the treatise, which expressed the view that by 
recurrent recourse to aesthetic experience (L21:5), both of our natures 
may be re-orientated out of oppoostion (114:6), or one-sided drm.lm.tirm 
(17:4), into a state of equ.li^hri^cus harmony (L20?4), which provides 
the psychological pre-concd^'ti^on (L22s1) of a realistic and realizable 
’noble1 mooraity (L25:7» fns. 2 & 5),
Schiller concludes the Letter, by affiraing that in his theory of
psycho logical development, beauty is the bridge between nature and 
22freedom. The transition from the sensuous state to man* s morsH
concd-tim, is effected through beauty rendering the two cmcdtions 
compattble (not by rendering them into a neutral con<d.tion, but by 
encouraging them to interfunction whist retaining their independent 
integral chanterra).
*We need, then, no longer feel at a loss for a way which might 
lead us from our dependence upon sense towards moreal freedom, 
since beauty offers us an instance of the latter being perfectly 
com?attble with the former ...**... if Cmanl is already free 
wlh-le still in association with sense, as the fact of beauty 
teaches ... then there can no longer be any question of how 
... in his thinking and willing, he is to offer resistance to 
the life of sense, since this has already happened in beauty.* 
(125:7)
The *aesistEmce to the life of sense’ referred to here, has ’already 
happened’ in our experience of beauty, because aesthetic contemplatirn 
involves a psychological process in which man, wlhlst still sensuous 
(receptive to sense-impressions), is also rationally self-detemining 
(inlrsing form upon what he senses). For Sclhller, beauty is the bridge 
between nature and freedom, because it simultaneously symbooizes and 
effects a psychological state in which rational self-deta:min.ltion is 
compaible with our dependence on sensuous being. The question of how 
the sensuous individual can raise himelf to the moiel standpoint, is 
solved in the symMic model of the psychological structure of this 
standpoint, shown in the apparent phenomsm.1 structure of the beautiful 
object; and by the psychological re-structuring effected in the 
contemplative experience of such an object.
Now there appeaie, prima facie, to be two flaws in Schiller’s
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arguments concerning beauty here. Firstly, any kind of phenomenal 
object is a relation of form and matter (and not merely beautiful 
objects), and so capable of being a phenomenal, symbol of the 
psychological structure of the ’noble' moraL will. Hcwever, Scthller 
I think would argue that only beautiful objects are sufficiently form 
doimnated in their harmonious relation to the sensuous (cf. L22:5), to 
fully reflect the rational doiminaion which pertains even to the 'noble’ 
moral will in its harmonious relation to its phyical substructure. 
Secondly, Schiller appears to forget that earlier in this Letter, he 
has already aUcwed ’contemplation’ in the widest sense, of any kind 
of phenomenal object, to involve the interfunctioning of thought and 
sense, so that he can hardly make the contemplation of beauty uniquely 
educative in this respect. Horever, it should be remembered that when 
discussing contemppation in this wider sense, he did suggest that both 
distance and disinterestedness were essential components of it (in L25;2). 
Now I think Sclhller would want to argue that such component moments 
reach their most compete form only in our contemelation of beauty.
The uniqueness of beauty in this respect, will be a significant part of 
the argument of the next Letter (26), which deals with Sclhller’s theory 
of ’ aesthetic semblance’.
LETTER 26
Mans Psycho-iHstorical Development (l!% The Nature of Aesthetic
Semblance
In Letters 24 and 25, Schiller described the ability to self-consciously 
distinguish the self from the not-self, as the transitional point at which 
man emerges from his sensuous natural state, (of. L24:2, last sentence; 
and L25:1). In Letter 25, telf-oonscioutnest was closely associated with 
the contemppative ability to distance oneself from an object, and to be 
relatively disinterested in its sensuous character. Here in ^tetter 26, 
the importance of detaching our contemplation of an object from definite 
conceptual or particular sensuous considerations, is developed further 
into a theory of artistic production ; in which we deliberately create, 
or rather re-create for contemppation, objects of a type which will be 
more conducive to evoking an aesthetic attitude involving both psychical 
distance and disinterestedness. Schiller teems such special objects
199
'aesthetic semblances’ , by which, put moot simply, he means art objects. 
In now turning attention to the artistic production of aesthetic 
semblances, Sclhller locates it as a stage in ma^’s psycho-historical 
development, and understands it against the background of a simppified 
Kantian epistemology. We foio<w a fairly abstract discussion of the 
psycho logical foundations of the process of artistic re-creation, rather 
than a concrete consideration of the practical skills and techniques 
involved in artistic production as such.
The full meahng of the term ’ aesthetic semblance’ is only gradually 
disclosed by Sclhller as this Letter unfolds. It is more convenient, 
however, to seek to comprehend the concept before proceeding any further. 
Now although the concept of aesthetic semblance refers to art objects, it 
cannot be fully understood in abstraction from a certain theory 
concerning the process of artistic production (which itself rests upon 
a Kantian epistemology). This theory views aesthetic semblance as a 
product of the follcwing process : It involves 1) the mental, abstraction 
of form from an existential phenomenon; 2) such form is then creatively 
re-fomed by the imagination; 3) it is then re-presented, through being 
embodied in some form dominated medium of a different kind from its 
sensuoiss^ origin. The process, in short, involves the abstraction, 
re-formation, and re-presentation of form. The maority of the content 
of this Letter wil be concerned with outlining the psycho logical 
development of the capacity to perform the first two parts of this 
threefold process. (The third part wa dealt with in Letter 22, in 
Scihller’s discussion of the art object.)
In addition to its meaning as being a creatively re-fomed form, the 
concept of aesthetic semblance also involves the notion of it being an 
illusory appearance, in view of its detachment from sensuous reality, 
and its predom.inntly formal. character?. Ho^e^^r, Schiller is careful to 
distiiguish aesthetic semblance from a deceptive illusion, trick or 
error. He distinguishes aesthetic semblance which is known and loved as 
an aesthetically pleasing illusion, from a logical semblance by which we 
are deceived concerning empirrcal existence or conceptual validity. An 
aesthetic semblance does not claim to present reality or truth.
’. . . I am here concerned with ... aesthetic semblance (which 
we EcoornscooulyD distinguish from actuality and truth) and not 
logical semblance ... semblance, therefore, which we love just 
because it is semblance, and not because we take it to be
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something better. Oily the first is play, whereas the latter is 
mere deoeption.' (L26:5)
The early part of Letter 26 is concerned with describing how the 
development of the psyche from the sensuous state into the aesthetic 
condition, is effected by nature itself s through evoking an interest 
and delight in the apparent forms of natural beauty; and also by the 
development of our natural senses. Sclhller begins by referring to 
nature’s role in ran’s psychological development, in only the most 
general terms:
' • . . Eas] it is the aesthetic mode of the psyche which first 
gives rise to freedom, it is obvious that it cannot itself 
derive from freedom and cannot, in consequence, be of moral 
origin. It mut be a gift of nature . . .' (L26:1)
Sclhller here eschews a teleological approach to understanding mm's
psycho-lhstoricai development, in favour of efficient causation. That
which we are to become (i.e. moraa), is not the final cause of the
movement,.of becoming towards it. This position would appear to contrast
with that of Kent. For Kant, aesthetic judgements of taste are ultimately
grounded upon the apprehension of the purposive forms produced by the 
1
a priori teleological principle of reflective judgements. Such
judgements, being grounded in the a priori, and being the result of
theoretical reason’s regulation of our faculty of judgement, are grounded 
2in the supe2SseItible. This process has a deeper raison d’etre, as part
of the general * economy of reason' , in promooing the realization of the 
5
moral will* The moral will is for Kant the teleological end of the 
universe (in the Critique of Teleological Judg^ment)4, so that in so far
as aesthetic experience promotes more!. it has a teleological
purpose. Thm, whereas for ScThller the aesthetic condition of the psyche 
develops temporaHy and psychooogically out of sensuous experience, for 
Kant aesthetic judgements are ultimately teleologically grounded in reason 
and the supers ernible.
In Sclhller’s view, man first begins to emerge from tat■urn and to 
become human, when he becomes self-conscious and social, both of which 
involve the development of language, in order to signify our thoughts 
to ouraelves and to express them to others:
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’. . . man . , « [finds] humaxiity within himself - but only ... 
where . . , he discourses silently with himelf and . . . with 
all the rest of his kind, only there will the tender blossom of 
beauty unfold.’ (L26:2)
Now the experience of beauty begins to ’unfold’ at first in the shape 
of natural beauty, which presents us with aesthetically pleasing 
phenomenal configurations in the very midst of the sensuous domain 
itself. The perception of such forms, develops the sense-drive and the 
form-drive to interfunction in an actively receptive equilibrium:
’. . . [where in] nature ... form trlmiphant ennobles even the 
lowest orders of creation ... where out of [natural] life 
itself the sanctity of [rational] order springs ... here alone 
will sense and spirit, the receptive and the formative power, 
develop in that happy equilibrum which is the soul of beauty 
and the condition of all human ty.’ (1,26:2)
Scthller has now described the emergence of man from out of a state 
involving the doimnation of sense. The transition is effected through
1) , the development of self-comciousness, language and sociability; and
2) , by apprehending the apparent forms of natural beauty. There is an 
implied psychological comiection between 1) and 2) here : Through 1), 
the individual develops the ability to think and thus form objects in 
coghtive experience. He is then in a psychological position to 2), 
perceive and centenplate phenomenal forms in nature. A further 
psychological connection is implied by Sclhller here prefacing his 
discussion of aesthetic semblance in this tetter, by a consideration of 
the effects of apprehending natural beauty. It would seem that the beauty 
of nature must first educate man to contemplate and enjoy form, before
he can create, contemplate and enjoy aesthetically, beautiful art objects. 
For Sclhller, natural beauty provides mui’s first aesthetic education 
(in the narrw sense, related to beauty), which his second through art 
psycholo^LcEuLly presupposes, for natural beauty plays a vital role in 
the equilibrious development of our psychological powera. It is the 
first mode of genuinely aesthetic education we experience, and one which 
is not merely proto-aesthetic, as was ’well-bengg’ in Letter 25. (it is 
notable that in the treatise as a whole, Sclhller emphasizes art in 
discussing the aesthetic experience of beauty, and in contrast to Kant
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in the Critique of Judgement, the role of natural beauty is neglected, 
except in the paragraph under consideration here.)
The ability to take pleasure in contemplating the purely formal 
characteristics of phenomenal objects, and to deliberately display 
aesthetically pleasing natural forms in order to provide such pleasure, 
is seen by Schh-ller as marking a major point of transition in mans 
ps ychologi cal development:
'And what are the outward and visible signs of the savags’s entry 
upon humon-ty?’ ' . . , delight in semblance, and a propensity to 
ornamentation and play. ’ (L26:3)
The ’ delight in semblance’ referred to here, is only achieved when man 
attains a degree of freedom from the sensuous : when his imagination is 
no longer merely pressed into the service of satisfying sensuous needs ;
*. . , indifference to reality and interest in semblance may be 
regarded as a genuine enlargement of humaLnty and a decisive 
step towards culture.* ’ . , , this affords evidence of outward 
f^reedom j for as long as necessity dictates, and need drives, 
imagination remains tied to reality with powerful bonds . . .*
(L26:4)
Interest and delight in semblance is also a maltfestatiot of inner 
psychological freedom, as we become self-conscious of the independent 
power of the imaagmation to form images without direct reference to 
external nature:
'But it affords evidence, too, of inner freedom, since it makes 
us aware of a power which is able to move of its own accord, 
independently of any mterlal stimulus from without . . .* (L26:4)
Aesthetic contemplation has now been described as involving not merely 
a negative disinterest in the sensuous nature (and in L20;4 fn., the 
rational character) of an object, but also a simultaneous positive 
' interest* in form or semblance (L26:4). Thus in Schiller’s view, 
aesthetic contemppation is not a totally disinterested experience. Now 
we my wonder whether such an interest in form, does not necessarily 
involve an interest in the rational character of an object ; in the
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inevitable at least minimal recognition of a certain phenomenal
configuration as pertaining to a particular natural species or artistic 
genre, so that intellectual and aesthetic pleasures psychologically 
merge; or, perhaps, aesthetic pleasure is really nothing more than 
implicit intellectual pleasure, corresponding to the implicit 
rationality of the form contemplated.
Employing a simplified Kantian epistemology, Sclhller states that 
we can distinguish the sensuous mater Which pertains to an object in 
itself, from its apparent form, Which is determined by our own perceptual 
activity. Now the point Sclhller is really mking here, concerns our 
freedom and autonomy in relation to aesthetic semblances. In contemplating 
such forms, we encounter something Which is essentially of our own macing. 
Ve delight in the product of our actively receptive perceptual process, 
not something which is nature* s and which we simply passively receive.
’The reality of things is the woak of things t hew elves; the 
semblance of things is the work of ran; and a nature which 
delights in semblance is no longer taking pleasure in what it 
receives, but in wlhat it does.’ (l26s4)
Sclhller continues to emphhaize that the transition from the natural 
state into the aesthetic coned.tion is effected by nature. He has already 
discussed the role of natural beautiful forms in educating us to delight 
in contemplating form for its own sake. Now he describes the role played 
by our natural senses in enabling us to perceive such form;
’It is nature herself wlhch raises man from reality to semblance, 
by furnishing him with two senses which lead him to knowledge of 
the real world through semblance alone.’ (126:6)
Sclhller proceeds to distinguish the higher senses of visual and aural 
8perception, from the lower more animal senses. The development of the 
former senses is of those whose contact with sensuous phenomena is 
indirect, meedated by thought imposing form upon what is sensed, and 
creating simultaneously both a physical and psyclhcal distance between 
subject and object. The object is perceived as having a formal structure, 
and not simply as a sense-daaim as with the lower senses.
’In the case of the eye and the ear, ^nature] herself has driven
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importunate mt ter back from the organs of sense, and the object, 
with which in the case of our more animal senses we have direct 
contact, is set at a distance from us. What we actually see with 
the eye is something different from the sensation we receive; for 
the mind leaps out across light to objects.’ ’ . . . the object of
eye and ear [is 3 a form that we engender.’ (126:6)
Now the perceptual ability to subjectively impose form upon objects 
through the higher senses, leads in Schhller’s view, to the development 
of an artistic ability to abstract wteat has been so imposed, and to 
treat form independently of its original apparent sensuous ’ embodiment’ . 
The capacity for imitative art at first arises, (but later, form is 
treated more autonomously, and is creatively re-fomned without reference 
to nature).
'Once man has got to the point of distinguishing semblance frem 
reality, form from body, he is also in a position to abstract 
the one from the other , . .’ 'The capacity for imitative art is 
thus given with the capacity for form in general . . .’ (126:7)
Sclhller thus conceives of the capacity for artistic creation, as an 
almost natural further development, in objective and volitional terms, 
of our ordinary cognitive processes of perception (in which we impose 
form upon an object subjectively), and of abstraction (in which we detach 
such form subjectively).
Sclhller tells us that in creatively handling form, the subject
mhfests his independence from nature and its laws, by re-foming it 
9imaginatively to conform to laws of his own , altering without hindrance 
the apparent ' natural' structure of the form’s original sensuous 
’ embodiment’ :
'With unrestricted freedom, he is able, can he but imagine them 
together, actually to join together things which nature put 
asunder; and conversely, to separate, can he but abstract them 
in his mind, things which nature has joined together.' (Lj26:8)
The degree of creative freedom exercised in this process of imaginatively 
10re-forming form , is a function of the extent to whch the artist 
abstracts form from its original sensuous ' embodiment’ :
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1, , . the more scrupulously he separates form from substance
• • • the more compPete the autonomy he is able to give to
the former • • (L26s9)
There are two related, kinds of autonomy involved here : the freedom 
of the i map-nation from sensuous constraints upon its creativity; and 
the independence of form or semblance from its original sensuous 
* existence1 • The freedom of the imsag-nation, and our autonomy in an 
aesthetic doma.n where our laws operate (albeit imppicitly), is 
facilitated by lessening the dependence of aesthetic semblance upon 
sense.
In Schiller’s view, the nature of aesthetic semblance necessarily 
imposes limitations upon the proper activity of the artist, and in 
particular, upon wWt is a proper subject for artistic representation. 
The need for semblance to be such, is for form to be detached from its 
sensuous 1 origin1. Consequently, the artist must not claim that the 
ideal world he presents has reality, or relevance to reality (by being 
aimed at effecting some political, moral or social change). The artist 
mist not allcw his autonomous semblance to become crudely * re-attached’ 
to sensuous existence, by either seeking to make semblance determine 
existence (as in ideological art), or by letting existence determine 
semblance (as in merely imitative or naturalistic art winch, by its 
dependence upon the sensuous, limits the scope of imsag-inative freedom). 
Aesthetic semblance mist be honest (not claim reality), and autonomous 
(not depend upon reality for its effect).
’. . . the . poet transgresses his proper limits, alike when
he attributes existence to his ideal world, as when he aims at 
bringing about some determinate existence by means of it.1 
’. . .(encroaching with his ideal upon the territory of 
experience, and presuming to determine actual existence by 
means of what is merely possible)or • • .(aio<wing experience 
to encroach upon the territory of the ideal, and restricting 
the Eimsagnatively] possible to the concdL tions of the actual)/ 
(L26:1O)
’ Only inasmuch as it is honest (expressly renounces ail claims
to reality), and only inasmuch as it is autonomous (dispenses 
12with ail support frem reality), is semblance aesthetic.’
(126:11)
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‘Hwewr, Sclhller does realistically all<w aesthetic semblance to 
have a material aspect : the necessary medium for the re-presentation 
of a creatively re-fomed form. But, as we saw in L22?5, form should 
predominate and subordinate sense in an art object. In addition,
Sclhller now tells us, we must subjectively abstract from the sensuous 
aspect of such an object, if our judgement of it is to be aesthetic in 
character:
’This does not, of courae, imply that an object in wlhch we 
13discover aesthetic semblance mist be devoid of reality ; all 
that is required is that our judgement of it should take no 
account of that reality; for inasmuch as it does take account 
of it, it is not an aesthetic judgement (126:11)
Hre, S<chHer is, to some extent, following Kaait’s theory of the 
judgement of taste in the Critique of Judgement. For Kant the ’pure’ 
judgement of beauty or ’ taste’ , necessarily involves a disinterest in 
the sensuous and rational character of an objeet. Tire judgement of
taste rests upon the ’ free play’ of the faculties of imag-nation and 
understanding, and such free play is hindered by considerations of a 
determinate sensuous or rational kind engaging these faculties. TMs 
happens when a judgement of rational ’perfection’ or of the sensuously 
’agreeable’ enters into the aesthetic judgement of taste, becoming 
psycho logically conjoined with it. Different types of object are more 
or less conducive to evoking such ’ioe^ure’ or conflated judgements, 
leading Kant to distinguish ’ dependent’ and ’ free’ types of beauty.
In the experience of dependent beauty, our judgement of taste
15psychologically ’ trails in the wake’ of a judgement of perfection.
Recoghzing that a good deal of art will fall under the category of
dependent beauty (in its purposively and thus concept-mally contrived
character), Kant also talks of the necessity to acquire the ability to
abstract from determinate sensuous and rational considerations, in order 
16to focus upon an object’s purely formal character.
Elaborating upon the need to acquire the ability to abstract from
sense and to focus upon form, Sclhller tells us that if we delight more 
in a beautiful woman herself than in a picture of one, then she is not, 
for us, an autonomous semblance. Wiaaever the character of the object 
before us, if our aesthetic judgement is not ’pure’ , because sensuous 
consderations have entered into it, then the object is not for us an
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aesthetic semblance:
’The beauty of a livTing woman will please us as well, or even a 
little better, than a mere painting of one equally beautiful? 
but inasmuch as the living beauty pleases better than the 
painted, she is no longer pleasing us as an autonomous semblance, 
no longer pleasing the purely aesthetic sense.* ’• . . the appeal 
... even by living things must be through sheer alletrttce 
. . .’ (L26:11)
Horever, the process of abstracting from sense to focus upon form, is 
more difficult in the case of a pred.omLrntltly sensuous natural object, 
than it is with a form domnated art object;
’But It does • . • require an incomparably higher degree of 
aesthetic culture to perceive nothing but sheer semblance
in what is actually alive, than it does to dispense with the 
element of life in sheer semblanae.* (L26;11)
Clearly,'* then, certain types of object are more conducive than others 
to being formally contemplated, and judged in a purely aesthetic manrer, 
with art objects enjoying an advantage in this inspect over objects of 
natural beauty.18
Sclhller has already described the necessary objective lreroqu.sites 
for satisfactory aesthetic experience : in terns of a form domnated 
object (L22j5)» and the need for aesthetic semblance to be ’honest’ and 
’autonomous’ vis-a-vis reality (L26:11). Now in the three quotations 
above, he has in addition described the subjective prerequisite for a 
genuinely aesthetic experience : in the need for our aesthetic judgement 
to be purified of sensuous considerations, and to be concerned only with 
the contemplatiot of form.
Scthller does then, to some extent, follw Kant’s distinction between 
’pure’ and ’impure’ judgements of taste, and between ’free’ and 
’dependent’ beauty (with the latter re-temed by Schhller ’autonomous’ 
and ’dependent’ semblance). Horewr, Scihller’s em^sais, whether 
considering the purity of aesthetic judgements, or the autonomy of 
aesthetic semblances, is upon disinterest in, and distance from, the 
sensuous. In contrast, Kant places an equal em^t^£^i.s upon aesthetic 
judgements of taste being disinterested in both sensuous and conceptual
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considerations of a definite kind; and Kant conceives of the distinction
between dependent and free beauty, mainly in terns of whether an object
does or does not evoke an explicit definite concept in our aesthetic 
19judgement of it, x
Now two problems appear to arise from Scthller allowing that a 
beautiful woman, i.e. an object of natural beauty, my be an autonomous 
semblance, if only our judgement of her is purified of sensuous 
considerations. Firstly, Scthller overlooks the view he took in this 
Letter concerning the necessity for aesthetic semblance to be an 
imag-natively re-fomed form (of, L26:8, 1O&11), and thus to be an 
art object. Such imag-native re-creation was earlier described as being 
a necessary part of the process of distancing form from seise, so as to 
endow aesthetic semblance with an autonomous appearance (of, L26j11).
The apparent forms of natural beauty, wlhch are apprehended without 
imaginative re-formation, in their close relation to the sensuous, should 
be regarded by Schuller as ’dependent* semblances, irrespective of the 
purity of our aesthetic judgement of them. The contemplation of natural 
beauty would seem to involve *restricting the imaginatively possible to 
the concdtions of the actual’ (L26:1 o). Objects of natural beauty,
including a beautiful woman, do not *dispense with all support from 
reality’ , in the way that Scthller earlier described (in L26s11) as 
being a necessary coned.tion of semblance being both * autonomous’ and 
* aesthetic*.
The second problem, arises from the fact that in his discussion of
the beautiful woman, Schiller appears to make the character of the object
(as being either an autonomous or dependent semblance), depend Wnc^3^1t
upon the nature of our judgement of it (whether it is pure or impure,
20respectively). O Such an emphaais upon the subjective determination of 
the character of an object of beauty, is inconsistent with his otherwise 
reciprocal view in the treatise, concerning the complex causal
relationship between subject and object in aesthetic experience, (cf. 
I»25:5)« Tlhs view was expressed in a way relevant to the discussion here, 
in Letter 22, when Sclhller told uss
*. . . that we have not had a purely aesthetic experience - 
whether the cause lies in the object or in our own response or, 
as is almost always the case, in both at once.* (L22s5)
A problem of a different kind arises in ciInlectiin with Schiller’s
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concept of aesthetic judgement in L26:11, when we compare it to the 
description of the process involved in evaluating an art object given 
in L22;4, which took the form of a metajudgement of owe own
psychological state in the course of, or imnediaaely after, aesthetic 
experience. Now the latter judgement must involve an assessment of our 
feelings, and be signified to ourselves in thoughts, viz. it is 
necessarily of a determinate sensuous and conceptual character. Such a 
mode of psycho-sasthetic assessment, would be considered as ’impure’ or 
conflated in character, in terns of the concept of aesthetic judgement 
put forward in 126:11. Moreover, such a metajudgement is essentially 
involved in an introspective psychological self-assessment, and is not 
principally concerned with contemplating the formal character of an 
object. There is, then, some inconsistency between the earlier and later 
views of the process of aesthetic assessment and evaluation that Sclhller 
puts forward in the treatise : as to whether or not the process involves 
determinate feelings and thoughts ; and as to whether it is principally 
subjectively or objectively referenced.
In the next tetter (27), Sclhller will return to a subject he has not 
dealt with since Letter 9» viz. the socially beneficial effects of the 
testhetap, (cf. L9:1 & 2). Horewr, we are now presented with a brief 
previw of this later discussion, as he tells us that when an individual 
or a people have developed to the stage when they can delight in creating 
and contemplating honest and autonomous aesthetic semblances, they show 
a spirit of freedom and self-determination in relation to all that is 
sensuous : the conduct of life is governed by the moral law; honour is 
more important than maerial gain; rational thought is valued more than 
mere sensuous pleasure; belief in the immrtaaity of the soul is preferred 
to hopes of achieving happiness in the finite sensuous realm.
♦In whatever individual or whole people we find this honest and 
autonomous kind of semblance . • • we shall see actual life 
governed by the ideal, honour trimphant over possessions, thought 
over enjoyment, dreams of imnootaaity over existence.’ (L26:12).
In contrast, those who confuse reality and semblance, are hypocrites in 
the moral sphere, and lack all freedom of imag-ration in the aesthetic
domain:
♦. . . single individuals, as weUL as whole peoples, who either
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eke out reality with semblance, or (aesthetic) semblance with 
reality - the two often go together - give evidence alike of 
their moral worthlessness and of their aesthetic incapacity. ’ 
(126:12)
Schiller concludes Letter 26 by responding to the views of those 
who criticize aesthetic semblance precisely because of its detachment 
from sensuous reality. Such critics consider that art distracts men from 
serious concerns : they view art and beauty as superficial and frivolous, 
as a danger to moral sincerity, educating men to value appearances rather 
than real moral merit, and thus encouraging hypocrisy. Now Sclhller tells 
us that these ’moralizers’ , as he calls them, only allow art a place as
’dependent’ semblance, viz. as serving some definite aim in relation to
21 22 existential reality (such as, presumably, moral improvement , or
reinforcing religious doctrines).
’NoHing is more common than to hear certain shallow critics of 
our age voicing the compla-nt that ... Being is neglected for 
the sake of Seeming.’ ’ . . . these ... moralizers tend to . . . 
tppnlach the age not only for dishonest but for honest semblance 
too. And even the exceptions they might possibly be prepared
to mke for the sake of beauty refer rather to dependent than to 
autonomous, semblance.’ (L26:14)
Schuller proceeds to defend art as meeting a profound psycho logical need 
in man He eiserts (in a way strikingly similar to Nietzsche more than 
half a century later) , that art fills a psychic void and idealizes a 
harsh reality. We need its psychotherapeutic illusions, winch are 
harmless to truth and molraity, as we knew we are, and want to be, 
’deluded’ by them.2
’. . . they ... inveigh against that beneficent semblance with 
which we fill out our emppiness and cover up our wretchedness, 
and against that ideal semblance which ennobles the reality of 
common day.’^ (l26:14)
ScThller seems to suggest that art is a necessary self-conscious flight 
from reality. But for Sclhller, the so-called ’reality’ involved, which 
the critics of art cling to, is itself in a fundameinal sense unreal or
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unbtue. The sensible ream is not reality; the supersensible domain 
alone is the haven of truth and source of moial.ity. We should not 
respect miter as * realty* ; it is a mere means to the realization of 
supersensible ends.
•. . . they show a respect for substance as such which is 
unworthy of man, who is meant to value miter only to the extent 
that it is capable of taking on form and extending the ream of 
Ideas.’ (126:14)
In Sclhller’s view, we are, as a mtter of fact, a long way from 
having enough detachment from ’reality’ in our aesthetic judgemenns.
Our appreciation of aesthetic forms is hindered by considerations of 
possession (especially where natural beauty is concerned); and by 
judgements -of logical finality (enquiring into purposes, where art is 
concerned). W^ tie the imagination to determinate sensuous and conceptual 
concerns, instead of leaving it free to spontaneously and creative ly 
* play*.
* . . ,ve have not yet attained to the level of pure semblance 
at all ...*'••• we cannot enjoy the beauty of living nature 
without coveting it, or admre the beauty of imitative art 
without inquiring after its purpose ... we still refuse 
imagination any absolute legislative rights of her own . . .’ (L26:14)
We can sumnmaize Sclhller’s arguments in defence of aesthetic 
semblance against its critics (including those whose similar views were 
considered in L1O:4, 5 & 6), in the following way : 1) Such critics wish 
to only allow dependent forms of beauty, serving existential ends; 2) 
they fail to see the profound psychological need we have for art and 
beauty, in order to fill a psychic void and to idealize a harsh reality;
3) they dernoosttate a concern and respect for a ’reality’ wli-ci, from a 
metaphysical standpoint, is ultimately unreal; 4) far from being too 
detached from reality, the quality of our aesthetic response demoostrates 
an attaclment to determinate sensuous and conceptual considerations which 
hinders our imaginative freedom. With these four negative arguments in 
defence of art and beauty, Sclhller bo some extent supplements his 
earlier ’transcendental proof’ (in Letters 11 to 16) of beauty’s 
necessity and importance : its psycholo^-cal value in mking us comppete
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and balanced human beings, (in which Beauty w^ seen as a necessary 
condition of the full realization of the Idea of Human Being). Hoewr, 
we must regard the four supplementary arguments advanced here as being 
merely assertive in character; while the ’transcendental proof’ was 
based upon a speculative psychology which it is impossible to either 
validate or invalidate, being neither logically deduced nor empirically 
corroborated.
In Letter 26, the role of the play-drive becomes problemtic. In 
L14:3» it was described as involving the harmormLois interfunctioning of 
the form and sense drives; wlhLle in L16:2 and Ll7s2, it w^ described 
as a dynamic interplay between two fully developed and equilibrious 
powers. Hcowvvr, the pre-e»minance given to form in Schiller’ s theory of 
the art object (Letter 22), in his theory of aesthetic contemP^ttaon 
(Letter 25), and now in his theory of aesthetic semblance (Letter 26), 
leaves little scope for a balanced role for the sense-drive. The 
imbalance began to enter into Schiller’s aesthetic theory, with the 
unbalanced art object of Letter 22, in which form predominated. From 
that point onwards, it was inevitable that Schuller’s theories of 
aesthetic contemppation and of aesthetic semblance would also be 
unbalanced by being form doimnated. An unbalanced, form domnated art 
object, bound on Sclhller’s t^e^s (in which the art object has
psychological effects), to lead to unbalanced aesthetic experience. By 
the time we reach the end of Letter 26, sense has been thoroughly 
subordinated to form, in both the subjective and objective aspects of 
aesthetic experience. As a resuLt, the aesthetic coned tion of the psyche 
is not (despite various statements in Letters 18, 20, and 21), an 
equilibrious 'middle state’ , but rather a state doimnated by the 
form-drive. It is also difficult to see how Schiiler’s concept of freedom 
as resting upon the counterbalancing of the form and sense drives, in 
which rational and natural necessity cancel out each other's determination 
of the will (of. L19:Lo & 12; L20:4), can survive the increasing formalism 
of his general aesthetic theory. The concept of the play-drive, then, is 
effectively redundant by Letter 26, and SchuHer has instead turned to 
a much more Kantian view of aesthetic experience, as involving : the 
appreciation of the purely formal aspect of objects; disinterested 'pure' 
aesthetic judgements; a distinction of 'froe' and ’dependent’ beauty (or 
autonomous and dependent semblance); and the free play’ of the 
imagination. The Kantian understanding of aesthetic experience, will be 
competed in Letter 27, as the concept of aesthetic play, becomes the
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free play of the imagination with the faculty of the understanding. 
Briefly reviewing the structure of the treatise as a whole, it is
now possible to re-divide it into three different (though related) 
philosophical contexts : Lstters 1 to 18 express and seek to prove, 
SclhLllerian ideals (of freedom, harmony and whooeness); Letters 19 to 
21 rest upon a derivatively Pichtean epistemology; Letters 22 to 27 
represent the introduction of an increasingly Kantian view of beauty 
and aesthetic experience. It is as though as the treatise progressed, 
Sclhller began to doubt his philosophical ability to prove the 
theoretical necessity and practical viability of his ideals, and 
increasingly looked to one, and then the other, of his two great 
philosophical co^itemporraies, for assistance in bringing his 
philosophical enterprise to a successful conclusion.
LETTER 27
Ma^'s Psvoho-EHstorical Development (ill). The Aesthetic Imagination.
The Aesthetic State.
.j
In Letter 27, Schiller continues to describe mii's psycho-historical 
development, bringing it to a con elusion in the concept of the Aesthetic 
State. In Letter 26, Sclhller to some extent moved prematurely ahead in 
describing the process of ma^'s development, as he was principally 
concerned there to provide an account of the psychological foundation of 
artistic production, to foio<w his consideration of aesthetic contemppation 
in Letter 25, Although the development of mans capacity to create 
aesthetic semblance was located in the context of his psycho-hhstorical 
progress, it becomes clear in Letter 27 that man has first to create and 
enjoy 'dependent' semblance, specifically in the shape of formally 
pleasing artifacts of primarily sensuous utility, before he becomes 
interested in creating and contemppating 'suitnnomous’ aesthetic 
semblance, i.e. objects of fine art.
In this Letter, we will follow a progression of aesthetic forms, 
corresponding to mu's psycholo^-cal development. Sclhller sees the 
growth of rationality in mo^'s life generally, as being reciprocally 
related to his ability to create and enjoy contempOating increasingly 
autonomous forms of aesthetic semblance. The growth of rationality in 
sensuous man, involves a decreasing dependence upon the merely smsuous
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in all aspects of his life, and. this is reflected in his increasing 
ability to create and contemplate more formal types of beauty, which 
are detached from considerations of sensuous utility. At the same time, 
the externally aesthetic, internally refoms the character of man 
himelf. Beyond this, however, Sclhller goes further, and asserts that 
the personal relations of men and women, and the social relations of 
classes in society, are also raised to a more harmonious and rational 
form. Individual psychological harmony is translated into general social 
harmony. Sclhller moves from viewing the process of aesthetic education 
primarily in individual psychological terms, to consider its social 
consequences. In this Letter, therefore, we will observe a hierarchy of 
aesthetic forms corresponding to man' s psycho-historical progress ; 
involving a gradation from dependent to autonomous semblance; from 
external forms of beauty, to the internal formation of man* s character; 
and from personal psycho3.ogi.cal harmony, to social harmony in an 
Aesthetic State.
In the midst of the above development, however, Sclhller introduces 
a rather tangential discussion of the aesthetic imsaa-natSon. In Letter 
26, Scthller stressed the need for im^g-native freedom, as a condition 
of creati-ng and contemp^ting autonomous aesthetic semblance. He will 
continue this discussion where he left it, and argue that this is not 
an arbitrary lawless freedom, but rather a controlled freedom within 
rational limits, as the im^g.nation co-operates with the understanding, 
by being s^^o:med by the latter's concepts. This derivatively Kgaitian
1
theory of the aesthetic *free play' of the imag nation and understanding , 
sits rather unesahly in this Letter, and it would have been more 
coherently located with the discussions in Letter 25 of aesthetic 
contemplation, and in Letter 26 of the process of im^g-native reformation 
involved in artistic production.
Sclhller commences Letter 27 by stating that the creation and 
contemplation of autonomous aesthetic semblance, presupposes a level of 
psychological development at which mn has left behind a mode of life 
in which both his cogntion and volition are passively do^n^lted by the 
sensuous :
'To strive after autonomous semblance demands higher powers of 
abstraction ... more energy of will, than man ever needs when 
he confines himself to reality; and he must already have left 
this reality behind if he would arrive at that kind of semblance.' 
(L27s1)
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As the first traces of an interest in semblance appear in the life of 
man, such semblance takes a conditioned form, being involved in the 
satisfaction of his sensuous needs, as a kind of appendage. Delight in 
semblance is mixed with pleasure taken in. the satisfaction of his 
sensuous needs, (in Kantian terms, aesthetic judgements of taste are
2
psychologically conflated with judgements of the sensuously agreeable.)
’ ChaLned as he is to the mderial world, man subordinates
semblance to [sensuous] ends of his own long before he allows it 
3
autoncmous existence in the ideal realm of art. For this latter 
to happen a comp pete revolution in his whole way of feeling is 
required • . (127:1)
Sclhller refers here to the need for man to f•imdarmrmally change his 
'whole way of feeing’ • What he means by this, is that for semblance to 
become autonomous from considerations of sensuous utility, man mot 
rationalize his sernribility, and develop the capacity to take pleasure 
in form per se, and not primarily in the sensuous being of objects, with 
form merely ’added on’ , as a pleasant ’optional extra' , as it were.
The ability to make a 'pure’’ judgement of taste, in Kantian. terms, 
viz, to be able to appreciate the purely formal characteristics of an 
object, in a way WiLci is disinterested in sense, and un.concd-tioned by 
utilitarian purposes^, is associated by ScihLller with the achievement 
of full humf-ty:
'Wherever, then, we find traces of a disinterested and imroncdtaimal 
appreciation of pure semblance, we may infer that a revolution of 
this order has taken place in his nature, and that he has started 
to become truly hu^.' (12% 1)
The quaLity of aesthetic experience thus becomes an indicator of progress 
achieved in mai’s natural development of increasing rationality. We saw 
in the last Letter (26), how man’ s rational development is initially 
sponsored by nature (thrcugh natural beauty and our higher natural 
senses)^ The aesthetic not only assists mfi’s further development from 
sensuousness to rationality, it also indicates his progress in this 
process, by the quality or 'purity' of his aesthetic experience : the 
degree to wliLci he is able to create and contemplate pure foims^ (or 
autonomous semblance). The aesthetic, therefore, is viewed by Sclhller
216
as being both a cause and effect of mn’s psycho-historical development ; 
assisting and mnnfesting it.
The first manfestations of an interest in form as such, occur within 
a context still domnated by sensuous concerns, At this stage, form 
functions to merely embeeiish mu's sensuous existence. However, a 
certain sacrifice of coghtive and volitional activity which could bee 
directed solely towards satisfying sensuous needs, is involved in 
modifying features of his sensuous existence to mke them become 
formally pleasing, This is an important step forward : from mai’s activity 
being entirely limited to acquiring the means of, and actually satisfying, 
purely sensuous needs, he is now set on a course of development which is 
ultimately unlimited by the sensuous.
'Traces of this kind are, however, actually to be found even in 
his -first crude attempts at embbll^llshing his existence, attempts 
mde even at the risk of possibly worsening it from the maerial 
point of view. * *. . . a breach has been effected in the cycle 
of his animal behaviour, and he finds himself set upon a path to 
which there is no end.* (L27:1)
Man first attains some limited freedom from sensuous needs by acqhring 
an abundance of the means of satisfying them (or what Sclhller calls a 
' superfluity of miaerial things'). In the next stage of his development, 
man also seeks a means of satisfying his nascent form-drive by a 
' superfluity in maerial things' 5 in the shape of the pleasing formal 
appearance which may be found in, or else given to, objects of sensuous 
utility.
'Not just content with what satisfies nature, and meets his 
instinctual needs, he demands something over and above thhs ; 
to begin with, ad•lmttldly, only a superfluity of maerial things, 
in order to . . . ensure enjoyment beyond the satisfaction of 
immeliate needs; soon,however, a superfluity in material things, 
an aesthetic surplus, in order to satisfy the formal impulse too 
. . (L27s2)
A 'superfluity of maerial things* increases the qusaitity of pleasure 
man enjoys, as he has both current pleasure from actually satisfying his 
sensuous needs and, in addition, he has the pleasure of anticipating
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their future satisfaction. Howeer, a 'superfluity in mterial things’ 
goes beyond this, and effects a qualitative change in the nature of his 
pleasure. Man now develops the capacity for non-sensuous pleasure 
(albeit limited in scope, by being as yet, still conjoined with sensuous 
pleasure),
'By merely gathering supplies around him for future use, and 
enjoying them in anticipation, be does, it is true, tramscend 
the present , • .' 'He enjoys more, but he does not enjoy
differently. But when he also lets form enter into his enjoyment, 
and begins to notice the outward appearance of the things which 
satisfy his desires, then he has not merely enhanced his 
enjoyment in scope and degree, but also ennobled it in kind.' 
(127:2)
As a prelude to discussing the aesthetic imag-nation, Sclhller 
proceeds to distinguish what he calls 'physical play* from 'aesthetic 
play*. The former is something that even animals my rise to, and is a 
formless self-expressive activity, which rests upon the relative freedom 
from natpral necessity which my be achieved through acquiring an 
abundance of the means of satisfying sensuous needs.
'When the lion is not gnawed, by hunger ... his idle strength 
creates an object for itself : he fills the echoing desert with 
a roaring that speaks defiance, and his exuberant energy enjoys 
its self in purposeless display.' 'Without doubt there is freedom 
in these activities; but not freedom from compulsion altogether, 
merely from ... complllsion from without. An animal my be said 
to be at work, when the stimulus to activity is some lack; it my 
be said to be at play, when the stimulus is sheer plenitude of 
vitality . . .' (L27:3)
S chiller sees the limited self-expressive activity of animals (and even 
vegetation), as resting upon freedom from iemeaiate wants. But the modes 
of expression involved are purposeless and formless. Although free from 
external CGIaplLlsion, they are still governed by the instincts of 
internal nature. Now Schiller’s whole purpose in getting involved in a 
dubious discussion about the natural ' self'—expressive activity of 
animls, is to prepare us for the next paragraph which deals with the
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human imagination, end where! he will stress the need for it to get 
beyond naturea. play of a fonnless kind, eaid instead to work in 
co-operation with the faculty of concepts (the understanding).
Sclhller begins his discussion of the imagination by considering 
what he calls its ’material play’. TlhLs is a formless, free association 
of images. Although the imsag-nation in this condd.ti.on operates 
independently of the need for external stimuli, and is thus free from 
external nature, it is not free from the influence of our internal 
sensuous nature. It is, therefore, only seml-aurtonomous from nature, 
and such maerial play is regarded by Sclhller as equivalent in 
rational stains to animal self-expression based upon natural instinct.
’• . . [mai’s] imag-nation ... has its . . . material play, an 
activity in which, without any reference to form, it simply 
delights in its oom . . . mfettered power?. ’ ’. . .in a free 
association of mages» suhh payy . . . belongs merely to his 
animal life, and simply affords evidence of his liberation from 
all external physical commulsion, without as yet warranting the 
inference that there is any autonomous shaping power within him. 
(f.27M)
In order for the imagination to become more independent from nature, 
and to be definitely creative, the faculty of concepts, i.e. the 
understanding, mist impose form, unity and structure, upon the flux of 
transient images:
’From this play . . .to be explained by purely natural laws, the 
imagination ... makes the leap to aesthetic play#’ . a
coinpletely new power now goes into action : for here, for the 
first time, mind takes a hand as lawgiver ... subjects the 
arbitrary activity of the imagination to ills own . • . unity, 
introduces its own autonomy into the transient, and its own 
infinity into the life of sense.’ (L27:4)
Sclhller’s claim, in the above passage, that this development is 
something radically new, happening ’here, for the first time’ , is 
greatly exaggerated, for it is barely distinguishable from the 
perceptual process whereby form was imposed upon a meahfold of 
sense-impressions, by the rationally informed imsa-g-nation in L25:2 & 5,
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The ordinary coggn.ti.ve process of synthesizing the manifold in
perception has already been described as involving the co-operation of 
the imagination and 'thought*. This was not described as 'aesthetic 
plsy* , as presumably it is an earnest process of cognition, aimed at 
attaining knowledge, and employing explicit definite concepts. H>weler, 
Sclhller should now clearly differentiate aesthetic play from the 
ordinary coghtive perceptual process (which also involves the 
co-operation of the imEagination and uiderstaidiig). One way for him to 
do this, would be to say that aesthetic play involves only a 'loose* 
co-operation, in which the im^g-nation is implicitly ilffo:mli by a
7
multiplicity of relatively indefinite concepts of the understanding.
Now while there is some evidence for this being Schiller’s position in 
8L20s4, fn, , there is no clear statement of it being so in this Letter, 
where it really ought to be. Thus Sclhller fails to adequately 
differentiate the ordinary co-operation of the imsag-nation and 
understanding involved in the perceptual process in general, from its 
specifically aesthetic mode. Not for the firet time in this treatise, 
Sclhller fails to adequately delimit the aesthetic ilmt.i of human 
experience.
It is, worth recalling that in Letter 25, Sclhller explicitly 
incoiplratei the aesthetic mode of perception into every act of general 
perception:
'In a general way, then, those three moments which I mentioned at 
the beginning of the twenty-fourth Letter [the sensuous, 
aesthetic, and rational conditions of the psyche! . . . are also 
to be distinguished in each single act of perception, and are, 
in a word, the necessary conditions of all knowledge which comes 
to us through the senses.* (L25:1, fn.)
As much general perception is of a more or less earnest kind, it is not 
clear how aesthetic 'play' is involved in it. Schhller either eradicates 
play from the aesthetic relationship of the imagnation and understanding 
(for it is not clear how any play is involved in the rationally informed 
^agnation he describes in L27s4), or else he mOces all general 
perception involve an element of aesthetic play. The latter would seem 
to be his position, but either way, aesthetic perception becomes 
blurred into general perception. Although the notions of * disinterestedness 
and psychical ' distance* (in Letter 25), my, prim a facie, appear to
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assist Sclhller to psychologically distinguish aesthetic perception 
from other modes of perception, it must he remembered that in the first 
half of Letter 25, he allowed ordinary non-saesthetic ‘contemplation1 to 
also have these attributes to a lesser extent. In the end then, the 
difference between aesthetic and non-esthetic modes of perception is, 
for Sclhller, a mtter merely of the degrees of play, disinterestedness 
and distsnce involved. There is no absolute psychological distinction 
between the two types of perception, only a blurred shading into each 
other.
In a footnote, Schiller proceeds to reiterate that the development
of the i^^^g^na^isoor^’ s ability to initially engage in a formLess natural
play, is a partial liberation frem nature qua external. But in this
semi-autonomous state, freed from nature’s alien laws, but not yet
governed by laws of the understanding, the imagnation is a lawless
power, not yet capable of creating anything definite. Oily by being 
9
related to the ‘faculty for ideas’ , i.e. the understanding , does the 
imagnation become incorporated into the process of the mnd's rational 
self-dietemination, free from natural limitations and ordered by form:
’]%st of the imaginative play wlhch goes on in everyday life is 
independence of the fantasy from external stimuli,
wlhch constitutes at least the negative condition of its creative 
power?.’ ’. . . before the imsagination, in its productive capacity, 
can act according to its own laws, it must first, in its
10reproductive procedures, have freed itself from alien laws.
From mre lawlessness to autonomous law-giving from within ... 
a commlltely new power, the faculty for ideas, must first be 
brought into play.’ (L27:4, fn.)
Sclhller talks about the imagination, in co-operation with the 
understanding, rising above mere formless 'physical play’ to ‘aesthetic 
play’ with form. Then in the same paragraph, just two sentences after 
this reference to the ‘aesthetic play’ of the imagination, as he 
commences to describe the first aesthetic mrhfestations of this more 
rational imagination, Sclhller refers to the ’ aesthetic play-drive’ :
’From this play . . . to be explained by purely natural laws, the 
imagnation ... maces the leap to aesthetic play.’ ’The 
aesthetic play-drive . . . will in its first attempts be scarcely
221
recognizable, since the physical play-drive . . • constantly 
gets in the w<ay.* (L27?4)
In the context of L27:4, no break in meaning between the two terns
’aesthetic play’ and ’aesthetic play-drive’ is apparent, and they seem
to function synonymously. Thus we see the ’ aesthetic play’ of the
imagination (based on Kort's notion of the ’free play’ of imagination
and understanding in the Pratique of Aesthetic Judgement;) , become
equated with Schiller's earlier concept of the ’play-drive’. The latter
has now, however, been trarssmuted, with the scope of the unity it
effects considerably reduced. Whereas in tter 14» the play-dri ve
interrelated and harmonized our rational and sensuous natures and their
respective drives., here in Letter 27 the interrelation and harmony
effected is limited to embracing two mental faculties. The full range
of man’s physical sensuous nature, has been effectively reduced by
Sclhller to the imag-nation, a mere faculty of sense. The fundamental
division within man, between his rational and sensuous natures (a division
which the whole treatise is concerned with overcomng), has now been
reduced to a resolvable ’ tiff’ between two men’al faculties, which are 
12really 071 the same side of this division.
Schiller proceeds to tell us that the play-drive, which earlier in
the treatise that in which the form-drive and the sens e-drive were
able to work without difficulty ’in concert’ (cf. L14:3), is at first 
inhibited by a ’ physical play-drive’ . There occurs a mixture of 
aesthetic play/aind rarterrLal play : presumably, of the imagination with 
the understanding*, and of just the imagination on its own; resulting 
in the creation or contemplation of beauty in conjunction with the 
sensuously agreeable : a hybrid form of dependent semblance (in which 
the formal is dominated by the sensuous), the product of a hybrid 
imag-nation.
’The aesthetic play-drive ... will in its first attempts be 
scarcely recognizable, since the physical play-drive . • . 
constantly gets in the w^y. Hence we see uncultivated taste 
first seizing upon what is new and startling - on the colourful, 
fantastic, . . .’ ’It fashions grotesque shapes, loves swift 
transitions, exuberant forms, glaring contrasts, garish lights 
• . .’ ’At this stage what man calls beautiful is only wtaat 
excites him, wteofc offers him maerdal . • .’ (L27:4)
222
alwler, it is not clear from anything Sclhller says here, precisely 
how these two different cmcULtions of the imag-intion subsist together. 
It would seem that they mcut be alternate lawful/lawless crnc&tions, 
each of short temporal duration, as they cannot be psychologically 
simultaneous states. (Sclhller him elf provides no explanation as to 
how one form of imaginative play 'gets in the w^' of another, and 
confines himself to describing its aesthetic maifestatilns.)
The general direction of mrn’s psycho-lhstorical development, is 
away from natural external determination, towards rational 
selfdietemination. This is reflected in a movernrnt beyond the creation 
and enjoyment of artifacts whose primary purpose is sensuous utility, 
towards modes of aesthetic self-expression. The individual begins to 
surround himself with artifacts in which beauty of form has become a 
major consideration in their conception, creation and owner! kip; and 
where such form, by its own harmonious clmbelil,tion with mater (cf.
125:6), externally expresses mn in his wholeness (as mind, body, and 
spirit):
'The things he possesses, the things he produces, my no longer
bear upon them the macks of their use, their form no longer be
merely a timid expression of their function; in addition to the
service they exist to render, they mut ... reflect the genial
mind which conceived them, the loving hand which wrought them,
13the . . . liberal spirit which chose and displayed them. ' x 
L27:5)
From this, mn moves on to modes of aesthetic self-expression which are 
more autonomous from sensuous concerns. He proceeds to create and 
clntl]iplatl objects which are simply beautiful, and of no utility, viz. 
fine art objects:
'Not content with introducing aesthetic superfluity into objects 
of necessity, the play-drive as it becomes ever freer finally 
tears itself away from the fetters of utility altogether, and 
beauty in and for itself alone begins to be an object of his 
striving. ' (L27:5)
Ve are now following a process of development in which not only does 
aesthetic semblance become more autonomous from sensuous utility, but
223
in which it moves from external objective forms, to more internal 
psychological forms. The aesthetic is reciprocally related to man's 
process of psycho-historical development : not merely externally 
expressing it, but also in turn, re-acting back upon him himelf ; 
re-foming his own nature, to take on a more itrmornLlls and rational 
form, (There is nothing new in this position, for Sclhller has already 
fully discussed the psychological process involved in this interior 
reformation, in Letters 20 and 21, which dealt with the aesthetic 
concdtion of the psyche.) There occurs a process whereby form becomes 
progressive ly internalized (as the form-drive develops).
'And as form gradually comes upon him from without - in his 
dwelling, his household goods, and his apparel - so finally it 
begins to take possession of him himelf, transforming at first 
only-the outer, but ultimately the inner man too.' (L27s6)
It is at first the external aspects of maVs being, such as bodily 
eovemelns, which are endowed with form:
'Unco-orcdnated leaps of joy turn into dance, the unformed 
movemaits of the body into the graceful and harmonious language 
of gesture,' (L27:6)
Eventtually, however, harmonious form enters into man's psychological 
comtitution. Having already discussed this particular subject (in Letters 
14, 20, 21 & 23), Schiller presumably sees no need to do so again now. 
Instead, he immeeLately communes a countlrmovleent, of a different 
type, from the inner to the outer : from the aesthetically formed person, 
to his inter-personal relations, and finally to man's social relations.
In this movemmnt, we follw a process whereby individual psycho logical 
harmony finds a wider social expression,
Sclhller begins by describing the transformation of the personal 
relation of the individual man and woman, from a relationship initially 
domnated by natural desire, to one based upon love and free wills
'Now compulsion of a lovelier kind binds the sexes together , , ,’
', . , the eye, less troubled now by passion, can apprehend the 
form of the beloved , . 'Desire , , , is exalted into love,
once humainty has dawned in its object; and a base advantage over
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sense [the sensuous being of the other] is now disdained for the 
sake of a nobler victory [winmnng3 over Cthe other's] will.'
(L27:7)
The physical sexual relation develops into a relationship in wlhch the 
other person is no longer an object of sense (a mere sex-object). A 
base advantage over the physical being of the other (by Which sexual desire 
is satisfied), becomes tramsfomaed instead into a miter of winning over 
the will of the other (as love is given volitionally). This entails 
pleasing the other person by our rational or formal being, by our beauty 
of soul, and not by ^^e^ely being a blind physical force (simply pleasing 
the other sexually). The whole relato on ship shifts from one based upon 
nature and sense, to one of mind and form,
. lust he can steal, but love must come as a gift. For this 
loftier prize be can only contend by viriuie of form, never by 
viriuie of mtter. From being a force impinging upon feeling, he
become a form confronting the mind , . (L27:7)
In tl^ remainder of Letter 27, Sclhller will proceed to make explicit 
the social, ethical, and political implications, of his general theory 
of aesthetic education, wlhch since Letter 11, has been primarily couched 
iin terns of the psychology of the individual. He begins by mdcing the 
bold claim that beauty is able to resolve cortflict in the ' complex whole 
of society', He initially attempts to justify this claim by asserting 
that precisely the same harmonizing and rationalizing effects which form 
has in reconciling the sexes at the level of the individual man and 
woman, can be 'writ-large' , so to speak, at the level of society and 
its conflicts. This view rests upon the assumption that social coihlict 
is closely analagous to the corn'll ct between the sexes. Both types of 
conflict, in Sclhller:'s view, are between gentleness and violence:
', , , beauty resolves the conflict , , , in the complex whole 
of society,endeavouring to reconcile the gentle with the violent 
in the moral. world after the pattern of the free union it there 
contrives between the strength of man and the gentleness of 
woman' (L27:.7)
One way, perhaps, to mace sense of what Sclhller is saying here, is to
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see the cortflict between the violent/end the gentle in society as a 
whole, as being between the two types of people or classes who for 
Sclhller compr.se society, i.e. the 'savage' masses/and the enervated 
'barbarian' ruling class and intelligentsia, 4 But here we can only 
speculate, as Sclhller simply does not say enough to base a fim 
interpretation upon.
We have already noted that Schiller's general aesthetic theory in 
this treatise is unbalanced, by being form dominated. Now we also find 
that his ideal of social harmony involves the trimph of form, 
rationality and gentleness:
'Now we«akness becomes sacred, and unbridled strength 
dishonourable , , ,' (L27:7)
In L1O:5 & -6, Sclhller talked of the ' enervating influence' of beauty 
as being a 'threat to the true civilization of mn' , wlhch rests upon 
'energy of character'. Sclhller's description of a harmonious civilized 
society in 127:7 (last three sentences), would seem to ironically 
confirm the earlier more cautious view of beauty's effects.
The iyst three pages of the treatise are very densely written. Not 
only are they rich in subject-mtter, but they rely heavily on the 
Ksntian critical philosophy for their fnmework, a relisoice m,de more 
difficult than usual to discern due to Schiller's usage of a series of 
unnecessgarily obscure images and metaphors. We are entering into one of 
the hardest parts of the whole treatise, where Sclhller says a good deal 
that is important in a very short space.
Borrowing from Kent's notion of two 'realms' of being, Sclhller tells
us that the aesthetic domain lies within both the sensible world (the
realm of nature and its blind forces), and within the supersensible
world (the ream of morality and its rational moral law). It does not
lie 'between' them (as some kind of neutral 'point of indifference'),
but works within them, as a ream of beautiful foams, the creation and
contemplation of which, psychologically releases us from the limitation
placed upon our wholeness by an untempered sensuous nature, or by a
me-sided purely rational morality. Through the psychologically
harmornzing effect of the experience of beauty, the opposition of
nature and reason is mitigated : man's sensuous nature is made more 
15
rational and moral, enabling morality to be less opposed to sense.
226
*In the midst of the fearful kingdom of forces, and in the midst 
of the sacred kingdom of laws, the aesthetic impulse to form is 
at work, unnoticed, on the building of a third joyous kingdom 
of . . . semblance, in which man is « . • released from ... 
constraint , , * in the physical and in the moral sphere.*
(L27s8)
Sclhller's reference here to ' the aesthetic irnpuLse to form' being at 
work creating the realm of aesthetic semblance, is rather revealing.
It would seem that the play-drive, which we have already seen reduced 
from the interfunctioning of our sensuous and rational natures (in 
Letter 14), to the free play of two cogntive faculties (in B27:4), 
is now equated with the ' aesthetic impulse to form' , i.e. the 
form-drive. This makes it even more clear that the process of aesthetic 
education does not balance the sense-drive with the form-drive in a 
third play-drive, but involves an aesthetically assisted natural 
evolution of increasing rationality, in which man develops from being 
dominated by the sense-drive, to becoming dominated by the form-drive : 
mooing from one mode of psychological one-sidedness to another. The 
form-driye is developed at the expense of an increasingly suppressed 
sense-drive throughout all the Letters that deal with man's psycho­
historical development. Consequenniy, wlhat Sclhller unwiitingly 
describes in this treatise, is a course of psychologg-cal development 
which trans foras the sensuous ' savage' into an enervated ' barbarian'.
In Sclhller's view, man's natural, rational, and aesthetic 
psychological concdtions, may be given objective realization in three 
forms of political or social life : the Natural State, the Moral State, 
and the Aesthetic State, respectively. We have encountered the first 
two types of State before, in Letters 3$ 4 & where Schiller pondered
the means whereby man might meet the psycho-ethical prereqm.site for 
abolishing the Natural State in order to securely found a durable Moral 
State, We were told that a ' third character' of man (L3:5)> would be 
needed as a ' support' to 'ensure the continuance of society* (L3s4), 
wlhlst this process of political change was being effected. This ' third 
character' of man became the aesthetically formed 'noble' mcral will, 
in Letter 23, ° Now Schiller goes further, and talks of an 'Aesthetic 
State' playing a key role in the process of political change. The notion 
of an Aes-the^tac State appears for the first time in this Letter, It will 
become clear that its role is supportive, as a society of aesthetically
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formed, psycholoog.cally harmoihous, and morally ennobled individuals, 
who are the bo3is of a political Moral State. The Aesthetic State is 
really what we m.ght call an 'Aesthetic Society' . It is not a temporary 
transitional political structure, but rather provides a permanent social 
psycho-hethical underpinning for the political MoraL State. Thu the goal 
of mi's psycho-historical development, and of aesthetic education, 
remains the same as Sclhller stated in Letter 3, viz. to replace the 
current Natural State with a Moral State. The notion of the Aesthetic 
State does not contradict this aim; it rather demonstraaes, for 
Sclhller, its real possibility.
Sclhller's no’tion of the Natural State is best understood in
relation to the then common concept of * civil society' : a dynamo
economic system for satisfying sensuous needs, regulated by positive
laws which principally serve to merely enforce individual rights of 
17property and contract. In the Natural State, the unlimited activity
of each individual to selfishly satisfy his own sensuous needs (of, 
L24:5), is ultimately limited only by the blind forces of the ma?ket, 
and by the physical coercion of the State machine (cf. L5s4)* In the 
Moral State, ton as universal, as represented by the State (cf.
L4:2 & 3), externally imposes rational limits upon the individual's 
natural desires, by positive laws which embody the moral law. In the 
Aesthetic State, man is predisposed to moral volition, by the ennobling 
effect of form upon his sensuous nature (of. Letter 23). Moral freedom 
is achieved through an aesthetically effected psycho logical freedom and 
harmony within each individual:
'If in the dynaimc [Natural] State of ri#rts it is as force 
that one man encounters another, and imposes limits upon his 
activities; if in the ethical [MoralD State of duties ton Cas 
uhveraaLl sets himelf over against Cnndividual] man with all 
the majesty of the [mo rail] law, and puts a curb upon his desires; 
in those circles where conduct is governed by beauty, in the 
Aesthetic State, none may appear to the other except as form[ed]
. . ,' 'To bestcw freedom by means of freedom is the fundamonSal 
law of this kingdom, ' (L27:9)
Schiller next proceeds to distinguish the three types of State in 
terms of the three bases of social life they involve : something akin 
to the ' invisible hand' notion of Adam Sm,th and late eighteenth century
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18 19political economy ; the 'general will’ concept of Row3seau ,
20
Sclhller's own idea of the aesthetically ennobled. morel will.
Sclhller indicates the degree to which each of these principles is
capable of raising man from selfish individualism towards social life,
by macing rhetorical usage of the three related logical concepts of 
21the 'possible' , the 'necessary', and the ' actual' . He says that the
Natural State maces social life a possibility, as the selfish
particularity of each individual is limited by that of others in a
natural equilibrium. In the Mrel State, social behaviour results from
the necessity of obligation, externally imposed upon the individual,
to conform his volition with the general will of all. In the Aesthetic
State, through the process of aesthetic education, the will of the
individual is naturally in ' noble' conformity with the general will of
society. Social behaviour becomes an actuality, as the individual's
sensuous nature has been internally fumed by beauty to assume a more 
22rational, univeraaL, and thus social character.
'The dynamic [Natural] State can merely mace society possible, by 
letting one nature be curbed by another^; the ethical [Moral]
Sjate can merely mace it (m>reHy) necessary, by subjecting the 
individual will to the general; the AesttheiJxo State alone can mace it 
actual, because it crnEnmIra.les the will of the whole through the 
nature of the individual.' ' • . . beauty alone can confer upon 
him a social character.' (L27;1o)
In what Sclhller says about the Aesthetic State here, he appears to 
confuse the will of all (the 'general will' of Rousseau), with the 
inherently universal will (the 'pure rational will' of Kait).^ He 
conflates an empyreal concept and a transcendent!. (a priori) logical 
concept. Allness is assumed to be equivalent to um-vereaLity, as if the 
latter were merely a quantitative mater. Moreover, Sclhller does not 
allow that the general will of society may be ev.1 and irrational. He 
also assumes social conformity by the individual is autoImlicallLy a 
good thing, forgetting that artists are frequently social 
non-confonmits, as he himself implied w^ necessary in Letter 9» when 
he said:
'But how is the artist to protect himelf against the corruption 
of the age which besets him on all sides? By disdaining its
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opinion.’ (L9:5)
’Live with your century; but do not be its creature. Work for 
your contemooaaies; but create wlhit they need, not what they 
praise.’ (L9s7)
Scthller has asserted that the effect of beauty is to endow the 
individual with a social character, and to conform his volition with 
the general will of society. He sees the aesthetically ’ ennobled’ 
individual will, as the basis of an harmonious aesthetic society (or 
Aesthetic State), which is in turn the secure ’ support’ for the Moral 
State. The Morel State is not securely established if it merely attempts 
to externally impose morel willing upon its citizens via positive laws 
which embody the moraL law. Its citizens mut, within them elves, be 
already psychologically predisposed to morel volition, through being 
aesthetically formed from sensuousness to rationality. Sclhller thus 
grounds the MoraL State in the psychological state of the individuals 
who compprse it.
This em?thais upon the psychology of the individual, is also found 
as Sclhller now attempts to explain why the aesthetic experience of 
beauty ip the source of social harmony. He tells us that
’Tahe alone brings harmony into society, because it fosters 
harmony in the individual. ’ (L2’7:1 o)
Now in taking this view, Sclhller appears to assume that ’society’ is 
simply the sum of hl the individuals who comprise it, and that it has 
no substantive being of its own. He does not consider the psychological 
effects of society upon the individual (and not mrely vice versa). He 
says nothing about the roles of religion, ideology and mythology, in 
shaping the men1;al outlook and character of the individual. Nor does he 
allow that social disharmony may be deeply rooted in objective factors : 
in institutional structures, or in economic relations of a contradictory 
character (e.g., between labour and capital, and between consumers and 
producers). Sclhller’s view, that social harmonn/or disharmony, is rooted 
in individual psychological har^c^r^j^/i^:r disharmony, is at once
reductionist and naive. It seems quite probable that the objectively 
grounded factors producing social disharmony, would at least counter, 
if not largely negate, any haimonmzimg effect produced by beauty, whether 
at the level of social relations, or in the psychology of the individual.
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Schiller seeks to explain how beauty can harmonize both the
individual and society, by mdcing an implicit usage of Kant’s notion
of the * subjective wnLverasaLity’ of aesthetic judgements of taste (in 
25the Critique of Judgement)♦ J The psychological structure and
functioning of the mind (Which was outlined in the a priori
psychic logical model presented in Letters 11 to 14) > is common to all 
men by virtue of their humnity, so that the aesthetic mode of the 
psyche is, in principle, universal. By virtue of having a sensuous 
and a rational nature, all men can aesthetically play, and so 
harmom-oiujly interrelate these two natures. W^ee^as all other modes 
of perception are private in character, and of either a predominantly 
sensuous or rational type, aesthetic perception simultaneously makes 
man whole, by harmoniously interrelating both his natures, and also 
unites society, by facilitating social intercourse on the basis of a 
universally sharable mode of individual experience.
’All other forms of perception divide man, because they are 
founded exclusively either upon the sensuous or upon the 
spiritual part of his being; only the aesthetic mode of 
perception makes of him a whole, because both his natures mmst 
be in harmony to achieve it. All other forms of commnication 
divide society because they relate exclusively either to the 
private receptivity or to the private proficiency of its 
individual memmers, hence to that which distiigui-shes man from 
man; only the aesthetic mode of colm[tnicatioi unites society, 
because it relates to that which is common to all.’ (L27:1O)
Howver, we may seriously doubt the validity of Schiller's claim here, 
that the aesthetic mOces man whole, ' because both his natures mtut be 
in harmony to achieve it'. Schiller's reference here to aesthetic 
experience in terms of ' the aesthetic mode of perception' is reveaLing. 
It serves to highlight what we saw earlier, in L27s4 & fn. : that for 
S ch.ller, aesthetic experience only relates the mentaL faculties of 
sense (imag-nation), and reason (underrstan<dLrng); it does not mace us 
whole by effecting a harmonious unity between our physical being and 
our me^al being. Psycho logical harmony is one thing; a greater harmony 
between our 'natures' (as Sclhller claims is effected), viz. between 
our psychological being and our physiological being, is quite another 
thing. It is this latter harmony which Sclhller neglects, due to his
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failure to take full account of the body. Like many idLeOList
philosophers, Schaller does not take on board the full consequences of 
the fact that man is an embodied rational being. Consequently, his 
later emphsais is on bifurcation and its overcoming being a purely 
psychological problem, requiring a psychological solution.
In Schaller's view, all other modes of experience besides the
aesthetic, fail to make us whole, and fail in their privacy to
facilitate a universal communication on the basis of an experience
sharable by all. The pleasures of sense are purely private. The
pleasures of rational knowledge (or theoretical reason), are dependent
upon private proficiency, particularly skills of abstraction. Oily
aesthetic pleasure is private and subjective, as well as, in principle, 
26public and inter-subjective.
'The pleasures of the senses we enjoy merely as individuals . , . 
hence we cannot mace the pleasures of sense universal . . .'
* . . we cannot mke the pleasures 
of reason universal, because we cannot eliminate traces of 
individuality from the judgements of others . . 'Beauty alone
dp we enjoy at once as individual and as genus . . .' (L27:10)
SchhLller continues his discussion of the degree to which sensuous,
rational, and aesthetic modes of experience, are each capable of 
27providing a universally sharable pleasure. Hcorever, he now replaces
the pleasures of knowledge (or theoretical reason), with the happiness 
which ought to result from virtue, viz. from moral willing (or 
practical reason). He begins by stating that the 'good of the senses' , 
i.e. the agreeable, affords only a private, purely sensuous pleasure, 
which is socially exclusive:
'The good of the senses can only make one man happy, since it is 
founded on appropriation, and this always involves exclusion; 
and it can only make this one man one-sidedly happy, since his 
Personsaity has no part in it.' (L27:1o)
This view that the personalty is not involved in sensuous pleasure, 
rests upon a rather extreme psychological dualism, which reverts to 
the rigid distinction Schiller made in Letter 11 between the ' person' 
and ' condition' , (a distinction he later modified in the Fichte an
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epistemology of Letter 19).
Continuing to distinguish between sensuous, rational, and aesthetic 
modes of pleasure, in terns of their degree of uhLvezrasaLity, SclhLller 
tells us that the * absolute good1 , i.e. moral perfection, although in 
principle producing a universal happiness, cannot do so in practice, 
for it is impossible for all men to achieve, since it requires a degree 
of self-denial few are capable of; (cf. L23:7, fn. 5: ’[Sublime conduct]
exceeds . • • our experience of the . • . strength of the humn will’). 
Moreover, the coincidence of virtue and happiness is contingent for
finite rational beings like ourselves inhabiting the ream of nature,
28(of. Kent’ s Critique of Practical Reason, Bk. II, Ch. 2, Section V).
Schiller thus concludes that only the aesthetic experience of beauty 
can provide a form of happiness which all men are capable of enjoying.
'Absolute good can only bring happiness under concdtions which we 
cannot presume to be universal; for ... [it is] the prize of 
abnegation ... £ and] only the pure in heart believe in the 
pure will. Beauty alone mkes the whole world happy, and each 
and every being forgets its limitations whale under its spell.* 
(&27:1O)
Hcwever, we my wonder whether, like the happiness which ought to result 
from moral virtue, the univezraaULty of the pleasure which arises from 
the aesthetic experience of beauty,is also something which is only trne 
in principle, and not in practice ; for, as a mater of fact, mny people 
my either have only limited taste, or even no taste at all. The * lower 
and more numerous classes* (L5s4), who are 'savages* (L4?6), doimnated 
by their sensuous being, would be likely only to seek sensuously 
agreeable forms of hybrid beauty or dependent semblance, as their 
’physical play-drive* * gets in the way* of their * aesthetic play-drive* 
(cf. L27;4» p. 211). Schiller*s theory of an aesthetically effected 
social harmony, does not allow for the fact that individuals and classes 
in society will not psychologycsaHy develop at a uniform rate of progress 
He assumes that all membbzrs of society will simultaneously be capable of 
the same quality of aesthetic experience, achieving psychological 
wholeness, and interrelating harmorn.ouusly. The construction of Schhller’s 
argument in L27j10, as he distinguishes mjor modes of pleasurable 
experience in terns of their universal sharability, involves a degree 
of legerdomain : for whilst he considers the emirical concdtions which
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place practical restrictions upon the uhverasaity of both sensuous
and rational types of pleasure, he compPeeely exempts his discussion
of aesthetic pleasure from any examnation of the emmirical factors 
29which would limit its univeraaaity.
It is worth looking briefly again at the last sentence of the above 
passage, where Sclhller says that
'Beauty alone mdces the W^ole world happy, and each and every 
30being forgets its limitations wlhle under its spell.'
(L27:1O )
What Sclhller says here about beauty, m^kes it only a subjective 
(albeit inter-subjective), means for achieving social harmony. There 
is no talk here of any need for social and political reform of an 
objective, -institutional kind, (including the earlier stated need to 
' abolish' the Natural State; of. L3s4). It would seem that beauty can 
overcome what may be objectively grounded limitations on man's 
wholeness, by subjectively fleeing from or forgetting them. Beauty is 
described in a way which mdces it become abberational and narcotic, 
aclheving social harmony and happiness only for as long as we are 
'under its spell'. Such a transient psychological state does not sound 
like a satisfactory ' support' for a durable Morai State.
Schiller next proceeds to describe the relationship between the
aesthetic domain and the two Kjahian 'realm' of the superrsensible and
the sensible. He tells us that the aesthetic doma.n is a ' third, realm'
which extends right as far as 'the point' where each of the other two
realms have their legislative authority. (This corresponds to the view
he expressed in L27:8, where he said that the aesthetic domain is 'in
the mist' of, viz. is i^mmaK^i^'t to, each of the other two realm.)
Sclhller’s point now, is to reiterate that the aesthetic cannot
legislate in either the domain of reason or that of nature : it cannot 
31determine the content of either cognitive truth, or of the moral law ; 
not can it determine nature’s own laws. All the aesthetic can do 
(through the psychological ref oration effected by the experience of 
beauty), is to temper the harshness of the morsa law, so that it does 
not simply suppress our sensuous nature; and ’ ennoble' our sensuous 
being, so that it becomes naturally inclined to perform moral duty.
'. . . the realm of aesthetic semblance extends • • . • •t i
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upwards to the point where reason [the realm of the
superaensible] governs with unconcd-tioned necessity, and all
that is mere mater ceases to be. It stretches downwards to
the point [the realm of the sensible] where natural impulse
reigns with blind compuliion, and form has not yet begun to
appear. And even at these furthermost confines, where taste
is deprived of all legislative power, it still does not allow 
32the executive power to be wrested from it. * 'Duty . . . mist 
moderate the ... tone of its precepts ... and show greater 
respect for nature through a nobler confidence in her willingness 
to obey them' (L27sll)
Returning to the concept of the Aesthetic State, Sclhller proceeds
to draw a rather dubious analogy between the political ruler’s
relation to- the people of such a society, and the artist’s relation to 
33the mater he forms.Wile not pleasing as an analogy, it does enable 
Sclhller to affim (albeit obscurely), his faith in the French 
Revolution's ideals of equal rights and democracy, as features of the 
Aesthetic State.
'In the Aesthetic State ... even the tool which serves - is a 
free citizen, having equal rights with the noblest; and the mind, 
which would force the patient mass beneath the yoke of its 
purposes, mst here first obtain its assent.' (L27;11)
Here at the end of Letter 27, Sclhller talks both about the 
Aesthetic State in terms which make it an ideal (in L27:11), and about 
the possibility of its real existence (in L27:12). The Aesthetic State 
is best understood as an ideal form of society : an ideal which, like 
moral perfection, we can aim and progress towards, rather than ever 
fully realize. It may achieve, according to Sclhller, only a limited 
realization in smll groups of aesthetically formed individuals, rather 
than a oomplete realization in society as a whole:
'But does such a State of Aesthetic Semblance really exist?’
'... as a realized fact, we are likely to find it . . . only 
34in some few chosen circles , where conduct is governed . . . 
by the aesthetic nature . . .' (L27:12)
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Wlht is particularly revealing is that in his description of these 
m.crocosms of the Aesthetic State, there is no talk of a political 
kind. They are described in terms with which we are already fam liar, 
viz. in terms of psychological harmony and doble mmor. willii’. Ve aae 
told that men in such ’circles’ will
’. . . mace their way, with undismayed sinplicity and tranqihl 
innocence [Greek wholenensOss ... free alike of the [naturaa! 
compulsion to infringe the freedom of others in order to assert 
their own, as of the necessity to shed their dignity Cmooal
-i 36destinyJ in order to manfest grace [natural nobilityj.’^
(127:12)
In the reality of the Aesthetic State, then, men attain a psychooogical 
oon<d.tion in which they are free from natural companion in the 
determination of their volition. They achieve a psycholo^nal balance 
in which they do not need to sacrifice man’s morral vocatoca (t’e nhed 
for rationa willing), in order to live in hhrnanm with sthsuens oasling. 
The main feature of the Aesthetic State which emerges from this, is that 
it is a psychologically based moral way of life, rather than a pollitical 
institution or State as such.
The non-pooitical, non-iirntitutional character of the Aesiiheitio State, 
is also revealed in Sclhller’s statement that
’Here, therefore, in the realm of aesthetic semblance, we find 
that ideal of equaity fulfilled which the enthusiast would fain 
see realized in substance.’ (127:11)
The ideal of equaity is ’fulfileed’ in principle in the aesthetic 
domhn, rather than ’ realized’ in practice in the political realm. The 
latter is the aim of the ’enthusiast’ or zealous social reformer. The 
’equality’ Sclhller has in mind here, is an aesthetic rather than 
political or economic one : the availability to all, in principle, of 
that pleasurable experience wlhch alone mkes us psychologically 
balanced and compete human beings. The Aesthetic State is a society 
of aesthetically formed, psychhoically ha^c^^<^xus, and morally 
ennobled individuals, in which men achieve ’equality’ by vir-tue of the 
inter-subjective universality of aesthetic experience.
Although the Aesthetic State is an ideal social form, rather than a
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political State, it does have political consequences, for in so far as 
it finds further realization, through its 'circees' extending to embrace 
more of society, then it would metee possible the t:latlsfo:Imatiom from the 
Natural State to the Morral State (fulfilling the aim expressed in L3:2). 
In Letter 4» Sclhller made it clear that the Moral State, in order to be 
securely established, would need to rest upon a society of morally 
refcCTied individuals, whose willing has become 'ennobled' to be 
naturally inclined to morality:
'The setting up of a Mral State involves being able to count on 
the moral law as an effective force . . .' ' . . . to be able to 
count on man's moral behaviour ... he will have to be led by 
his very impulses to the kind of conduct which is bound to 
proceed from a moral character.’ '. . . this can only be brought 
about through both these motive forces, inclination and duty, 
producing comppetely identical results in the world of phenomena 
... through impulse being sufficiently in harmony with reason 
. . .' (L4s1)
Such psychologically harmonious and morally ennobled individuals, would 
willingly obey the rational laws of the Moral State, for
'Once man is inwardly at one with himself • • • the [Moral] State 
will be merely the interpreter of his own finest instinct, a 
clearer formulation of his own sense of what is right* (L4s3)
The Moral State and the Natural State, are each the political 
institutions governing a specific type of society : the Aesthetic State, 
and civil society, respectively. But whereas the Moral State would 
relate organically to the aesthetic society it governed, with the 
political ruler readily obtaining the assent of the people for its 
rational laws (of. the analogy in L27:11), the Natural State in 
contrast, is mechattcally related to civil society, externally imposing 
its lews by physical coercion (L27:9), as it seeks to hold together a 
disintegrating social structure (L5:4)« Wereas the sharability of 
aesthetic pleasure produces a society of individuals able to
harmornously interrelate as whole human beings (L27:10)5 the
specialization of the faculties within individuals, and of social 
functions between different classes, divides civil society (l6;3, 6 & 7)
237
so that the Natural State does not rest upon a fundamental consensus 
amorngst those whom it abstractly governs (l6:9).
Wiat is ultimately most important about the aesthetic experience of 
beauty, in Schiller’s view, is not that its pleasure as such is 
sharable, but that the psychotherapeutic effect of this pleasure is 
universally available, in order to overcome any form of psycho logical 
one-sidedness or bifurcation (of. Letters 16 and 17)« The more complete 
and balanced modes of ordinary cognition and volition which indirectly 
follow from aesthetic experience (cf. L22;1), have a positively 
beneficial effect on all aspects of ran's social and political life 
(cf. L27s7)# The ’equality’ which is ’fulfilled’ in the ’ream of 
aesthetic semblance’ (L27s11), provides the means for achieving a 
society (the 'Aesthetic State’), of psycholog-csaHy harmonious and 
morally ennobled individuals, capable of supporting the Moral State, by 
willingly obeying its moral positive laws.
There is little evidence in the text of the Aesthetic Letters to
support the view that Sclhller conceived of the Aesthetic State as
being a political State in its own ri$rt, rather than as a social
support for the Moral State. Those many Sclhller scholars who interpret 
37the Aesthetic State politically , are forced to view the treatise as
involving a serious inconsistency, or a major moddficatiot, between the
aim expressed in Letter 5 of abolishing the Natural State in order to
establish a durable Morral State, and the view which they construct,
that Sclhller later saw the need for a further political development 
38beyond the Moal State, in the Aesthetic State. Some view the
Aesthetic State as providing a dialectical synthesis of the Natural 
39State and the Moral State , after the pattern of the harmonious
interrelation which the aesthetic coned tion of the psyche (supposedly)
effects between our sensuous and rational ’natures’ However, the
aesthetic coned, tion per se is not realizable (L21:5), and cannot
itself produce anything determinate for our cogphtion or volition
(L21s4)# Thus the aesthetic coned.tion of the psyche cannot be viewed
as being capable of creating a directly corresponding objective 
A1
political institution. Moreover, in order to correspond with, or be
the objective expression of, the aesthetic psychological conce.tiot, 
the Aesthetic State would itself have to be an ’ unlimited 
determirnbility’.'., giving rise to nothing determinate.., etc., a 
wholly untenable type of poULtical State.
Horewr, the greatest defect of all such views, is that they
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explicitly contradict Schaller’s clearly expressed position in the 
early Letters (particularly Letters 3 and 4), by changing the goal 
of mn's psycho-hhitorical development from the Moral State to the 
Aesthetic State (whilst assigning this contradiction and change to 
Schuller himself).f in interpreting SclhLULer’s concept of the 
Aesthetic State, it would seem more sensible to do so in a way Which 
does not all<w a few sentences at the end of the last Letter, to 
overturn the whole course of the argument put forward by him from 
Letter 3 to Letter 9* The much longer and more clear argument of these 
Letters, should shape how we interpret the very short and somewhat 
ambiguous remarks that Sctuller msdes concerning the Aesthetic State 
at the end of Letter 27. It is better to interpret Schuller, wherever 
possible, not as changing his mind, or as contradicting himself, but 
as being generally coherent and consistent in the work. In this way, 
the earlier ..Leeters of the treatise provide an important means for 
establishing the meaaung of its end.
In conclusion, therefore, the aesthetic is never meernt by Sclhller 
to be more than an inter-subjective means for effecting the 
psycho-ethical reform of man’ s character. The aesthetic does not itself 
supply the political end of man's psycho-hhstoihcal development, 
supplanting the Moral State. Its role, as the title of the treatise 

































An Orera!! View and Evaluation of the Aesthetic Letters
Following oaur detailed vxtm.rmafcion of the Aesthetic Letters, the 
first part of this conclusion will comaist of a recapitulation of the 
min arguments in each Letter, so as to provide an overall view of 
Schhller’s general line of argument in the treatise. In the second 
part, I propose to briefly evaluate the treatise, by identifying those 
specific theories which appear to be of greatest value, in terns of 
their contemporary aesthetical and political relevance, and their 
potential for further fruitful theoretical development.
I
(Letter 1) Sclhller acknowledges his dependence upon Kantian 
philosophical lrimailles. He pays tribute to Ksait's moral philosophy, 
as clear ly expressing in a conceptual form, those moral instincts by 
which nature has implicitly guided men for centuries. Hwewr, the 
technical form of philosophy only info ms mat's intellect, leaving his 
sentient being uneducated. Sclhller thus impUcitly opens up a division 
between man* s rational and sensuous natures.
(Letter 2) Scthller criticizes the ^^623.8110^0 and utilitarisn 
ethos of contemporarf civilization, and sees it as a threat to art. He 
contrasts the general focus of men on the material, with true art’s 
t^:r^s^(2^ndence of the limitations of sense. Art is, nevertheless, 
relevant to life, for the aesthetic experience of beauty is the 
prerequisite for man achieving moral and political freedom.
(Letter 5) Sclhller distinguishes the contemporary Natural State 
(governed by blind forces and serving to merely satisfy ma^’s physical 
being), from the Moral State (a hypothetical State governed by rational 
lrimcillvs). There is a moral imueative to abolish the Natural State 
and replace it with the Moral State, for the former is at variance with 
msai’s moral being. The creation of the State can neither be
accomplished by man’s selfish natural being, nor by his moral being, 
which has yet to be foamed. A ' third character’ of man is required, 
which will develop man’s moral nature, and harmonize it with his 
sensuous nature,
(Letter 4) The Moral State can only be securely established if men
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become naturally : if they are naturally inclined to perform
their rational morel duty. Mai’s sensuous nature is a legitimate part 
of his whole being, and morelity is one-sided if it involves its 
suppression. The State is similarly defective if social harmony is 
achieved only by suppressing the natural variety of individuals. The 
individual will find in the Moral State’s positive laws, the 
embodiment of the morel lew of his own reason. Sclhller identifies two 
types of psychological one-sidedness : reason may doi-nate feeling (in 
the ' barbarian’ ) ; or feeling may doi-nate reason (in the ’savage). The 
achievement of freedom in a MoreL State requires a wholeness of 
character which overcomes both types of one-sidedness.
(Letter 5) The moral undevelopment of modem man excludes any 
im!iicliate large scale and durable political reform. The ’barbarian’ 
upper classes are sunk in depravity and lethargy, whale the ’ savage’ 
lower classes are occupied in pursuing the satisfaction of their animal 
nature. The Natural State is forced to resort to physical coercion to 
hold such a society together, for it is becoming disorganized and 
atomstic. The social system is grounded in individual egotism. New 
artificial needs are constantly generated. Social control through public 
opinion and ridicule, along with an ethic of passive obedience, and fear 
of losing material possessions, ensure personal and social development 
remain frozen.
(Letter 6) Schuller continues his critique of contemporary 
civilization, focusing upon the specialization of psychological faculties 
and social functions it imposes upon individuals. He identifies two 
primary causes of modem psychosocial diremption : a) the development 
of analytical thought and the empirical sciences, leading to men’al 
specialization; b) the State, which has disorganized society into 
separate classes and occupational groups, which insist that the
individual develops specialist skills. The resulting social atomization 
reciprocally effects the State, which losing sight of the individual, 
has to govern through various abstract categories and rational constructs. 
The State becomes an external maclune in relation to its citizens, 
incapable of bonding them together orgamcsaLly. But such psycho-social 
fragmentation has been both inevitable and, for the species as a whole, 
desirable, for it has enabled human knowledge across a wide front to 
advance, and facilitated the development of mrn’s mmnfold
potentisaLities. Nevertheless, it is wrong that individuals should have 
to sacrifice the happiness which stems from being a complete human
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being. Oily through art will we find, a means to reconcile progress 
and human wholeness,
(Letter 7) There is no political solution to the problem of 
individual and social fragmeetatirn, fir the Natali State is a major 
cause if the problem, whale the founding if t Moial State presupposes 
that men have become moral. As the mass if men are * savages* , current 
attempts at political refom are chimerical. Political reform 
presuppises men whi have harmoit.oTU3ly integrated their sensuius and 
rational natures, and are thus capable if naturally being m^rsal. In 
short, political reform presuppises the psycho-ethical reform if the 
individual.
(Letter 8) Having ruled out the State as an instrument for 
achieving freedom, Schiller considers the possible roles of reason and 
philosophy in man* s transformation from a natural to a moral life.
Reason, per-.se, can do no more than discover the precepts of the moral 
law; it cannot overcome our annsuous mature to realize this law with 
certainty, on a general social soaie. Reasnn must wok on srnse 
indirectly, using feeling itself, through the development of a rational 
drive. Ve cannot, then,m^2^£0^1y reform the individual through his reason 
alone. Mgreover, it is either inactive, or exhausted by the labour 
process, in the *sa,vage’ msses; or it is irrationally active in 
producing or reproducing m/yholog£es, in the ^arbariant’ intelligentsia 
and ruling classes of State and church. Men of both kinds require a 
powerful moral education, based on feeling not abstract precepts. The 
capacity to feel must be developed, so that men will translate moral 
precepts into practice.
(Letter It is fine art wh.ch provides a powerful means for
morraiy reforming the individual that is independent of the negative 
influences of society and State. Sclhller makes art independent of 
tenporal limitations and deficiencies, by postulating atenqoral Ideas 
of Art and Beauty, which are peremnal and not confined to any particular 
time. The true artist should be detached from his own time, disdaining 
its opinions, and ensuring the formal aspect of his work transcends 
confinement to the taste of his age. Through its ability to preserve 
past truth, art can rescue a currently degraded humnnty, by confronting 
it with immortal. exem?leara. Art can bypass the corruptions and 
prejudices of mm* s intellect, by gaining direct access to his sentient 
being, and effect a powerful reformation of his whole character by 
working from his physical substructure.
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(Letter 10) We cannot simply assume the effect of art and beauty 
is always beneficial. Experience shows beauty fosters a menttlity 
emphasizing form and appearance, at the expense of content and what is 
real. Concern with the aesthetic my hinder judgements of moral value, 
for outer impression ignores merrt, and most vices are com>pa*-ble with 
a pleasing appearance. History shows art flourishing in societies when 
political freedom and wrality are in decline. H>wever, the evaluation 
of beauty should not be approached solely through experience, and 
historical interpretation of its supposed causes and effects. We mist 
discover and evaluate the concept of Beauty via a ’transcendental’ 
investigation. In Schuller’s procedure,this involves establishing what 
is the universal essence of human nature, and then seeing what is a 
logical and psychological condition of it achieving fullness of 
development. (His answer will be that complete and balanced human being 
requires the psychological effect of experiencing an ideal form of 
beauty. He will work from a), an a priori motel of the essence of Human 
Being in Letters 11 to 14; tob), a corresponding a priori model of 
ideal Beauty in Letter 15; to c), an a posteriori model of the 
essential structure of existential beauty in Letter 16.)
(Letter 11) Sclhller distdguishes the ’person’ (the rational self, 
the ego or ’I’), and the ’ con<dition* (the body and external sensuous 
world, or the non-ego). The person has an atemporal transcendent being 
which endures, wPhle the condition is temporal and changing. The 
activities of the person or ego are all possible because of the 
existence of the non-ego or condition. Personality per se is only 
potential being, devoid of reality. Its existence and realization are 
only possible as a phenomenal being, in a particular condition in time. 
The ego receives external reality into itself through the process of 
perception, remaining constant while forming this material into a unity. 
The ego also has a formative tendency directed outwards to refoam 
externality, and in so doing, to realize itself. These two formative 
processes are the fundamennal ’laws of our sensuo-rational nature’.
(Letter 12) Man is impelled by two opposite drives ; the 
sense-cddve’ and the ’ form-drive’ . The sense-drive, proceeding from 
man’s sensuous nature, seeks to confine him to a life doiunated by 
ma-aerial reality. The sense-drive is essential to man’ s phenomenal 
existence, and to his rational being achieving realization. The 
form-drive, proceeding from man’s rational nature, his ego or 
personality, seeks to introduce unity and foam into his manfold
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sensuous experiences. In knowing, it seeks rational truth; in willing, 
it seeks to realize the moral law. The form-drive res cues man* s 
sensuous nature from the limitation of a purely material existence, by 
involving it in the process of rational knowing and willing.
(Letter 13) The two primary drives are essentially compatible, and 
must interfunction if either is to fully carry out its own function.
They do not naturally encroach upon each other, but civilization, in 
its depeacture from nature, has confused their spheres of operation. The 
ideal relation of the drives is reciprocal, as mitiuily subordinated, 
facilitatdig the co-ordinated activity and realization of the whole man. 
Education mist develop both drives, within their proper spheres, by 
fully developing our capacities to feel and to reason. Our sensuous 
nature needs to be developed extensively, in order to be receptive to 
apprehending the maximum variety of sensuous experience. Our rational 
nature needs to be intensively developed, to comprehend and unify the 
material apprehended by our sensuous nature.
(Letter 14) Through the experience of a certain type of (beautiful) 
symboKc object, the two primary drives develop to co-operate in 
concerted activity, giving rise to a secondary drive, the psychological 
product of their combined activity : the ’play-drive’. (The play-drive 
is the psycholo^g-cal basis of aesthetic crntemlation and artistic 
production.) The sense-drive subjects the ego or psyche to natural 
necessity, wlhle the form-drive subjects it to rational or moral 
necessity. The commbintion of primary drives in the play-drive, develops 
and strengthens each of mm’s natures, so as to be capable of limiting 
the drive of its opposite nature. The drives thus mtigate each other* s 
power, reducing their opposed compuusions to crmUemiatary tendencies. 
Peeling is rendered with morality, and vice versa.
(Letter 13) Sclhller is concerned in this Letter with the 
trimscendental deduction of the Idea of Beauty from the Idea of Human 
Being, viz. from the a priori model of our funda^enn^ human nature 
which he believes he has established in Letters 11 to 14. He begins by 
asserting the objective correlative of the play-drive is Beauty, tersely 
defined as ’ living foim’. Hwever, the mere conjunction of form and 
material content, wlhle necessary, is not sufficient, to produce beauty. 
The process whereby they become sufficient, in their mitual relation, 
is unknowable. We can only recognize beauty in experience, a posteriori, 
not formulate it in advance, a priori. The play-dri ve is a logical 
necessity for the coherence of the concept or Idea of Human Being, and
244
alsi a psychological necessity in irder ti make existential human 
nature cimplete. The tetim 'ply*’ is justified, as indicating the 
harmoniius ci-iperation the play-drive creates between the twi sides 
if iur being. Sclhller distirguishes the aesthetic attitude if 'play’ 
towards ibjects, from the nm-aesthetic attiuide if 'earnestaiess* in 
Which we relate to them as sensuiusly ' agreeable* , ir as rationally 
'giid* and ’perfect’ , viz. in a prepinderantly sensuius ir rational 
engagement, in cintrast ti the play-drive* s balanced encounter. In 
reality, iur experience if the play-drive and beauty will be defective, 
due ti either sensuius ir rational lrelltderatces in the subject ir 
ibject. Sclhller cincludes by asserting a very clise cinnectiin between 
aesthetic play and the achievement if full humahty : each is a 
cindition if the ither.
(Letter 16) Ideally, Beauty has a twofild effect upin iur 
recipncally related primary drives : it simuLtaneiusly * tenses* ir 
strengthens bith drives, and 'releases’ ir weakens them ti the s£tte 
degree. In reality, hiwever, beauty will either tense more than 
release, ir release more than tense, as *energizing’ and * melting’ 
beauty, respectively. Although bith drives are either strengthened ir 
weakened^ the sense-drive is affected most. Disagreements iver the 
value if aesthetic experience, are principally due to nit
differentiating these twi firms in which the Idea if Beauty exists, 
and their different psycholo^cal effects. The value if each will be 
relative to the type if character it is experienced by.
(Letter 17) Twi basic types if psycholigical imperfection iccur 
in man : 1) Psychological dishariminy, due ti me if the primary drives 
being toi tensed ir strong, dnmnating the whole if his being. 2) Both 
the s^su^s and rational natures may be toi weak. Beauty can act 
lsychotherapeuticitl.ly ti cirrect either type if imperfection : melting 
beauty can relax an iver-strong nature ir drive; energizing beauty can 
vivify the individual in whim bith drives are weak. Ficusing in the 
prcblem if an iver-tensed drive, the sensuiusly tensed man may be 
released by a beautiful ibject mjanfei^iting a *tratquLl fonn' • The 
spiritually tensed man my be released by a beaitiful ibject
m■atfestitg mater as a vibrant * living image* (in which firm is 
heavily imbued with a vivid sensults content). These twi species if 
melting beauty, act by weakening ir strengthening the sense-drive. Their 
influence in mai’s rational nature is inly indirect : a matter if either 
weakening sense, ti allow rationality the op]po2rtttn.ty ti develip : ir if
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strengthening sense, to balance a powerful rationality.
(Letter 18) There is a 'middle state’ lying between a passive, 
sensuously recipient, and an active, rationally formative state. In 
inducing us into this middle state, beauty links the two inherently 
opposed activities of feeling and thinking. The philosophical task 
Sclhller sets for Letters 19 to 21, is to establish hew beauty can 
unite such opposed conditions. Sclhller next criticizes empiricist 
and rationalist aesthetics, as having one-sided and incomplete 
understandings of beauty. Emizicist aesthetics focuses on the general 
sensuous characteristics of beautiful objects Which evoke certain 
sensations in their perceiver. Rrthonalist aestheticiens engage in 
a complex dissection of beauty and aesthetic experience, analysing t
the whole into discrete parts. Sclhller proposes (in Letters 22 to 27), 
to adopt both methods, alternately : he will examine the necessary 
conceptual distinctions the intellect mikes in aesthetical miters; 
but also seek to draw them into a unity, by examining the effect of 
beauty upon our sensuous nature.
(Letter 19) Sclhller briefly outlines a three stege model of the 
psychological development of the individual. 1) The mind ' begins’ by 
being in^a state in which it is not determined in any manner at all, but 
is pure potential being. 2) The mind becomes passively externally 
determined by the sensuous, acquiring a content through its receptivity 
to sense-impressions. 3) There arises the self-diet emining activity of 
the ego, as it forms the mlttplicity of sense-impressions into a 
unity, through the concepts employed in thinking and judging. Stage 3) 
presupposes stage 2), viz. the ego’ s rational activity rests upon the 
basis of the passive reception of external mterial to form. Sclhller 
connects the passively recipient, and rationally active phases, with 
the sense and fom drives, respectively, enabling him to argue that the 
form-drive rests upon the sense-drive, and thus the primary drives only 
fully function in a relationship of co-operation.
(Letter 20) The ’ aesthetic condition' of the psyche is a fourth 
stage in mai's psycho logical development, located between stages 2) and 
3) in the model of Letter 19* The purpose of aesthetic education is to 
assist man's progression from stage 2) to 3). The aesthetic coned.tion 
of the psyche is thus not itself an end, but rather a means for enabling 
mn to become more rational and moral. It involves two phases : (a), an 
unbalanced coned.tion, in which the sense-drive is suppressed to allow 
the form-drive to develop ; and (b), a balanced coned.tion of the two
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primary drives, which is the basis of the psyche’s freedom, Schiller 
argues that the transition from the sensuous to the rational condition 
cannot take place directly. The form-drive cannot satisfactorily 
develop against the dominant position of an already established 
sense-drive, unless the latter is temporarily suspended as a drive, by 
the mbnimzation of the psyche* s receptivity to sense. The form-drive 
is enabled to develop so it becomes strong enough to counterbalance a 
restored sense—drive, so that the aesthetic condition assumes a more 
balanced psychological structure,!’ which reason and sense cancel each 
other out as determining forces. The psyche then becomes free to choose 
whether to know or act in a sensuous or rational way, without being 
under the compuLtsion of either natural or moral necessity,
(Letter 21) Schiller continues his discussion of the aesthetic 
condition of the psyche, focusing on its fully developed equilibrious 
mode, and in particular, upon its role in grounding freedom. The overall 
effect of ex^srriencing beauty is not something determinate, i.e. definite 
and particular, for either knowing or willing. It is rather a state of 
freedom from such limited activities. Man is raised to an unlimited 
contem?Uatiee concdtion : to a highly receptive state of openness to the 
rational and sensuous determination of all his drives and faculties.
The overall effect of aesthetic experience is to leave the will free 
from the domnation and comtraint of either primary drive, so putting 
man back into a similar position of ’ open’ potential, to that which he 
enjoyed before he was determined by either drive at all. From this 
position of potential being, man is enabled to realize himself in a 
way which, through its wioleness and psychological balance, realizes 
his ftndamental human nature. Hoover, as soon as man attempts to 
realize him elf, he loses his full huImtnty and becomes limited, by 
being involved in either a uredoImln£tntly sensuous or rational mode of 
activity, in a particular and definite way. There is thus a need for a 
permanent recourse to aesthetic experience, in order to continually 
restore man to psychological wholeness and potential being, after each 
fragmentary mode of only partial self-realization.
(Letter 22) Both the sensuous and rational contents in an art 
object should be balanced in their psychological appeal, by being 
simultaneously addressed to all our faculties, through both types of 
content being rendered implicit by the uradomntnce of form in the art 
object. If aesthetic experience does not establish psychological 
aquilibrilil, but leaves us principally inclined either to thought or
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to feeling, it is nit a 'pure' aesthetic experience (caused either by 
the ibject, iur respinse, ir bith). In reality, any aesthetic 
experience will leave us to sime extent in either a passive ir an 
active mood, with a bias towards feeling ir thiught. Aesthetic 
evaluation invilves an introspective psycholo^-cal assessment if such 
moid and bias. It is thus nit directed at any characteristics if the 
art ibject, but at iur iwn psychological cmcdtiin. The criterion fir 
evaluating 'styXe* in a type if art, lies in its ability to appeal ti 
the totality if iur faculties. The skilful artist utilizes firm ti 
absirb bith aetatlts and cinceptual cintents in an art ibject, si that 
they become subl^ted within it and rendered impHcit. Firm appeals 
psychologically to all iur drives and faculties, whereas sime definite 
cinceptual ir particular setstlts cintent, appeals ti ine drive ir the 
ither, ir to a particular faculty. Firm aline is cinducive to 
lsychollgical equHibrum and wholeness. The art ibject shiuld thus be . 
film dlImLtated.
(Letter 2^) Sclhller next discusses the practical educative rile 
if the aesthetic, as the means whereby the mass if mankind, dnmnated by 
their sensuous nature, may become rational and moral. He cinceives if 
the 'aesthetic' in a broad way, as firm in general, in the sense if 
irder, structure, and harminy. The pricess if aesthetic educcatiin begins 
with iur setst.ita nature being firmed ti become a * secind nature* if a 
more rational kind, cimpaaible with reasin itself. The individual, in 
irder ti transcend the limitation if merely realizing natural ends, must 
begin to realize them with an element if chiice and self-die termination. 
This invilves ' well-being’ , viz. the cl-lriintted and systematized 
satisfaction if natural needs, which impEarts sime degree if firm and 
thus implicit rationality, to wlhat would itherwise be the firmless 
satisfaction if blindly filhwed natural impuLses as they clntitgently 
arise. Moral life must begin within the dimin if physical life. By 
impaarting firm and thus implicit rationality ti iur natural impilses, 
their ipposition and hindrance ti reasin is dimLrtLshed: they become more 
clmppaible with the demands if morel ream’, enabling them ti assist its 
realization. A tendency towards 'nible* crnduct results, in which man is 
naturally and allntane^t3ly moral. By deviliping a *nible* nature, we 
can aviid the need fir *sublime' auler^t,mtt mrl willing (in which we 
attempt ti externally impise morol principles tllt an unformed and 
psychologically independent aenstlus nature). Moral volition cimes ti 
rest more securely in the basis if a ci-iperotive relationship with a
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compatible sensuous nature.
(Letter 24) An account of the psycho-bustorical development of 
the individual and species begins with the purely sensuous man, 
inhabiting a ’state of nature*. He experiences phenomena as isolated 
transient items, being unable to organize them into a system of 
knowledge. He can do no more than respond to the endless demnds of 
his physical needs, which only find a natural limit in his exhaution.
As reason emerges from such a psychological state, it at first functions 
to msdke miters worse : reason’s regulative demand for comppeteness in 
knowing and for unconditioned willing, is converted by mm's sensuous 
being into a drive to achieve the unlimited satisfaction of his phraical 
needs. At a further stage of development, sensuous man uses his 
intellect to causaLly relate phenomena. Redon's regulative demand for 
comppeteness in knowledge, leads the individual to seek an unconditioned 
causal explanation for phenomena. Failing to find it in the world of 
external sensuous phenomem, he finds it in his own feelings (which are 
u^ooj^cd^’ti^oned by having no caue,in their contingency). How he feels, 
becomes the arbitrary criterion of a perverse * truth* and * mrality’ ,
At a further stage in the development of reason in sensuous man, he 
becomes pware of the moral law. The precepts of the moral lew appear to 
him merely as fetters on his * freedmm’ . He degrades the status of the 
moral law, viewing it as a positive creation at some time in history.
The perverted course of sensuous mm's * rational* development, results 
from the sense-drive domnating the for^^d^i^-ve, so that the rational 
aspect of his character is pressed into the service of the physical.
(Letter 25) Sclhller next considers * contemplation’ in general ; 
and also how the contemppation of beauty specifically, effects an 
harmonious interfunctioning of our rational and sensuous natures, 
promooing moral, volition. The point at which man emerges from 
submergence in nature is when he distirguishes the self from the 
not-self : mmdfesting self-consciousness, and a relative autonomy from 
the sensuous realm. It is closely associated with the emergence of a 
capacity for contemppation : the ability to view phenomenal. objects 
with a degree of psycho logical distance from, and disinterest in, their 
sensuous being, Man now becomes cognitively selfddeeemining in 
relation to the externeaLly sensuous : the miltiplicity and flux of 
sens e-impressions becomes subjectively structured, as he forms 
representational images of phenomena in his imagination, and imposes 
form upon the sensuous by the process of thoruht. Now the cdnteppaation
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of beauty specifically, has a twofold, m^r^ally educative effect :
1) In its harmorhous phenomenal relation of form and sensuous content, 
the beautiful object is an educative external symbol of the harmonious 
psychological relation of reason and sense in the 'noble* morel will.
2) Aesthetic contemplation involves a psychological process in Which 
man, wlhle still sensuous (receptive to sens e-imp :ressions), is also 
rationally self-determining (imposing form upon what he senses). Beauty 
is the ' bridge* between nature and freedom, because it simultaneously 
symbdizes and effects a psychological state in wlhich rational 
self-detemlimation is compaible with our dependence on sensuous being.
(Letter 26) Sclhller presents a theory concerning the artistic 
production of 'aesthetic semblance' (or art objects), locating it as a 
stage in mi's psycho-lhstoricai development. The development of the 
psyche from the sensuous state into the aesthetic concdtion, is effected 
by nature itself. Nature presents man with aesthetically pleasing 
phenomem! configurations, the perception of wlhch, develops the primary 
drives to interfumctiom in eqihlibriim. In adcdtion, the higher natural 
senses of visual and aural perception, have o relation to sensuous 
phenomena wlhch is mecdated by thought, imposing form upon what is 
sensed. Now this leads to an artistic obility to abstract what has been 
so inqued, and to treat form independeotly of its original apparent 
sensuous 'embodiment'. The capacity for imitative art at first arises, 
but loter, form is treated more autonomously, and is creatively re-fomied 
by the imeagJmatisn without reference to nature. The degree of creative 
freedom exercised in this process, is a function of the extent the artist 
abstracts from the sensuous. He should not allow existence to determine 
semblance (as in imitative art); nor should he seek to mlke semblance 
determine existence (as in ideological art). Aesthetic semblance must 
have o sensuous aspect (the necessary medium of re-presentation), but
we must abstract from this if our judgement is to be purely aesthetic 
in character.
(Letter 27) Sclhller's account of mu's psycho-lhstorical 
development continues. As the first traces of an interest in semblance 
appear in man's life,it takes o conditioned form, being involved in the 
satisfaction of his sensuous needs. Man achieves some limited freedom 
from sensuous needs by acquiring an abundance of the means of satisfying 
them. Wren he also seeks to satisfy his nascent form-drive, by a 
pleasing formO appearance in objects of sensuous utility, he enhances 
the quality of pleasure. Man* s imagination develops some independence
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from the sensuou3, by engaging in ’material play’ : a formless, free 
association of images, without need for external stimhi. But for the 
imagination to become definitely creative, it mut co-operate in 
’aesthetic plsy’ with the faculty of concepts (the unde ore taindLinO, 
with the latter imposing form upon the train of transient images.
Beauty of form now becomes a major consideration in the creation 
and owierehip of artifacts. Murn moves on to create and contemplate 
objects winch are simply beautiful and of no utility, viz. fine art 
objects. At the same time, the externally aesthetic increasingly 
reforms man himself. Form becomes progressively internalized : at 
first in the external aspects of man’ s being (in graceful bodily 
movemenns), and then in his psychological coirntitution (as the 
form-drive develops, to counterbalance the sense-drive, so that the 
individual achieves psycho logical harmonn^'). Individual psychological 
harmony firndls a wider expression : The relationship of the individual 
man and woman is transfoCTmd from one initially dominated by natural 
desire, to one based upon love and free will. Beauty also resolves 
social coirniict by uniting society on the basis of a universally 
sharable mode of individual experience.
Finally, Sclhller distirguishes three types of State. In the 
Natural State (or civil society), each individual’s activity to satisfy 
his own sensuous needs is limited only by the blind forces of the 
mateet and physical coercion of the State. The Moral State externally 
imposes rational limits upon the individual’s natural desires, by 
positive laws which embody the moral law. In the Aesthetic State, man 
is predisposed to volition by the ennobling effect of aesthetic
form upon his sensuous nature. The Aesthetic State is a society of 
aesthetically formed, psychologg.cga.ly h^r^^^c^ms, and monally ennobled 
individuals, who provide the psycho-ethical support for a durable 
Moral State. The MoraL State is not securely established if it merely 
attempts to externally impose moral willing upon its citizens via 
positive laws which embody the mo:ral law; they mist be already 
psychologically predisposed to moral volition. In reality, however, 




The treatise contains a mltitude of insights into the cultural 
1
and psychosocial deficiencies of western civilization , and insights 
into the nature of aesthetic experience. What is of particular value, 
and where Sclhller provides mttrial for further development by 
aestheticisms and political theorists alike, is the threefold way in 
wlhch he relates the aesthetic to other doma.ns of human experience.
Firstly, aesthetic perception is integrated into the process of
ordinary perception, and made a common feature of everyday experience.
Aesthetic experience is not, for Sclhller, some high level mode of
contemplation, a specially demrcated domain, confined to special
times and places (e.g. art galleries, concert halls, and nature paries).
2Instead, it my be found in every single act of perception , as we
constantly encou^iter phenomena, and whether consciously or 
5 4
uncomciously, aesthetically judge them. Aesthetic experience often 
is unexpected, unplanned, novel and startling, catching us unawares 
wlhlst occupied in some mundane activity. Sclhller’s theory of 
aesthetic perception goes some way towards explaining this phenomenon, 
and to demysysfying the spatio-temporal and psycho logical loci of 
aesthetic experience.
Secondly, Sclhller throws useful light on how the aesthetic 
psychological, conedtion relates to determinate, viz. to particular and 
definite, acts of cognition and volition. He sees the aesthetic 
condition as grounding more psychooogg-cally compete and balanced 
modes of ordinary knowing and williigp, so that the aesthetic feeds 
positively into our everyday activities, enhancing their quaity.^
He provides a theoretical explanation for the psychological value 
we intuitively feel the aesthetic has for us, and demonnsrates it to 
be a vital part of a fully human life. He shows that it is not merely 
a superfluous leisure pure-iut, but rather a re-vitalizing and 
re-creative psychological restorative; and a preparativefor 
qualitatively enhanced knowing and willing in ail aspects of privateQ
and social life.
Tlhrdly, Sclhller iHminates the relationship of the aesthetic 
to the political, helping to resolve a problem wlhch has particularly 
perplexed Marxist aestheticians. Sclhller does not mke the con-tent 
of art explicitly political (as in e.g., the demand for 'socialist 
realism’ by Stallinlst States). Neither does he rake the con-tent of art,
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as ideal, imPicitly contrast with a harsh reality, provoking us to
reform the latter (the view of Marcue^). He does not talk of integrating
imagmaive artistic production into the general process of production
(like Benjamin ), a view unrealistically ignoring the imperative of 
11profit maimzation inherent to capitalism. In Sclhller's view, it is
by being ideally beautiful, i.e. by simply being good art, in a
predominantly formal sense, that the aesthetic is able to restore a
psychological wholeness wlhch moirlly reforms mm's character, enabling 
12him to enact durable political reform.
Now Schiller's political aesthetic theory my be further fruitfully
developed, to allcw the contrast experienced between aesthetically
effected psychological wholeness/and our everyday psychosocial
fragmennation, to involve not only an aspect of aesthetic pleasure,
13but also an aspect of intellectual pain, so that we are sublimely 
educated to a heightened awareness of socio-pod tical deficiencies 
(to the causes^ of the contrrat). Aesthetic experience may thus be 
' consciousness raisng* , overcoming the various forms of * false 
consciousness' engendered by the domnant ideologies and mythooogies in 
society (e.g., consumerism = happiness), urging us to revolt against 
the established social dis-order, and to create the concd-tions for more 
compete and balanced modes of psychosocial life.
What is striking about Sclhller's account of the ills of society, is
its modem relevance. His solution to these ills, in terms of the need
for psychostlhcal reform, rather than for political reform on its own,
has some appeal follcwing the general moiral. failure of the many
twentieth century experiments in socio-political reform (ranging through
Stalinism and fascism, to social democratic Keynesianism, and 
1 sneo-conservative Friectaanism 2). In the aftermath of the French
Revolution, Sclhller saw the inadequacy of one dimensional purely
political or economic revolutions. Sclhller did not reject political
revolution (the Natural State must be * abolished' ), but saw the need
for it to be tndesiitned by psychological and ethical revolutions in 
16mn s individual and social being : a three dimentio]tsl revolution.
In conclusion, therefore, wlhle Sclhller's specific aesthetic
theories of beauty, art, and the nature of aesthetic experience per se,
with their emphsis on form, disinterestedness, and imaginative play,
17seem to advance little beyond Kant '; and wlhle his epistemology and 
theory of drives appear not to advance much beyond Fichte; his social 
critique, his integration of the aesthetic into all domains of
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experience, and his three dieermiomal theory of psychonenSucal-poOitical 
revolution, mOce a valuable contribution to opening up a much broader 
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& MonmreeaL, 1982), ch. 1: 'Scteller'.
24. According to A New English Dictionary on Hstorical P:rimQ±-p3.e8, 
ed. J. A. H, Mmy, the words 'focused' or 'focusing* may be used with 
either one 's' or two, but the use of two is the more 'irregular’ . I will 
therefore use one ' s' in both words throughout this work. See ibid, 
vol. iv, p. 377 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897).
25. B. Schaper, 'Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich 
Scteller' , British Journal of Aesthetics, Suemer 1985» PP* 166-7.
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26. K. Dewhurst & N. Reeves, eds. & trans., Friedrich Sclhller ; 
Meeti-cine, Psychology and Literature (Sandford Pubbications, Ocford,
1978).
27. Sclhller attended the Duke of wW^rtembberg s Mlitary Academy in 
Stuttgart, 1775-80 (aged 14-21), initially training in law, but after 
2 years transferring to meedcine. He became a regimenta doctor on 
leaving the academy in 1780.
28. W. Grossman, 'The Idea of Giltural Evolution in Sclhller's Aesthetic 
Educaaion’, G^nmanc Review, vol. 54» 1959.
29. L. A. Willoughby, 'ScihLller on Mai’s Education to Freedom through 
Knwleedg* , G^:rmanc Review, vol. 29, 1954.
50. E. Schaper, 'Towards the Aesi/he^ic ; A Journey with Friedrich 
ScihLller*, op. cit.
51. H. S, Reiss, 'The Concept of the Aesthetic State in the Work of
Schiller and NovaaLis’ , Publications of the English Goethe Society, 
vol. 26, 1957.
32. E. M, Wilkinson & L. A. Willoughby, 'The Whole Man in Sclhller’s 
Theory of CuLture and Society : On the Virtue of a Plurality of Models' , 
in S. S. Prawer, R. ffinton Thorns, & L. Foirster (eds.) Essays in German 
Language,, Culture and Society (Univ. of London Institute for German 
Studies, 1969), pp. 177-210.
33. I. Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J. C. Meeried-th (Oxford Un.v, 
Press, 1952). The work is divided into 2 parts ; Part 1, the ' Critique 
of Aesthetic Judgement* ; Part 2, the Critique of Teleological Judg^j^e^f .
34. David Hume (I7II-I776), British Emiriicst; most influential work : 
A Treatise of Human Nature (1756—40) in 3 vols.
35. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smth (Manillan, 
1929).
36. I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck (Bobbs- 
Merill, 1956).
37# The moora! dLieenicn underlying the Critique of Judgement is brought 
out clearly in P. Cirowher, The Kean tian Sublime : From MocnSitt to Art 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989). See esp. ch. 'Kant’s Aesthetic Theory 
and its MoraL Significance*. TlhLs brings out the ieSapio'tScal, 
teleological, and sn£SLogLral linkages Kant rakes between nature and 
iocaSity in the third Critique as a whole.
38. See Kant, Critique of Judgement op. cit., Introduction, section 
iv, pp. 18-20, for the distinction between ' reflective’ and 
' determinant’ judgeients.
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59. Ibid*, Introduction, section v, pp, 20-26,
40. Ibid*, Port 2., section 25, pp. 108-9.
41. IMd.. Part 2, section 23, pp. 99-100.
42. Ibid*, Introduction, p, 59 (where Kant maces his initial claim 
concerning this connection). See Part 1, section 59» pp. 221-25, for 
the psychological connection between natural beauty and moraaity made 
via angaLogLes, and p. 227 (last para).
43. Ibid., Introduction, section viii, pp. 35-56.
44. Keat’s arguments in support of these five features of judgements 
















3. tetter to Korner, 10/11/1794 : 'That I have advanced as propositions 
many ideas of Kant without proving them, w^ unavoidable in so 
circumscribed a notice of a subject wlhLch crm)pa^es the entire man . 
Correspondence of Sdriller with Korner, trans. L. Simpson, 3 vols.
(London, 1849), vol. 2, p. 298. Also, letter to Korner, 19/12/1794 :
• Your reproach that I am treading in Kgant' s footsteps, will be more 
applicable in this second part than to the first . . Ibid., vol. 2, 
pp. 304-5. (The ’second part' referred to here, being the second 
instateent in The Horen, viz. L10-16).
4. The part played by the traditional notion of natural law in Sclhller's 
thinking on social, ethical, and political issues, is briefly discussed
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by W. Witte, 'Law and Order in Scthller’s Thcought’ , Modem Language 
Review, vol. 1, 1955, PP* 296-297.
5* Kerry, op. cit., p. 151, describes Scthller as 'using abstract 
terms in an essentially poetic Manne'. Grossman, op. cit., p. 45, 
refers to Schller as a ' philosopher poet1.
6. Wiikinson & Willoughby (ScMller*s Aeetheeic Leeteere, op. cit., 
p. cxxrii), take the view that 'Sclhller is not just out to coin5t:ruct 
his own systm of abstract relations.; nor, as is more often alleged,
out to engage the total psyche of the reader . . .* 'He is out to do 
both things at once . . .'
LETTER 2
1. Sclhller's concept of the Ideal will be explored in the 1x01^111101 
of L4, 9, & 10.
2. Of. L27j10, p. 217 (last sentence).
5. This idea is developed in ScMller's theory of ’aesthetic semblance' 
in L26. See, e.g., L26:8 (p. 197).
4. J.Jb Rousseau, Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750), trans.
G. D. H. Cole (in The Social Connaract and Discouraes. Dent, 1973).
A. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of dirtl Society (1767), ed. D. 
Forbes (Edinburgh UrrnLv. Press, 1966). E. Bimke, Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (1790), ed. Conor Ciru.se O'B:ltinm (Penguin Books, 
1969).
LETTER 3
1. Sdhller's notion of the 'Natural State' will also be examined in 
our discussion of L6, L27:9 & 10.
2. SchLller probably has in mind here, those moddls of a ' state of 
nature' involving social contracts, found in Hobbes Leviathan (1651), 
and Lodce's Second Treatise of Government (1690), a^^r^'t others. 
Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schuller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., p. 225). 
see Rousseau as providing the relevant moldl here. Howver, Rormseau in 
The Social Con.mttact (1762), used the idea of a ' state of natur’ , not 
to support the contemporary State via a social contract theory, but to 
argue for certain inalienable ri^its man has, and can claim against the 
contemporary State, e.g., that the people are ultimately the sovereign.
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5. Gressmai, op, cit., p. 4» cco^iu^i^s the contemporary National State 
with the historical fiction of a ' state of nature’ . Schaper too 
('Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Schiller’ , op. cit.), 
talks of the Natural State as a state of nature (in the mamer of Hobbes* 
'war of ail against all’). More strangely, Schaper describes what 
Sclhller mjkes clear (in L5s5) is a moral ideal, i.e, the Rational or 
Moral State, as having already come into being historically, and as 
having been somehow ' superinposed’ over the Natural State. Referring 
to the early otters of the treatise, she tells us 'these Letters give 
a sem-historical account of how the "state of reason" gradually 
superinposed itself on the "state of nature" . . .' (p. 159). For 
Sclhller, the Rational State has not ' superinposed* itself on the 
Natural State, but is the future ideal form of the State which 
aesthetically educated men will be in a psycho-ethical conchtion to 
replace the' current Natural State with.
4. Adam Ferguson, by whom Sclhller seems to have been greatly
influenced, in his An Essay on the Hstory of Civil Society (17&7), 
op. cit., also explicitly rejected the state of nature/social con-tract 
apparatus, proclaiming simply 'Man is bom in society and there remains' 
(p. 16).* Cf. Sclhller, L5:2 (first sentence), where man 'aw^ces' and
’ finds himelf - in the State' (p. 11).
5. Sclhller says little about the attributes of the Moral State (and 
what little he does say, is not found until L27s9 & lo). It is as though 
he expects us to be faimliar with the concept. This could be the cose, 
for his notion of the Moral State would seem to be based partly on 
Rcnwseau’s ’general will' in The Social Contract, (see esp. L27:9 & lo); 
and partly on ideas expressed by Kant in his then widely known Idea for 
a Uihvereal Hstory (1784)? According to Kain, op. cit., p. 28, Kant 
took the view that 'a society of men driven together by natural feeling 
(need) is to be transformed into a moral whole, into a society based on 
practical principles. Society moves towards this end, toward a society 
of the greatest freedom, the greatest morality, and the fullest 
development of all human capaacttes*. *. . . man must produce for himelf 
anything that goes beyond the mecthahcjaL ordering of his animal 
existence.' Note the imperative here. Kain gives as his source : Kaaifs 
Idea for a Uihvereal Hstory, in Kaifs Political Writings « ed. H. Reiss 
(Cambrn.dge Univ. Press, 19*71), PP. 44-45, 47-48. Reiss (’The Concept of 
the Aesthetic State in the Work of Sclhller and Novaais' , op. cit.,
pp. 29-50), also believes Sclhller's concept of the Moral State is based
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on Kanfs philosophy of history and political philosophy. As we will 
see, from Sclhller's few remarks concerning the Moral State, its chief 
chsaraceristic is that it will he governed by positive laws that embody 
the mortal law. There will be a coincidence between the general will of 
society (expressed in such laws), and the individual moral will (cf.
L27:9 & 10), and thus a bringing together of the principles of
Rousseau and Kant.
6. i.e. ' civil society' , the level at wlhLch economc activity operates 
within the Natural State, satisfying the needs of mai's 'physical being*. 
This must be retained, wlhlst its externally related political machinery, 
the Natura State, is 'abolished'.
7. Grossman, op. cit.,p. 44, mstakenly asserts that Sclhller sees the 
' importance of renouncing the satisfaction of physical wants for the 
sake of cultural evolution'. Sclhller's view, is that moi's physical 
needs must be satisfied before mora progress is possible. Of. Sclhller, 
On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), trans. J. A. Elias, in German 
Aesthetic and Literary Crrticism, ed. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge Uu.v.
Press, 1985), p. 221 t '. . . above all else nature must be satisfied 
before the bind can make its dema.n.s'.
LETTER , 4
1. There is some continuity here with Sclhller's earlier views in 
On Grace and Dignity (1795), trans, anon., in Essays Aesthetioal and 
Philosophical (Bohn's Standard Library, 18715), PP* 168-223, esp. pp. 
198-203, passim. , e.g. *. . . when morality has become to him a second 
nature, it is then only that it is secure . . .' (p. 200).
2. Prima facie, a Platonic objective idealism lies behind Schiller's 
use of the terms 'Idea' or 'Ideal'. In his discussion of the Idea of 
Art in L9, and the Idea of Beauty in L1O, 15, & 16, it is clear that 
they have a transcendent status. In Ll7s2, Sclhller distiiguishes the
' region of Ideas’ from * the stage of realty'. The problem is that they 
also have an immannt status, and Sclhller talks of the existential 
'realization' of these Ideas (in e.g., L16s1), so taking him beyond 
Platonic or neo«-?latouic notions of mere vague participation of reality 
in transcendent Forms. This dual transcendent and immanent status points, 
as Lukacs has recognized (in Gnethe and H,s Ags. Merlin, 1968), towards 
a proto-Hegelian absolute idealism.
There is also some connection with Kufs notion of Ideas, but as we
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will see shortly, the l±rk is with practical reason’s ideal, i.e. moral 
perfection, not with the Ideas of theoretical reason. Kant discusses the 
latter in the Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., pp. 308-326. H.s 
position is concisely expressed by him as follows: *I understand by 
Idea a necessary concept of reason to Which no corresponding object can 
be given in sens e-experience. Thus the pure concepts of reason, now 
under discussion are transcendentjOL ideas.’ 'The objective employment 
of pure concepts of reason is always transcendent, wlhle that of the 
pure concepts of understanding mst, in accordance with their nature, 
and inasmuch as their application is solely to possible experience, be 
always rama-mn.’ Ibid., p. 318 (A327). Kaari’s Ideas of reason are 
transcendent, as they are regulative of the operations of the
understanding, directing the employment of the latter’s immanent 
concepts (which provide cornriitutive knowlecdg), to achieve an absolute 
or unconcdtioned totality in the synthesis of conditions (ibid., p. 318). 
Now Sclhller goes well beyond this, for his Ideas are not meraly 
transcendent aLly regulative, in an epistemological sense (of. L1O:7).
They also have an objective ontological being, achieving degrees of
* realizatorn’ in the existential.
It was in his Ksdlias Letters (1795) to Koraer, that Sclhller 
explicitly expressed an objective idealism, in his notion of beauty as
* freedom in appearance’ , involving the conformty of an object’ s
’ technical fora* to its own * essential nature’. The notion of objective 
essences, which exist independently of our a priori construing, is found 
in the later KaJLlias Letters, following Komer*s criticism of his earlier 
letters for grounding beauty in the a priori construing of the subject, 
contrary to Schiller’ s declared aim of defining an objective criterion 
of beauty. There is some shift back, in the Aesthetic Letters (in L26), 
to an object’s fora being construed a priori, and thus to a Kantian 
epistemology. Yet, alongside this, there is talk of the Idea of Art 
existing over time, independent of human caprice (L9s3). We have to 
examine each usage of the teras Idea or Ideal, as it occurs, and cannot 
assume a uniform usage by Sclhller.
3. Sclhller explains the notion of ’ennoblement’ in L23.
4. Such a defective education is described in L13’4 fn. 3» (i.e. Letter 
13» para. 4» footnote 3)*
5. Vilhelm Keich, The Psychology of Fascism (Penguin Books, 1979).
6. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 40, 
p. 151 (lines 16-28).
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7* Thrcoufcout On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, Sdhller imLlcitly 
operates the idea of the '!ai-ve* poet and ’realist' personality type 
being guided by natural law, wh^e the 'sentimental* poet and 'idealist* 
character, is conscious of the moral law. Man mu't be morally guided by 
one or the other, or be adrift without a law. Cf. op. cit., p. 220.
8. Cf. L1:4. Cf. also, L8:1 & 3, where discussing the role of philosophy,
Schiller says 'Reason has accomplished all that she can accomplish by 
discovering the law and [theoretically] establishing it.1 (L8:3).
9. See the brief charraterization of the 'Ethical Sta±e* in L27s9.
10. The fact that Schiller talks here of what the State 'will have to* 
do, empaaszes that he is talking about the future Moral State, which 
will have to ’ ruthlessly trample' underfoot the kind of individualism 
which is rife in the society governed by the Natural State (of. L5s5» 
’egotism has founded its system*). Such ruthless trampling by the State, 
could only be effected by the positive law, but Schuller's reference to 
its ’solemn rigour* recalls Kant's mamer of talking about the moral law. 
This again indicates the identity of moral law and positive law in the 
Moral State.
11. The distinction between the 'savage*1 and 'barbarian' is later 
modified to become the ' realist' and ' idealist* personalty types 
described in Cn Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), op. cit., pp.
224-232.
12. Chefly in L15, 22, & 25.
13. This is a reference to beauty, and gives us an early foretaste of 
the formaist view of beauty Sclhller will adopt in his later Letters 
(cdbninting in L22s5).
14. Reiss, op. cit., pp. 30-35, argues that Soh.llei*s plays too, show 
his ’ awareness of the psychological basis of political relations' .
' . . . nn all Schiller* s plays the problem of freedom is seen in 
psychological terms’ (p. 31). Referring to Schller's plays, Reiss tells 
is that ' for Sobhller, corHict always arises from a struggle between 
the two cort?lictilg tendencies in the human personalty' , i.e., ' the 
sensuous and intellectual aspects of the human personalty. We have thus 
a series of characters emboodyng either of these two aspects none of 
whom is capable of integraton* (p. 32). Reiss sees the Aesthetic 
Letters as a continuation of Sdhller* s dramaic interest in this
dualism, but expressed in Kantian philosophical terms
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LETTER 5
1. Of. Ferguson, An Essay on the Hstory of C^vil Society (1767), 
op. cit., p. I9> who similarly describes'the locsening of the bands 
of com[lbraCal society*.
2. It is clear here, that Sclhller distinguishes the Natural State 
per se (which in L5:3, first sentence, is referred to as 'a political 
body*), from civil society (or the * civil order* as he calls it in 
L5:4), wlhLch released from the former1 s ' controls' , is becoming ever 
more atomized.
3. According to Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit., p. 127, at the military 
academy Sclhller became familiar with the writings of Clhastian Grave 
(1742-96). They refer to Gsurre’s '• . . portrait of how the growing 
economic structure of a society produces new needs and new wishes in 
a srlf■gr3nrrating process . . .'
4. Especially Rousseau*s Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750). 
Another important influence w^ probably Ferguson, op. cit., whose 
Essay contains much mralistic critictbb of the eberag.ng comIbraCal 
society of Sclhller’s times.
5. Rowver, wlhlst Rousseau may have been a primary source, Vicky 
Rippere, Sclhller and Alienation, op. cit., dem>ontrates that Scthller's 
social critique is drawn from a large number of contemporary sources, in 
a then fairly commoplace debate about the virtues and vices of modenm 
civilization. She shows that Sckhller’s critictb^lt were not, in fact, 
particularly original.
LETTER 6
1. Of. Sclhller, On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, op. cit., p. 213:
'Let the Ctentibental poet] not lead us backward to our childhood 
[Greece], but rather forward into our maiur-ty in order to permt us 
to perceive that higher harmony . . .*
2. According to Mchasl Jones, 'Twilight of the Gods : The GarTeRs in 
BUhller and Mcacs' (^rnmanc Review, vol. 59, 1984)» Scthller merely 
mde use of what he knew was a nythLcal ideal of ancient Girsece, in 
order to criticize contemporary society. SchUler did not expect his 
statements concerning Greece to be taken literally; the myth of Grjece 
w^ a critical device, not a historical fact. Jones' view rests upon 
speculation about what wa 'really* in Sclhller's mind, i.e. about what
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his intentions were. Such speculations are notoriously difficult to 
verify.
3. Ancient Greece also functions as a lost psychological and social 
ideal in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, op. cit., pp. 189-190. The 
Greeks lived at one with nature, something which modern, civilized man
has lost and can only yearn for, as expressed in much * sentimental’
poetry.
4. The human creation of divinities, is an idea also suggested in the 
latter part of L24:7, where man ’. . . forfeits his human-ty by seeking 
a Godhead . . .’ , and in L25:3, when mans ancient gods reveal
’ them elves as projections of his own mind’.
5. I». Feuerbach, The Essence of Chhritianity (1841). K. Marc, Economic 
and Philosophical M^auscripts (1844)*
6. Prima facie, there is some contradiction here. But for Sclhller, 
the apparent ’ organ.zation’ of society into disparate classes and groups 
essentially ’disorganizes’ it, in the sense of transforming it from an 
organic unity into a medhanccaL system.
7. Viz., an orggahcally interrelated whole.
8* Sdhller’s critique of contemporary society (governed by the Natural 
State), was probably influenced by his reading of the Scottish political 
econoimst and morraist, Adam Ferguson (1723-1816). (Ferguson graduated 
frem St Andrews Uhversity in 1742, was professor of moral philosophy in 
Edinburgh Urnvereity, and is thought to have attended Adam Sm.th‘ s 
lectures on political economy in the I76OS, at Glasgow Urnverrity.) The 
Natural State is the ’political body’ (Lj3:3) governing civil society 
(the emerging comaerrial society and capitalist economy). Co^sare the 
passages quoted from 16:7 & 8, with Ferguson's description of iomerrCal 
society: ’Many mechanical arts succeed best under the total suppression 
of sentiment and reason; and ignorance is the mother of industry as well 
as supeirtition ... Man.Sacturei accordingly prosper most when the 
mind is least consulted, and where the workshop may, without any great 
effort, be considered as an engine, the parts of which are men . « . 
Thinking itself in this age of separations may become a particular 
craft.’ An Essay on the history of Civil Society, op. cit., p. 185. For 
Ferguson’s influence on Sclhller, see K. Plant, Heenl (Gorge Allen & 
Unwin, 1973), PP* 21—23; also Dewlhu^t & Reeves, op. cit., pp. 123-5.
9. It is not clear what Sclhller means by ’primtive mrraity’ here. 
Given the context, I take it to mean a narrowly personaL morraity, 
concerned with e.g., controlling one’s own imjpiuses, and not extending
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beyond (at best) farnly welfare. It is morality which has no genuinely 
social dimension. One thinks of Hegl’s distinction in the Philosophy 
of Right (1821), trans. T, M. Knox (Oxford Um.v. Press, 1967), between 
individuaHstic moraLity and social ethical life (moaai-tat/gn^d 
sittlcchkeit). The latter presupposes a rational social order (see 
ibid., p. 319» note 75)» viz. something like life in Scthller's 
Rational or Moira. State.
10. Of. L22:2, 'That which tenses our intellectual powers and invites 
them to form abstract concepts . . • Chas the effect of] depiriving us 
of sensibility . . .’
11. Of. On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, op. cit., p. 211, where
Schiller says that while recognizing modem raai’s estmgjement from 
nature, we muut not overlook civilization’s advent gages. He criticizes 
poetic idylls which talk of a past golden age: 'Set before the beginnings 
of civilization, they exclude together with its disadvantages Hl its 
advantages . .
12. Kant, in his Idea for a Urnvereal Hstory* and in Perpetual Peace, 
had argued that man’s faculties and capaccties could be developed 
historically only through their mitiuOL oppooition. S duller w^ familiar 
with this view : according to Regin, op. cit., pp. 56-7, for the 
occasion of his inaugural address as professor of history at the 
Uinveeuity of Jena (My 1789), 'Scihller had almost mechanniaHy 
foioOTed Reinhold’s advice and read Kent's two essays concerning 
history’. See Idea for a Uiuvemal Hstory, and Perpetual Peace, in 
Kent’s Political Writings, ed. H. R. Reiss, op. cit., pp. 44-45, 109-14.
13. J. J. Winokelmann, Thoughts on the , Imtation of the Painting and 
Sculpture , of the Greeks (1755), in Nisbet (ed.), op. cit., pp. 32-54. 
Ferguson, op. cit., would also be influential here, for he too contrasted 
modem fragmented man with the ancient Greek’ s wholeness.
LETTER 7
1. Adam Ferguson, in his Institutes of Mo ora. Philosophy (Edinburgh,
17695 ed. & trans. into ^rman by C. Garre, 1772), took the vi<w that 
the constitution of a State depends on the citizens who inhabit it. 
According to Dewhmut & Reeves, op. cit., 'Ferguson’s ideas on 
government derive directly from his ethics and these are based on 
empirrcH, obse3a■antoMa.ist psychology. The view that political 
structures depend in the last anaLysis on the psychological rake-up of
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their wias of formative influence on Sclhller.’ In the Aesthetic
Letters *this fusion of psychoro^g^ said pooiiics is bassc . . .* (p. 125),
*. . . Sclhller knew Gave’s notes on Ferguson almost by heart* (p. 125).
2. For Kornt, wlhle a wholly rational being (a 'holy will*), can will a 
rational act as a matter of course, an ibperfectly rational finite 
creature, in contnast, is beset by distracting sensuous irnduLses, which 
mke moral actions a mater of obligation. A will is made ' dependent' 
by the em>0ir.ca1 fact that its rational being is combined with, and 
hindered by, sensuous imppuses. See Koat, Groundwork of the Meeaphhsic 
of MoraJLs, trans, H. J, Paton (Harper & Row, 196/4), p. I07.
3. I use these terms to emplhaize that in these earlier Letters of the 
treatise, Sclhller's pargrbme is to reconcile mt^’s rational and 
sensuous natures, not ^^er^^ly his rational and sensuous faculties. As 
the Letters proceed, he does move arbbl a wwder Carteesoa to t narrower 
Keaititn dualism, but at this stge^ » as Deewuiust & Reee-ve put it (op. 
cit., p. 358), Sclhller wants 'to fuse Ksaitian transcendental freedom 
with his own earlier concept of psycio-plh■sica1 ... balance’.
Wilkinson & Willoughby (Sclhller’s Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., p. xxsciii), 
tell us that for SclhLl1rr, 'the notion of the hu^arn mind as . , . 
reciprocally related to the physical organism, wa and remaned a 
genuine interest . . *'
4. See L8:6, and Schiller's talk of the 'oitcuar ideas’, ' convenient 
images' , and ' fond delusions , (provided by 'State and Priesthood’ ), 
which murny ' people prefer' to ' the rays of truth*.
5. Schaper ('Towards the Aesthetic ; A Journey with Friedrich Schiller* , 
op. cit., p. 157)» overstates the political dimension of the Aesthetic 
Letters when she says that 'the first ten Letters are almost exclusively 
concerned with political rrgiamizatiom and . . . various forms of 
govrambbnn’.
LETTER 8
1. See Kant, Groundwork of the Metaplhsio of Morats, op. cit., p. 64:
** , . a will which is good •••**.•• mist be the highest good and 
the concdtiom of aLl the rest . . .*
2, See Koit, CirLtique of Practical Reason, op. cit., pp. 76-79? *. . . 
a feeling of respect for the moral lew . . . can be called a moral 
fee^ig^’ . * [Thus the moral lew ] has an influence on the sensibility of 
the subject tme effects a fee1.-mg which promotes the influence of the
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law on the will’ (p. 78)* ’This feeling, under the name of moral
feeling, is therefore produced solely by reason’ (p. 79).
3. In L20 & 21, Sclhller will argue that the fom-drive of our
rational nature, develops via aesthetic experience, to counterbalance 
(and thus ’check* ) the sense-drive of our sensuous nature, thereby 
promooing the possibility of moral volition. In the Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgement, Kant argues that aesthetic experience promotes 
moral feeling (which checks our sensuous i^JptSBes, and so assists the 
realization of the moral will). There is thus some broad parallel 
between Sclhller and Kant here.
4. See Sclhller, On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (179!?), op. cit., 
pp. 221-222: ’The state of mind of most people is on the one hand 
intensive and exhausting labour, on the other, enervating indulgence. ’
’ • . . nothing is more disadvantageous for sensibility to the truly 
beautiful than both these all-too—cmmon frames of mind among men.’
’Beauty . . . can ... be perceived and appreciated only under the 
comd-tion that he employ all his powers fully and freely.’ ’The 
relaxation that nature demands after every sustained effort and also 
takes without invitation (and only for such mommnts does one reserve 
the enjoyment of beautiful works), is so little favourable to aesthetic 
judgement . . .’
LETTER 9
1, Perhaps ’positive’ constraint here, refers to existential limitations 
in genenr!.. However, the context supplied by the next two sentences, 
indicates that Sclhller’s concern is with the limits imposed by the 
political legislator, and thus by positive laws.
2. It may be worthwhile briefly outlining the more radLcHy talmscemdnnt
Idea of Beauty put forward by Plato,in order to facilitate ioe^aaiion 
with Solhller*s views of beauty and the role of the artist, in this 
Letter. Plato’s sense of the Idea was unambiguous : it was the Idea of 
all beauty, incorporeaL and taaricendent with respect to any form. The 
works of the artist were ’ true’ in the sense of corresponding to a 
transcendent realty. For Plato, beauty involves correspondence to an 
Idea, viz. beauty as truth. Plato preferred to think of beauty as 
participation in the Beauuiful, which thought to derive from the
Idea of the Good. The Platonic Idea very jomwh ddggnfied the role of the 
artist, since it impUcitly granted him access to the world of pure
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Forms; but it also confounded the visual and intelligible, raising the 
question of the boundary between them. The artist* s * higher’ kind of 
imitation bypassed the imperfect sensible form in favour of the 
intelligible. It was difficult to explain such departures into the 
merely possible without recourse to other ideas such as ’furor’ (or 
mwdiess). Ca summary of relevant points taken from D. Sumnere, 
Mohelangelo and the Language of Art (Princeton U^'v. Press, 198), 
paatsim.]
3. The tendency to simply dismiss Sclhller’s ideas as being ’poetic’ 
is deplored by Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller’ s Aesthetic Letters, 
op. cit., p. xcix).
4. e.g. 8. 8. Kerry, ’The Artist's Intuition in Sclhller’s Aesthetic 
Philosophy’ , Publications of the English Cjethe Society, vol. 28, 1959, 
p. 80.
5. There are some similarities between Sclhller' s views concerning 
beauty and the effects of aesthetic experience, and the ideas of 
Plotinus. Plotinus takes from Plato the belief that the Forms are ideal 
archetypes of the visible world’s furniture. Beauty is a sensuous form 
by which a transcendent Form of Idea is revealed to contseplation by 
art. Beauty of form results from the participation of an object’ s form 
in ideal Form. There is a hierarchy of beauty, and above beautiful 
sensuous forms is beauty of soul. The way to beauty of soul is through 
the harmoenzation of inner discord within the soul, Plotinus describes
a progression by which we ascend from the experience of sensuous beauty, 
through morel perfection, to coghtive truth. Now in L27, Sclhller 
provides a similar picture of development, from apprehending sensuous 
form3, to psychological harmony and an inner beauty of soul, to an 
aesthetic society in which the 'mysteries of science’ have entered into 
'broad daylight’ (L27s11). We are talking of some degree of parallel 
here, between Scthller and another thinker, not an identity of 
conceptions. Large differences reman between Sclhller and Plotinus.
For a clear and concise account of the aesthetic thought of Plotinus, 
see M. C. Beard ley, Aesthetics from Classical Greece to. the Present 
(Uihv. of Alabgma Press, 197!?), PP« 78-87. (I have followed Beardsley 
closely above.)
6. The picture is complicated because on occasions, Schiller uses the 
Idea, and especially the term ’Ideal’ , in a Keaitian sense, as the ideal 
of practical reason, viz. moral perfection, or the morel will. Some of 
the different Platonic and Kantian employments of the terms Idea or
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Ideal by Sclhller, are briefly referred to by Wilkinson & Villdghby 
(Sclhller’s Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., glossary, p. 317)* An adcdtional 
problem arises from Sclhller not always employing Kantian or Platonic 
notions separately. The intermixing of Kantian and Platonic conceptions 
is recognized by Mdhal Podro, op. cit., who tells us that Schiller's 
* ... general view of human development, both through history and 
through the lives of individuals, is sjmULtaneoiu3ly Kantian and
Platonic* (p. 47). Finally, a further comppieation in Schiller’s use of 
the terms Idea or Ideal, arises from what Lukais, op. cit., has 
recognized as Schiller's proto-absolute idealism, in which the Idea has 
an objective ontological status (as in S<chller’s Kai lias letters : see 
my note 2, to L-), with Sclhller talking of their hralization* and 
actuality. The conflation of these different mesahngs of the Ideal by 
Sclhller in the Aesthetic Letters, leaves open an ammiigu.ty wlhch m^ms 
each usage has to be examined separately for its mesahng. There is no 
overall meaning used in a uniform way on Hl occasions.
7. Of. Plotinus : the painter in his picture may capture and exhibit 
transcendent Form more fully than it was mahfested in the form of a 
sensuous object. The artist thus goes beyond the mere imitation of 
existential form, and instead idealizes the original to exhibit its 
Form more fully. See Beardsley, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
8. Of. Plotinus : it is necessary to become moraHy perfect in order 
to be able to know Beauty. See Beared ley, op. cit., p. 84.
9. Kant, Orrtiaue of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 59,
pp. 221-225.
10. Of. Sclhller, Oi the Pathetic, trans. J. Weess, in The Philosophical 
and Aesthetic Letters and Essays of Sclhller (Ohapman, 1845): 'The 
representation of the supersensuous is the final end of art, and the 
tragic art in particular effects this by making objective to us Tour] 
mora!. independence of nature’s laws, in the concdtion of emotion*
(p. 213). Sclhller illustrates this, follcwing Lessing, by referring 
to the Laocoon group (p. 223).
11. In L25:6 & 7, Sclhller will argue that a beautiful object, by its 
own harmoihous relation of form and content, puts before us an external 
symbol of the inner harmony of reason and sense in the 'noble* wral 
will. But this is not the same a? raking the 'Necessary and the Eternal’ ,
i.e. the superaensible moral law itself, into an external symbol.
12. The transcendent Idea of Beauty inhabits the same supersensible 
realm, is the raraL law.
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13. This psychologg-cal linkage of beauty and eotallty, is effected 
tiatsgh the aesthetic experience of beauty hamenrzim? man's national 
and sensuous natures, so that he is prndislosed to morral. volition.
See L25:4-7.
14* See my note 4, to L8, above.
15. KeaT, Critique of Judgermen, op. cit., Part 1, section 59, pp. 
221-225. The liikage between beauty and motrllty made by Kant in this 
section is by of almaLogiei between them, (The arguments are not 
taken up by Sclhller.)
PART TWO
LETTER 10
1. This position itn^brliti with ihai exlreiind by Schiller in On The 
Sublime (I80I), (in Weess, op. cit., p. 259), where beauty's educative 
role has to be complemented by that of the sublime : ’The sublime mut
be added to the beauuiful, in order to commute the totality of aesthetic 
education.’ ’Only if sublimity is wedded to beauty, and our iusceplibblity 
for both is equally developed, are we finished citizens of nature.’
2. An alluision to Rouuseau’s Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750).
3. A reference to Plato’s The Rep^Llc (esp. book ten).
4. Throughout paras, 2-6 of this Letter, the iriticSemi of beauty’s 
effects function rhetorically. Sclhller advances arguments which he 
intends to counter later in the treatise (most explicitly in Li 6:4,
L26:13 & 14).
5. In contrast, this was seen as an advantage of the aesthetic in On 
the Stai% as a Moonl Institution (1784), (in Bohn, op. cit.): ’opinions 
about government and classes right be reformed by the stage.’ ’• . • . 
helping the nation to agree in opinions and inclinations’ (p. 358). The 
essay puts forward the idea of art’s value for producing social harmony, 
resting on an aesthetically induced fundamentaL consensus; and the idea 
of art’s value in providing an niiale from a hes^h reality: ’lier we are 
disgusted with the world ... we dream of another sphere . . .’ (p. 359).
6. This criticiee is countered in L26:13.
7. Ferguson, An Essay on the Biiitry of Cvil Society (1767), op, cit., 
passim.
8. Later, in L16:2 & 3, SchiHer will counter this view by revejaLi^ng 
the ability of beauty to restore energy of character to those lacking
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it (through ’energizing' beauty).
9. Sadie (op. cit., p. 198), misquotes the original German words
here. Sclhller’s ’vemwaftbegrrff* , becomes ’verstandesbegriff der 
SchOnheit* , so macing the Idea of Beauty into a ’pure concept of the .
•mnerstEaidd.rnr , instead of an Idea of reason as Sclhller intends.
Sadie's dew would mean that the Idea of Beauty provides us with 
corrntitutive knowledge of the beautiful, rather than mjzrely regulating 
the understandings employment of concepts, as Sclhller implies by saying 
it * regulates our judgement’ .
10. Not in Kean's sense of ’imminent’ , i.e. a concept which gives us 
constitutive knowledge. Sclhller’s Idea of Beauty is immanent in the 
sense that it achieves degrees of realization in beautiful objects.
It also functions to regulate the process of apprehending beauty - as 
part of man s menn^O. apparatus. (On both counts, therefore, it is not 
*transcendent’ in the radically Platonic sense. ) Sclhller’s position 
would seem to be one of proto-absolute idealism : in which the Idea of 
Beauty has both an objective ontological status, and a subjective 
epistemological function (like the categories in Hege’s Lode).
11. Ve cannot cognize, i.e. know, an Idea in experience. (Yet, in 
L16:5, Sclhller dll talk of the Idea of Beauty's existential ’species'.)
12. In the Critique of Pure Reason, op, cit., Kant says: ’• . . the pure 
concepts of reason ... are transcendental Ideas’ (p. 318). ’No 
objective deduction, such as we have been able to give of the categories 
£of tnde:ratan<di]mr), is, strictly speaking, possible in the case of these 
transcendental Ideas’ (p. 324; B393)* For Kant it is possible to derive 
the categories from experience, as they are presupposed by the shape of 
experience; it is not possible to arrive at Ideas (whether of ’Beauty*
or of ’ Hman Being’ ), by means of a transcendental deduction from 
experience, for there are no corresponding shapes of experience: ’Just 
because they are only Ideas they have, in fact, no relation to any 
object wlhch could be given as coinciding with them’ (p. 324; B393).
13. Tlhs, in the simplest terms, is Sclhller's ostensible aim over the
next six Letters. Hcowver, in practice, the concept of beauty is not 
shown to be a logical conchtion of the concept of human being; rather 
existential beauty is asserted to be an a posteriori condition of man 
attaining a compete and balanced psychological state.
14. Ellis (op. cit., p. 89 fn.), thinks that Sclhller does not really 
do anything a priori at all: ’ • . . in the Aesthetic Letters, when at 
the end of the tenth Letter Sclhller annoTLmces that his concept of
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beauty will not be derived from experience, but will be a "pure rational 
concept*’, he in fact moves to enpirioal statements of a more abstract 
nature, not to purely a priori statements.*
15. Nevertheeess, Kant does so move. According to L. W. Beck (Kant’s 
C:riLtique- of Practical Reason, op. cit., p. vii), ’the method of the 
Crrtigue. • . is synthetic. That is, they begin with principles and 
thence proceed to the experiences Which they organza, govern, and render 
intelligible.’ Hmver, in Ka^fs defence, ’before' the first two 
Crrtiques. he provides separate shorter works (the Prolegomena, and 
Groundwork of the Metapihsic of Morals, respectively), which '. . . 
follw the ana^ical or regressive method; they begin with experience 
and regress upon its a priori presuppooitions or principles without 
which it would not be possible to have that kind of experience’ (ibid.). 
Now wlhlst these preparatory works w allow us to see how Kant gets 
from experience to the a priori, they cannot prevent him from carefully 
selecting the ’ experience’ which is his point of departure.
16. ’That which is absolute’ , and ’the necessary conditions’ of
existence, become the ’pereon' and ’ coned,tion’ , respectively, in L11.
17. This expression emphaszes the essentially psychology!. character
of Sc^hllta’s theoretical enterprise over the next few Letters. Ve will 
foioow ’Sc^hllea’s ... endevour to present an essentially psychological 
analysis of mind in Kantian a priori terms . . .’ (Dewhxret & Reeves,
op. cit., p. 358).
18. The ’pure rational concept of Beauty' is assertively disclosed in 
Li 5:2, where it is defined as ’ living form’. The ability of beauty to 
induce harmony between mu’s two natures, rests on more specific 
assertions concerning the psycholo£g-cal effects of two types of 
existential beauty (’ energizing’ and ’melting’ beauty) in Li 6 & 17.
LETTER 11
1. J. G. Fichte, The Science of Knco; ledge (179-4), ed. & tirnw, P. Heath 
& J. Lachs (Cambridge Uihv. Press, 19Q2).
2. The rational self, ego, or person, transcends any one of its 
particular temporal experiences; but it is also immannt, as an embodied 
rational being, involved in each of its particular temporal experiences.
3. We find an early presaging of the person^ conedtion distinction (made 
before SchLller read either Kant or Fichte), in his mlitary academy 
dissertation The Philosophy of Physiology (1779), (in Dewhurst & Reeves,
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op. cit., pp. 149-165). ’A perception is nothing but an alteration in 
the soul, which is the same as a change in the world, and in the course 
of which the soul distinguishes its own self from that change.’ *. . . 
only my personality separates my self from it and makes me aware that 
it is an external change’ (p. 157)* In other words, the person can 
distinguish the self from changes of condition in itself. This implies 
the person transcends each of the externally determined alterations of 
its condition.
4. Schiller may have been wary of what Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 
(op. cit., pp. 528 ff., esp. A541-544), regarded as the fallacious 
abstract reasoning involved in ’ the rational doctrine of the soul’ , in 
which the soul is conceived of as ’ substance’ •
5. That is, created by rational causation.
6. There is some ambiguity concerning the status of the ’absolute ego’ 
in The Science of Knowledge. In later lectures and essays, Fichte was
at pains to gradually make it explicitly into God. But in the 1794 first 
edition, with which Schiller was familiar (referring to it approvingly 
in L15s2 fn.), it is the unitary unconditioned self, (whose primordial 
self-limiting activity gives rise to the finite ego and the non-ego).
7. We have now arrived at a position in which the ’person’ is
self-grounded or absolute being, and the ’condition’ is grounded in time. 
The distinction between the absolute and time, is also found in a letter 
from Schiller to K*omer, 19/12/1794, concerning the Aesthetic Letters 
(referred to as his ’system’). ’The system turns upon the idea of 
reciprocal action between the absolute and finite - of the definitions 
of liberty and of time.’ In Simpson, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 504-505*
8. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., pp. 155-161.
9. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 104*
10. An allusion to the immortality of the soul.
11. Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 518, B585: ’Reason 
accordingly occupies itself solely with the employment of understanding 
... in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction towards 
a certain unity ... in such a manner as to unite all the acts of the 
understanding in respect of every object, into an absolute whole.’
12. Cf. e.g., Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 251:
• ... in relation to a possible object, the pure self-reverting activity 
of the self is a striving} and ... an infinite striving at that. This 
boundless striving carried to infinity is the condition of the possibility 
of any object whatsoever . . .’
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15. In L15:3» Sclhller will begin to equate, and so reduce, our 
sensuous and rational natures to the faculties of sense and reason.
Thus what commences as an a priori model of Human Being (in L11 & 12), 
becomes reduced to an a priori model of the mind (L13 ff).
31^11^6 couly, Schiller* s aim in the treatise moes, ie>PL-citly, from 
lsycho-pbhstologLoal balance to merely one of psychological equLlibrum.
14. Referring to the Aesthetic Letters, in his letter to Goethe,
7/1/1795, Sclhller writes: *As the beautiful itself is derived from man 
as a whole, so my analysis of it is drawn from my own whole being. * In 
L. D. Sctomtz, Corresmondenoe Between Sclhller and Goethe, (Bohn* s 
Standard Library, Goorge Bell & Sons, 1877 & 1879), vol. 1, p. 45,
Letter 40.
15. B. Schaper (’Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich 
Schiller* , op. cit., p. 162), also describes Sclhller’s method in this 
part of the' treatise as being a speculative psychology: **Ve cannot take 
whafc follcws as descriptive psychology . . .* *It is, at best, highly 
speculative . . .* To describe what Sclhller does in LU-17 as a
’ speculative psychology* , is simply to enplhaize that he is engaged in a 
highly conjectural theoretical exploration of the essence of man, from 
an enpirical basis which is, and reeaJn:, remote. It is worth noting that 
because it does have some empirical basis (in Sclhller’s self-observation) 
his a priori model of the essence of human being does not fall under the 
heading of what Kant criticized as ’rational psychology* (QariLtique of 
Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 329, A542).
LETTER 12
1. The striving for commute realization, and doImLnahom of our being, 
by each primary drive, is described in general terms in L12;1 & 4, but 
is later iiuustreted in some detail in L24. It is already imppicit, as 
achieved results, in the one-eided natures of the ’savage* and ’barbarism* 
in L4:6,
2, Much depends here, of course, upon how the Gorman word is
translated. In examining Sclhller’s view here, I am endorsing Wilkinson 
& Willcughby* s general translation of the term * trieb* as * drive* (in 
Sclhller’s Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., uassim,). and rejecting the 
alternative renderings of Miler (op. cit., pp. 111-112), who refers to 
the drives as ’imposes*, and Regin (op. cit., p. 125), who refers to 
them as ’urges* • The most bizarre renderings of the drives are provided
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by B. R. 'The Aesthetic Writings of SchLller' (The Open
ComT;, vol. 45» 1929, p. 242), for whom the sense-drive, the foim--di.ve, 
and the play-drive, are respectively, the 'thing-bent' , the 'foim-bent', 
and (a little perve:raely), the 'play-bent'.
5. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, op. cit., pp. 76-79. Although 
Kant explains the cause of moral feeling (as being produced by practical 
reason, not pathologically), he does not explain its pathological effect,
i.e. how reason can produce a sensuous feeling, and how, even if it is a 
special type of intellectual feeling, it is able to have an effect on 
our sensuous im^p-uses. Somewhere along the line of Kant's reasoning, a 
' jump' is made over what he hiraelf (in the Critique of Judgement, op. 
cit., Introduction, p. 14) calls the 'great gulf faxed’ between the 
supersensible/and the sensible, or between reason/and sense.
4. e.g. in L13:3, L15:2, 127:4 & fh.
5. See e.gi, my discussions of L12:4 & 5, presently.
6. G. V. P. Hggl, The Phenomenology of Mnd (1807), trans. J. B.
Bali lie (feorge Allen & Unwin, 1951). Cf. ch. 'Sense-Certainty', esp. 
pp. 149-150.
7. Because Miler (op. cit., p. 111) translates 'trieb' as 'impulse' , 
he wroigly criticizes Sclhller for reducing man's rational nature to a 
mere implse, so depriving reason of its absolute character.
8. Cf. L11:6 & 8.
9. G. W. P. Hegl, Philosophy of Right, op. cit., p. 10: 'What is 
rational is actual and what is actual is rational.' The correspondence 
which Heggil here describes as achieved, is for Sclhller the rational end 
of the form-drive.
10. Later in the treatise, (m>st notably in L27:4 & fn.), some of these
separate Kantian faculties emerge in Sdhller's own account.
11. Cf. Kant, Groundwoh: of the Metaplh~sic of Morals, op. cit.,
pp. 69-71, 88.
12. Ibid., p. 107.
13' Ecqhlibrious : 'That is in a state of equilibrium; evenly balanced.' 
See A Hew English Dictionary on Hstorical Principles, ed. J. A. H. Murray 
(Clarendon Press, Ocford, 1897)» vol. 3» P. 257.
14. A clear and concise account of the man principles of Fichte's 
The Science of fon<nw.e<dge, can be found in op. cit., translator's preface, 
by J. Lachs. See esp. pp. xrii-xriii, for Fichte's theory of drives.
15’ See Fichte, op. cit., pp. 284-286, for the drive to harmony or 
indeterm.natiou.
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16, Bewhust & Reeves, op. cit., pp. 355-556, briefly consider whether 
Fichte w^ the source of Sclhller’s theory of drives, but relying on the 
authority of K. Tomuohek (writing in 1862’), take the view that Fichte 
’saw mly one fundlmental drive, the autonomous activity of the self'. 
They even argue that Fichte probably derived his theory of drives from 
SchUler. Howver, Fichte’s most recent translators (^ath & Lachs,
1970), in their preface to The Science of Kmowecd^e op. cit., clearly 
expound Fichte as operating ’ two futdlmental drives’ (p. xrii).
LETTER 13
1. Wilkinson & Willoughby, 'The Whole Man in ScMller’s Theory of 
Culture and Society' , (op. cit., p. 191), argue that Goethe is the 
influence here, and ignore Fichte (despite ScMller's explicit 
acknowledgement of the latter). They refer to a scientific paper on 
the subordination and co-ordination of functions in living organisms, 
which Goethe sent to 8chLllta whle he was writing the Aesthetic Letters. 
But for Schiller to have been greatly influenced in his view of man’s 
essential nature, by the results of Goethe’s biological enguries into 
plants, would go against Sclhller’s general acceptance of Kant’s view
of human freedom. The biological would be associated by Sclhller with 
the conditioned aspect of man; and could not provide a model applicable 
to the structure and functioning of the whole of our being. Moreover, 
Schiller sees himelf in L1 1-14 as involved in a transcendental enquiry 
to establish an a priori moddl of the essence of human being; to 
incorporate the results of a posteriori biological enquiries into plants, 
would be itcotgauent to such a tOeo:ra^^t;icll enterprise.
2. See my note 13, to L11, above.
3. In L12-21, Sc^O.llea operates a model of the mind primar-ly in terms 
of drives, with attempts to fit the Kantian faculties into it from time 
to time. But later, especially in L26 & 27, the Kantian faculties come 
more to the fore, with attempts to occasionally fit his earlier theory 
of drives onto them, (as in e.g. L27:4).
4. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., pp. 131-134 (A99-A1O3), 
pp. 145-144 (A119-121).
5. Kant, Critique of Judgement op. cit., Part 1, pp. 94-109. See esp. 
p. 99 (lines 13-27), and pp. 107 (line 27) to 108 (line 7).
6. Kant’ 8 puLaing of apprehension and aesthetic comprehension in 
section 26 of the ’Arnaybic of the Sublime’, directly parallels the
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synthesis of imagination and reproduction in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, first edition.
7. Behind Sclhller1 s criticism hezre, lies his view that mooaaity mut
be developed from refoim.mg man's sensuous nature per se, rather than 
by the latter’s rational repression ab extra. In this respect, he was 
influenced by Ferguson’s Institutes of Moonl Philosophy (17&9)* Ferguson 
writes, e.g., 'Before we can ascertain rules of mooaaity for mank-nd, 
the history of mam’s nature, his dispositions ... should be known' 
(quoted in Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit., pp. 125-124).
WTER 14
1. Ksamt, Critique of Practical Reason, op. cit., pp. 126-127: *But 
commute fitness of the will to the moral lew is holiness, which is a 
perfection of which no rational being in the world of sense is at any 
time capable.* ’Om.y progress from lower to higher stages of mo oral 
perfection is possible to a rational but finite being.*
2, As being both pere-hal and existential.
5. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 21, p. 85 
(esp. lines 25-52).
4. Unlike in his earlier philosophical writings, in the Aesthetic 
fetters, Scthller effectively excludes the possibility of mooality being 
based solely upon our rational being, where, in the con-text under 
discussion here, the form-drive would suppress the sense-drive. Moora.! ty 
is only realistically possible, in practical tez^, for finite rational 
beings, when the two primary drives are in harmoomyCOf, L23:7 fn. 5, 
where Sclhller talks of rationally suppressive or * sublime* moor!, 
volition, as exceeding our experience of the strength of the human will, 
viz. as being effectively a psychological ie^losibility.)
5. Vhooistic : (adjective), being of a whole or commute character.
See under ’Wolim* , in A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
ed. R. W. Burcthiold (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), vol. 4, p. 1288,
6. There is no compete translation of the MathLsson article in 
English. An account of some of its main points, in so far • as they bear 
upon the development of Sclhller’s aesthetics, may be found in M, Podro, 
op. cit., pp. 42-46.
7. Quouodin M. Poo.ro, ibid., pp 44»
8. Cf. KekI, Critiquu of JudgJiunt, on* oH., PsoI 1, p. 86 i-ines 
6-12): ’. . . aathoouh in the apprehlpseoo sf a fagen object of sense
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[the irntginatim] is tied down to a definite form of this object, and 
to that extent, does not enjoy free play . • . still ... the object 
may supply retdy-mtde to the LmtgLuaticu just such a form ... as the 
imagination, if it were left to itself, would freely project . . .' 
Sclhller appears to be following Kant here closely.
9’ See, e.g., Hegl, Philosophy of Right, op. cit., para. 261 Adcdtion, 
p. 280.
10. Quoted in M. Podro, op. cit., p. 49* (My own insertions in square 
brackets, to elucidate the mesoning.)
11. Sclhller prefers the expression 'pure dete:irmnuablity' , although 
he mtces it clear in L2O:3, that this involves man being '. . . 
momennairly free of all determination whatsoever . . .' (p. 141)•
12. The nearest equivalent to the play-drive in Fichte's The Science
of Know-ede, is the ' drive to harmony’ . A similarity with 114:4 may be 
seen in the' follcwing passage: '. . . there will have to be evidence of 
a drive towards ... harmony . . .' 'Harmony is provided by anything 
that can be reciprocally viewed as determinate and determint!.' 'A drive 
of this sort is to be found in the drive to indetermination.' 'This drive 
my be described as the self's drive to . . . coIU?leteuess of the self 
within itself.' Fichte, The Science of op. cit., p. 284.
15. In Sclhller's various descriptions of the relationship of the 
primary drives under the play-drive, he uses expressions such as e.g., 
acting 'in concert' (H4:5), 'reciprocal action' (l16:1), they
' co-operate within it' (H4:5), which mice clear that wlhlst they 
interfunction, they do not interpenetrate : they remain externally 
related, and do not merge in a simple unity.
14. The form-dive is actively formtive; the sen3e-drive is pstsively 
receptive (to sense-imp prssions). Their interrelation in the play-drive, 
produces t psychological concdtion of active or creative-receppivity, in 
which we actively respond to, and creatively formwhat we receive in 
sense (cf. L26). Podro, op. cit., pp. 43—53, speculates how this rnght 
work in practice, in the aesthetic contemplation of art : by the 
(active) spontaneous drawing of analogies between (received) elements 
of tn art object's formed content.
15# Wilkinson & Willoughby, Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., 
glossary, p. 515.
16. Of. Fichte, The Science of KnowleUre, op. cit., p. 124: 'But to 
sty that the self posits itself as determined ob'^VLCUsly tmornts to 
saying that the self determines itself.' 'The self determines itself by
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an absolute activity'
17. aesthetic contemplation. Although in L14, Schiller merrily refers
to the object's special sy-mhonc character (L4:2), in 115:2 it becomes 
clear that it is beauty that is the objective correlative of the 
plly-erive.
LETTER 15
1, Savile (op, cit,, p. 214), Mstakenly asserts that living form has 
immeeiate application only to beauty in man, not to beauty in art or 
nature. fere, ScMller warns against such a view, and points to a possible 
example of living form in art, viz, in a work of sculpture,
2, Of. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction, p. $2 (lines 
25-27): '. . . one cannot determine a priori ^^’t object will be in 
lccoadltce with taste or not - one mist find out the object that is
so . • .'
5. What Sc^hllea is really getting at here, is that we cannot prescribe
recipe 'rules* for producing beautiful art objects. But this need not 
paolhLbit him from providing a very genera., purely conceptual definition 
of the I}dea of Beauty, in terms of its essential meeaplhrsiclll mometts.
4. It is only here in Ll5s4, that Sclh.llea comes anywhere near to 
providing the crucial deduction that was paom^sed in H0;7 : ’This pure 
rational concept of Beauty ... would ... have to be discovered by a 
process of abstraction, and deduced from the sheer poten’taHities of 
our sensum-rational nature. In a word, Beauty would have to be shown 
to be a necessary condition of Human Being, ’ The Idea of Beauty is to 
be deduced from the Idea of Human Being, Howver, in Li 5:4-, it is not 
Beauty, but rather the llay-dtive, that is asserted to be necessary for 
compete human being. There is no ’ deduction’ (’ transcendental’, or 
otOerwcse), of Beauty as such. Sclhller seems to believe that to 
demoon'rate the necessity of the play-drive is, ipso facto, to deduce 
the pure rational concept of Beauty (by a kind of 'coat-tedls’ effect).
It is assumed that to demoon'rate the rational necessity of a certain 
end (the play-drivt, or commpete human being), is itself to demenntrate 
the necessity for a llrticutaa asserted to that end (beauty). The
’ transcendental deduction' of the Idea of Beauty that SclOLlLea offers 
in this treatise, merely takes the form of a psychological assertion 
concerning the necessity of the lLay-e.aive for crle>l^'te human being.
5, Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, sections 2-5, pp. 42-50.
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6* Sclhller here uses the term ’play’, not to directly refer to the 
piay-rrLLve's reciprocal relation of primary drives, but to denote what 
Kant (ibid. ) cHls a contee>lativo attiude of ’disinterest* in the 
real existence of am object. Similtaneoujly, ScMller’s use of the 
term * earnestness* roughly corresponds to what Kant calls having am 
’interest’ (sensuous or conceptual) in an object’s real existence.
7. The play-rrivo is the psychological cause of the playful (or 
disinterested) aesthetic attitude to objects. It creates risimtorest 
through a perfectly balanced rational and sensuous engagement (by the 
form and sense drives) with a formed sensuous content. Prima facie, 
this metees disinterest rest upon a total, but balanced, interest, of 
two types. But ScMller sees the interests here as cancelling-out each 
other qua interests, to create am overall ritdntorett (cf. L19:12,
L2O:4, & esp, L22:1). Just how such a perfect balance is created, rests 
upon assertions concerning the psycho logical effect of apprehending 
form, found with specific reference to art objects in L22. Im Letters 
22 onward, however, Scthller does appear to shift his position from 
L14 & L15, to make both beauty and the play-drive (them termed the
* aesthetic concdtion of the psyche1), become form-doImLnlber, rather than 
perfectly balanced.
8. Cf. L14s2, L15s4, and my discussion thereof.
9. Scthller, Aesthetic Letters, op. cit. p. 211,
10. ’With beauty man shall only play; and it is with beauty only that
he shaLl play’ (Li 5:8).
11. This is also indirectly supported by the discussion of inferior 
forms of merely ’agreeable* art, at the end of L27:4, which are products 
of an imperfect play-rrdvo (the ’physical llly-drivo’ ) •
12. Sc]h.llor’s very wide conception of the aesthetic, and of 
aesthetics itself, is a topic I will return to at the end of the 
conclusion to the present work,
13. Schiller only uses this term om one occasion in the treatise, in 
L15:9 (when describing the psychological concdtion of the Greek goed).
Ho prefers to use the term ’pure detorm.naaility’ , rather than either
* indetermination* or ’ inddfOerence* , although in the end, they all come 
to mean much the same thing.
14. See Kant, Critique of Jtrroeenn, op. cit., Part 1, p. 179 (lines 
5-13). Also, p. 64 (lines 3-11)» p. 143 (lines 17-21),
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LETTER 16
1. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 54, p. 201 
(lines 4-9).
2. Miler (pp. cit., p. 115), says that ’reading between the lines, 
one cannot help feeling that Sclhller’s rather unfortunate idea of 
energetic beauty is reHly a disguised form of the sublime’. This view 
is also held by feadstrom (op. cit., p. 242). But neither Miler nor 
Heads trom lee<grulely justify this interpretation, and ultimately, it 
is difficult to see why Sclhller, who was fam-liar with both Burke’s 
and Kent’s theories of the sublime, and had also written on the subject 
himelf (1795), would not use the term ’ sublime’ if that is what he 
meant here.
3. G. W. P. Hgel, Aestheicis, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford Mv. Press, 
1975), vol.- 1, Introduction, pp. 75-81.
4. Where we have not created an art object one elves, an unbalanced 
psychological lre-con<ettion my still lead us, in the course of aesthetic 
contemplation, to subjectively ooEmtrue a beautiful object (of art, or 
in nature), as if it were unbalanced. Cf. L22:6, where Scthller describes 
how an k^bilually one-sided mode of perception, when brought to aesthetic • 
experience, will affect our ability to perceive beauty in a balanced way.
5. In L17:4.
6. Miler (op. cit., pp. 114-115), interprets Scthller here as
explaining why beauty has sometimes had the negative effects on human 
character in history which were described in L1O:4—6. Miler sees this 
explanation as the main purpose of L16 & 17, and fails to see that their 
primary aim is more positive : to develop a theory of aesthetic 
psychotherapy. .
7. This will become clear in L17H.
8. Of. Scthller, On the Bangers of Aesthetic Manners and Moirals (1795), 
(in Weess, op. cit., pp. 175-197). ’The iemereeate propensity for the 
beautiful . « • vitiates the character, and causes us to neglect our 
duty. ’ ’And aesthetic refinement renders man prone to this dangerous 
extreme, as he cornut' himsef, exclusively to the feeling of beauty, 
and maxes taste the unrestrained legislator for his will* (p. 191).
9. A letter from Sclhllea to G>ethe, 2/2/1798, iiuxstrates this point.
’ Your remadcs on opera recalled to me some ideas which I discussed 
rather fully in my Aesthetic Letters J ’. . . c mhch prefer to see 
businessmen, and plhlistines in general., engaged with . . . playful
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humour than idle worldlings, for with the latter the play is always 
without power and character. We ought always to he able to serve each 
party according to its need, and thus I would send the one to the opera 
and the other to see a trege<y-.« In Schmtz, op. cit., vol. 2, p, 52, 
letter 422,
10. The distinction between energizing and melting beauty, finds 
im?picit expression in three other works by Sclhller. In On Naive and 
Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit., p. 214), he describes 
the different psychological effects of experiencing two types of poetry:
. nn [sentimental poetry] his mind is in mooton, it is in tension, 
it wavers between conflicting feelings; whereas in [naive poetry] it is 
calm, relaxed, at one with itself and complieely satisfeed.' We can see 
a presaging of the psychotherapeutic functions of energizing and 
mlting beauty, in On the Stage as a MorraL Institution (178-4), (in 
Bohn, op. cit., p. 559): 'Effeminate natures are steeled, savages made 
man . . Implicit in this too, is the barbarian/savage distinction of 
L4:6. In On Grace and Dignity (1795), (in Bohn, op. cit., p. 219), we 
find two types of 'grace' which, in their effects, correspond to 
energizing and meeting beauty: 'There is a kind of grace which animtes, 
and another which calms the heart.'
LETTER 17
1. The usage of the term 'psychotherapy' here, is unrelated to any 
particular, e.g. Freudian, theory of psychotherapy, extraneous to 
Schiller's own. Dewhurst & Reeves (op. cit., p. 559), use the similar 
expression 'psychic therapy' , and see what they caLl Sclhller's
' therapeutic considerations' in L17, as being rooted in the medical 
doctrines taught at the Mlitary academy*
2, Presumaiy, then, we mist rely on great art preserved from the 
pa3t (of. L9?4), particularly that of ancient Greece (cf. L15*9), to 
provide modern fragmented ran with beautiful art of an ideally balanced 
kind. Hwever, as we will see shortly, aesthetic psychotherapy is 
effected through unbalanced types of beauty.
5. CO. Schiller's nmiitar- a^caLem d.ssertation, CO the Connection 
Between the AnLma. and Spiritual Nature of Man (1780), in Dewhurst & 
Reeves, op. cit.: 'misic mooiifies savages, beauty and harmony ennoble 
mamers and taste, and art leads the w^ to science and morals'
(p. 268). 'The relaxation of man's animal nature is ... a source of
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perfectoon* (p. 281), Bowvvr, dm the dissertation, the
psychotherapeutic function of beauty in. the Aesthetic letters, is 
principally assigned to sleep, through which, ’the harmony of our 
psychic processes is recreated • • •’ ’Sleep • • « restores all things 
to oqullibrtm . . . .’ (p. 284).
PART THREE
LETTER 18
1. Cf. Sclhller, On the Stage as a Moral Institution (1784), (in 
Bohn, op. cit., p. 335): ’Man, neither altogether satisfied with the 
senses, nor for ever capable of thought, wanted a rnddle state, a 
bridge between the two states, bringing them into harmony. Beauty amd 
aesthetics -luppliod that for him’ Cf. also Scthller, On Grace and 
Dgmity (1795;), (in Bohn, op. cit., p. 197): *• • •we shall find the 
beautiful between two extremes, between ... the doimnation exercised 
by the mLnd, ami the ... doImnalion exercised by instinct.’ Schiller 
them talks of *. • . the third state ... that in which reason amd the 
sonses, rt.ty and inclination, are im harmony . . .’
2. Although this expression is not used by ScMller, it does convey 
the position of the psyche in the ’ aesthetic concntion’ in L20 & 21,
(The expression is one frequently found in Schelldng’t philosophy of 
identity, 1801-1804.)
3. Sclhller, Aesthetic Letters, op. cit.: Cf. p. 124 (line 1, last 
word), with p. 125 (line 2, first word).
4. In one of his Kallias letters (1795) to Koomer, Schiller had made 
a more complex fourfold eethodrOoor-cal distinction within aesthetics. 
These are here reduced to two. The philosophers named as rationaaists 
of one kind or another in the letter concerned, were Baumgarten, 
MendrOstohn, and Kant; whilst Burke was identified on the ee>lricist 
side. See letter to Koimer, 25/1/1793, quoted in Schaper, Studies in 
Kant’ s Aesthetics (Edinburgh Un.v. Press, 1979), p. 104,
5. In follcwing after a rational analysis of beauty, the ’ ee>lLri.cise’ 
involved here is only a second order one, vir. it does not involve first 
order oeeldiccll observation and induction. In a later letter to Goethe, 
after similarly referring to the limitations of ee>lricise and
rationalism, Scli.lier tersely describes the true method in pi^losoliy: 
’The pure phenomenon which, as I think, is one with the objective law
284
of nature, can be got at only by rational ee?iit1cise . . . [which] 
itself can never begin dirtctly with empiricism.' Letter 44, 19/1/1798, 
in Schmi^sz, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 18. TgL here of the ’pure phenomenon’ , 
and the 1 objective law of nature’ , provides more evidence of Schiller’s 
absolute idealism. This is also coupled with talk, in the same letter 
to Grethe, of a dialectical method, adding credence to the view of him 
as a proto-He^lim: ’The third category arises at all times from the 
union of the first with the second . • (ibid.). Howver, Whist we
do see some evidence of dialectical relationships between concepts in 
the Aesthetic Letters, (in, e.g*, the llay-erivt’ s relation to the 
primary drives), there is no systematic emloyment of a dialectical 
method (in the manner of Hgge). Wiat maces the work so difficult, in 
fact, is ScUller’s deployment of a variety of tver-f^Oangita
meehodero<£.es, which are sometimes conflated (e.g. psycOolrgicaL/^nLe 
tratscendennel), and even ultimately contradictory (as in his espousal 
of an absolute idealist ontology/and a Picht^an epistemology).
LETTER 19
1. This’ dual ’history’ is simultaneously phylogenetic and ontogenetic : 
a mythical history of the psychological development of both the 
individual and human species. Hire in L19, ScUller only briefly outlines 
the stages in his modd! of psychological development. In L20 & 21, he 
will focus, in abstract terms, on its aesthetic stage, before in L24,
26, & 27,providing a more detailed portrait of man’s psycho-MstoricH 
development.
2. What ScMller is primaaly boaaocita from Fichte here, is the 
general principle that freedom rests upon limitation, thrruaO the 
interdependence of the ego and the non-tar in the process of knowing lte 
willing. In ScUller’s terms, this becomes the tnterdeptettnt e of our 
rational and sensuous natures and their drives, in tte procesp of 
rational knowing (e.g., Li 1:6, L15:5, L19s4), and in (’noble’) moral 
willing (123).
5. Of. Kant, CIa■tique of Judge^n’, op. cit., Introduction, p. 14:
’. # . between the ataLm of . . . the sensible andthe realm re . . . 
the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed . •
4. Hoover, Whist seeking to preserve the ego from Oeteronoey as such, 
ScUller argues in this Letter, and aene:aaLly in the treatise, only for 
a relative autonomy (which incorporates the sensuous), rather than an
285
absolute autonomy, for the ego or psyche in relation to nature and 
sense.
5. See F. Oorlestone, A Hstory of Philos onhy (image Books, 1965), 
vol. 7» Fart 1, ch. 2, p. 77: 'Fichte tries to overcome the dichotomy, 
present in the Katia philosophy, between the higher and lower nature 
of man., between man as a moral agent and man as a complex of instincts 
and impulses.’ ’. . . Fichte sees the moral life as a development out
of the life of instinct and impuLse rather than as a counterblast to it*
6. Ultimately, Sclhller's absolute idealism, with its objective 
ontological status for the Godhead (L11:6 & 7)» and the Ideas (e.g.,
L9:3 & 4)» rules out the full acceptance of Fichte's subjective idealism.
7. See Kat, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 85.
8. Kat, Groundwork of the Me^y^nh^yj-c of Moraas, op. cit., p. 107.
9. Of. SchUler, On the Oormietioi Between the Admal and Spiritual 
Nature of Man (1780), in Dew hurt & Reeves, op. cit.: ’. . . [man's 
animal nature^ is the bed rock on which the constitution of our psychic 
instrument rests . . .' (p. 262), 'Ahmal drives arouse and develop 
spiritual drives' (p. 263). '. . . all the individual's mnnal faculties 
evolve from physical drives' (p. 265). ' • . ♦ Nature not only aroused 
these many drives in mn in order to ensure his comfort, but ... to 
set his drives in morion, to provide a thinking being with food for 
thought , • .’ (p. 267).
10. Viz., willing of the kind required by the categorical imperative 
in Kat's mral philosophy. See Kat, Groundwork of the Meeaphiyic of 
Moraas, op. dt., pp. 69-71, 88.
11. Kat, Critique of Pure Reason, op. dt., pp. 135-161.
EETTBR 20
1, Of, Schller, On the Oormietion Between the Animal and Spiritual 
Nature of Mai, 078O), in Dwhurt & Reeves, op. cit. In the 
introduction, Sclhller presages L19:9 and L20:2, in lmlitSzing the 
importace of both man's rational and sensuous natures, and how moraaity 
and rationality rest upon our phyical being: '. . . the intellect . . . 
deihgrates one part of mn • , . and tries to raise us to the level of 
ideal beings ... a system which flatly cmtradcts our entire 
historical knowledge and philosophical understanding of how the 
individual and the whole race evolves, and which is quite incomptible 
with the limitation of the human soul* '. . . the higher morral ends
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• . . wo achieve with the add of our animal nature • • . their
essential physical foundations • • •’ (p. 257).
2. In L19s9.
5. Sclhller does not explain how the sense-drive recovers from being 
suppressed. Presumably, since our sensuous nature is always ’ there’ , as 
it were, the restoration of the sense-drive is a fairly attomlic 
process, whLch occurs as we begin to also aesthetically apprehend the 
sensuous aspect of a beautiful object.
4. Grossman (op. cit., p. 44), whale rocogiLrimg that the aesthetic 
condition has more than one phase, asserts that ’ play is to Sclhller 
the first phase in the aesthetic stage’. Howwver, Scli.LLler’t view is 
that aesthetic play, properly speaking, presupposes a balanced rational 
and sensuous emragoeent with a beautiful object (cf. 127:4), md 
therefore pertains to the second phase of the aesthetic comd.ti.on of 
the psyche
5. Of. Kat, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, pp, 41, 48, 70 
& 72.
6. This will become clear in 122 & 126.
7. See 127:4 & fn,
8. Cf ./^Scli.ller, On the Necessary Limits of the Beeautful, Especcally 
in the. Presentation of Philosophica Truths (Sept, 1795), (dm WeOss,
op. cit., p. 138): ’True Beauty is based upon ... the highest internal 
necessity; only this definiteness mut wdt to be found, rather tiam 
forcibly intrude itself. The highest conform ty mist exist there, but 
it mut appear as nature. Such a product will fully satisfy the intellect 
is soon as it is studied - but exactly because it is truly ieEal.tiful, 
it does not intrude its conform ty, nor areress itself to tho intellect 
in particular, but it speaks as a pure unity to the harmonizing whole 
of ma.’
9. Cf, Kat, Critique. of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p, 58 (linos 8ff.).
10. For Kat, the pleasure involved in a jurroeent of taste is a 
genera, one, subjectively based on the harmoonou: disposition of the 
faculties of imagination and understanding. Seo ibid., p. 64 (linos 3ff.)•
11. Howvvr, we should not overlook tho genera influence here also of 
Fichte, not directly upon Sclhller’s vi<w of aesthetic experience per se, 
but on the underlying episOmiology amd, in particular, the theory of 
drives involved. The nearest oquivaLent to tho play-drive in Fichte’s 
The Science of fomoe■e(rge, is tho ’ drive to harmony’ (op. cit., pp. 
284-286), In Sclhller’s play-drive, tho psyche is rociprocaiy passively 
roter:miier through the sense-drive/amd actively retereLnimg through the
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form-drive. For Fichte, the drive to harmony is similarly ’, , • 
provided by anything that can be reciprocally viewed as determinate 
and determinant,* ’A drive of this sort is to be found in the drive 
to indetermirnation’ (ibid,, p. 284). The connection between such 
’indetermination’ (or what Sclhller calls the 'pure . determLrnability’ 
of the aesthetic coned, tion of the psyche), and psychological wHooeness, 
is also mule by Fichte: 'This drive may be described as • • . the drive 
to absolute unity and completeness of the self within the self (p. 284). 
Sclhller will mOce it clear in L21:5, that the psychological harmony 
and wholeness achieved in the aesthetic conddtion of the psyche, is 
only a temporary one. Ve find Fichte similarly saying that 'The harmony 
exists, and • • • a feeling of contentment, of repletion, of utter 
completeness (which lasts only a moment, however) . . .' (p. 286). 
Hwever, there is no indication that Fichte conceives of any of this in 
specifically aesthetic term3. The similarity between Sclhller and Fichte 
is one of form, wlhle between Sclhller and Kant there is some 
correspondence of content (in their aesthetic theories),
SETTER 21
1, In 119:2,
2, See Keait, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 43, 48-4-9. 
Unlike the agreeable or the good, '. ♦ . the judgement of taste is 
simply contemplative, i.e, it is a judgement which is indifferent as
to the existence of an object , , ,' It is concerned only with the form 
of a representation, without subsum.ng it under a definite concept.
3, Cf. Sclhller, Oi the Necessary Limits . of the . Beaattiful. . Especially
in the Presentation of Philosophical Truths (1795), (in op, cit.,
p. 174): . our knowledge is not extended by decisions of taste,
and no cognition, not even of Beauty itself, is obtained by the 
perception of beauty. Where then cognition is the aim, taste can be of 
no service to us - at least no direct and immddate service; rather is 
cognition discontinued, just as long as we are occupied with beauty. ' 
Given Sclhller's vi<w in L21:4, that the aesthetic concdtion does not 
produce any particular result for our knowing or willing, and so does 
not translate itself directly into ordinary experience in a concrete 
way, one cannot agree with Savile (op. cit., p. 202), that the
' aestheticization of experience' is an ideal for which is ' central*
to the Aesthetic Letters.
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4. Th.s view receives fim support in L25:1, fn., where Sclhller says 
that the aesthetic concdtion is ’. . .to be distiiguished in each 
single act of perception . . .’ (p. 185).
5. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction, pp. 27 (line 
32)-28 (line 5).
6. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. A, V. Miler
(Oxford Um.v. Press, 1977), para. 658, p. 400.
7. See the description of the 'be(a^ti.ful soul’ in Heggl’s Philosonhy 
of Right, op. cit., para. 13 Addition, pp. 229-250: 'A will eliLci 
resolves on nothing is no actual will . . .' ’The reason for indecision 
may also lie in a faintheartedness which knows that, in willing 
something determ-inte, it is engaging with finiiuide, imposing a barrier 
on itself and sacrificing the infinite; yet it will not renounce the 
totality after which it hankers. Horaver” beahtful” such a disposition 
may be, it is nevertheless dead.'
8. Wilkinson & Willoughby (Sdhller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., 
pp. lxcxx-lxxx-ii), take a similar view of the indirect positive 
relation of the aesthetic condition of the psyche to other domains of 
experience, involved in what they term Sclhller's ' doctrine of 
indirecti-on'. Kain (op, cit., p. 19), informs us that 'Schiller's goal 
is to transform labour and make it more like play’ . Schiller, however, 
sees aesthetic play alternating with earnest ordinary activities of 
knowing and willing,and does not want to aestheticize the rest of life, 
including the labour process. Willoughby, 'Sclhller on Man’s Education 
to Freedom Through Knowwedge’ (G;rmti■h Review, vol. 29, 1954), 
recognizes that the aesthetic concdtion of the psyche is not, per si, 
to be extended to other realms of experience (p. 170), but is a 
predisposition which brings to each and ail of them something of its 
opei^^^s (p. I7I). Wilkinson &Willosgiby, 'The Whole Man in Sclhller's 
Theory of Ou-ture and Society’, op. cit., consider the possible ways 
the aesthetic condition may interrelate with other domains of experience 
The article is flawed by the use of an artificially complex tirle layer 
model of interrelation, involving subordination/co-ordinati on/end 
superordinatioi (based on a biological study Goethe sent to Sdhller).
they give a good account of the ’ doctrine of indirection’ , 
telling us that through the aesthetic condition we are able ’ to further 
the t;utheniicity of determinate acts so that, despite the inevitable 
subordination of powers these entail, they my bi performed with the 
full weight of the whole personalty behind them' (p. 194).
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9. Cf. Sclh-Ller, Oi the MoraH Value of Aesthetic Mamers aid Morals 
(March 1796), (in WeOss, op. cit., p. 201); ’Tasto cam favour m^o^r^;L 
conduct • • • but its influence cam never create that which is eooal.‘
LETTER 22
1. See my note 14, to L14» above.
2. Cf. Scthller, Oi the Necessary Limts of tho Beaaltt.fuL, Especially 
in the Presentation of PfoLlosopthLcal Truths (Sept. 1795), (dn WeOss, 
op. cit., p. 174): *Ais we cai onLy perceive and not cognizo beauty, we 
. • • refer its mode ... but to our perceptive self.1 *We experience 
mothimg in a beautiful object, but from it we oxperioice a change in 
our condition.* Cf. also Kant, Critique of Judgement, op, cit., Part 1, 
p, 42: ’Tins [feeling of pleasure or rislieasurel denotes nothing in the 
object, but is a foeling the subject has of itself . . .’
3. Silhlier is not suggesting the need for some kind of umficatioi of 
the arts.
4. Cf. Kant, Q:ri■tiqto of Judgement, op. cit,, Part 1, p. 67: ’In 
painting, sculpture, and in fact in all tho . . . fine arts, the design 
is what , As essential. Here it is not what gratifies in sensation but 
merely what pleases by its form, that is tho f■umraeentalL prereqqusite 
for taste.’ Sa^vlle (op. cit.), on a numeer of occasions assorts, without 
citing textual support, that Sclhller rejected Ksut’s aesthetic formalism 
Sclhller’s statements here in L22:5, are diseLtsed as a ’ clumsy piece
of bluster’ (p. 242 fn,). Howvvr, this is no isolated eoImntary lapse 
by Schiller, is Sa^vLle impies. Cf, L1Os4, ’ • • • taste is aLways 
concerner with form and never with content . . .’ Of. L26:11, on the 
mood to abstract from the sensuous aspect of art works in a judgement 
of tasto, for ’the appeal ... bo through sheer appearance . . .’
Vo mft ’perceive nothing but sheer somblamie . . .’ The whole theory 
of aesthetic semblance in L26, rests on the idea of art as boimg 
lredomn3lltly formal. See also, Schuller, Oi Naive aid SemtimntaL 
Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit., p. 19B), where SclhLllor’s aesthetic 
formulism leads hi^m to place greater aesthetic value on comedy than 
tragedy: ’Since in jtegoeentt of tasto the cceeent is never taken into 
account, it folltws matun^ly that the aesthetic value of these two 
genres stands in inverse proportion to their substantive significance. ’ 
See also, Scli.ller’s letter to G>ethe, 7/7/1797 (in Schmtz, op. cit., 
vol. 1, p. 353, letter 342): ’Maty, I find err again in a different
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manner, inasmuch as they refer the Idea of Beauty much more to the 
subject of a work of art than to the treament of it • • • '
5. See Kant, Cirtipue of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 43
(disinterestedness); pp. 62-63 (the formal character of beauty); p. 118 
lime 29, to p. 119 line 11 (disinterestedness promotes moral feeling).
6. Through the psychologically harmonizing effect of the aesthetic,
Schiller wants to draw our sensuous nature into mooraity (see 123); 
wlhle Kant wants to aesthetically cultivate a disinterest in sense that 
promotes a moorllty wlhLch opposes the inclinations of sense.
7. Cf. Sclhller, On the Pathetic (1793), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 238): 
'To impaat to men a moral culture, emd to kindle national efeiniises in 
the citizen, is truly an honmu^b^e mssion for the poet . . .' 'But 
that which wtould emnently prosper in a mecdate connection with poetry, 
would have, in an immediate connection, but an ill success.' 'Its sphere 
of action in the totality of human nature, and so far as it has an 
influence upon the character, can it influence its single operaaions.'
LETTER 23
1. Cf. ,L21:4.
2. Kart, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 64 (lines 3-11), 
p. 83 (the common sense).
3. Ibid., p. 151 llinss 16-28).
4. Sclhller will gurtuallly use hhe eemi 'well-bergg ’ in the next para. 
(L23:7)> in connection with ordering or imposing form on our natural 
desires. In L24j5 (p. 177), he will describe well-being as a
' mlairestltion of reason' in the purely sensuous man, as he strives 
for absolute being.
5. Of Sclhller, The Philosophy of Physiology (1779), (in Dewlhurst 
& Reeves, op. cit., p. 163), where Sclhller describes the ability of 
the soul to 'choose' freely which 'maeehal ideas' to concentrate upon, 
via ' attention', Monellty, resting on freedom, is dependent upon the 
soul's ability to engage in such attention. This earlier simple idea 
of choice, as involving inner self-deermination by the soul, presages 
the psyche's organization of man's inner sensuous life in well-being, 
here in L23, whereby man is able to realize 'his physical destiny with 
a certain freedom of spirit . . (L23:6).
6. The inportance of man's morraL education beginiiig in his physical 
substructure, is an idea which Sclhller mintains in On Naive and
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Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. dt., p. 229): *. . . the 
ideaList lift to himelf would just as little seek to cultivate the 
sensuous faculties or to educate man as a natural being) yet this is 
an equaLly substantial part of man's vocation and the coned.tion of 
all moral ennoblement.’
7. This notion of the 'noble* moral will, is presaged in Sdhller’s 
On Grace and Dignity (1795), (in BoHn, op. dt., pp. 198 ff.), in such 
statements as: ', . • it is ordLnsfily more favourable to the conformity 
of acts with the [moral 1 law that inclination is on the side of duty'
(p. 198). '. . . virtue is not anything else than an inclination for 
duty' (p. 199). ’. . . when mooraity has become to him a second nature, 
it is then only that it is secure . . .' (p. 200). ’. , , in a noble 
soul it is not this or that particular action, it is the entire 
character WhLci is moosa.' 'It is then in a noble soul that is found 
the true harmony between reason and sense, between inclination and
duty . . .' (p. 205).
8. Regin (op. dt.), mistakenly refers on a number of occasions to 
Scdller's m^jsal aim in the Aesthetic Letters as being the aesthetic 
cultivation of sublime character. (See e.g. p. 127.)
9. Of. .f>chiller, On the OornIiltion Between the Animal and Spiritual 
Nature of Man (I78O), (in Dewkhust & Reeves, op. cit., p. 262)j '. . . 
not even the spirit's most strenuous efforts can withstand the onslaught 
of animal feelings and, as they intensify, reason grows numb and the soul 
is forcibly enchained to the organism’ Wilkinson & Willoughby (Scdller's 
Aesthetic Letters. op. cit., p. xci), tell us Schaller objected to 
Kant's concept of the moral dll because of '. • • its im^aacicabblity
- an ideal of human conduct WhLhi lies outside the realm of genuine 
possibility because it is, in the last arn^l^yis, incompatible with 
human nature in its phenomenal existence’.
10. K. Wilcox, 'On Sublimation and Suppression in the Woasks of Scdller' 
(Germaac Review, vol. 55, 1980), argues that this sem.~ratimaaLization 
of our sensuous nature, involves its rational suppression, through the 
loss of its sensuous integrity. (Certainly, Schiller's notion of noble 
morral volition, does not inirlie a harmony of moral reason and natural 
impulse which is on equal terms, for our sensuous nature has to move 
towards becoming more rational, wlhlst morsa reason does not have to 
become like our sensuous nature, or ' slm.-liatu3rbLized' , as it were.
The 'harmony' in the 'noble' moral will, is achieved by a one-sided 
psychological developm!.)
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11. This view represents a radical departure for Schiller from his 
views in earlier philosophical works, where generally he sees a 
complementary role for sublime moral willing, as and when necessary, 
alongside noble moral volition. Whereas, in the Aesthetic Letters, 
sublime willing is ruled out as impracticable, in On Grace and Dignity 
(1793), (in Bohn, op. cit.), it is regarded as a reserve position of 
rational domination to fall back on, on those occasions when 
psychological harmony puts moral freedom at risk (p. 216). In On the 
Dangers of Aesthetic Manners and Morals (Dec. 1795), (in Weiss, op. cit.), 
Schiller expresses a highly cautious view of noble moral volition:
’It is true fthe aestheticj succeeds in ennobling the desires, and 
bringing them into greater harmony with the demands of reason; but 
from this very success great danger may finally result for morality*
(p. 191). ’• • . it may happen that those impulses which before were 
only fearful through their blind violence, become far more dangerous 
to morality of character, through an appearance of dignity and an 
assumed authority, and exercise a far worse tyranny ... beneath the 
mask of . . . nobleness’ (p. 192). However, in On the Moral Value of 
Aesthetic Manners and Morals (March 1796), (in Weiss, op. cit.), it is 
again sublime moral willing which is seen as an insecure basis for 
morality: *We can never expect human nature, so long as it is human 
nature, to act as pure reason, uniformly and steadfastly, without 
interruption or relapse, and never to offend against moral order’
(p. 208). In On The Sublime (1801), (in Weiss, op. cit.), there is 
the need, on occasions, for psychologically disharmonious sublime moral 
willing to take over from harmonious noble willing. Schiller, then, 
wavers in his views between 1793-1801, as to the adequacy, on its own, 
of harmonious noble willing. We can view the Aesthetic Letters as 
involving a temporary optimism concerning such volition.
12. This entails a much wider conception of ’aesthetic education’ than 
some commentators have recognized in the Aesthetic Letters. E.g.,
Grossman (op, cit., p. 43), talks only of art’s educative effect, 
ignoring the vital early role of well-being, and reducing aesthetic 
education to art education. As Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller’s 
Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., p. lxv) correctly point out: *We are 
unlikely to grasp what Schiller was after if we suppose “artistic 
culture" is an adequate rendering of "aesthetic education". The latter 
was to begin far earlier than the contemplation or creation of works
of art; it was also to extend far beyond it.’
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15. Savile (op, cit., pp. 2126 ff.), finds difficulty in undeerjtmding 
how man aesthetically develops a mioral character. The problem arises, 
as he overlooks the role of well-being in proto-iass thetically educating 
man's sensuous nature, while he is still in a natural state. He 
msinterprets L25;6-8, as relating to giving an externally
aesthetically pleasing form to our actions to realize our i^n^^ses 
(p. 227), rather than as an internal rational organization of the 
impulses by the psyche. He may have been msled by Sclhller's footnotes 
to L25:7, which not only look ahead to the mors! harmony which may 
result from the seM-rationalization of man's inipulses, but also to 
the aesthetic forms created by the noble soul (in L27). As Schiller 
says in L23;7 fn. 1, such maiiestltions are the 'mark of a noble soul'. 
L25 is, in its main paras. (6-8), concerned with the formation of such 
a noble disposition, not with its later external aesthetic maife8tationS) 
Savile is led to incorrectly state (p. 242), that moral character is 
formed at the 'terminus' of the aesthetic stage of development, whereas 
the whole point of L25, is to argue that the essential foundation of a 
moral disposition is laid down earlier, by the rational formation of 
man's sensuous inpulses at the physical stage of development.
?*.
LETTER 24
1. Wilkinson & Willoughby, 'The Wole Man in Sclhller's Theory of 
Culture and Society' , (op. cit., p. 182), see the general concept of a 
psychological history as being derived . from HurLer. Hconver, Grossman 
(op. cit., p. 40), points instead to Lessing's Education of the Human 
Race (I78O), as providing the relevant precedent. M. Jones (op. cit.,
p. 55), argues that Sclhller presents an aesthetically orientated mUhcal 
history which reduces human history to aesthetic history : history becomes 
'ae^t^^'tic^z^ed'. K. Wilcox (op, cit.), believes that a psychological 
history of man may be elicited from Sclhller's On Grace and Righty 
(1795)» similar to that in the Aesthetic Letters (1795). Howver, unlike 
the former work, there is no notion of a pre-established fuidamnial 
harmony between reason and nature in the psycholo£gcal history presented 
in the Aesthetic Letters. Instead, we start from the purely sensuous 
man, and seek to develop his latent rationality, so as to establish 
such a harmony,
2. Historicism : 'The belief that an adequate understanding of the 
nature of anything and an adequate assessment of iis value are to be
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gained by considering it in terms of the place it occupied and the 
role it played within. a process of development.1 Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards (Mamillan, 1967), vol. 4, p. 24. Also : 
’Concerned with the discovery of "laws of development'* that govern 
the historical process and perit long term social forecasts and 
predictions.’ A Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. A. Flew (Maanhllm,
1979), p. 138.
3. Cf. L12:2 & fn.
4. Sclhller’s awareness here that he is only providing a rational 
model of development, not a history proper (in the sense of a 
chronological account of actual events based on historical evidence), 
invalidates Jones’ criticsmm (see note 1 above), that he reduces human 
history to an aesthetic history. He is not concerned with human history 
in Jones’ sense.
5. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. )18 (A326, H383).
6. However, for Kant, while we may infer Ideas of theoretical reason, 
we cannot cognize them. See Kant, ibid., pp. 308-9 (A31O-311, H3&8); 
pp. 318-19 (A327, H384).
7. Hre, Schiller points to the only limited rational character of 
the standpoint of ’eell-beiIg.’ developed in L23. Whilst it sets us on 
the path to morality, by reducing sensuous hindrances to its development 
(in the form of naked blind impulsse), it does not itself provide man’s 
volition with rational purposes or moral ends. It merely provides 
sensuous man with a sem.-rational form for pursuing purely natural ends, 
as he seeks to realize his physical needs in a systematic manner. 
Well-being may set man on a path to iorality, but in itself, it is 
devoid of morra content, pertaining to sensible, not supereeinhble ends.
8. Tlhs is a criticim which can be made of the treatise as a whole, 
and was indeed made at the time by Scthller's friend Komer. Letter to 
Sclhller, 16^7/1793, referring to the third and final batch of Letters 
(L17-27) published in The Hnren a month earlier in June 1793: ’The last 
Letters gave me great satisfaction. The results seem to me of the 
highest importance; the deductions however, do not qihte please me.’
(in Simpson,op. cit., vol. 3, PP* 3-6.) Also, letter to Sc]hlllr, 
14/9/1793, passing judgement upon the Aesthetic Letters as a whole:
’. . . here and there I miss precision, and proof.’ ’I should desire to 
see more clearness and precision, more conclusive evidences, and so 
forth.’ (ibid., vol. 3, p. 17.) Mny modem readers will find theme Ives 
echoing Korner's sentiments here.
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9. Viz., the psychology of aesthetic conte^mlatirn.
LETTER 25
1. Tlhs crmnectioi between self-conscicusness, contenplatirn, distance 
and disinterestedness, is also very briefly noted by Miler (op, cit., 
p. 120).
2. Although Scthller only uses the team 'distance’, then is a notable 
similarity between Sclhller's idea and Edward Bsllrsgi's crnhllt of 
’psychca distance' , in ’PsyclhLcal Distance as a Factor in Art and an 
Aesthetic Principle' , (British Journal of Psychology, vol. 5, 19^2). 
B^ULlcugi described ' aesthetic consciousness' as ’ distanced’ , to the 
extent that our engagement with an object is sicrncerned with practical 
needs and ends. The similarity between Sclhller and Bulloslgi here, is 
noted by E.-M. Wilkinson, 'Sdhller's Concept of Schein in the Light of 
Recent Aesthetics’ , (German Quaterly, vol. 28, 1955, p. 219). See also 
Wilkinson & Willoughby (Edhller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit.,
p. hlx^i.ii), where Bxu.lough's work is said to owe a great deO. to 
Scihilet.
3. Although Sclhller does not explicitly refer to ’foam’ here, it ss 
clear from L22;5 tibt '. . , only through the form is tHe whche man 
affected . . .’ and not simply '. . . one or other of Idi functions’.
4. In the refennhe to ' any law or purpose’.
5. Ka^n, Cottique of Ju<dgemli, oon cit., Part 1, sections 2-5,
pp. 42-50.
6. Grossman (op. cit., p. 43), sees the aesthetic condition of the 
psyche only as a 'stage' in man's cultural evolution and, like many 
other hrmnnniatort;, ignores Sclhllet’s point hetl that it is an integral 
congonent past of the homle'te process of perception. The aesthetic 
concdtion is not to be viewed simply as a discrete histrtihbl ’ stage’
in man's psychological development, but also as a letmtIenily mediating 
momnt in out total experience (once iil aesthetic stage has been 
approximaely attained, and we have left behind the purely physical 
state).
7. Of. e.g., L26:11.
8. Plato, The Repum-c, trans. D. Lee (Peingrin Books, 1974)» pp. 3''6-32 5.
9. Rann, Critique of Judgement op. cit., Introduction , sectrins iv to 
vi, pp. 18-27, (esp. pp. 18, 23, 25, 27).
10. See L22:5, and my discussion iie:rerf.
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11. Ibid.
12. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 11,
pp. 62-65.
15, Using the term * GogoLi-LLt-e’ hehe t t mean kkiwig in .he w^ewt 
sense, whether involving eae^lpci.t or i melOlit concepts, (in SchiSler’s 
theory of contempt ion, concepts are impOlcitll involved, and it is 
an integral part of the oompOete process of knowing; of. 125:1 fn. )
14. Cf. Sclhller, On Grrce and Dignity (in BUton, op. cit., p. I78):
'. . . beauty belongs at the same time to . . . two worlds ... '
'. . . taste ... holds at once the spiritual element and that of 
sense ... these two natures, inoom)oli’ble one with the other, approach 
in order to form in it a happy union.'
15. Karnt, Critique of Practical Reason, op. cit., pp. 76-79.
16. Or, to be m>re accurate, by the rationaLly informed i^gnation 
(as will bei&Lsclosed in L27:4 & fn.).
17. In Burke' s A. Pihlosopihcal ^10^^ into the Origin of our Ideas 
of the Sublime ana. Beautiful ( 1(57)? ed. J. T. Boultoo (LooLoo, 1998); 
and in Kali's Crrtique of JuBgemeni, o^ cct., Part 1.
18. Conitruting Sclhller and Kant on this issue, Ellis (op. cit.),
tells us jthat Sclhller '. . .is aeaed that beauty is a product of the 
mLnB and the object and so cannot exist without subjects. But he considerra 
rightly, that this does not exclude the exam.iiation of the stnurture of 
objects'. (Sochller considers their 'structure' , understood in the most 
general sense, as the overaaLl edllOionstip between form and content in 
objects of art and beauty, in e.g. L1^?2, L16:1, L17:4, L22:4 & 5,
L25:5 & 6.) In contrast, 'Kant does mot speak about the examnation of 
objects, being content to point out the orelConcdLtions for observing 
beauty in the subject' (p. 125).
19. Ths twofold reciprocity of form ilB mitter in the beautiful 
object, and thought and feeling in mn, is an iBn Schller continued 
later in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit., 
p. 207): '. . . aesthetic content is containeB only in the
comd-nation of spirit anB mater, and in the um.fi.ed relation of i wozk 
to the faculties of feeling and ideas.'
20. Sclhller's definition of beauty in his KaHins letters (1792), as 
' freedom in appearance' , also involves the beaitiful object being an 
mKogue for the moral will (and thus a symbol of rnjoraii^^). '. . . the 
beautiful world of sense CisD the happpest symbol of what the moral 
world should be, and every object about me . . . cHls out ”0' free
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like m3*’.’ KsUias letter of 23/2/1793 (quoted in Headstrom, op. cit., 
p. 239). The form of the beautiful object has to appear free, deepi-te 
sensuous hindrances (pjhrsicaL forces), by seeming to overcome them.
The mrality symbolized is thus one involving sublime mora willing.
In the Aesthetic Letters, by contrast, the definition of beauty as 
’ living form’ involves the harmony of form and miter in the object, 
symbol zing the harmony of rlairn and sense in the noble moral will.
The disposition of the moral will symborized by beauty in each of the 
two works is, therefore, quite different,
21. Cf. L14s2, 'Should tieal ... be cisis in which he were to have 
this twofold experience simultaneously, in wh.ch he were to be at once 
conscious of his freedom and sensible of his existence . . . the object 
which afforded him this vision would become for him a symbol of his 
accomlishld destiny and ... serve him as a maniestation of the 
infinite.’ -
22, This appears to contradict Scihller’s earlier statement, in L19:&, 
that in no sense does beauty ’bridge the gulf’ separating feeling from 
thinking. Hcowver, as Sc]h.llea there went on to say, 'beauty can become 
a means of leading man . . . from a limited to an absolute existence' , 
’not by providing an aid to thought' in a positive sense, but by 
providing nason with ' the freedom to express itself according to its 
own laws’, viz., by diminishing sensuous hindaancei to rational 
sej^;fd^(5te:minati^on, through rendering our sensuous nature compali01e 
with our rational being. Beauty thus provides a negative, indirect menis, 
whereby reason is enabled to develop itself out of nature, to attain a 
relative autonomy.
LETTER 26
1. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction, pp. 20-27, 30. 
Part 1, pp. 62-63.
2. Ibid., Part 1, pp. 2O0-2O9, 220 (line 20).
3. IWoI., PpiI 1t p» 222 ((ir^ee 2O-2O0.
4. Ibid., Part 2, pp. 99-100, 108-109.
3. Ibid, d Innroddution, p, 39 (Hires 8-144* Part 1, p. 119 (1!^
7-11), pp. 22^222, 222 (lsat pare.).
6. Like many other crmainnalo:]a3, Savile (op, cit.) mssis the role of 
natural beauty in L26:2, and wonders how a interims original ’ gift 
of nature’ gives rise to the play-drive (p. 230). Kerry (Schillea’s
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Writings on Aesthetics, op, cit.), also fails to notice the role of 
natural beauty in man* s psycholo^-cal development. Whhreas Schiller 
sees natural beauty, and our natural senses (in 126:6), as encouraging 
such development, Kerry, more negdhvely, simply declares that ’nature 
does not prohibit higher activities’ (p. 160).
7* Cf. 127:5, ’Now the ancient German goes in search of glossier skins, 
statelier antlers, more elaborate drinking horns; and the Caledonian 
selects for his feasts the prettiest shells’, At the stage Schiller is 
now talking about in 126:2 & 3, it is nature, not art, which provides 
forms for ornamental display and aesthetic pleasure,
8, This distinction has a long history. See 1, Sum^m3^ (op, cit.,
p, 353): ’According to AMstotle only the senses of sight and hearing 
were able to perceive the be^uitiful, and this was for reasons that were 
entirely consistent with the idea of beauty as proportion. Mny authors 
repeated , -• , that sight and hearing were the highest of the senses 
because they were the only ones to which the divine order of the world 
could be apparent, Aiugistine argued in this way, contributing to the 
widespread notion that hearing and sight were the more spiritual of the 
senses, while the other three, smel.1, taste and touch, were associated 
with the, flesh. *
9, Unddrlying this is a distinction between the merely reproductive 
imagination/and the productive (or creative) imaag. nation, which is found 
in Schiller’ s discussion of the aesthetic imagination in 127:4 fn:
’. . . before the imagination, in its productive capacity, can act 
according to its own laws, it must first, in its reproductive procedures 
have freed itself from alien laws,’
10$ M-l, Waldeck, ’Shadows, Reflexions, Mirror Images and Virtual 
"Objects” in Die Kiimtler and their Relation to Schiller* s Concept of 
"Schein'” (Modeem Language Review, vol. 58, 19^3), points out how some 
features of Sdh,llLe:i” s theory of aesthetic semblance are presaged in his 
earlier poem The Artists (1789). However, she goes awry in underetanding 
Schiller’ s theory principally in terms of optical illusion, E. M. 
Wilkinson (op, cit.), correctly emppaaszes that the illussicn in ’Schein’ 
is ’. • . something the artist creates, as a property of his work, not 
just a w^ of looking at it . . .’ (p$ 223). Wilkinson recognizes that 
Schiller’ s theory of aesthetic semblance is primarily concerned with the 
process of artistic production, rather than aesthetic contemplation (and 
optics). The business of the artist ’, , , is to create a new dimension 
apart from the famliar world’ (p, 223).
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11, There is here a break with the theory of beauty in Schiller' s
Kalil aa le-tiers (1793). There beauty was defined as 'freedom in 
appearance1, Initially, Sclh.lldr took the view that the lppelrance of 
freedom was oomldredd upon the object, a priori, by practical reason. 
Howver, as the Kallias letters progressed, and under critical pressure 
from Korner, he moved away from pr^i^:icl( reason to the object itself 
(thus breaking the bonds of Kentim epistemology). If one can establish 
that an object' s form has been determined by its own essential nature 
alone (and not by external physical forces, or by human purposes), then 
the object is beautOful. 'Freedom in lpoelrance' involved the 
ooeedsoondemce of an object' s form to iis own substantive nature. In 
contrast, Schiller's theory of aesthetic semblance in the Aesthetic 
Letters (1795), involves the of form from what lppeles as its
natural substantive being (l26:8 & 9), Ohr:ougt the intervention of the
' outside' human activities of abstraction anB imlgimativd re-formation. 
There is also a return within the general framework of Kantian, 
epistemology, with the form of an object being the work of man (L26s4), 
who gives 'form to OOiO which is formless' (L255 3). Dropped now is the 
KaHHas idea of the object having an independent form of its own, more 
or less .corresponding' to some ontological 'essential nature',
Now some scholars have failed to see this mjor shift in Schiller1 s 
viewpoint. According to Ellis (op, cit,, p, 138), 'the theory of beauty 
in Cthe Aesthetic Letters ] is not in any eldioal way different from the 
[Kallias letters]’. In the view of Schaper, 'Schiller1 s Kant : A Chapiter 
im the ffiLstory of Creative MisunderstandingT1 (Studies in Kant1 s 
Aesthetics, op. cit,, ch. 5), in the Aesthetic Letters 'freedom in 
aooearlmce' there becomes transposed into the key notion , , , of 
aesthetic semblance. Things in their natural state , , , appear to the 
senses as beautiful' (p, 116), Howver, for Sclhller, there is no 
question of autonomous aesthetic semblance involving leaving objects 
' im their natural state', It is central to Schiller' s theory of 
aesthetic semblance that our imagination creatively re-forms an 
abstracted phenomem! form. What Schaper describes, would be for 
Schiller ’dependent’ semblance, not 'ltt<iIomots' aesthetic sembbance,
(see L26;10 & 11),
12, The need to dispense 'with all support from reHty', and thus for 
mterial taken from external reality to be creatively reformed, rather 
than merely imltatively reproduced, is reflected in Schiller’s discussion 
of ’elegy' in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), (im Nisbet, op, cit,
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p, 201): 'The external mater is, therefore, always indifferent in 
itself, since the poetic art can never employ it as it occurs, but 
only by means of what poetry mazes of it does it receive poetic value.’ 
L^iier in the same work, Shriller warns that • the naive poetic
spirit is in danger of nourishing itself all too much with common 
reality . . .’ , with the result that it , achieves only the
spiritless and ignoble expression of the actual . . .’ (p. 217), In 
his discussion of daamaic poetry in Oi the Pathetic (1795), (in 
We^s, op. cit., p. 236), Shriller tells us that ’the pleasure we take 
in ideal characters loses nothing by the recollection that they are 
poetic fictions : for all aesthetic effect is based upon poetic, not 
upon historic, truth. Hut poetic truth does not consist in the fact 
that something has really happened but that it could happen’, Cf.
Shriller, Ol TTh TTragc Ari ((7922, (Weiss, op. cit., p. 315): ’• . . 
tragedy • .-. (differs from historic imitation.’ ’If it pursued a 
historic design , , . it would be obliged to confine itself entirely 
to historic correctness.’ ’It possesses freedom in imitation : it 
contains • , , , the obligation, to subordinate historic truth to the 
laws of poetry.’ ’It betrays very narrow conceptions of the tragic 
art • , > to teg the tragic poet before the tribunal of hisro3y. , and 
to demand instruction foom him, who , , , is plecged for emotion and 
delight llrnl.’
13. Cf, Shriller, On the Sublime (I60I), (in Weess, op, cit,, p. 247): 
’But after all, the semblance will still have a corpoisity, in which it 
manfests itself, and so , , , a need alml.ms for the existence of 
objects , , ,’
14. Kant, Critique of Judgement op, cit,, Part 1, section 2, pp. 42-44; 
section 3, pp. 48-30,
13. These points are made in ibid., Part 1, section 16, pp. 72-73, Kant 
gives flrweai as an example of free beauty in nature, and ’music that is 
not set to words’ as an example of free beauty in art. The beauty of a 
woman (see ibid., p. 73, line 4) in nature, or of a church in art, each 
presuppose the concept of an end, and so are examples of dependent 
beauty. For Shriller, the problem with the beauty of a woman, as we 
will shortly see, is not the conceptual, but rather the sensuous interest, 
we take in her. In contrast to Kant, Schiller lophilizls sense, 
rather than concepts, as posing a problem for the ’purity’ of aesthetic 
juege]oents. As a dramtist, no doubt Shriller was not keen on the idea 
that concepts (and thus words), may under an art form inferior (as
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’ dependent’) in character,
16, Ibid., Part 1, section 16, p, 74 (lines 18-21),
17, The need to ’dispense with the element of life’, shows how far 
Schiller’ b earlier definition of beauty as ’living foma’ (in 1,15:2) 
has been revised, to now become the pure form of ’ sheer semblance’
(in L,26:11),
18, Cf, Sclhller, On the Sublime (I80I), (in Weess, op, cit,, p, 26o):
’ , . , as the whole enchantment of the , , • beautiful cornists only in 
the show and not in the contents, art has every advantage over nature, 
without sharing her fetters.* For Kait, in contra t, the purposively 
contrived character of art makes it more likely to be dependent beauty, 
Kant, Cr-ti^que of Judgement, op, cit,, Part 1, p, 158 (line 30), talks 
of ’ , • , the superiority which natural beauty has over that of art
, . , ’, and how ’, , , in estimating beauty in art the perfection of 
the thing must be also taken into account , , ,’, ibid., Part 1, p, 173 
(lines l0-11), The contrast between Kant and Schiller here, again 
reflects Schiller’s greater concern with the sensuous, rather than the 
conceptual, as threatening the ’purity’ of aesthetic experience,
19’ Ibid,, Part 1, section 16, pp. 72-73­
20, Here, SclaLllei does fol.l<w Kant, in ibid.. Part 1, p. 74 (last 
para.).
21, See L26:1O, for this second way in which semblance may be
dependent,
22, In Schiller’s view, art should not have a direct moonl aim. It 
achieves its mural influence indirectly through re-creating
psycho logical harmony and whooeness. Cf, Schiller, On the C souse of the 
Pleasure W^ Derive from Tragic diets (179*1), (in Bohn, op, cit,, 
p, 362): ’If it is the aim that is moral, art loses all that by which 
it is powerful, . - X mean its freedom , • ,’ ’The play which recreates 
is changed into serious occupation, and yet it is precisely in 
recreating us that art can the better ooinelete the great affair - the
morral work. It cannot have a salutary influence upon the morals but in
2
exercising its hi ghee t aesthetic action, and it can only produce the 
aesthetic effect in its highest degree in fully exercising its liberty,’ 
Cf, also SchLller’& letter to G>ethe, 7/8/1797, criticizing Diderot’s 
aesthetics : ’In his aesthetic works, I think, he still looks too much 
to foreign and monal aims , , ,’ ’To him the beauuiful work of art must 
always serve some other purpose,’ ’, , , he seeks this effect of art in 
its substance, an”d in some definite result for the understanding , , ,’
/ '
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(in Scholz, op, cit,, vol. 1, p. 3&5, letter 335*)
23, Sim lari ties between Schiller's ideas and Nietzsche’ s early
aesthetic views, are discussed by Adrian Del Caro, ’Ethical Aes^he^ic : 
ScM-lln and Nietzsche as Critics of the Eighteenth Century’ (Girimnic 
Review, vol. 33» 1980), Both men looked back to a Greek ideal, and were 
concerned with the function of art in society, Del Caro also points to 
the later divergence of Nietzsche's views from those of SchUler (with 
Nietzsche explicitly criticizing Scthller),
24, Cf, L26:3.
23, Cf, P, Nietzsche, The Hirth of Tragedy, trans, C. Padiman (New York,
1927): ’Art approaches as a , , , healing enchantress ; she alone my 
transform these horrible reflections on , , , the absurdity of existence 
into representations with which man my live’ (p, 210), 'Art is not 
merely an imitation of the reaLity of nature, but in fact a 
meeaphisScul supplement to the reality of nature , , ,’ (ibid, p. 334). 
Cf, also P, Nietzsche, The Wiil to Power, trans, 0, Levy (London, 19I0), 
vol, 2s ’Art is with us in order that we my not perish through truth’
(p, 264), 'We are in need of lies in order to rise superior to this 
reality, to this truth - that is to say in order to live , , ,’ (p, 289). 
'All artworks as a tonic;’ (p, 232), ’Art is essentially the affiliation 
the blessing, and deification of existence’ (p, 263).
LETTER 27
1, See e,g,, Kant, Critique of Judgement, op, cit,, Part 1, p, 30 
(lines 17 ff.)j p, 38 (liines 8 ff,),
2, Ibid., p, 73: , it is a clog on the purity of the judgement of
taste to have the agreeable (of sensation) joined with beauty to which 
properly only the form is relevant , , ,’ (lines 8-11),
3, Note the cIiii identification here of ’autonomous ’ aesthetic 
semblance with ’the realm of art’ , (Mere artifacts, and natural beauty, 
are forms of ’dependent’ iembOLance.)
4, Kant, Critique of Judgement, op, cit,, Part 1, section 2, pp. 42-44; 
section 3, PP. 48-30; and esp, section 11, pp. 62-63,
3, In L26:2 & 6.
6, Cf, Sc^hllea’i use of the terms ’sheer appearance’ and ’sheer 
semblance’ in L26;11 (last 2 sentences). Although the artist does not 
create a 'pure forma’ as such, what is aesthetic about the form domnated 
object he creates (of, L22:5), is its forma, aspect. Autonomous aesthetic 
semblance my be lmbocdLed in a sensuous medium, but in aesthetic
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oonteIi^latinm, we mut totally abstract from this if our judgement of 
it is to be purely aesthetic (cf. L26:11, p. 199, first sentence),
7, Of, Kant's discussion of the psycho logical effect of apprehending 
an ' aesthetic idea', in the Crrtique of Judgement, op, cit., Part 1, 
p. 177 (linds 7-17)5 p. 179 (lines 5-15).
8, Wnere it was stated that in the aesthetic concdtiom, the psyche is 
'. , , in no wise free from laws' , but that ', , , the laws according 
to wltLch the psyche then behaves do not become apparent as such , , .'
In other words, concepts are involved in aesthetic experience, but only 
im?0(citll so,
9, There seems no reason to inOdroret the 'faculty for ideas' here, as 
being anything other 0tam the understanding, Wilkinson & Willoughby 
(Scthller's Aesthetic Letters, op, cit,, pp, 292-295, mote on L27s4 fn.), 
quote extensively from Sclhller's letter to Korner .I/12/1788, in wth-ch
he argues for the meed for a loose co-operation between ' the understanding' 
and the imag-initiom, in the interests of genuine artistic creativity,
Cf, Sclt.llde, On the Necessary Lim-ts of the Beauttf•UL, Especially in 
the Presentation of Plttloso^iItical Truths (1795), (im Weess, op, cit,, 
p, 190): ' CThe true artist 5 subjects luxuriant fancy to the discipline 
of taster and sufldes the sober intellect to survey the banks, between 
eltich the streem of inspiration is to leap and sparkle,' Im On Nsa.ve 
and Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit,, p. 201), Schiller 
warms against too much control of the i^glnation by the undere3tlmding's 
thought, in his oeiticiem of Rousseau's poetry: 'His serious character 
never perm-ts him , , . , to rise to poetic play*' '• • , it is his excess 
of thought that lays shackles upon his imagination.’
10, TWLs distinction between the reproductive/amd productive
imagination, and the association of creativity with the latter, is also 
found im Sclhller, On the Necessary Lim.ts of the Begautful, Espeocally 
in the Presentation of PttLlosoolhLcal Truths (1795), (im Weess, op. cit., 
p, 177): 'Then the imagination will be brought into play much more by 
the popular exposition, but still only reprodut00^v^ll (renewing 
commuiiated representations), and not produucively (demormsratimg its 
self-creating power).’ The distinction is also found in Kait, Critique 
of Judgement, op, cit,, Part 1, p, 86: If mow, imagination mut in the 
judgement of taste be regarded in its freedom , , . it is mot taken as 
edproducOive, as in its subjection to the laws of association, but as 
productive and exerting am activity of its own , , ,'
11, Despite the clear similarities between ScMller and Kant here,
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Savile (op, cit., p, 201 fn,), creates a false contrast between them : 
asserting that whereas Kant explains beauty in terms of the harmony of 
imagination and understanding, Sdhiller does so in terms of mater and 
form. In fact, however, Sclhller does both ; explaining the psychological 
process involved in creating and csntemplating beauty in terms of the 
former harmony, and the laenomenllosJic^al structure of the beoiuiful 
object in terms of the latter,
12, Schaper, ‘Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Sclhller’ 
(op, dt,, p, 162), denies that in the Aesthetic otters Sclhller ever 
uses a Caahesian mlnd/body dichotomy, but instead foioowed Kant’ s 
distinction between man’s cognitive faculties of sense/end reason.
However, in my view, in the earlier Letters Sclhller operates the wider 
Caar;esian drnlity between the rational and tentustt natliet of man, and 
then in later Letters gradually moves to the lesser Kantian distinction 
of opposed coghtive facuLties, in order to resolve the earlier dmlity. 
Even Schaper, when talking of the primary drives, relates one to ‘man’s 
animl nature’ , and the other to his ’spirit’ (p. 163), Wilkinson & 
Willoughby, ‘The Wh>le Man in Scdller’s Theory of CuLture and Society’
(op, cit,), recognize that i-n the earlier Letteie, it is not meekly the 
faculty -$f sense, but man’s physical being as such, that is involved.
Thus they talk of ’, , • his concept of an aesthetic mode , , , involving 
, , , the whole man, his physical being induded’ (p, 197).
15. Sclhller sees this development as also due to man’s increasing 
sociability, as he seeks to not merely please dmslf, but also others:
’ Soon he is no longer content that things should please him; he himself 
wants to please. At first, indeed, only through that which is his; 
finally through that which he is ’ (L27:5). We find the same idea of 
man’ s early activity of embellisiment being related to his sociability 
and desire to please others, in Kant, Cdtique . of Judgement, op. dt,,
Part 1, p, 155 (lines I7 ff*): At ‘, , , the beginning of civilization 
, , ,‘ man is ’. • , not quite satisfied with an object unless his feeling 
of delight in it can be shared in commuion with others,’ ’, • , at first 
only charms, e.g, colours for painting oneself , , • or flcwere, sea 
shells, beaiuifuLly coloured feathers, then in the course of time, also 
beauuiful forms (as in canoes, wearing-apparel, etc.) • . ,’
14. Cf, L4s6 (savage/barbarian distinction); L5s5~5 (two classes);
L8:6 (intellLtgnntsia of State and church),
15. Cf, Kant, Critique of Judgement, op, cit,, Introduction: ’, , ,
between the realm of the natural concept, as the sensible, and the realm
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of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, there is a great guLf 
fixed • . .' (p, 14)* Horever, ‘the play of the cognitive faculties 
whose harmonious accord contains the ground of [aesthetic] pleasure, 
mdes the concept Cof a finality of nature], in its consequences, a 
suitable mecdating link connecting the realm of the concept of nature 
with that of the concept of freedom, as this accord at the same time 
promotes the sensibility of the mLnd for monral feeliig* (p, 39)* For 
Kant too, then, the aesthetic is able to relate the 'reams' of nature 
and freedom.
16, In which sensuous inclination/Enid. rational morel duty are in 
harmony.
17, Cf. Hgl, Philosophy of Right (op. cit., para. 157): ' Civil 
society - an association of merntbrs as self-iubsistent individuals
. . .' 'Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal 
system - the means to security of person and property - and by an 
external organization [the State] for attaining their particular and 
common interests.' Both Hegl and Sclhller dree ideas concerning civil 
society from the Scottish political econoihst Adam Ferguson's An Essay 
on the . History of Civil Society (17^7), translated into German by C. 
Garve, 1768. See S, Avineri, Hgel' s Theory of the Modern State 
(Caimbidge Unlv. Press, 1972), p. 141, fn. 28, on Hegel's study of 
Ferguson's essay. R. Plant, Hejgl (op. cit.), talks of Sclhller reading 
Ferguson's Essay (p. 21), and hoe in Germany there was a '. . . growing 
aesareness, after about 1770, of the great works of the thinkers of the 
Scottish Enligheement on the development of com^:rcii^]L society, 
particularly the writings of Adam Ferguson and John MULar, [which] 
provided them with a diagnosis of the contemporary milsalse . • .' (p. 17) 
' Ferguson w^ interested primaily in tracing the history of mlncine from 
primitive sinplicity to coimlicated refinement, but at the same time, did 
not forget the effects which this cimbliiated refinement had on the 
character of the individual ♦ . .' (p. 21). There is an '. • . humnisSii 
critique of indvutrial society impleit in the work of Ferguson • • •'
(p. 2 2), who unfavourably contrasted Greek wholeness with the effects 
of the modem division of labour.
18, Wether or not Scthller read Sreth (The Wealth of Nations w^ 
published in 1776), Ferguson's views imUcitly contain the 'invisible 
han^^' idea, that the sum of individuals’ activities m^ataly promote 
the common well-being. In his Essay (ed. D, Forbes, Edinburgh Mv.
Press, 1966), we find Ferguson saying: '. . . the happiness of
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individuals is the great end of civil society . . *’ 'The interests 
of society, however, and of its membbee, are easily reconciled’ (p. 58)* 
'The object im comnerce is to mhe the individual rich; but the more he 
gains for him elf, the more he augments the wealth of his country'
(p. 144).
19* J.-J. Ronusseau, The SoaLal Contract (I762), trans* G, D. H. Cole 
(Deiib, 1973), pp. 184-186, 247-250. See my note 23 below.
20. As developed im L23.
21. See Kant, Critique of . Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 239 (B266), 'The 
Postulates of EImOrecal Thought in Gneral'. See also Hegl, The Science 
of Logic, trans. A. V. Miler (Rorge Allen & Un^i^n, 19&9), pp. 542-550. 
—. With is going om here, is that Sclhller is criOiciz:mlg the 
contemporary Natural State and its civil or coimmrccal society, as the 
latter is governed by blind doonom-c forces,, wlhlst the former exter^lly 
governs society by coercion and laws wOLct lack mo:!ra. status. The Moral 
State is basically Rousseau’ s political ideal (im The Social ConiralC), 
UtLct, via the ' general ill' , is governed by positive laws wtich conform 
to tte individual's moral will* But, tte French Revolution demenitrated 
the failure of the Moral State to be realizable prior to men becoming 
predisposed to moral willing. Hence the need for an Aesthetic 'State’
or society, of moraHy ennobled individuals to 'support’ tte Mral State. 
Tte primciolds of social life in. '^0 'State', wltLct Sclhller presents 
here, can be seem as those described by Ferguson, Rousseau, and Schiller, 
respectively, (with Sclhller attempting to render Rousseau’ s a 
realizable proposstion).
23. Cf. Ferguson, An Essay om the Hi-story of Civil Society, op. cit., 
p. 128: In civil society, 'tte public interest is often secure, not 
because imdividuals are disposed to regard it as the end of their 
conduct, but because eact, in tis place, is determined to preserve his 
own Liberty is mintained by the continued differences and oppositioms 
of numlbrs, not by their concurring zeal om bethf of equitable 
govdrnmeni:’ Suct a 'oonouering zeal' could be construed as Rdusseau' s
' general will', witch establishes am ' equitable' authority, eact 
individual is monel.ll obliged to obey. (See Rousseau, Tte Social 
Coniract. op# cit., p. 188.)
24. Although Rousseau wished to dtstinig^E^h the general will from tte 
will of iH, and to mke the former like a cslleoOive Kantian universal 
or rational willing, the way in witch this will is established, viz. by 
a mass vote, turns it into a quaLittative univeeralitl of ' Uimess’ .
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Thus, in The Social Contract, op, cit., R<ou3seau. tells us: ’There is 
often a great deal of difference between the rill of all and the generaL 
will; the Latter considers only the common interest, while the former 
takes private interest into account, and is no more than the sum of 
particular wills . . .’ (p. 185). But later, he admits ’. . . the 
general will is found by counting votes’ and that * * . . this
presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of the general will ... 
reside in the maority . . ,’ (p. 250).
25. See e.g., Kat, Critique of Judgement, op, cit., Part 1, section 6, 
pp. 50-51 (urnversality based on disinterestedness); sections 20-22, 
pp. 82-85 (wnveirsaity based on the common sense). Kant uses the 
expression ’subjectively universal’ to mean that (delight) which is 
inter-hub jectively universal (as distinct from a feeling which is 
purely subjective and private; or that which is logically, and thus 
objectively universal, by way of a concept).
26. Given that most of L27:10 is concerned with arguing for the
inter-subjective urriveirsality of aesthetic pleasure, it is surprising 
to find Savile (op. cit., p. 201), saying that whereas Kant empPhaszes 
the inter-subjectivity of aesthetic pleasure, SchLller considers only 
its intrra-subjecdve gapped Like Kand Schiller is interested in both.
27. Kait, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, seciinns 6-83, pp. 
50-57, also compares the relative univemjaLity of sensuous, rational, 
and aesthetic experience (in terms, explicitly, of the universal validity 
of judgements concerning the ’agreeable’ , the ’good* , and the
’beauttful’ , respectively).
28. Kant, Critqque of Practical Reason, op. cit., p, 129. ’Hence there 
is not the slihtest ground jm the moral lw for a necesaay connectoon 
between the mo:ornity and proportionate happiness of a being which 
belongs to the world as one of its parts and as thus dependent on it.’ 
’Nevertheless ... such a cowmectiim is postulated as necessary . . .’ 
(This leads Kant to postulate the existence of God, as ’. . .a cause 
of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature, which contains the 
ground of the exact coincidence of happiness and mora-Hty’,)
29. Cf. Schiller, On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, 
op, cit.), wtere he does take empprical considerations into account, 
which right limit men’s ability to tnive3i3a]Lly respond to the aesthetic. 
’The state of rind of most people is on the one hand intensive and 
exhausting labour, on the other, enervating indulgence. ’ ’. . . nothing 
is more disadvantageous for sensitivity to the truly beautiful them both
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these ailttoo—common frames of mLnd among men' (p, 221). A distinction 
between ' realist’ and 'idealist’ personality types (ibid, pp.224 ff.), 
can be seen as continuing, in a bOiLefitd wf, that between the ’savage’ 
and 'barbarian', respectively, in the Aesthetic Letters. In the former 
division, Sclhller recognizes a factor limiting the inter-subjective 
univeInJElLity- of taste: '. . . a very remarkable psychological antagonism 
among men ... [that! is nadlill and based on inner mental dispositions 
... deprives the artist of all hope of pleasing and affecting 
universally • • .' (p. 224).
30. The ability of aesthetic experience to create consensus and social 
harmony, and to provide an escape from reality, are also found in 
Schiller, On The Stage As A Moral Institution (1784), (in Bohn, op. cit.): 
'O?lLtiins about government and classes might be reformed by the stage.’
’. . . helping the nation to agree in opinions and inclinations.’ ’EThe 
staged ult-tts Hl classes . . .' (p. 338). 'Men of all ranks, rra^^^s, and 
conditions ... fraternize here in a universal sympathy, forget about 
the world • . .' (p. 339)•
31. Of. L21;4, L23:3.
32. Although it cannot determine the content of knowing or willing, the 
aesthetic can effect the psycho logical form in which they are carried out 
(or executed), by hanbbitzing reason and sense.
33. Co^t^^uing an analogy in L4:4, with its talk of the ’political 
artist’ and the 'm-aerial on which he worics’.
34. Regin (op. cit., p. 145), interprets these 'circles' in a narrow 
way, contrary to the egalitarian and debbiirlic ideals ScUller has just 
expressed, as ’• . . the courts of such etlightette rulers as Friedrich 
Clhistian and Karl Aiugust . . .'
35. Here, Scthller appears to be employing the formula WiniktLbatn used 
to characterize the finest Greek statues, especially the Laocoon group:
' noble simpHcity and tranquil grandeur. ’ See Winckemann, Thoughts on 
the Imitation of the Painting and 8culptune of the Greeks (1755), in 
Nisbet (ed. & trarn.), op. cit., p. 42. As Nisbet points out in his 
introduction (p. 4), the formuLa 'encobp£asts moorl and spiritual 
qulities’ besides aesthetic attributes. Clsasical figures for 
Winikemlann (and Greek society for Solhller), represented '. . . an 
ideal of humanly, of human iobbletttess . . .'
36. The general meanings of the 'dignity' and 'grace’, are
lscertaLnee from Schiller's essay On Grace and Dignity (1793), in Bohn, 
op. cit., pusim).
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37. Regin (op. oit., p. I40), makes the Aesthetic State into a 
political State. Finding little evidence for this im the text, te 
criticizes Sclhller for not providing a blue print for the State: 
without 'a viable constitution Ctte] Aesthetic State remained a 
beautiful but ■untufilled idea . . .' (p. 144). Willoughby Csp. cit.), 
also sees the Aesthetic State as a political State, and admiting OtaO 
there is mot much support for this in the Aesthetic Letters, resorts 
(pp. I72-I73) to Sclhller's p(.ii Wilhem Tell (1804) for evidence:
'. , .it represents the corporate realization of an Aesthetic State 
. . .' (p. 172). Hufer, his discussion of Ote play centres on tte 
wholeness and balance in the character of Tell timeH, and says little 
about tis society or State. Reiss (op. cit.), Oakes the view Otat It 
is mot helpful to argue thaO Sclhller when speaking of the Aes-tHebac 
State does not dn•eistge a political organization. in all its BeteaLls, 
but something much less specific, suct as an ideal commuity of men 
. . .’ (p. 39). *. . . tte Aesthetic State is an ideal ... of a 
peculiar kind . ... which mu»t not be oomceiveB in intellectual terms,' 
'Tte Aesthetic State defies clear definitions, but can be intimated by 
poetic means' (pp. 39-40). Again, it is unconiVncimgLl argued that 
'Wilhelm, Tell . • • supplies the m.ssimg conclusion and exeme0ifica0ion 
of the Aestohetoic Letters . . .’(p. 40). The aim of establishing a Moral 
State is denied by Reiss. Appoardily, in 04, Scthller 'dismissed titl 
as a false aim of political enBevour' (p. 4I). The oveinll obsc■^ueiOl and 
oomlusion Reiss creates is finally bl!med onto Sclhller, wto ’. . . 
leaves us as far as tte State is concerned wi0t a poetic lmeblgU.ty 
. . .' (p. 42).
38. Kain (op. cit.), interprets the Aesthetic State as a political 
State beyomd the Moral State, and asks 'what will move us on fm^m the 
Rational Oo the Aesthetic State?' (p. 29).
39. Kaim (op. cit., pp. 30-31), asserts 0ha0 the Aesthetic State is 
a 'synthesis' of the Naiouzr^l and Mrs! States.
40. Schaper, 'Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Schiller' 
(op. cit., p. 166), tells us that tte Natural and Moral States '. . . 
are presented as having to be kept in balance, interacting and holding 
each otter in check. If this can be achieved ... a third State will 
emerge . . .' 'This is a pearUe! requirement of equilbbiimn' 0o that 
which ' doimimtes the middle Letters'' (p. 166), Thus for Sctaper,
Sclhller has an ideal political model involving 0he equLlibrum of the 
Natural and Moora. States in tte Aesdoheioic State, Otat corresponds to
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his ideal psychological model of an equHibrlim of primary drives in 
the play-drive. Urn’orttmaely, Schaper neither explains how the Natural 
State, based on blind forces, could co-exist and interact with the Moral 
State, governed by rational laws and moral principles, nor how the 
Aesthetic State could fit into this. Perhaps Schaper’ s view could work 
if the Aesthetic State is seen as a society of smai groups wlhLch, in 
their specifically moraa. ethos, meddate between the selfish
individualism fostered at the economc level of civil society, and the 
urn-versal orientation demanded by the laws of the Moral State (thus 
functioning to fulfil the mecdating and ethically educative role of 
corporations, between civil society and the ethical State, in Hegel’ s 
Philosophy of High). Howver, to mike Schaper’ s view plausible in this 
w^y, involves incorrectly identifying civil society (economic life), 
with the Natural State (its externally related political organization; 
cf, i5s4, Ir6s9), as being one and the same. It also involves the 
retrospective im|^olPtiom. of an Hegslian politico-ethical model onto 
Scthller, Most critically, we m^'t remember that the Natural State is 
not to be mecd-ated or held in ’ eqtilibrhm’, but ’ abolished* in 
Scihller’s scheme, as a prelude to establishing the Moora State (of. 
13:4). Civil society itself, is to be retained, as necessary to maPs 
physical existence (cf. i3:3 & 4), though it will be tramsoomed by the 
indirect effect of the aesthetic on knowing nme willing, as man 
determines him elf from a wholistic and iarmom.ous basis.
41. Willoughby (op. cit., p. I7I), mstakenly criticizes Sclhller for 
confusing the political Aesthetic State and the psychological aesthetic 
state. But, in the course of this criticSsm, Willoughby rightly 
recognizes the impossibility of a State based on the latter writ - large, 
as ’■unthinkable’ in its indeterminacy.
42. Of 120:3 (p. 141), 121:2 & 5,
43. Of. 121:4, 123:3.
44. M. C. Beardsley (op. cit., p. 229), sees ’. . . a deep ambivalence 
in Sclhller1 s aesthetic theory, wh-ch he never resolved : whether the 
aesthetic d^ed-tion ... is meraly transitional or truly final’. Kerry 
(Scihller’s Writings on Aestheeios, op. cit., pp. 113, 120), thinks that 
ScMller makes the aesthetic eventually become ’ an end in itself1 • Kain 
(op. cit., p. 32), believes Sclhller uses two inconsistent moddls of 
development : a) Natural-Aestlietto-Rational States (e.g., 13);
b) Natural•-Rl.nionmaLl-Aeathetic States (e.g., 127). Grossman (op. cit., 
p. 47)» asserts that thera is a ’. « • contracdLction in Scthller's idea
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of evolution’ , and sees a change from an earlier mrid! of physio!- 
ltstettCCftoral stages of development, to a later one involving 
physical-morinaaesthetic stages (in 127).
CONCOLSION
1. Particularly in L5 & 6,
2. See 125:1 fn.
5. See L21:5 fn
4. See 120:4 fn. : 'Everything wh-ch is capable of phenomem!.
m3ttfestation . . .' may be contemplated and judged aesthetically.
5. See 122:1,
6. See 127:7.
7. See 121:5, for both the preparative and restorative roles of the 
aesthetic. -
8. Schaper, 'Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Sethller' 
(op. cit., p. 156), recognizes that '. . . the letters ... may support 
. • • a wider conception of the aesthetic than that which emerges from 
the maLnstregm of the tradition’. '. . . Sclhller took it for granted 
that the role of the aesthetic has the utmost importance in our lives
. . .’ Schller may be arguing the aesthetic is that '. . . through 
which ordinary living can be enhanced . . •' Wilkinson & Willoughby,
'The Whole Man in Sdn-Uer's Theory of CuLture and Society', (op. cit., 
p. 197), also notice Sc^hHtr’ s wide and litecnrh■ancitg notion of the 
aesthetic: '. . . the aesthetic ... baatfests itself, not [bee?ee_y3 in 
the conscious iittetglalion of art or beauty, but subliminally or 
uncomciously, as a mode of ment! activity indispensable to the 
efficient functioning of each and all our detenminate activities . . .’
9. H. Mrruse, The Aesthetic Dimension (MacUlm, 1979),
10. W. Benjamin, ’The Author as Producer’ , (in Undetr3tlnditg Brecht, 
trans. Bostook, New Left Bodks, 1975).
11. The logic of efficiency governing the general productive process, 
would render aesthetic semblance ' dependent’ , as serving an extraneous 
end.
12. Schiller _h^ a lifeoong interest in social and political reform, 
which is traced by W. Witte (op. cit.), who provides concise accounts 
of the political dimension in each of Schiller's plays.
15. The subimne here, is used to refer to those aesthetic experiences 
which induce both aesthetic pleasure and intellectual pain, accompanLed
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by an intensified selfawaedmess. In the aesthetically sensitive anB 
socially aware individual, most aesthetic experiences (of sufficient 
quaLiOy and diu»tion), miy have such a sublime effect.
14. Aesthetic experience will not itself directly disclose the specific 
causes of our dissatisfaction with existence, only induce an imm'date 
post-aesthetic 'unhappy consciousness' , that may ioOivatd us 0o osmaencd 
the search for suct causes.
15. Many of the socio-eoonomio policies tta0 have been pursued by 
western governmenis, have had their ultimate ideological justification 
im tte dcsnom-c theories of J. M. Keynes or Mlton Frie<man.
16. W^ Witte Csp. cit., pp.288-297), thinks it would be going too far 
to describe Sclhller as a revolutionary in method or aim. Hcoweer, I 
would suggest, that whtlst Sclhller my have rejected revolutionary 
direct action as a method (foio<wing his disiltusSimlen0 with the course 
of tte French Revolution), he nevertheless hoped that tte ps^^2?e^■l^Zl 
indirect effecO of the aesthetic would achieve reform of a ftndaiidial 
and wide ranging nature. One could say thaO Sclhller saw the aesthetic 
as providing a mode of revolutionary indirdo0 action, 0o achieve a 
revolutionary aim 5 tte abolition of the comtdOTporarl (NaturaL) State. 
Wilkins op & Willoughby, 'The Whole Man in Scthller's Theory of CuLture and 
Society' , (op. cit., pp. 196-197)» recognize Otat in the Aesthetic Letters, 
'. . , the devolutOolairl of his youth was by mo means dead within him' , 
and ttat ’. . .lie saw art as profoundly subverraive of established
order . . .'
17' We cam distinguish SclhLllde's theory of aesthetic experience in 
itself (wltLct is lalrgell Kantian in character), from his own wide view 
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